Opinion

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

11 ANUJ MAHENDRA PATEL, Case No.: 1:26-cv-04617-CDB (HC)

12 Petitioner, ORDER DIRECTING PETITIONER TO

SHOW CAUSE WHY PETITION SHOULD

13 v. NOT BE DISMISSED FOR FAILURE TO

EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

14 WARDEN OF FCI MENDOTA CAMP,

(Doc. 1)

15 Respondent.

21-Day Deadline

16

17

18 Petitioner Anuj Mahendra Patel is proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in this action

19 seeking habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, filed on June 15, 2026. (Doc. 1). In his

20 petition, Petitioner challenges the results of a disciplinary proceeding by the U.S. Bureau of Prisons

21 (“BOP”) that resulted in his loss of good conduct time and commissary privileges and requests in

22 relief, among other things, restoration of the good conduct time. Id. at 1. He alleges that his

23 placement in a halfway house is scheduled for September 2026, and, thus, his petition “requires

24 expedited review.” He asserts that exhaustion of administrative remedies should be excused

25 because exhaustion “would likely render any relief ineffective because the disciplinary sanctions

26 directly affect prerelease placement, custody calculation, and release-related determinations.”

27 Petitioner asserts that he is “actively pursuing administrative remedies” but that “due to the limited

time before prerelease placement,” were the Court to require he complete the process of exhaustion,

1 it would render relief “ineffective” (presumably because his scheduled halfway house placement

2 would occur prior to full exhaustion or otherwise would undermine the Court’s ability to render

3 timely relief).

4 Governing Authority

5 “As a general rule, [28 U.S.C.] § 2255 provides the exclusive procedural mechanism by

6 which a federal prisoner may test the legality of detention.” Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 952, 955

7 (9th Cir. 2008) (quotations and citations omitted). Thus, a federal prisoner who wishes to challenge

8 the validity or constitutionality of his federal conviction or sentence must do so by moving the court

9 that imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside, or correct the sentence under § 2255. Alaimalo v.

10 United States, 645 F.3d 1042, 1046 (9th Cir. 2011).

11 In contrast to challenges to the legality of a conviction and sentence, a petition by a federal

12 prisoner challenging the manner, location, or conditions of a sentence’s execution is brought under

13 28 U.S.C. § 2241 in the district of confinement. See Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861, 864

14 (9th Cir. 2000). The BOP’s calculation of sentencing credit is an issue pertaining to the execution

15 of a sentence which a habeas petitioner may challenge through such a petition. See Zavala v. Ives,

16 785 F.3d 367, 370 n.3 (9th Cir. 2015). A district court must dismiss a habeas petition if it “plainly

17 appears” that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. Valdez v. Montgomery, 918 F.3d 687, 693 (9th

18 Cir. 2019) (quoting Rule 4).

19 Before filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus, a federal prisoner challenging any

20 circumstance of imprisonment must first exhaust all administrative remedies. Martinez v. Roberts,

21 804 F.2d 570, 571 (9th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). The requirement that federal prisoners exhaust

22 administrative remedies before filing a habeas corpus petition was judicially created; it is not a

23 statutory requirement. Brown v. Rison, 895 F.2d 533, 535 (9th Cir. 1990). Thus, “because

24 exhaustion is not required by statute, it is not jurisdictional.” Id. If Petitioner has not properly

25 exhausted his claims, the district court, in its discretion, may either “excuse the faulty exhaustions

26 and reach the merits or require the petitioner to exhaust his administrative remedies before

27 proceeding in court.” Id.

1 C.F.R. § 542.13. When informal resolution procedures are inadequate, the BOP makes available

2 to inmates a formal three-level administrative remedy process: (1) a Request for Administrative

3 Remedy (“BP-9”) filed at the institution where the inmate is incarcerated; (2) a Regional

4 Administrative Remedy Appeal (“BP-10”) filed at the Regional Office for the geographic region

5 in which the inmate's institution is located; and (3) a Central Office Administrative Remedy Appeal

6 (“BP-11”) filed with the Office of General Counsel. 28 C.F.R. § 542.10 et. seq.

7 Discussion

8 In support of his request that the Court excuse his failure to exhaust administrative remedies

9 prior to commencing this action, Petitioner appears to assert that his placement in a halfway house

10 is scheduled for September 28, 2026, if his good time credits are restored, and thus the petition

11 requires expedited review. Id. at 1, 3-4. In support, Petitioner cites to Brown, 895 F.2d at 533,

12 without elaboration. Id. at 3.

13 In Brown, the Ninth Circuit found that the petitioner was entitled to credit against his

14 sentence for time spent in a “community treatment center”/halfway house, as the enforced residence

15 therein involved conditions “approaching those of incarceration.” Brown, 895 F.2d at 536.

16 Because the government did not raise the issue, the Ninth Circuit did not review the district court’s

17 waiver of exhaustion of administrative remedies. See id. The district court did not waive

18 exhaustion due to the length of any remaining sentence requiring expedited review but, rather,

19 because the court found that an existing BOP policy rendered exhaustion futile and because the

20 petitioner presented a constitutional challenge against an administrative policy, finding that “[t]hese

21 questions are particularly ill-suited for administrative resolution.” Brown v. Rison, 673 F. Supp.

22 1505, 1507 (C.D. Cal. 1987).

23 The district court also noted that the “matter does not turn on factual disputes” and so the

24 court “would not be aided by the development of any factual record in the administrative forum,”

25 and BOP policy evidenced that it was “most unlikely this court’s time could be conserved due to

26 the possibility of relief being granted on the administrative law.” Lastly, the court found that, as

27 the issue presented was one of constitutional law, “it does not involve any errors occurring during

1 Id.

2 Petitioner’s petition does not set forth any analogous facts. Petitioner does not assert that

3 there exists some BOP policy that would render the administrative remedies futile, nor that the

4 petition involves a constitutional issue that would not benefit from factual development, nor that

5 the administrative error alleged (refusal to consider alleged exculpatory evidence during a

6 disciplinary hearing) could not be corrected by the administrative agency in the course of the

7 administrative proceedings (namely, at BP-10 and BP-11). Thus, the facts as alleged in the petition

8 are not comparable to Brown and Petitioner has not set forth grounds for waiving administrative

9 remedies. The Court specifically rejects the notion that “the limited time remaining” before

10 Petitioner expects to transition to a halfway house warrants excusal. See Thompson v. Hendrix,

11 No. 3:22-cv-00560-SI, 2022 WL 4549825, at *2–3 (D. Or. Sept. 29, 2022) (finding that “neither

12 the relative brevity of his remaining sentence nor his desire for a faster path to federal court justifies

13 excusing the exhaustion requirement applicable to this case”); Galvan v. Duron, No. CV 25-5668

14 CV (PVC), 2026 WL 817196, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2026) (“But as noted, Petitioner’s First

15 Step Act time credits could be applied to reduce his supervised release term. Therefore, exhausting

16 Petitioner’s administrative remedies was not futile because of his release from physical custody for

17 the same reasons his release did not render his First Step Act claim moot. Therefore, he was not

18 excused from exhaustion for that reason.”) (citation omitted).

19 Petitioner does not argue that administrative remedies are unavailable in connection with

20 the disciplinary hearing he challenges by his petition. To the contrary, he alleges he is “actively

21 pursuing administrative remedies” by submitting a BP-10 form on June 9, 2026, which is currently

22 under consideration. (Doc. 1 at 1). However, Petitioner notes that custodial staff declined to

23 provide him with a copy of the hearing report, which he alleges prevented “meaningful review of

24 the disciplinary decision and impaired [P]etitioner’s ability to fully exhaust his administrative

25 remedies.” Id. at 2.

26 Petitioner does not elaborate why denial of access to the hearing report deprived him of the

27 ability to exhaust administrative remedies. For instance, Petitioner does not assert that he was

1 | petition fail to show why he could not exhaust administrative remedies. See Ferreira v. Derr, No.

2 | CV 22-00539 SOM-WRP, 2023 WL 2898670, at *3 (D. Haw. Apr. 11, 2023) (“In Ferriera’s Reply,

3 | she argues for the first time that she should be relieved of the exhaustion requirement because she

4 | ‘was told that [she] cannot use the administrative remedies and was denied forms to appeal BOP’s

5 | denial to apply my FSA ETC and Elderly Offender credits.’ ... Without more of an explanation as

6 | to the circumstances surrounding the purported denial of any administrative request and why she

7 | could not appeal that denial, Ferreira fails to show why the court should waive the administrative

8 | exhaustion requirement.”).

9 Thus, as it appears from the petition that Petitioner did not exhaust his administrative

10 || remedies, and because the petition does demonstrate sufficient basis for waiver of exhaustion,

11 | Petitioner will be ordered to show cause why the Court should not dismiss the petition for failure

12 | to exhaust administrative remedies.

13 Conclusion and Order

14 Accordingly, Petitioner is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE, within 21 days of service of

15 | this order, why the Court should not dismiss the petition without prejudice for failure to exhaust

16 | administrative remedies. Petitioner shall set forth in his response any grounds he asserts establish

17 | futility, his inability to exhaust said remedies, or would result in irreparable harm.

18 Any failure by Petitioner to respond to the Court’s order will result in a

19 | recommendation that this action be dismissed without prejudice for failure to prosecute and

20 | failure to comply with court orders.

21 | ITIS SOORDERED.

| Dated: _ Sune 18, 2026 | Wr bY

23 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

24

25

26

27

28