The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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JESUS GONZALEZ (A-095-739-118), No. 1:26-cv-2804 DC CSK
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Petitioner,
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v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
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WARDEN, CALIFORNIA CITY
14 DETENTION FACILITY, et al.,
15 Respondents.
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17 Petitioner Jesus Gonzalez (A-095-739-118), a native and citizen of Mexico who entered
18 the United States without inspection in 1992, filed a verified pro se petition for writ of habeas
19 corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.1 On February 24, 2026, petitioner was taken into custody
20 and detained by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) Enforcement and Removal
21 Operations (“ERO”) officers. This habeas action concerns petitioner’s re-detention. For the
22 reasons that follow, the Court recommends the petition for a writ of habeas corpus be granted and
23 ordering petitioner’s immediate release.
24 ///
25 ///
26 ///
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1 This matter proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, Fed. R. Civ. P. 72,
28 and Local Rule 302(c)(17).
1 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND2
2 Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States without inspection
3 and has lived in the United States since 1992. (See ECF No. 1 at 2; ECF No. 7-1 at 2 (Form I-
4 213).) Petitioner was seven years old when he came to the United States with his father.3 (Id. at
5 3.) Petitioner, now 40, is married and his wife and three children are all American citizens. (Id.
6 at 2, 3.)
7 In August 2007, petitioner was convicted of a firearm charge. (See ECF No. 7-1 at 3;
8 ECF No. 7-2 at 2.) Petitioner was issued a Notice to Appear on August 29, 2007. (Id.) Petitioner
9 was detained and released by immigration officials in 2007.4 (See ECF No. 13 at 3; see also ECF
10 No. 7 at 3.)
11 On April 19, 2013, petitioner filed an application to register permanent residence or adjust
12 status (Form I-485), which was administratively closed on July 9, 2024. (ECF No. 7-1 at 3.) On
13 September 17, 2013, an immigration judge granted petitioner voluntary departure, which
14 petitioner appealed. (Id.) The Board of Immigration Appeals administratively closed the case on
15 May 7, 2015. (Id.) On September 19, 2022, petitioner filed for application for employment
16 authorization, which was rejected on September 21, 2022. (Id.) On April 6, 2023, petitioner filed
17 another application for employment authorization, which was approved on October 3, 2024, and
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19 2 Petitioner filed a verified habeas petition. (ECF No. 1 at 21.) A court “may treat the
allegations of a verified . . . petition [for writ of habeas corpus] as an affidavit.” L. v. Lamarque,
20 351 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing McElyea v. Babbitt, 833 F.2d 196, 197-98 (9th Cir.
1987)). Respondents appear to contest petitioner’s factual allegations. (See ECF Nos. 7, 7-1, 7-
21 2.)
3 The petition states that petitioner’s father is a United States citizen. (ECF No. 1 at 3.)
22
Respondents have submitted records that indicate petitioner’s father is a Mexican citizen. (ECF
23 No. 7-1 at 1.) The Court need not resolve this factual dispute.
4 Respondents submitted a rap sheet for petitioner with law enforcement encounters beginning in
24 2000, which include assault and battery, weapons, gang-related, DUIs, and drug-related offenses,
through his most recent arrest in February 2026 for controlled substances charges. (See ECF No.
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7-2) An unsigned filing was submitted to the court that includes handwritten notations on an
excerpt of what appears to be an immigration court filing and handwritten notations on
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petitioner’s rap sheet that appear to explain or dispute some of the entries. (See ECF No. 10.)
27 Because respondents do not assert that petitioner is detained on the basis of § 1226(c) for criminal
conduct, the Court cannot consider unsigned filings, and petitioner’s counsel does not explain or
28 refer to this filing (see ECF No. 13), the Court declines to consider this filing.
1 valid through October 2, 2029. (Id. at 2-3)
2 On February 19, 2026, petitioner was arrested by the Siskiyou Sheriff’s Office for
3 transporting a controlled substance, possessing a controlled substance for sale, and possessing
4 unlawful paraphernalia.5 (ECF No. 7-1 at 2 (Form I-213); ECF No. 7-2 at 9.) On February 20,
5 2026, ERO became aware of petitioner’s arrest, and petitioner was taken into ICE custody on
6 February 26, 2026. (Id.) Petitioner contends that he would have been released on bond in the
7 criminal case had detention and deportation officers not taken petitioner into immigration
8 custody. (See ECF No. 13 at 3-4 (citing ECF No. 7-1 at 2).) Petitioner has been continuously
9 detained since February 26, 2026. (ECF No. 1 at 2.)
10 II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
11 On April 13, 2026, petitioner filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus and motion for
12 appointment of counsel. (ECF Nos. 1, 3.) On April 27, 2026, respondents filed a timely
13 opposition. (ECF No. 7.) On May 21, 2026, this Court appointed counsel for petitioner. (ECF
14 No. 12.) On May 27, 2026, petitioner, through counsel, filed a supplemental reply.6 (ECF No.
15 13.) Briefing is now complete.
16 III. LEGAL STANDARD
17 The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every individual
18 detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const.,
19 Art I, § 9, cl. 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality
20 of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.”
21 5 In their opposition to the petition, respondents do not mention petitioner’s prior criminal
history. (ECF No. 7, passim.) On August 8, 2007, petitioner was convicted of violating
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California Penal Code § 12031(A)(2)(C) “GANG MEMBER:CLF/ARM:PUB/ETC,” and
23 sentenced to 60 days in jail and probation. (ECF Nos. 7-1 at 3 (Form I-213), 7-2 at 6 (RAP
Sheet.) The 2007 conviction was dismissed under California Penal Code § 1203.4 based on
24 petitioner’s successful completion of probation. (ECF No. 7-1 at 3.) On June 12, 2015, petitioner
was convicted of DUI and sentenced to three years’ probation; on October 13, 2015, the sentence
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was vacated. (Id.)
6 On April 27, 2026, petitioner, proceeding pro se, filed a copy of DHS’ request to the BIA to re-
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calendar petitioner’s removal proceedings and his rap sheet with handwritten comments re status.
27 (ECF No. 10.) However, the document was not signed by petitioner. Because petitioner was
subsequently appointed counsel and allowed to file a supplemental reply, the Court disregards the
28 April 27, 2027 filing. (Id.)
1 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas corpus may be granted to a
2 petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law.
3 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing
4 the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.”
5 I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). A district court’s habeas jurisdiction includes challenges
6 to immigration detention. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001).
7 IV. DISCUSSION
8 Generally, noncitizens are subject to civil immigration detention only if the noncitizen
9 presents a risk of flight or danger to the community. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (holding that
10 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) does not authorize indefinite detention). At the time petitioner filed his
11 petition, he was proceeding pro se and pro se pleadings are liberally construed. Thus, the Court
12 construes the petition challenging his re-detention as seeking release to raise a statutory claim
13 under the Immigration and Naturalization Act (“INA” and a due process claim under the Fifth
14 Amendment.7 (See ECF No. 1.) In the response to the petition, respondents appear to have
15 construed the petition to raise the following claims: (1) a statutory claim under the INA; and (2) a
16 Fifth Amendment due process claim. (See ECF No. 7.) Therefore, there is no prejudice to
17 respondent in the Court’s construction. Respondents do not argue that petitioner is a flight risk or
18 a danger to the community and instead argue that as an “applicant for admission,” petitioner’s
19 detention is mandatory under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) and he is ineligible for a bond hearing. (ECF
20 No. 7 at 1-2.) Respondents also argue that petitioner does not possess a right to freedom from
21 immigration detention in any form other than the form provided by Congress. (Id. at 2.)
22 In reply, petitioner, through counsel, argues that petitioner is subject to detention under
23 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), and was entitled to a pre-detention hearing, which he did not receive, and
24 therefore should be immediately released. (ECF No. 13 at 3.)
25 Importantly, respondents do not argue that petitioner is subject to detention under 8 U.S.C.
26 § 1226(c) or § 1231.
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7 The form petition also addresses prolonged detention and challenges third country removal
28 procedures, neither of which are at issue herein. (See ECF No. 1, passim.)
1 A. Statutory Claim
2 This Court must first decide whether petitioner, who has lived in the United States since
3 1992, is subject to discretionary release as first ordered by immigration officials under § 1226(a)
4 in 2007 as petitioner contends, or whether petitioner is now subject to mandatory detention under
5 § 1225(b)(2)(A), as respondents argue. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) mandates detention during removal
6 proceedings for applicants “seeking admission” and does not provide for a bond hearing.
7 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) “provides the general process for arresting and detaining [noncitizens] who
8 are present in the United States and eligible for removal.” Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th
9 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2022). Under § 1226(a), the government makes an initial custody
10 determination, and the noncitizen will be released upon a showing “to the satisfaction of the
11 officer that such release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the [noncitizen]
12 is likely to appear for any future proceeding.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1196 (citing 8 C.F.R.
13 § 236.1(c)(8)). Section 1226(a) provides “an initial bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker,
14 the opportunity to be represented by counsel and to present evidence, the right to appeal, and the
15 right to seek a new hearing when circumstances materially change.” Id. at 1202. Therefore, “[i]f
16 the noncitizen is detained under section 1226(a), she is entitled to a bond hearing.” Labrador-
17 Prato v. Noem, 2025 WL 3458802, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2025) (citing Jennings v. Rodriguez,
18 583 U.S. 281, 306 (2018)). Respondents contend § 1225(b)(2) applies because petitioner is an
19 “applicant for admission” and therefore subject to mandatory detention. (ECF No. 7 at 1-2.)
20 The Court concludes that § 1226(a) applies to petitioner. First, the parties do not appear
21 to dispute that petitioner was previously released by immigration authorities. (See ECF No. 7 at 3
22 (referring to the “agency’s previous determination to grant release” and the termination of
23 petitioner’s release); ECF No. 13 at 3 (petitioner “was previously detained and released by
24 immigration officials”).)
25 Second, this Court agrees with and joins the majority of courts nationwide, including the
26 Eastern District of California, in rejecting respondent’s new interpretation8 of Sections 1225 and
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8 Until DHS changed its policy in July 2025, the Government consistently applied Section
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1 1226. See, e.g., Barbosa da Cunha v. Freden, No. 25-3141, 2026 WL 1146044 (2d Cir. Apr. 28,
2 2026) (“Today, although we part ways with two other circuits that have addressed this question,
3 we join the overwhelming majority of federal judges across the Nation to consider it and conclude
4 that the government’s novel interpretation of the immigration statutes defies their plain text.”);
5 Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, et al., 2026 WL 1283891, at *1 (6th Cir. May 11, 2026) 9; Hernandez
6 Alvarez v. Warden, Fed. Det. Ctr. Miami, No. 25-14065, 2026 WL 1243395 (11th Cir. May 6,
7 2026); Castañon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, 1060-62 (7th Cir. 2025);
8 Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock, 2025 WL 2782499, at *1, 21-22 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2025)
9 (concluding, after a thorough analysis, that “the government’s [interpretation of § 1225] belies the
10 statutory text of the [Immigration and Nationality Act], canons of statutory interpretation,
11 legislative history, and longstanding agency practice”); J.Y.L.C. v. Bostock, 2025 WL 3169865,
12 at *2 (D. Or. Nov. 12, 2025) (collecting cases rejecting the government’s assertion that § 1225
13 empowers DHS to arrest and hold a noncitizen present without legal status who has spent years in
14 the U.S.); Cardona-Lozano v Noem, 2025 WL 3218244, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 2025)
15 (“Repeatedly, [district courts across the country] have found that DHS and the [Board of
16 Immigration Appeals’] construction of the [Immigration and Nationality Act] is incorrect and
17 that petitioners who have long resided in the United States but are being held under § 1225 are
18 entitled to relief.”) (collecting cases)); Faizyan v. Casey, 2025 WL 3208844, at *5 (S.D. Cal.
19 Nov. 17, 2025) (holding that § 1226 applies to a petitioner who “DHS has consistently treated” as
20 subject to discretionary detention and “who has been residing in the United States for two years”
21 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Josue I.C.A. v. Lyons, 2025 WL 3496432, at 3
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1226(a), not Section 1225(b)(2), to noncitizens residing in the United States who were detained
23 by immigration authorities and subject to removal. See Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1196.
9 The full case citation also includes the following: Juan Manuel Lopez-Campos (25-1965); Juan
24 Carlos Sanchez Alvarez (25-1969); Jose Daniel Contreras-Cervantes; Fredy De Los Angeles-
Flores; Mariela Virginia Ocando-Leon; Luis Felipe Jarquin-Jarquin; Debbie Vasquezcruz; Jairo
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Manuel Godoy-Perez; Marifer Diaz-Alcantar; Miguel Angel Reyes-Sanchez (25-1978); Jesus
Jose Pizarro Reyes (25-1982) v. Kevin Raycraft, Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, Acting Dir. of Detroit
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Field Off., Enf’t & Removal Operations (25-1965/1969/1978/1982); Markwayne Mullin, Sec’y of
27 U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security; U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (25-1965/1969); Todd W.
Blanche, Acting U.S. Att’y General; Exec. Off. of Immigr. Rev. (25-1965), 2026 WL 1283891, at
28 *1 (6th Cir. May 11, 2026).
1 n.6 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2025) (collecting cases); Morales-Flores v. Lyons, 2025 WL 3552841, at
2 *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2025) (collecting cases) (“Courts nationwide, including this one, have
3 overwhelmingly rejected respondents’ arguments and found DHS’s new policy unlawful.”).
4 “These courts examined the text, structure, agency application, and legislative history of
5 1225(b)(2) and concluded that it applies only to noncitizens ‘seeking admission,’ a category that
6 does not include noncitizens like [petitioner], living in the interior of the country.” Salcedo
7 Aceros v. Kaiser, 2025 WL 2637503, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025) (collecting cases). By
8 contrast, “[t]he government’s proposed reading of the statute (1) disregards the plain meaning of
9 section 1225(b)(2)(A); (2) disregards the relationship between sections 1225 and 1226; (3) would
10 render a recent amendment to section 1226(c) superfluous; and (4) is inconsistent with decades of
11 prior statutory interpretation and practice.” Guerro Lepe v. Andrews, 2025 WL 2716910, at *4
12 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025) (collecting cases). This Court incorporates and adopts the thorough
13 and persuasive reasoning of the district court in Lepe, 2025 WL 2716910, at *3-9.
14 Following the majority of courts, this Court also rejects the government’s new
15 interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and their contention that petitioner is an “applicant for
16 admission” subject to § 1225(b)(2). This Court finds that petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C.
17 § 1226(a) and its implementing regulations because petitioner entered the United States in 1992,
18 petitioner was previously released by immigration authorities, and his February 26, 2026 arrest
19 and re-detention were not upon his arrival to the United States. “Federal regulations provide that
20 [noncitizens] detained under § 1226(a) receive bond hearings at the outset of detention.”
21 Jennings, 583 U.S. at 306 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(d)(1)). If, at this hearing, the detainee
22 demonstrates that he or she is not “a threat to national security, a danger to the community at
23 large, likely to abscond, or otherwise a poor bail risk,” the immigration judge will order his or her
24 release. Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F. 4th at 1197 (citing Matter of Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec.
25 37, 40 (B.I.A. 2006)). As such, petitioner should have been provided a bond hearing before his
26 re-detention and is entitled to relief on his statutory claim.
27 B. Due Process Claim
28 Petitioner also argues he has a fundamental liberty interest in freedom from imprisonment
1 pursuant to the Fifth Amendment, and has a liberty interest in not being incarcerated after prior
2 release without pre-custodial hearing or notice. (ECF No. 13 at 3.) Respondents argue
3 petitioner’s due process claim fails because petitioner does not possess a right to freedom from
4 immigration detention in any form other than the form provided by Congress. (ECF No. 7 at 2.)
5 Respondents’ arguments do not demonstrate the government has satisfied the requirements of the
6 Due Process Clause, “which of course constitute[s] the supreme law of the land[.]” Tot v. United
7 States, 319 U.S. 463, 472 (1943) (Black, J., concurring).
8 The Due Process Clause protects persons in the United States from being deprived of life,
9 liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. “It is clear that
10 commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due
11 process protection.” Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992). “[T]he Due Process Clause
12 applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is
13 lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693. “The Due Process
14 clause applies to noncitizens in this country in connection with removal proceedings, even if their
15 presence is unlawful or temporary.” Tinoco v. Noem, 2025 WL 3567862, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec.
16 14, 2025) (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690).
17 The Court analyzes petitioner’s due process claim “in two steps: the first asks whether
18 there exists a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second examines
19 the procedures necessary to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with
20 the Constitution.” Garcia v. Andrews, 2025 WL 1927596, at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 14, 2025) (citing
21 Kentucky Dep’t of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)). The Supreme Court has
22 found that a protected liberty interest may arise from a conditional release from physical restraint.
23 Young v. Harper, 520 U.S. 143, 147-49 (1997). Even when a statute allows the government to
24 arrest and detain an individual, a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause may
25 entitle the individual to procedural protections not found in the statute. See id. (finding due
26 process requires pre-deprivation hearing before revocation of preparole); Gagnon v. Scarpelli,
27 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (same, in probation context); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482
28 (1972) (same, in parole context). To determine whether a specific conditional release rises to the
1 level of a protected liberty interest, “[c]ourts have resolved the issue by comparing the specific
2 conditional release in the case before them with the liberty interest in parole as characterized by
3 Morrissey.” Gonzalez-Fuentes v. Molina, 607 F.3d 864, 887 (1st Cir. 2010) (internal quotation
4 marks and citation omitted).
5 In Morrissey, the Supreme Court explained that parole “enables [the parolee] to do a wide
6 range of things open to persons” who have never been in custody or convicted of any crime,
7 including to live at home, work, and “be with family and friends and to form the other enduring
8 attachments of normal life.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. “Though the [government] properly
9 subjects [the parolee] to many restrictions not applicable to other citizens,” such as monitoring,
10 his “condition is very different from that of confinement in a prison.” Id. “The parolee has relied
11 on at least an implicit promise that parole will be revoked only if he fails to live up to the parole
12 conditions.” Id. The revocation of parole undoubtedly “inflicts a grievous loss on the parolee.”
13 Id. (quotations omitted). Therefore, a parolee possesses a protected interest in his “continued
14 liberty.” Id. at 481-84.
15 Here, petitioner’s initial detention and subsequent release in or about August 2007 are
16 similar because it allowed petitioner to live in the United States, subject to immigration
17 supervision, but free of immigration custody for over 18 years. Such time allowed petitioner to
18 form “enduring attachments of normal life.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. Plaintiff obtained work
19 authorization and worked. (ECF No. 13 at 1.) Petitioner has three U.S. citizen children ages 12,
20 14, and 24 years old, and is also married to a U.S. citizen. (ECF No. 13 at 1.) This Court finds
21 that petitioner’s original release and time out of custody gave rise to a constitutionally protected
22 liberty interest.
23 Petitioner’s release was presumably premised upon a finding that, at the time of
24 petitioner’s release, he was not dangerous or a flight risk. See 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8) (“Any
25 officer authorized to issue a warrant of arrest may, in the officer’s discretion, release an alien not
26 described in [8 U.S.C. § 1226](c)(1), under the conditions at section [8 U.S.C. § 1226](a)(2) and
27 (3) of the Act; provided that the alien must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer that such
28 release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the alien is likely to appear for
1 any future proceeding.”); Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff’d
2 sub nom. Saravia for A.H. v. Sessions, 905 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2018); F.M.V. v. Wofford, 2025
3 WL 3083934, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025). In light of all of the foregoing, the Court finds that
4 petitioner’s prior release created a reasonable expectation that he would be entitled to retain his
5 liberty as long as he was not a flight risk and did not pose a danger to the community. See Perry
6 v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-03 (1972) (finding reliance on governmental representations
7 may establish a legitimate claim of entitlement to a constitutionally-protected interest); F.M.V.,
8 2025 WL 3083934 at *4-5; Guillermo M. R. v. Kaiser, 2025 WL 1983677, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July
9 17, 2025) (recognizing that “the liberty interest that arises upon release [from immigration
10 detention] is inherent in the Due Process Clause”); Ortega v. Kaiser, 2025 WL 1771438, at *3
11 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2025) (collecting cases finding that noncitizens who have been released have
12 a strong liberty interest).
13 Next, the Court turns to what procedures are necessary to ensure that the deprivation of
14 that protected liberty interest meets the demands of the Constitution. The Ninth Circuit has
15 “regularly applied Mathews [v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)], to due process challenges to
16 removal proceedings.” Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1206 (9th Cir. 2022); see also
17 Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 993 (9th Cir. 2017) (applying Mathews factors in
18 immigration detention context). In applying the Mathews test to a procedural due process claim
19 challenging immigration detention, the Ninth Circuit explained that “Mathews remains a flexible
20 test that can and must account for the heightened governmental interest in the immigration
21 detention context.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F. 4th at 1206-07 (citations omitted). Under Mathews,
22 the Court considers three factors: (1) the private interest affected; (2) the risk of an erroneous
23 deprivation; and (3) the government’s interest. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
24 First, petitioner has a clear interest in remaining free from detention. “Freedom from
25 imprisonment -- from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint -- lies at
26 the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (citing
27 Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80 (“Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty
28 protected by the Due Process Clause.); Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 981 (“[T]he government’s
1 discretion to incarcerate non-citizens is always constrained by the requirements of due process.”).
2 Petitioner lived in the U.S. since 1992, when he was brought here with his parents. For over 18
3 years after petitioner was released from immigration custody in or around August 2007, petitioner
4 was free from immigration custody before his re-detention. During that period, petitioner had
5 children, obtained work authorization from immigration authorities in October 2024, and worked.
6 (ECF No. 13 at 1.) The lengthy duration of his conditional release elevates and underscores his
7 interest in liberty. See Pinchi v. Noem, 2025 WL 2084921, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2025) (in the
8 past five years, petitioner developed “extensive relations of support and interdependence” that
9 “underscore the high stakes of [his] liberty.”).
10 The second Mathews factor also weighs in petitioner’s favor. “The risk of an erroneous
11 deprivation [of liberty] is high” when “[the petitioner] has not received any bond or custody
12 redetermination hearing.” See A.E. v. Andrews, 2025 WL 1424382, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 16,
13 2025). Again, civil immigration detention, which is “nonpunitive in purpose and effect[,]” is
14 typically justified under the Due Process Clause only when a noncitizen presents a risk of flight
15 or danger to the community. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; Padilla v. ICE, 704 F. Supp. 3d
16 1163, 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2023). Respondents do not argue that petitioner’s criminal record
17 subjects him to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). (ECF No. 7.) Here, petitioner has
18 been detained since February 26, 2026, without being given an individualized bond hearing to
19 evaluate whether petitioner is a flight risk or a danger to the community. It is not this Court’s role
20 to determine whether petitioner is a danger or flight risk, and a neutral arbiter may very well
21 determine that petitioner is a danger given his criminal history.
22 As to the third Mathews factor, this Court recognizes that the government has an interest
23 in enforcing immigration laws and in public safety, but respondents’ interest in detaining
24 petitioner without a hearing is “low.” Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 963 (N.D. Cal.
25 2019); Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1094 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2025). Detention hearings
26 in immigration courts are routine, and impose a “minimal cost.” Doe, 787 F. Supp. 3d at 1094.
27 In addition, here, petitioner was previously released by immigration officials in 2007 and he
28 remained on release for over 18 years. See Pinchi, 2025 WL 1853763, at *2.
1 Overall, balancing these factors, the Court finds that the Mathews factors weigh in favor
2 of finding petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing, and petitioner should have been provided such a
3 hearing before he was detained. “An essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of
4 life, liberty, or property be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the
5 nature of the case.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (internal
6 quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis added). In criminal cases, parolees released on
7 parole, which does not provide “absolute liberty,” but rather “conditional liberty properly
8 dependent on observance of special parole restrictions,” are also entitled to due process, including
9 a predeprivation hearing before their parole can be revoked. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480-86.
10 “Numerous district courts have held that these principles extend to the context of immigration
11 detention.” F.M.V., 2025 WL 3083934 at *6 (collecting cases). Respondents point to no reasons
12 a pre-deprivation hearing could not be held, and provided no evidence of “urgent concerns,” thus,
13 “a pre-deprivation hearing is required to satisfy due process.” Guillermo M. R. v. Kaiser, 791 F.
14 Supp. 3d at 1036. Accordingly, the Court finds that petitioner is also entitled to relief on his due
15 process claim.
16 C. Petitioner’s Other Claims for Relief
17 In light of the Court’s recommendation that petitioner’s be granted relief on his statutory
18 and due process claims, his claims under the Administrative Procedure Act and the Eighth
19 Amendment (ECF No. 1 at 15-18) need not be resolved.
20 V. CONCLUSION
21 In summary, the Court recommends that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be granted
22 on two separate grounds: (1) petitioner’s statutory claim, and (2) petitioner’s due process claim.
23 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
24 1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) be GRANTED on petitioner’s
25 statutory and due process claims.
26 2. Respondents be ordered to IMMEDIATELY release petitioner Jesus Gonzalez (A-
27 095-739-118) and be ordered to provide petitioner with a copy of the release order at
28 or near the time of release. If respondents have custody of petitioner’s documents
] (e.g., identification, passport, work permit, Social Security card, etc.), respondents
2 shall return those to petitioner at the time of release.
3 3. This injunction does not address other circumstances where detention authority is
4 established under different authority than what is presented in this case (e.g., 8 U.S.C.
5 § 1226(c) or 8 U.S.C. § 1231).
6 4. Respondents be ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from re-detaining petitioner unless
7 the government demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence at a pre-deprivation
8 bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, that petitioner is a flight risk or danger to
9 the community such that his physical custody is legally justified. Petitioner shall be
10 allowed to have his counsel present at any such hearing.
11 5. The Clerk of the Court be directed to enter judgment in favor of petitioner and close
12 this case.
13 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge
14 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within seven days of
15 || the date of these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the
16 || court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to
17 || Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the objections shall be
18 || filed and served within seven days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that
19 | failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District
20 || Court’s order. See Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991),
21
9 Dated: June 18, 2026 ry _-
Chan Spo
23 CHI SOO KIM
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
25 || /1/gonz2804.157.2241.imm.bond
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