The opinion
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4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
5 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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7 AGENOT BAZELAIS, Case No. 1:26-cv-03888 (EJD)
8 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
9 v.
10 TANYA ANDREWS, WARDEN GOLDEN Re: Dkt. Nos. 1, 3
STATE ANNEX DETENTION FACILITY,
11 et al.,
Respondents.
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This habeas action concerns the detention of Petitioner Agenot Bazelais, a noncitizen who
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has lived in the United States since December 14, 2023. Based on the Government’s new
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interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) as mandating detention for all noncitizens present in the
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United States without admission, Petitioner was detained without any finding of changed
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circumstances by a neutral decisionmaker that he was a flight risk or danger to the community.
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This matter is before the Court on Petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus and motion for temporary
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restraining order. See Dkt. 1, 3. For the reasons explained below, the Court GRANTS Petitioner’s
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writ of habeas corpus, and resolves the motion for temporary restraining order as moot.1
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I. BACKGROUND
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Petitioner is a citizen of Haiti who entered the United States at or near the Nogales,
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Arizona DeConcini Port of Entry on December 14, 2023 after booking an appointment with U.S.
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Customs and Border Patrol (“CBP”) through its CBP One application. Dkt 9-1 at 2. At the
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1 In setting a briefing schedule for the Petition and motion for a temporary restraining order, the
27 Court indicated that it intended to rule directly on the Petition. See Dkt. INSERT. Respondents did
not oppose a combined ruling in their joint response to the petition and motion for a temporary
1 appointment, Petitioner was found to be inadmissible “pursuant to section 212(a)(7)(A)(i)(I) of the
2 INA[,]” was issued a notice to appear, and placed in removal proceedings under section 240 of the
3 INA. Id. He was subsequently paroled into the United States on his own recognizance for a period
4 of two years. Id.; Dkt. 9 at 2. Following his release, Petitioner submitted an application for asylum
5 and temporary protected status, received work authorization, and began work. Dkt. 1 ¶ 23; Dkt. 11
6 at 9.
7 Petitioner was re-detained by U.S. Immigrations and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) on
8 March 30, 2026 after an arrest for public intoxication. Dkt. 9 at 2. Petitioner challenges the basis
9 of this initial arrest, explaining that he was stopped by a police officer after purchasing a sprite and
10 bottle of rum while walking home from work. Dkt. 1 ¶ 23. After reviewing Petitioner’s
11 documentation, and upon seeing that Petitioner had a bottle of rum in his shopping bag, the police
12 officer arrested Petitioner without conducting any sobriety tests. Id. The police turned Petitioner
13 over to ICE shortly thereafter. Id. Respondents have not indicated whether Petitioner was charged
14 following this arrest, nor did they submit a rap sheet to the Court indicating that Petitioner has
15 been charged or convicted of any criminal offenses.
16 Petitioner received a bond hearing before an immigration judge (“IJ”) on April 13, 2026.
17 Dkt. 9 at 2. Though Respondents did not produce the IJ’s order with their response, they
18 represented that the IJ denied Petitioner bond on the basis that the “court lacked jurisdiction
19 because [] Petitioner was an arriving alien.” Id. Petitioner did not appeal this decision to the Board
20 of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), and filed this instant petition on May 20, 2026.
21 II. LEGAL STANDARD
22 The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every
23 individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004)
24 (citing U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in
25 custody upon the legality of that custody, and ... the traditional function of the writ is to secure
26 release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas
27 corpus may be granted to a petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the
1 Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has
2 served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its
3 protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). Accordingly, a
4 district court’s habeas jurisdiction includes challenges to immigration detention. See Zadvydas v.
5 Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001).
6 III. DISCUSSION
7 Petitioner argues that his prolonged re-detention without an individualized finding of flight
8 risk or danger to the community violates the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment. See Dkt.
9 1 ¶¶ 46–49. As a remedy, Petitioner requests a constitutionally adequate bond hearing at which the
10 government must demonstrate that he is a flight risk or danger to the community to justify further
11 detention. See Dkt. 1 at 17; Dkt. 11 at 9.
12 Respondents make three arguments in response: (1) that Petitioner’s detention is
13 mandatory under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) (Dkt. 9 at 2); (2) that Petitioner is not entitled to due
14 process protections beyond what is provided by statute (id. at 2–3); and (3) that the petition should
15 be dismissed because Petitioner failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing the
16 instant petition (id. at 3).
17 A. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
18 “Exhaustion can be either statutorily or judicially required.” Acevedo-Carranza v.
19 Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 539, 541 (9th Cir. 2004). While 28 U.S.C. § 2241 “does not specifically require
20 petitioners to exhaust direct appeals before filing petitions for habeas corpus,” the Ninth Circuit
21 “require[s], as a prudential matter, that habeas petitioners exhaust available judicial and
22 administrative remedies before seeking relief under § 2241.” Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037,
23 1047 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by, Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzales, 548 U.S. 30
24 (2006). Prudential exhaustion may be required if: “(1) agency expertise makes agency
25 consideration necessary to generate a proper record and reach a proper decision; (2) relaxation of
26 the requirement would encourage the deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme; and (3)
27 administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes and to preclude the
1 need for judicial review.” Puga v. Chertoff, 488 F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Noriega-
2 Lopez v. Ashcroft, 335 F.3d 874, 881 (9th Cir. 2003)). “[A] court may waive the prudential
3 exhaustion requirement if ‘administrative remedies are inadequate or not efficacious, pursuit of
4 administrative remedies would be a futile gesture, irreparable injury will result, or the
5 administrative proceedings would be void.’” Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir.
6 2017) (quoting Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004)).
7 The Court finds that exhaustion would be futile under these circumstances and waives the
8 prudential exhaustion requirement. Like the IJ that found it did not have jurisdiction to release
9 Petitioner on bond, the BIA is obligated to apply Matter of Yajure Hurtado, in which the BIA
10 found that “aliens who are present in the United States without admission are applicants for
11 admission as defined under … 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), … must be detained for the duration of
12 their removal proceedings[]” and are “ineligible for a bond hearing[.]” 29 I. & N. Dec. 216, 220,
13 225 (BIA 2025). Given that an appeal of the IJ ruling here would result in an identical outcome
14 under this precedent, “any bond request pursuant to that statute would be futile.” Singh v.
15 Andrews, 803 F. Supp. 3d 1035, 1044 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (waiving administrative exhaustion where
16 appeal would garner an identical result under BIA precedent); J.A.C.P. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-
17 01354-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 3013328, at *7 n. 9 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 27, 2025) (“ pursuit of
18 administrative remedies would almost certainly be futile given the BIA’s recent holding that all
19 noncitizens present in the United States without admission are ‘seeking admission’ for purposes
20 of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and must be detained”); Cornejo v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-02062
21 JLT HBK, 2026 WL 237748, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2026).
22 B. Detention Authority
23 Respondents’ argument that Section 1225(b)(2) applies to all non-citizens present in the
24 United States without admission has been widely rejected across this circuit, and indeed,
25 throughout the United States. See, e.g., Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-06924-EMC (EMC),
26 2025 WL 2637503, at *12 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025); Ortiz Donis v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-CV-
27 01228-JLT-SAB, 2025 WL 2879514, at *1, 8 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 9, 2025) (petitioner, who was
1 apprehended at the border and released on his own recognizance, was not an “arriving alien” or an
2 “applicant seeking admission” under § 1225(b)(2)); Otilio B.F. v. Andrews, 809 F. Supp. 3d 1038,
3 1050 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (granting the immediate release upon payment of bond of a non-citizen who
4 had been in the country for years and had a pending U-Visa application); Lopez Benitez v. Francis,
5 795 F. Supp. 3d 475, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 2025) (“If, as [r]espondents argue, § 1225(b)(2)(A) were
6 intended to apply to all ‘applicant[s] for admission,’ there would be no need to include the phrase
7 ‘seeking admission’ in the statute.”). “Such expansive interpretation of § 1225(b)(2) is unlawful as
8 applied to non-citizens,” like Petitioner, “who have been released by DHS on their own
9 recognizance into the interior of the country.” Cornejo v. Andrews, 2026 WL 237748, at *6.
10 As Respondents have not provided any lawful statutory basis for detention, the Court next
11 turns to Petitioner’s due process claim.
12 C. Due Process
13 Petitioner’s constitutional challenge is analyzed “in two steps: the first asks whether there
14 exists a protected liberty interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second examines the
15 procedures necessary to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the
16 Constitution.” Garcia v. Andrews, No. 2:25-cv-01884-TLN-SCR, 2025 WL 1927596, at *2 (E.D.
17 Cal. July 14, 2025) (citing Kentucky Dep’t. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460
18 (1989)).
19 1. Liberty Interest
20 “A protected liberty interest may arise from a conditional release from physical restraint.”
21 Omer G. G., 815 F. Supp. 3d at 1108 (citing Young v. Harper, 520 U.S. 143, 147–49 (1997)).
22 Upon release, a parolee is allowed to live at liberty and establish ties in the community based “on
23 at least an implicit promise that parole will be revoked only if he fails to live up to the parole
24 conditions.” Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972). As such, “[e]ven when a statute
25 allows the government to arrest and detain an individual, a protected liberty interest under the Due
26 Process Clause may entitle the individual to procedural protections not found in the statute.” Omer
27 G.G., 815 F. Supp. 3d at 1108; see also Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 969 (N.D. Cal.
1 2019) (“Just as people on preparole, parole, and probation status have a liberty interest, so too
2 does [the noncitizen] have a liberty interest in remaining out of custody on bond.”); Pinchi v.
3 Noem, 792 F.Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (“[E]ven when ICE has the initial discretion to
4 detain or release a noncitizen pending removal proceedings, after that individual is released from
5 custody she has a protected liberty interest in remaining out of custody.”); Guillermo M. R. v.
6 Kaiser, No. 25-CV-05436-RFL, 2025 WL 1983677, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2025) (recognizing
7 that “the liberty interest that arises upon release [from immigration detention] is inherent in the
8 Due Process Clause”); Ortega v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-05259-JST, 2025 WL 1771438, at *3 (N.D.
9 Cal. June 26, 2025) (collecting cases finding that noncitizens who have been released have a
10 strong liberty interest).
11 Petitioner’s release from detention on his own recognizance was similar. For nearly three
12 years, it allowed him to establish ties in the community while pursuing relief in his removal
13 proceedings by applying for asylum and temporary protected status. These actions were made
14 possible by Petitioner’s freedom, which is “the most elemental of liberty interests[.]” Hamdi v.
15 Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 529 (2004). As such, Petitioner has a protected liberty interest in his
16 release.2
17 2. Mathews Factors
18 Many courts have applied the test established by the Supreme Court in Mathews v.
19 Eldridge in considering what process is due in the immigration context where a noncitizen
20 possesses a protected liberty interest in his continued release. See Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53
21 F.4th 1189, 1206 (9th Cir. 2022). There are three factors relevant to the due process inquiry under
22 the Mathews framework: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official action,” (2)
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24 2 Respondents have not argued that the expiration of Petitioner’s parole justified his re-detention,
so the Court need not consider that issue here. Regardless, the Court notes that courts throughout
25 this circuit have found non-citizens still possess a liberty interest in their continued freedom
following the expiration of their parole. See, e.g., Omer G.G., 815 F. Supp. 3d at 1108; Faqeri v.
26 Scott, No. 2:26-CV-00003-JHC, 2026 WL 194475, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 26, 2026); Sanchez
Obregon v. Mullins, No. 5:26-CV-02053-KJM, 2026 WL 1270753, at *3 (C.D. Cal. May 5, 2026);
27 D.L.C. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-1996 DC-JDP, 2026 WL 145646, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 20, 2026)
(“[N]umerous courts in the Ninth Circuit have found that when a noncitizen is paroled under that
1 “the risk of an erroneous deprivation ... and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
2 procedural safeguards,” and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and
3 the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement
4 would entail.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
5 As to the first Mathews factor, the Court finds that Petitioner has a substantial private
6 interest in remaining out of immigration custody because he has been released pending civil
7 removal proceedings for over two years. After his release, Petitioner was able to develop ties in
8 the community as his removal proceedings progressed. “[His] detention denies [him] that
9 freedom.” Omer G.G., 815 F. Supp. at 1111.
10 Turning to the second factor, “the risk of an erroneous deprivation [of liberty] is high”
11 when, as here, “[the petitioner] has not received any bond or custody redetermination hearing.”
12 A.E. v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-00107-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 1424382, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 16,
13 2025). Though Respondents argue that Petitioner’s arrest for public intoxication justified the
14 revocation of his release, “it does not eliminate Petitioner’s due process right ” to determination
15 before a neutral decisionmaker that he is entitled to release on bond. Alvarado v. Warden of
16 California City Det. Ctr., No. 1:26-CV-02473-KES-FJS (HC), 2026 WL 1025612, at *1 (E.D.
17 Cal. Apr. 15, 2026); see also, Llanes Tellez v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-08982-PCP, 2025 WL 3677937,
18 at *8 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2025) (DUI arrest was insufficient justification for re-detention without
19 providing any procedural safeguards required by due process); Dicxon Jose P.C v. Warden,
20 California City Det. Facility, No. 1:26-CV-02658-TLN-CSK, 2026 WL 1045516, at *3 (E.D. Cal.
21 Apr. 17, 2026) (similar).
22 Civil immigration detention, which is “nonpunitive in purpose and effect[,]” is justified
23 when a noncitizen presents a risk of flight or danger to the community. See Zadvydas v. Davis,
24 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001); Padilla v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Env’t, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1172
25 (W.D. Wash. 2023); Sharan S. v. Chestnut, 2025 WL 3167826, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 12, 2025)
26 (“Under section 1226(a), petitioner would be entitled to a bond hearing, and any custody
27 redetermination would have to be based on whether petitioner is ‘a threat to national security, a
1 danger to the community at large, likely to abscond, or otherwise a poor bail risk.’”) (quoting In re
2 Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (BIA 2006)). The record before the Court indicates that there was
3 no independent finding of changed circumstances by a neutral arbiter before Petitioner was re-
4 detained. As there have been no procedural safeguards to determine if Petitioner’s re-detention is
5 justified based on changed circumstances, “the probable value of additional procedural safeguards,
6 i.e., a bond hearing, is high.” A.E., 2025 WL 1424382, at *5.
7 The final Mathews factor also weighs in Petitioner’s favor. Although the Government has a
8 strong interest in enforcing the immigration laws, its’ interest in detaining Petitioner without a
9 hearing is “low.” Ortega, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 970; Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1093–95
10 (E.D. Cal. 2025). In immigration court, custody hearings are routine and impose a “minimal”
11 cost. Doe, 787 F. Supp. 3d at 1094. Indeed, Respondents have not pointed to any evidence
12 suggesting that providing Petitioner with a constitutionally appropriate bond hearing would be
13 burdensome.
14 In light of the fact that Respondents failed to make any showing of changed circumstances
15 before re-detaining Petitioner, he is entitled to a bond hearing before a neutral decision-maker who
16 will determine whether his continued detention is justified based on a finding that he is either a
17 flight risk or danger to the community.
18 IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER
19 For the reasons stated above, the Petition is GRANTED. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED
20 that:
21 1. Within 14 days of the date of service of this order, unless Petitioner consents to a
22 later date, Respondent SHALL provide Petitioner with an individualized bond hearing before an
23 immigration judge that complies with the requirements set forth in Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196
24 (9th Cir. 2011), and where “the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that
25 [Petitioner] is a flight risk or a danger to the community to justify denial of bond,” id. at 1203. In
26 the event Petitioner is “determined not to be a danger to the community and not to be so great a
27 flight risk as to require detention without bond,” the immigration judge should consider
1 Petitioner’s financial circumstances and alternative conditions of release. Hernandez v. Sessions,
2 872 F.3d 976, 1000 (9th Cir. 2017). If Respondents fail to provide a timely bond hearing in
3 accordance with this order, Respondents are ordered to immediately release Petitioner.
4 2. Prior to the bond hearing, the Petitioner SHALL receive meaningful notice of the
5 scheduled hearing and SHALL be entitled to appear at the hearing.
6 3. The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case and enter judgment for Petitioner.
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8 IT IS SO ORDERED.
9 Dated: June 11, 2026 O ( I )
10
EDWARD J. DAVILA
11 United States District Judge
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Case No.: 1:26-cv-03888-EJD