The opinion
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 HALIKI GREEN JR., Case No. 1:26-cv-00322-JLT-SAB
12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
RECOMMENDING GRANTING
13 v. DEFENDANTS’ PARTIAL MOTION TO
DISMISS
14 JEFF MACOMBER, et al.,
(ECF No. 17)
15 Defendants.
OBJECTIONS DUE WITHIN FOURTEEN
16 DAYS
17 Pending before the Court is the partial motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim filed
18 by Defendants Jeff Macomber and Patwin Horn. The Court held a hearing on May 13, 2026.
19 Dina Chehata, Esq., appeared on behalf of Plaintiff. Eric Miersma, Esq. appeared on behalf of
20 Defendants. Having considered the moving papers and arguments by counsel, as well as the
21 Court’s file, the Court issues the following findings and recommendations recommending
22 granting Defendants’ motion.
I.
23
BACKGROUND
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Plaintiff brings this religious liberty and excessive force case. In short, Plaintiff contends
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that Defendants have committed two sets of related acts. First, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants
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have systematically denied him access to Jumu’ah services, vital to Plaintiff’s Muslim faith,
27
while allowing for congregation and prayer by groups of other faiths. Second, Plaintiff’s use of a
1 prayer shall allegedly precipitated an unprovoked use of unreasonable force by an officer. All of
2 Plaintiff’s causes of action are based on these basic facts.
3 Plaintiff is Haliki Green Jr., a Muslim man incarcerated at Kern Valley State Prison
4 (“KVSP”) by the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”). (ECF No.
5 1, ¶¶ 1, 15, 19.) Defendant Jeff Macomber is the Secretary of CDCR and holds final decision-
6 making authority over CDCR policies, procedures, and operations governing religious
7 accommodations. (Id. at ¶ 16.) Defendant Patwin Horn is the Warden of KVSP and holds
8 decision-making authority over KVSP’s institutional polices, procedures, and practices affecting
9 religious programming. (Id. at ¶ 17.) Defendants Macomber and Horn are sued in their official
10 capacity only. (Id. at ¶¶ 16, 17.) Defendant Doe 1 was a KVSP correctional officer on duty on
11 January 22, 2024. (Id. at ¶ 18.) Doe 1 is sued in his individual capacity only. (Id.)
12 Plaintiff’s sincerely held religious beliefs require him to participate in Jumu’ah, a weekly
13 congregational prayer held at midday every Friday. (Id. at ¶ 20.) Jumu’ah consists of an
14 obligatory sermon followed by congregational prayer and typically lasts around 30-45 minutes.
15 (Id.) Jumu’ah is a central practice in Islam and is considered an obligatory practice for able-
16 bodied Muslim men. (Id. at ¶ 21.) Though often led by a Muslim religious leader called an
17 imam, Plaintiff sincerely believes that in the absence of an imam, he or another qualified Muslim
18 incarceree may lead the sermon and lead Jumu’ah prayer. (Id. at ¶ 22.) Denial of the
19 opportunity to participate in Jumu’ah services prevents Plaintiff and other Muslim incarcerees
20 from fulfilling a religious obligation, with every missed Jumu’ah prayer resulting in additional
21 deprivations of that religious practice. (Id. at ¶ 23.)
22 CDCR regulations require institution heads, including Defendants Macomber and Horn,
23 to make “every reasonable effort to provide for the religious and spiritual welfare of all
24 interested incarcerated persons . . . .” (Id. at ¶ 24, quoting Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3210(a).)
25 The regulations further require that a reasonable amount of time and accommodation be provided
26 for religious services, consistent with facility security and other necessary institutional
27 operations. (Id., citing Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3210(c).) Where practicable, institution
1 scheduled religious services. (Id., citing Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3210(c).)
2 When a chaplain is unavailable, CDCR regulations permit institution heads to designate
3 qualified incarcerated persons to minister to the religious needs of incarcerated persons of that
4 faith. (Id. at ¶ 25, citing Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3211(a).) According to Plaintiff, CDCR
5 facilities, including KVSP, have previously offered Jumu’ah prayer services and are familiar
6 with the basic requirements for observance. (Id. at ¶ 26.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants
7 Macomber and Horn do not maintain a standardized or consistent schedule for Jumu’ah services
8 at KVSP. (Id. at ¶ 27.) Plaintiff further alleges that Defendants Macomber and Horn maintain a
9 policy or practice under which religious services are conducted only when staff or volunteer
10 chaplains are present, and incarcerated persons are not permitted to lead services when a
11 chaplain is unavailable. (Id. at ¶ 28.)
12 Over several years, Plaintiff has repeatedly brought informal and formal grievances
13 regarding the lack of consistent Jumu’ah services. (Id. at ¶ 29.) Since Plaintiff’s transfer to
14 KVSP in or about November 2023, Muslim incarcerees at KVSP have been permitted to hold, on
15 average, fewer than five Jumu’ah services per year. (Id. at ¶ 30.) During the same period,
16 Plaintiff alleges that KVSP regularly provided congregational religious services for other faith
17 groups, including Christian services offered approximately 4-5 times per month. (Id. at ¶ 31.)
18 In 2024, Plaintiff alleges he exhausted the CDCR administrative remedy process
19 concerning the lack of consistent Jumu’ah services at KVSP. (Id. at ¶ 32.) KVSP and CDCR
20 staff informed Plaintiff that Jumu’ah services would not be conducted unless a chaplain was
21 physically present, a condition Plaintiff states occurred infrequently and unpredictably. (Id. at ¶
22 33.) Yet, Plaintiff’s sincerely held religious beliefs do not require the presence of a chaplain for
23 valid participation in Jumu’ah. (Id. at ¶ 34.) Plaintiff proposed that qualified incarcerees be
24 permitted to lead Jumu’ah services when a chaplain was unavailable and that, if the chapel was
25 unavailable, services be held in an alternative suitable space, such as an empty classroom or
26 communal yard. (Id.) KVSP and CDCR staff allegedly rejected these proposals, stating that
27 Jumu’ah services would not be conducted in the absence of a chaplain and that incarcerees were
1 safety or security concerns as reasons for these denials. (Id.) During the same period,
2 congregational services for other faith groups, including Christian services, were not canceled or
3 rescheduled based on staff availability. (Id. at ¶ 36.)
4 In October 2024, Plaintiff’s counsel sent a formal demand letter to CDCR seeking
5 resolution regarding access to Jumu’ah services. (Id. at ¶ 37.) CDCR did not respond. (Id.) In
6 December 2024, KVSP leadership approved a memorandum permitting Muslim incarcerees in
7 “Facility C,” including Plaintiff, to conduct Jumu’ah services in the communal yard without
8 chaplain supervision. (Id. at ¶ 38.) Approximately two weeks later, Plaintiff alleges that this
9 approval was rescinded, “after which Jumu’ah services again became sporadic and inconsistent
10 for Plaintiff Green and other Muslim incarcerees.” (Id. at ¶ 39.) On November 21, 2025, a
11 partial Jumu’ah service was conducted at KVSP, during which Plaintiff led congregational
12 prayer, but the required sermon was not permitted. (Id. at ¶ 40.) This was the first Jumu’ah
13 services permitted in months. (Id.)
14 On January 21, 2024, Defendant Doe 1, a correctional officer at KVSP, informed
15 Plaintiff that he was not permitted to carry his prayer shawl without documentation. (Id. at ¶ 41.)
16 Plaintiff asked for clarification because he was unaware of any such requirement and had not
17 previously been asked by correctional staff, including Defendant Doe 1, to produce
18 documentation for his prayer shawl. (Id. at ¶ 42.) “Doe 1 declined to provide clarification and
19 warned Plaintiff Green that he would need documentation in the future.” (Id. at ¶ 43.)
20 On January 22, 2024, while Plaintiff was walking to his scheduled “pill call” wearing his
21 prayer shawl, when Doe 1 approached him. (Id. at ¶ 44.) Plaintiff stopped walking when he saw
22 Doe 1 approach him. (Id. at ¶ 45.) Plaintiff turned around to face the wall in anticipation of a
23 pat down. (Id. at ¶ 46.) Plaintiff alleges that Doe 1 stood behind Plaintiff Green and demanded
24 documentation for the prayer shawl. (Id. at ¶ 47.) Plaintiff, while facing the wall, stated that he
25 did not have documentation. (Id. at ¶ 48.) Plaintiff alleges that without issuing a warning,
26 “Doe 1 grabbed Plaintiff Green’s right arm from behind and punched him repeatedly in the head,
27 pummeling him to the ground and causing him to lose consciousness.” (Id. at ¶ 49.) During the
1 resisting.” (Id. at ¶ 50.) “Doe 1 continued to strike Plaintiff Green after he lost consciousness.”
2 (Id. at ¶ 51.) The use of force ended only after other correctional officers intervened. (Id. at
3 ¶ 52.) Plaintiff was then taken for medical evaluation, which documented an abrasion to his right
4 knee and pain in his right frontal region. (Id. at ¶ 53.) As a result of the incident, Plaintiff
5 alleges that he experienced emotional distress and ongoing fear for his personal safety. (Id. at
6 ¶ 54.)
7 Plaintiff reported the incident to Lieutenant H. Arreola, who reported the matter to the
8 KVSP Use of Force Office. (Id. at ¶ 55.) Plaintiff subsequently filed a formal grievance
9 regarding the incident and requested review of available body-worn camera footage. (Id. at
10 ¶ 56.) Plaintiff alleges he completed exhaustion of administrative remedies in 2025 and
11 “received a memorandum from Defendant Warden Horn stating that CDCR investigated the
12 incident and sustained Plaintiff Green’s use-of-force allegation.” (Id. at ¶ 57.) However, the
13 memorandum did not disclose any personnel action taken in response. (Id.)
14 On January 15, 2026, Plaintiff commenced this action. (ECF No. 1.) Plaintiff brings four
15 causes of action: 1) Violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42
16 U.S.C. § 2000cc; 2) Violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution, 42
17 U.S.C. § 1983; 3) Violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the United
18 States Constitution; and 4) Violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
19 Amendment to the United States Constitution. (Id. at pp. 10-17.) On March 25, 2026,
20 Defendants filed the instant partial motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 17.) The assigned District
21 Judge referred the motion to the undersigned. (ECF No. 18.) The motion has been fully briefed
22 (ECF Nos. 24, 26), and the Court heard argument on May 13, 2025. (ECF No. 27.)
23 II.
24 LEGAL STANDARD
25 Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may file a motion to dismiss on
26 the grounds that a complaint “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” A
27 motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Navarro
1 of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
2 party.” Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337-38 (9th Cir. 1996). The pleading
3 standard under Rule 8 does not require “‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more than
4 an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.
5 662, 678 (2009), quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). In
6 assessing the sufficiency of a complaint, all well-pleaded factual allegations must be accepted as
7 true. Id. at 678. However, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported
8 by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. To avoid a dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), a
9 complaint must plead “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”
10 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570.
11 In deciding whether a complaint states a claim, the Ninth Circuit has discussed that two
12 principles apply. First, to be entitled to the presumption of truth the allegations in the complaint
13 “may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action but must contain sufficient allegations
14 of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself
15 effectively.” Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). Second, so that it is not unfair
16 to require the defendant to be subjected to the expenses associated with discovery and continued
17 litigation, the factual allegations of the complaint, which are taken as true, must plausibly
18 suggest an entitlement to relief. Id. “Dismissal is proper only where there is no cognizable legal
19 theory or an absence of sufficient facts alleged to support a cognizable legal theory.” Navarro,
20 250 F.3d at 732, citing Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept., 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988).
21 III.
22 DISCUSSION
23 Defendants Macomber and Horn (hereinafter, “Defendants”) move to dismiss claim III –
24 Violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and claim IV – Violation of the
25 Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from the complaint. (ECF No. 17.)
26 Succinctly, Defendants argue that have been alleged to be defendants in a supervisory position,
27 sued in their official capacity only, and, in any event, the complaint fails to allege a causal link
1 Plaintiff argues that these claims are brought pursuant to Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. Of the
2 City of N.Y., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). (ECF No. 24.) In reply, Defendants contend that a theory of
3 Monell liability is foreclosed by Eleventh Amendment immunity. (ECF No. 26, p. 2.) From the
4 briefing and relevant law on these issues, the Court agrees with Defendants in all respects.
5 At the hearing, however, Plaintiff took a different approach. When asked by the Court
6 what Plaintiff’s theory of liability was, Plaintiff—for the first time ever—asserted that his claims
7 against Defendants were subject to the exception of sovereign immunity first recognized in Ex
8 parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Notwithstanding Plaintiff’s change of course from his
9 opposition, the Court will first dispose of the arguments brought in the briefing before turning to
10 the argument raised in the hearing.1
11 A. Theory of Liability under Monell
12 In the briefing it seems as if Plaintiff has disclaimed any theory of supervisory liability
13 against Defendants in their individual capacity. (ECF No. 24, p. 8.) Yet, Plaintiff also states
14 “[w]ere the Court to assume that Defendants’ characterization of Plaintiff’s Claims III and IV is
15 accurate and that Plaintiff in fact brings his claims under a supervisor liability theory, things
16 Plaintiff does not concede, minor amendments to the Complaint would suffice to survive a
17 motion to dismiss against a supervisor liability theory.” (Id. at p. 10.) This is puzzling to the
18 Court, whose duty does not generally include “assuming characterizations” of legal theories
19 undergirding parties’ claims. To that point, the Court notes that nowhere in the complaint did
20 Plaintiff raise Monell liability and Plaintiff has explicitly, and emphatically, limited to suing
21 Defendants in their official capacities. (ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 4, 16, 17, 27, 28, 58-66, 76-95.) Thus,
22 Defendants approach in their motion to dismiss appears to be rational and not, as Plaintiff puts it,
23 a “confusing mess.”
24 Given Plaintiff’s representations, the Court will first analyze whether Eleventh
25 Amendment immunity bars a theory of Monell liability as to Defendants. Thereafter, the Court
26 will outline at least two legal standards whereby supervisors may be held liable in their
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1 individual capacities. This area of the law can be opaque at times; however, the Court expects
2 that going forward at least these issues will be clear.
3 The Eleventh Amendment “prohibit[s] federal courts from entertaining suits brought by a
4 state citizen against the state or its instrumentality in the absence of consent.” Mecinas v. Hobbs,
5 30 F.4th 890, 903 (9th Cir. 2022), quoting Culinary Workers Union, Loc. 226 v. Del Papa, 200
6 F.3d 614, 619 (9th Cir. 1999). Thus, Monell liability cannot attach to a State entity. See Will v.
7 Michigan Dep’t of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70 (1989) (explaining that States are protected by
8 the Eleventh Amendment while municipalities are not and noting that Monell is limited to “local
9 government units,” which are not considered part of the State for Eleventh Amendment
10 purposes); see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165-170 (1985) (discussing the
11 distinction between individual and official capacity claims and explaining that an official-
12 capacity suit is a suit against the entity); Nat’l Audubon Soc’y, Inc. v. Davis, 307 F.3d 835, 847
13 (9th Cir. 2002) (observing that the Eleventh Amendment bars application of the Monell doctrine
14 against state entities).
15 Here, the Defendants are sued in their official capacity as individual employees of
16 CDCR, which is a state entity. See Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995)
17 (per curiam) (observing that the CDCR is a state entity entitled to Eleventh Amendment
18 immunity), citing Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781 (1978); see also Kentucky v. Graham, 473
19 U.S. 159, 166 (1985); Leer v. Murphy, 844 F.2d 628, 631-32 (9th Cir. 1988); Morris v. Cal.
20 Dep’t of Corr. & Rehab., No. 1:17-cv-01488-AWI-MJS, 2018 WL 1211064, at *5 (E.D. Cal.
21 Mar. 8, 2018) (“Monell liability cannot attach to an individual (in his or her individual capacity)
22 or a State entity.”).
23 Accordingly, to the extent that Plaintiff brings claims III and IV against Defendants in
24 their official capacity under at theory of Monell liability, these claims must fail as barred by
25 Eleventh Amendment immunity. Again, Plaintiffs have limited themselves to suing Defendants
26 in their official capacity only. (See ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 4, 16, 17, 27, 28.) Therefore, the Court will
27 recommend that Defendants’ motion to dismiss be granted.
1 claim for claims III and IV against Defendants in their individual capacity, the Court notes that at
2 the hearing, Plaintiff seemingly stood on bringing claims against Defendants in only their official
3 capacities. However, the Court provides the following legal standards in an abundance of
4 caution, given Plaintiff’s representation in his opposition that he seeks leave to allege claims
5 against Defendants in their individual capacities. (ECF No. 23, pp. 10-12.)
6 Liability may not be imposed on supervisory personnel for the actions or omissions of
7 their subordinates under the theory of respondeat superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676-77; Ewing v.
8 City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th
9 Cir. 2002). Supervisors may be held liable only if they “participated in or directed the violations,
10 or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045
11 (9th Cir. 1989); accord Starr, 652 F.3d at 1205-06; Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th
12 Cir. 2009). Stated differently, supervisors may be held liable for their own conduct “if there
13 exists either (1) his or her personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation, or (2) a
14 sufficient causal connection between the supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the constitutional
15 violation.” Starr, 652 F.3d at 1207, quoting Hansen, 885 F.2d at 646. As relevant here, “[t]he
16 requisite causal connection may be established when an official sets in motion a ‘series of acts by
17 others which the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict’
18 constitutional harms.” Corales, 567 F.3d at 570 (internal quotation omitted). It may also be
19 established by “knowingly refus[ing] to terminate a series of acts by others, which [the
20 supervisor] knew or reasonably should have known would cause others to inflict a constitutional
21 injury.” Dubner v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 968 (9th Cir. 2001).
22 As a distinct theory, supervisory liability may also exist without any personal
23 participation if the official implemented “a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a
24 repudiation of the constitutional rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’”
25 Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 977 (9th Cir. 2013), quoting Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642,
26 646 (9th Cir. 1989).
27 B. Theory of Liability under Ex parte Young
1 At the hearing,2 Plaintiff argued that the exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity
2 under Ex parte Young applies to both claims III and VI in this case. Defendants generally
3 opposed, especially arguing that Plaintiff has not alleged a “fairly direct” connection between
4 Defendants and the alleged constitutional deprivation. The Court agrees with Defendants.
5 “The Eleventh Amendment shields states from suits brought by citizens in federal court.”
6 Forward, Inc. v. Macomber, 173 F.4th 1121, 1124 (9th Cir. 2026). Under Ex parte Young, 209
7 U.S. 123 (1908), an exception to this rule, plaintiffs can sue “state officers in their official
8 capacities for prospective declaratory or injunctive relief . . . for their alleged violations of
9 federal law.” Ass’n des Eleveurs de Canards et d’Oies du Quebec v. Harris, 729 F.3d 937, 943
10 (9th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The sued state officer must have
11 “some connection with the enforcement of the act, or else it is merely making him a party as a
12 representative of the state, and thereby attempting to make the state a party.” Ex parte Young,
13 209 U.S. at 157.
14 The Ninth Circuit has “long held that the connection must be fairly direct; a generalized
15 duty to enforce state law or general supervisory power over the persons responsible for enforcing
16 the challenged provision will not subject an official to suit.” Forward, Inc., 173 F.4th at 1124,
17 quoting Ass’n des Eleveurs, 729 F.3d at 943; see also Mecinas, 30 F.4th at 903-04 (requiring
18 “the implicated state official [to] have a relevant role that goes beyond a generalized duty to
19 enforce state law or general supervisory power over the persons responsible for enforcing the
20 challenged provision”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “This ‘fairly direct’
21 requirement also applies where a plaintiff seeks to enjoin an ongoing violation of federal law.”
22 Id., citing Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 80 F.4th 943, 955 (9th Cir. 2023)
23 (“Ex parte Young allows suits seeking prospective relief against a state official who has a fairly
24 direct connection to an ongoing violation of federal law.”) (citation omitted); see Mecinas, 30
25
2 Though raised by Plaintiff for the first time ever during the hearing, Defendants noted the possibility of an Ex parte
Young issue in their reply. (ECF No. 26, pp. 3-4.) The Court notes that at the hearing, both sides were afforded
26
notice that Plaintiff proceeds on an Ex parte Young theory, as well as given the opportunity to argue their positions.
Thus, the party-presentation principle is not implicated by the Court reaching the issue of Ex parte Young. See
27 Margolin v. Nat’l Assoc. of Immigration Judges, 608 U.S. ___, ___, 146 S. Ct. 1285, 1288 (2026) (“Because courts
are ‘essentially passive instruments of government,’ [they] rely on the parties to ‘frame the issues for decision’ and
1 F.4th at 903 (observing that the ‘fairly direct connection’ analysis is ‘closely related—indeed
2 overlapping’ with traceability and redressability under Article III standing).
3 In support of his position, at the hearing Plaintiff directed the Court to various paragraphs
4 of the complaint, which the Court quotes below.
5 Defendant Jeff Macomber is the Secretary of the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) and holds
6 final decision-making authority over CDCR policies, procedures,
and operations governing religious accommodations. He is sued in
7 his official capacity, only.
8 Defendant Patwin Horn is the Warden of Kern Valley State Prison
(“KVSP”). He holds decision-making authority over KVSP’s
9 institutional policies, procedures, and practices affecting religious
programming. Defendant Horn’s principal office is located within
10 KVSP, at 3000 West Cecil Avenue, Delano, CA 93216. He is sued
in his official capacity, only.
11
(ECF No. 1, ¶¶ 16, 17.)
12
CDCR regulations require institution heads, including Defendants
13 Macomber and Horn, to make ‘every reasonable effort to provide
for the religious and spiritual welfare of all interested incarcerated
14 persons . . .’ Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3210(a). The regulations
further require that a reasonable amount of time and
15 accommodation be provided for religious services, consistent with
facility security and other necessary institutional operations. Id. at
16 § 3210(c). Where practicable, institution officials are required to
ensure that other facility activities do not conflict with or disrupt
17 scheduled religious services. Id.
18 When a chaplain is unavailable, CDCR regulations permit
institution heads to designate qualified incarcerated persons to
19 minister to the religious needs of incarcerated persons of that faith.
Id. at § 3211(a).
20
(Id. at ¶¶ 24, 25.)
21
Over several years, Plaintiff Green has repeatedly brought informal
22 and formal grievances regarding the lack of consistent Jumu’ah
services.
23
(Id. at ¶ 29.)
24
In 2024, Plaintiff Green exhausted the CDCR administrative
25 remedy process concerning the lack of consistent Jumu’ah services
at KVSP.
26
(Id. at ¶ 32.)
27
In October 2024, Plaintiff Green’s counsel sent a formal demand
1 services. CDCR did not respond.
2 (Id. at ¶ 37.)
3 Plaintiff argues that these alleged facts demonstrate a sufficient connection between
4 Defendants and the alleged deprivation of Plaintiff’s rights. Further, Plaintiff argues that these
5 facts demonstrate that Defendants were on notice of the alleged violations and failed to act.
6 Plaintiff then contends that by not allowing these claims to go forward, Plaintiff would be
7 without a remedy. Finally, Plaintiff argues that by Defendants not moving to dismiss Plaintiff’s
8 RLUIPA claim that this evidences that Plaintiff has in fact stated a claim for his First and
9 Fourteenth Amendment claims.
10 Having gotten out ahead of Plaintiff’s argument, in their reply Defendants begin by
11 observing that it is undisputed that Defendants are senior staff officials within CDCR: Macomber
12 as the Secretary of the Department and Horn as the KVSP Warden. (ECF No. 26, p. 3.)
13 Defendants then assert that none of Plaintiff’s allegations state that Defendants were personally
14 involved in depriving Plaintiff of consistent access to Jumu’ah services. In their view, Plaintiff’s
15 allegations center on unidentified KVSP and CDCR staff. For example, “KVSP and CDCR staff
16 informed Plaintiff Green that Jumu’ah services would not be conducted unless a chaplain was
17 physically present.” (ECF No. 1, ¶ 33.) “KVSP and CDCR staff rejected [Plaintiff’s] proposals,
18 stating that Jumu’ah services would not be conducted in the absence of a chaplain and that
19 incarcerees were not permitted to lead the services. Staff referenced staffing limitations and
20 general safety or security concerns as reasons for these denials.” (Id. at ¶ 35.) Furthermore,
21 Defendants note that in his opposition, Plaintiff took the position that “personal participation is
22 not required” of Defendants in arguing his now discarded theory of liability under Monell. (ECF
23 No. 26, pp. 3-4, citing ECF No. 24, p. 3.)
24 As presently pleaded, the Court agrees with Defendants that the allegations regarding
25 who were personally involved are alleged in generalities. Even taking the factual allegations
26 identified by Plaintiff in the hearing in the light most favorable to him, the Court finds that at
27 most Plaintiff has alleged only a generalized duty to enforce state law or general supervisory
power over the persons responsible for enforcing the challenged provisions. Indeed, the cited
1 paragraphs by Plaintiff above outline only that Defendants are the Secretary of CDCR and
2 Warden of KVSP with a duty to enforce Cal. Code Regs. tit. 15, § 3210. That Plaintiff brought
3 grievances through informal and formal channels does not directly implicate that Defendants had
4 ‘some connection with the enforcement of the act’ or that the alleged deprivation was fairly
5 traceable to Defendants.
6 Plaintiff’s auxiliary arguments are of no moment. First, Plaintiff’s contention that he
7 would be left without a remedy is patently false because, as Defendants observed, Plaintiff still
8 has his RLUIPA claim. Yet, even if Plaintiff did not, Eleventh Amendment immunity, for
9 example, can often be a complete bar to a party’s claims. Thus, simply because a party is left
10 without a remedy is not persuasive in and of itself that the Court should find for Plaintiff here.
11 Second, Plaintiff’s argument that because Defendants do not attack Plaintiff’s RLUIPA
12 claim that this somehow only validates his First and Fourteenth Amendment claims is misguided.
13 Significantly, “RLUIPA authorizes a private right of action to ‘obtain appropriate relief against a
14 government’ for a violation of the statute, and it defines the term ‘government’ to include ‘any
15 other person acting under color of State law.’” Fuqua v. Raak, 120 F.4th 1346, 1357 (9th Cir. ),
16 quoting 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc-2(a), 2000cc-5(4)(A)(iii). Thus, RLUIPA provides a limited
17 waiver of sovereign immunity not present in the other constitutional claims. See Al Saud v.
18 Days, 50 F.4th 705, 709 (9th Cir. 2022) (“Only injunctive relief, not monetary damages, is
19 available pursuant to RLUIPA, and the claim must be against defendants in their official
20 capacities.”), citing Sossamon v. Texas, 563 U.S. 277, 287-88 (2011).
21 Because Plaintiff has failed to allege that Defendants had a fairly direct connection to the
22 alleged deprivation, Plaintiff’s claims at this time are not subject to the Ex parte Young
23 exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Therefore, the Court will recommend that this
24 aspect of Defendant’s motion also be granted.
25 C. Leave to Amend
26 Under Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, leave to amend shall be freely
27 given when justice so requires. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “In the absence of . . . undue delay, bad
1 amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of
2 the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.—the leave sought should . . . be ‘freely given.’”
3 Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962), quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). In other words,
4 “[a]bsent prejudice, or a strong showing of any of the remaining Foman factors, there exists a
5 presumption under Rule 15(a) in favor of granting leave to amend.” Eminence Capital, LLC v.
6 Aspeon, Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). The decision of whether to grant leave to
7 amend is within the discretion of the district court. Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music Pub., 512
8 F.3d 522, 532 (9th Cir. 2008).
9 Leave to amend should be granted. Here, the Court does not find that there is any
10 indication that Plaintiff has engaged in undue delay, bad faith, dilatory motive, repeated failures
11 to cure deficiencies, nor would there be futility of amendment or undue prejudice to Defendants
12 at this time. In particular, it appears that Plaintiff has only now, after a hearing, gained a
13 foothold on his theory of liability and the related pleading requirements. That said, the Court
14 will recommend granting leave to amend with the understanding that Plaintiff will do so only to
15 the extent he believes in good faith that he can plead additional factual material that could satisfy
16 the legal standards and deficiencies identified herein. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2); Lopez v.
17 Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000).
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1 V.
2 CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION
3 Based on the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that Defendants’ partial
4 | motion to dismiss (ECF No. 17) be GRANTED with leave to amend.
5 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the district judge assigned to this
6 | action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and this Court’s Local Rule 304. Within fourteen
7 | (14) days of service of this recommendation, any party may file written objections to these
8 | findings and recommendations with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document
9 | should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” The
10 | district judge will review the magistrate judge’s findings and recommendations pursuant to 28
11 | U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified
12 | time may result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th
13 | Cir. 2014), citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991).
14
15 IT IS SO ORDERED. DAA Le
16 | Dated: _ June 10, 2026 :
STANLEY A. BOONE
17 United States Magistrate Judge
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