Jaime

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 NAMON TAYLOR, Case No. 1:25-cv-01791-BAM (PC)

12 Plaintiff, ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT TO

RANDOMLY ASSIGN DISTRICT JUDGE TO

13 v. ACTION

14 GEORGE JAIME, et al., FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

REGARDING DISMISSAL OF CERTAIN

15 Defendants. CLAIMS AND DEFENDANTS

16 (ECF No. 7)

17 FOURTEEN (14) DAY DEADLINE

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19 I. Background

20 Plaintiff Namon Taylor (“Plaintiff”) is a former state prisoner proceeding pro se and in

21 forma pauperis in this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The action was

22 transferred to this Court on November 26, 2025. (ECF No. 11.)

23 On May 6, 2026, the Court screened Plaintiff’s second amended complaint and found that

24 he stated a cognizable claim against Defendants Correctional Officer Phan and Correctional

25 Officer Jane Doe related to his conditions of confinement in violation of the Eighth Amendment,

26 but failed to state any other cognizable claims for relief against any other defendants. (ECF No.

27 21.) The Court ordered Plaintiff to either file a third amended complaint or notify the Court of his

28 willingness to proceed only on the cognizable claim identified by the Court. (Id.) On June 1,

1 2026, Plaintiff notified the Court that he does not intend to amend his complaint,1 and he is

2 willing to proceed only on the cognizable claim identified by the Court. (ECF No. 23.)

3 II. Screening Requirement and Standard

4 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

5 governmental entity and/or against an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C.

6 § 1915A(a). Plaintiff’s complaint, or any portion thereof, is subject to dismissal if it is frivolous

7 or malicious, if it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or if it seeks monetary

8 relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

9 A complaint must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the

10 pleader is entitled to relief. . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not

11 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

12 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell

13 Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as

14 true, courts “are not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,

15 572 F.3d 677, 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

16 To survive screening, Plaintiff’s claims must be facially plausible, which requires

17 sufficient factual detail to allow the Court to reasonably infer that each named defendant is liable

18 for the misconduct alleged. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss v. U.S. Secret

19 Serv., 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009). The sheer possibility that a defendant acted unlawfully

20 is not sufficient, and mere consistency with liability falls short of satisfying the plausibility

21 standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quotation marks omitted); Moss, 572 F.3d at 969.

22 A. Plaintiff’s Allegations

23 The events in the second amended complaint are alleged to have occurred while Plaintiff

24 was housed at California City Correctional Facility. Plaintiff names the following defendants: (1)

25 California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (“CDCR”), (2) California City

26 Correctional Facility (“CCCF”), (3) Correctional Officer Phan, (4) Correctional Officer Sgt. T.

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1 Plaintiff notes his belief, however, that Sgt. T. Micheal should be held liable for his party in

28 reviewing his initial 602 and denying that a violation ever occurred. (ECF No. 23.)

1 Michael, (5) Correctional Officer Jane Doe, (5) Correctional Officer John Doe. Plaintiff also

2 alleges these defendants are “among others.”

3 In January 2022, Plaintiff was on quarantine as an inmate at CCCF. During this time, the

4 toilet in his cell backed up, filling and clogging the bowl with brown feces, urine, and used pieces

5 of tissue. Plaintiff immediately reported the incident to Correctional Officer John Doe as well as

6 the officer in the Control booth. Plaintiff was told by both individuals that a plumber would be on

7 the way. The plumber never showed up. Over the next seven to eight days, Plaintiff spoke to

8 multiple officers including those who seemed to run the unit, Correctional officer Phan and

9 Correctional officer Jane Doe, in the control booth (via cell intercom) about the nonfunctioning

10 toilet. Plaintiff was repeatedly told by these officers that a work order to fix the toilet was put in,

11 and the plumber was on his way. Again, the plumber never showed up. Plaintiff claims there was

12 inadequate training of CDCR staff and delayed appeal review process which led to his prolonged

13 stay in the nonfunctioning cell.

14 Plaintiff alleges that the cells were set up in a way that connects the sink and toilet, so

15 water from the sink runs down into the toilet to be flushed. This connection was devastating to

16 Plaintiff’s well-being since Plaintiff was made to eat smaller portions or not at all to refrain from

17 needing to use the restroom. Plaintiff also stopped drinking water or be forced to urinate on the

18 floor, due the contents of the toilet. Limited water usage also prevented Plaintiff from washing

19 his face, brushing his teeth, washing his only set of undergarments and more. Plaintiff was

20 stressed out mentally and physically.

21 Plaintiff filed a 602 asking for repairs or a cell move. Neither happened. After the eighth

22 day of living in these conditions, Plaintiff was transferred to a different part of the correctional

23 facility – general population. Not long after the move and on two separate occasions, Plaintiff

24 woke up because blood had discharged from his genitals while he slept. His 602 was denied as

25 moot.

26 Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages.

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1 B. Discussion

2 1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8

3 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, a complaint must contain “a short and plain

4 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Detailed

5 factual allegations are not required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action,

6 supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation

7 omitted). Plaintiff must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to

8 relief that is plausible on its face.’” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570,

9 127 S.Ct. at 1974). While factual allegations are accepted as true, legal conclusions are not. Id.;

10 see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556–557.

11 Plaintiff’s complaint is short but not a plain statement of his claims. Plaintiff’s complaint

12 does not clearly state what happened, when it happened, and who was involved. Additionally,

13 Plaintiff’s conclusory statements and legal conclusions are not sufficient to state a cognizable

14 claim for relief.

15 2. Linkage Requirement

16 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

17 Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected,

any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or

18 immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to the party injured in an

action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.

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20 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute plainly requires that there be an actual connection or link between

21 the actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by Plaintiff. See

22 Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). The

23 Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects another to the deprivation of a constitutional

24 right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s

25 affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the

26 deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

27 Plaintiff’s complaint fails to adequately link Defendant Sgt. T. Michael and John Doe to

28 any action or omission alleged to have violated his rights.

1 3. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

2 “The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for money damages in federal court against a state,

3 its agencies, and state officials acting in their official capacities.” Aholelei v. Dep’t of Public

4 Safety, 488 F.3d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007). Indeed, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal

5 courts from hearing a Section 1983 lawsuit in which damages or injunctive relief is sought against

6 a state, its agencies (such as CDCR) or individual prisons, absent “a waiver by the state or a valid

7 congressional override. . . .” Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 1999). “The

8 Eleventh Amendment bars suits which seek either damages or injunctive relief against a state, ‘an

9 arm of the state,’ its instrumentalities, or its agencies.” See Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. v. City of

10 Lodi, Cal., 302 F.3d 928, 957 n.28 (9th Cir. 2002) (internal quotation and citations omitted), cert.

11 denied, 538 U.S. 961 (2003). “The State of California has not waived its Eleventh Amendment

12 immunity with respect to claims brought under § 1983 in federal court. . . .” Dittman, 191 F.3d at

13 1025–26 (citing Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985)); see also Brown v.

14 Cal. Dep’t. of Corrs., 554 F.3d 747, 752 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding California Department of

15 Corrections and California Board of Prison Terms entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity).

16 Therefore, Plaintiff cannot pursue claims for damages against the CDCR or CCCF in this

17 action.

18 4. Supervisory Liability

19 Insofar as Plaintiff is attempting to sue Defendant Warden, or any other defendant, based

20 solely upon his supervisory role, he may not do so. Liability may not be imposed on supervisory

21 personnel for the actions or omissions of their subordinates under the theory of respondeat

22 superior. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676–77; Simmons v. Navajo Cty., Ariz., 609 F.3d 1011, 1020–21 (9th

23 Cir. 2010); Ewing v. City of Stockton, 588 F.3d 1218, 1235 (9th Cir. 2009); Jones v. Williams,

24 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002).

25 Supervisors may be held liable only if they “participated in or directed the violations, or

26 knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent them.” Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045

27 (9th Cir. 1989); accord Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1205–06 (9th Cir. 2011); Corales v.

28 Bennett, 567 F.3d 554, 570 (9th Cir. 2009). “The requisite causal connection may be established

1 when an official sets in motion a ‘series of acts by others which the actor knows or reasonably

2 should know would cause others to inflict’ constitutional harms.” Corales v. Bennett, 567 F.3d at

3 570. Supervisory liability may also exist without any personal participation if the official

4 implemented “a policy so deficient that the policy itself is a repudiation of the constitutional

5 rights and is the moving force of the constitutional violation.” Redman v. Cty. of San Diego, 942

6 F.2d 1435, 1446 (9th Cir. 1991) (citations and quotations marks omitted), abrogated on other

7 grounds by Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825 (1970). When a defendant holds a supervisory

8 position, the causal link between such defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be

9 specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Mosher v. Saalfeld,

10 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978). Vague and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement

11 of supervisory personnel in civil rights violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents,

12 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

13 Plaintiff does not allege that Defendant Warden was personally involved in any

14 constitutional deprivation. Plaintiff does not allege plausible facts that Defendant Warden knew

15 that Plaintiff’s placement in the cell or condition of the cell. Further, Plaintiff fails to identify any

16 policy sufficient to impose liability against Defendant Warden. Plaintiff’s conclusory allegations

17 are insufficient.

18 Plaintiff forwards a claim against Defendant Warden based on the alleged failure to

19 adequately train officers. A “failure to train” or “failure to supervise” theory can be the basis for

20 a supervisor’s liability under § 1983 in only limited circumstances, such as where the failure

21 amounts to deliberate indifference. See City of Canton, Ohio v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 387–90

22 (1989). To establish a failure-to-train/supervise claim, a plaintiff must show that “‘in light of the

23 duties assigned to specific officers or employees, the need for more or different training [or

24 supervision] [was] obvious, and the inadequacy so likely to result in violations of constitutional

25 rights, that the policy-makers . . . can reasonably be said to have been deliberately indifferent to

26 the need.’” Clement v. Gomez, 298 F.3d 898, 905 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Canton, 489 U.S. at

27 390).

28 Ordinarily, a single constitutional violation by an untrained employee is insufficient to

1 demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to train. Connick v. Thompson, 563

2 U.S. 51, 62 (2011). Instead, a plaintiff must usually demonstrate “[a] pattern of similar

3 constitutional violations by untrained employees,” id., unless the need for training is “so obvious”

4 and “so likely to result in the violation of constitutional rights,” that “the failure to provide proper

5 training may fairly be said to represent a policy for which the city is responsible, and for which

6 the city may be held liable if it actually causes injury,” Canton, 489 U.S. at 390.

7 5. Eight Amendment - Conditions of Confinement

8 The Eighth Amendment protects prisoners from inhumane methods of punishment and

9 from inhumane conditions of confinement. Morgan v. Morgensen, 465 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir.

10 2006). Extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions of confinement claim. Hudson

11 v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (citations & quotations omitted). A prisoner's claim does not

12 rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment violation unless (1) “the prison official deprived the

13 prisoner of the ‘minimal civilized measure of life's necessities,’ ” and (2) “the prison official

14 ‘acted with deliberate indifference in doing so.’ ” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th

15 Cir. 2004) (quoting Hallett v. Morgan, 296 F.3d 732, 744 (9th Cir. 2002) (citation omitted)). To

16 state a claim for violation of the Eighth Amendment, the plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to

17 support a claim that prison officials knew of and disregarded a substantial risk of serious harm to

18 the plaintiff. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 847 (1994); Frost v. Agnos, 152 F.3d 1124, 1128

19 (9th Cir. 1998). The circumstances, nature, and duration of the deprivations are critical in

20 determining whether the conditions complained of are grave enough to form the basis of a viable

21 Eighth Amendment claim. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2006). “[R]outine

22 discomfort inherent in the prison setting” does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Id.

23 at 731.

24 The deliberate indifference standard involves both an objective and a subjective prong.

25 First, the alleged deprivation must be, in objective terms, “sufficiently serious.” Farmer, 511

26 U.S. at 834. Second, subjectively, the prison official must “know of and disregard an excessive

27 risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 837; Anderson v. Cty. of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1313 (9th

28 Cir. 1995).

1 Objectively, extreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement

2 claim and only those deprivations denying the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities are

3 sufficiently grave to form the basis of an Eighth Amendment violation. Hudson v. McMillian,

4 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). Although the Constitution “‘does not mandate comfortable prisons,’”

5 Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991), “inmates are entitled to reasonably adequate

6 sanitation, personal hygiene, and laundry privileges, particularly over a lengthy course of time,”

7 Howard v. Adkison, 887 F.2d 134, 137 (8th Cir. 1989).

8 “‘The occasional presence of a rodent is insufficient to establish the objective component

9 of an Eighth Amendment claim, which requires that a deprivation be sufficiently serious.’”

10 Jackson v. Walker, 2009 WL 1743639 at *8 (E.D. Cal. 2009) (quoting Tucker v. Rose, 955 F.

11 Supp. 810, 816 (N.D. Ohio 1997). However, a “lack of sanitation that is severe or prolonged can

12 constitute an infliction of pain within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.” Anderson v. Cty.

13 of Kern, 45 F.3d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir.), opinion amended on denial of reh’g, 75 F.3d 448 (9th Cir.

14 1995). See also Taylor v. Riojas, 141 S. Ct. 52, 53–54 (2020) (finding no qualified immunity to

15 officers who housed inmate “in cells teeming with human waste” for six days).

16 At the pleading stage, Plaintiff states a cognizable claim against Defendants Correctional

17 Officer Phan and Correctional Officer Jane Doe related to his conditions of confinement. Over

18 seven to eight days, Plaintiff spoke to multiple officers including those who seemed to run the

19 unit, Defendants Correctional Officer Phan and Correctional Officer Jane Doe, in the control

20 booth (via cell intercom) about the nonfunctioning toilet. Plaintiff fails to state a claim against

21 any other defendant. Plaintiff does not allege he repeatedly told other defendants of the condition

22 of his cell or identify who those individuals are.

23 6. Grievance Process

24 Although not entirely clear, Plaintiff may be attempting to base his claims on the denial of

25 his grievances. However, Plaintiff cannot pursue any claims against prison staff based solely on

26 the processing and review of his inmate appeals. Plaintiff does not have a constitutionally

27 protected right to have his appeals accepted or processed. Ramirez v. Galaza, 334 F.3d 850, 860

28 (9th Cir. 2003); Mann v. Adams, 855 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1988). The prison grievance

1 procedure does not confer any substantive rights upon inmates and actions in reviewing appeals

2 cannot serve as a basis for liability under section 1983. Buckley v. Barlow, 997 F.2d 494, 495 (8th

3 Cir.1993); see also Wright v. Shannon, No. 1:05-cv-01485-LJO-YNP PC, 2010 WL 445203, at *5

4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2010) (plaintiff's allegations that prison officials denied or ignored his inmate

5 appeals failed to state a cognizable claim under the First Amendment). Denial or refusal to

6 process a prison grievance is not a constitutional violation. Rushdan v. Gear, No. 1:16-cv-01017-

7 BAM (PC), 2018 WL 2229259, at *6 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2018). Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to

8 state a cognizable claim arising out of the screening, processing, or denial of his grievances or

9 complaints.

10 7. Doe Defendants

11 “As a general rule, the use of ‘John Doe’ to identify a defendant is not favored.” Gillespie

12 v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637, 642 (9th Cir. 1980). Plaintiff is advised that John Doe (i.e., an unknown

13 defendant) cannot be served by the United States Marshal until Plaintiff has identified him or her

14 as an actual individual. Plaintiff will be required to identify him or her with enough information to

15 locate the defendant for service of process. Plaintiff will be given the “ ‘opportunity through

16 discovery to identify the unknown [Doe] defendants.’ ” Crowley v. Bannister, 734 F.3d 967, 978

17 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Gillespie, 629 F.2d at 642). Once the identity of the Doe defendant is

18 ascertained, Plaintiff must file a motion to amend his complaint only to substitute a name for John

19 Doe so that service by the United States Marshal can be attempted.

20 III. Conclusion and Recommendation

21 Based on the above, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s second amended complaint states a

22 cognizable claim against Defendants Correctional Officer Phan and Correctional Officer Jane Doe

23 related to his conditions of confinement in violation of the Eighth Amendment. However,

24 Plaintiff’s second amended complaint fails to state any other cognizable claims for relief against

25 any other defendants.

26 Accordingly, the Clerk of the Court is HEREBY DIRECTED to randomly assign a

27 District Judge to this action.

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1 Furthermore, it is HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

2 1. This action proceed on Plaintiff’s second amended complaint against Defendants

3 Correctional Officer Phan and Correctional Officer Jane Doe related to his conditions

4 of confinement in violation of the Eighth Amendment; and

5 2. All other claims and defendants be dismissed based on Plaintiff’s failure to state

6 claims upon which relief may be granted.

7 These Findings and Recommendation will be submitted to the United States District Judge

8 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(l). Within fourteen

9 (14) days after being served with these Findings and Recommendation, Plaintiff may file written

10 objections with the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s

11 Findings and Recommendation.” Objections, if any, shall not exceed fifteen (15) pages or

12 include exhibits. Exhibits may be referenced by document and page number if already in

13 the record before the Court. Any pages filed in excess of the 15-page limit may not be

14 considered. Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result

15 in the waiver of the “right to challenge the magistrate’s factual findings” on appeal. Wilkerson v.

16 Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838–39 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394

17 (9th Cir. 1991)).

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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20 Dated: June 10, 2026 /s/ Barbara A. McAuliffe _

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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