The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
JOSE PINEDA,
Plaintiff,
-against-
25-CV-4554 (JGLC)
DUTCHESS COUNTY, SHERIFF KIRK
IMPERATI, OFFICER ARROYO, OPINION AND ORDER
SERGEANT LAMONICA, and FRANK
TORRE,
Defendants.
JESSICA G. L. CLARKE, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Jose Pineda, who is proceeding pro se, spent seven days incarcerated at the
Dutchess County Jail in early May of last year. Pineda is Jewish and “observes kosher dietary
laws as a fundamental tenet of his faith.” But during six of the seven days he spent in jail, he was
denied access to kosher meals. Instead, jail officials provided Pineda with non-kosher food—
which he did not eat. As a result, Pineda experienced “significant physical effects including
extreme hunger, weakness, dizziness, and weight loss,” as well as “severe emotional distress,
humiliation, and spiritual anguish from being forced to choose between violating his religious
beliefs and going without food.”
Now released, Pineda brings this action against Dutchess County, Dutchess County
Sherriff Kirk Imperati, and several jail officials. He asserts claims under the First and Eighth
Amendments, as well as a claim for municipal liability. Defendants move to dismiss all of
Pineda’s claims. Because Plaintiff failed to state claims against the County and Sheriff Imperati,
the Court dismisses the claims against these defendants. All other claims survive for the reasons
stated below.
BACKGROUND
The following facts are, unless otherwise noted, taken from the Amended Complaint
(“AC”), ECF No. 34, and presumed to be true for the purposes of this motion. See LaFaro v. N.Y.
Cardiothoracic Grp., PLLC, 570 F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir. 2009).
Plaintiff Jose Pineda (“Pineda”) was incarcerated at the Dutchess County Jail from May
8, 2025, until May 14, 2025. ¶ 14. Pineda is a practicing Jew who “observ[es] kosher dietary
laws as a fundamental tenet of his faith.” ¶ 13. But for six of the seven days he was incarcerated,
jail officials denied him access to kosher meals. ¶ 2. When Pineda was provided non-kosher
food, he did not consume it. ¶ 19. As a result, Pineda experienced “significant physical effects
including extreme hunger, weakness, dizziness, and weight loss,” as well as “severe emotional
distress, humiliation, and spiritual anguish from being forced to choose between violating his
religious beliefs and going without food.” ¶¶ 33–34.
During his intake, Pineda told jail officials that he was a practicing Jew who needed
kosher meals to comply with his religious observance. ¶ 15. The nurse on duty acknowledged
Pineda’s religious dietary requirements and confirmed that she would note them. ¶ 16. However,
other intake employees—relying on old records—identified Pineda as a Catholic. ¶ 17. For the
next six days, from May 8, 2025, through May 13, 2025, Pineda did not receive kosher meals.
¶ 18.
Pineda tried to fix the problem by speaking with multiple other jail officials, including
Sergeant LaMonica (“LaMonica”). ¶ 20. But LaMonica refused to correct the error. ¶ 21.
LaMonica insisted that the jail had conducted the intake properly. Id. Accordingly, Pineda’s
religious identification remained unchanged—and he continued to receive non-kosher meals. See
id. He continued to not eat them. ¶ 19.
Approximately four days after his intake, Pineda began to feel lightheaded, weak, and
dizzy. ¶ 23. He requested medical attention. ¶ 24. The nurse who had conducted his intake again
“confirmed his religious dietary need for kosher meals”—this time in front of LaMonica. ¶ 25.
Another jail official, Officer Arroyo (“Arroyo”), was also present for Pineda’s medical
evaluation. ¶ 27. According to the Amended Complaint, Arroyo told Pineda that he “would love
to see [Pineda’s] health take a downhill turn and to be the one responsible.” Id. Arroyo warned
Pineda to stay on his bunk and to “shut the fuck up.” ¶ 28. These threats made Pineda “feel
unsafe and effectively deterred him from seeking further medical” assistance. ¶ 29. Pineda
continued to receive only non-kosher meals. ¶ 26.
On May 12, 2025, transport officers noticed Pineda’s condition and encouraged him to
seek medical attention. ¶ 30. One of those officers, Officer Correro (“Correro”), also tried to help
Pineda get kosher meals. ¶ 31. But LaMonica discouraged Correro and implied that further
efforts to get Pineda kosher meals “would not be supported.” Id.
Two days later, on May 14, 2025, Pineda finally received his first kosher meal. ¶ 32. It
was his last day in jail. Id. In total, Pineda spent six of his seven days incarcerated without
kosher food. ¶¶ 1–2.
Not long after his release, on May 27, 2025, Pineda filed this lawsuit. ECF No. 1. He
asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”) for violations of the First Amendment
Free Exercise Clause, the Eighth Amendment, and for Monell liability.1 ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 36–56.
0F
He seeks a declaratory judgement that Defendants violated his First and Eighth Amendment
rights; compensatory damages for his “pain, suffering, emotional distress, humiliation, and harm
1 That same day, Pineda also filed a companion lawsuit challenging the constitutionality
of his detention. See Complaint, Pineda v. Sutherland, No. 25-CV-4552 (JGLC) (S.D.N.Y. May
27, 2025), ECF No. 1.
to religious exercise;” punitive damages against Defendants Arroyo and LaMonica in their
individual capacities; and injunctive relief directing Dutchess County and the Sheriff’s Office to,
among other things, implement training about religious dietary accommodations and new
policies prohibiting retaliation against incarcerated individuals who request medical care. AC at
10.
On August 26, 2026, Defendants Dutchess County, Sheriff Kirk Imperati (“Imperati”),
Officer Arroyo, and Sergeant LaMonica (collectively, the “County Defendants” or “Defendants”)
moved to dismiss. ECF No. 20. They argue that, as a threshold matter, Pineda failed to exhaust
his administrative remedies and is thus barred from challenging the conditions of his
confinement under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). ECF No. 23 (“MTD”) at 4–5.
On the merits, they assert that Pineda has failed to state all three of his claims.2 Id. at 5–14. The
1F
County Defendants also contend that the “Individual Defendants”—Imperati, Arroyo, and
LaMonica—were not personally involved in the constitutional violations Pineda alleges. Id. at
15–17. And they argue that the Individual Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity. Id. at
17–18.
When Pineda first filed his Complaint, he also alleged a claim against a man named
“Frank” who worked in the jail’s Food Services Division. ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”) ¶ 12. Pineda
contended that Frank “refused or failed to act on confirmed dietary instructions” to provide
2 The County Defendants improperly include and rely upon the jail’s own “logs” to
support their arguments. See ECF No. 22-2. The Court does not consider these records because
they fall outside of the complaint. See United States ex rel. Foreman v. AECOM, 19 F.4th 85, 107
(2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Friedl v. City of New York, 210 F.3d 79, 83–84 (2d Cir. 2000))
(explaining that a district court “errs when it consider[s] affidavits and exhibits submitted by
defendants . . . in ruling on a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss.”). Although Pineda’s Amended
Complaint refers to jail officials’ notes, and to his own requests that jail officials take those notes,
the jail’s internal records are hardly “integral” to Pineda’s pleadings. See id. (noting that external
documents are “considered ‘integral’ to the complaint in a narrow set of circumstances”).
Pineda with kosher meals, even after Pineda tried to “escalate the issue.” ¶ 22. Defendants’
counsel later identified Frank as a man named Frank Torre. See ECF No. 19. Once “Frank’s”
identity was known, Pineda amended his Complaint to include Frank Torre as a named
Defendant. See AC at 1. Pineda’s Amended Complaint, which the Court construes to be the
operative complaint in this case, asserted identical claims against the County Defendants. See
generally AC. Recently, Frank Torre also moved to dismiss this case. ECF No. 41. However,
because Torre’s motion has not yet been fully briefed, the Court does not address it here. The
County Defendants, meanwhile, renewed their motion to dismiss Pineda’s Amended Complaint,
relying on their initial filings. See ECF No. 37. The Court addresses the County Defendants’
motion to dismiss below.
LEGAL STANDARD
In reviewing a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must “constru[e] the
complaint liberally, accepting all factual allegations in the complaint as true, and drawing all
reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor.” Goldstein v. Pataki, 516 F.3d 50, 56 (2d Cir. 2008)
(internal citation omitted). This is especially so in pro se cases, where “courts read pro se filings
‘to raise the strongest arguments that they suggest.’” Anderson Bey v. Roc Nation LLC, No. 1:24-
CV-02295 (ALC), 2025 WL 564248, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 20, 2025) (quoting Triestman v. Fed.
Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006)). A claim will survive a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion only if the plaintiff alleges facts sufficient “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). A claim is facially plausible “when
the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the
defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)
(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for
relief will . . . be a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial
experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. “Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of
action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678. If a complaint does
not state a plausible claim for relief, it must be dismissed. Id. at 679.
DISCUSSION
This discussion proceeds in seven parts. First, the Court analyzes whether the PLRA bars
Pineda’s claims and finds that the statute does no such thing. Second, the Court evaluates
Pineda’s First Amendment Free Exercise claim and concludes that he states that claim. Third, the
Court finds that Pineda plausibly alleges deliberate indifference claims under the Eighth or
Fourteenth Amendment. But, fourth, the Court concludes that Pineda does not sufficiently plead
a claim for Monell liability. Fifth, the Court assesses whether Pineda pleads sufficient facts to
demonstrate that the Individual Defendants were personally involved in the constitutional
violations he alleges. The Court concludes that he has sufficiently alleged that Arroyo and
LaMonica, but not Imperati, were personally involved. Sixth, the Court concludes that neither
Arroyo nor LaMonica are entitled to qualified immunity. And lastly, the Court sua sponte denies
Pineda leave to further amend his complaint.
I. The PLRA Does Not Bar Pineda’s Claims
As an initial matter, Defendants’ argument that the PLRA bars Pineda’s claims is without
merit. The PLRA provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions
under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], or any other Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or
other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42
U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “Exhaustion is ‘mandatory’ and ‘applies to all inmate suits about prison life,
whether they involve general circumstances or particular episodes,’” or allege excessive force,
the denial of adequate medical care, or some other wrong. Hernandez v. Coffey, 582 F.3d 303,
305 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516, 524 (2002)); see also Ross v. Blake,
578 U.S. 632, 635 (2016). To exhaust administrative remedies under the PLRA, an incarcerated
individual must “‘complete the administrative review process in accordance with the applicable
procedural rules’ – rules that are defined not by the PLRA, but by the prison grievance process
itself.” Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199, 218 (2007) (quoting Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 88
(2006)).
However, the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies only to “prisoner[s] confined in
any jail, prison, or other correctional facility”—not to individuals who sue after they have been
released from confinement. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); see also Morris v. Eversley, 205 F. Supp. 2d
234, 241 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (citing Greig v. Goord, 169 F.3d 165, 167 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that
litigants “who file prison condition actions after release from confinement are no longer
‘prisoners’ for [the] purposes of § 1997e(a) and, therefore, need not satisfy [its] exhaustion
requirements”)). Indeed, the Second Circuit has long made clear that “[t]he relevant time at
which a person must be ‘a prisoner’ within the meaning of the PLRA in order for the Act’s
restrictions to apply is ‘the moment the plaintiff files his complaint.’” Jones v. Cuomo, 2 F.4th 22
(2d Cir. 2021) (quoting Gibson v. City Mun. of N.Y., 692 F.3d 198, 201 (2d Cir. 2012)). Because
Pineda was released from the Dutchess County Jail on May 14, 2025, then filed this action after
his release, on May 27, 2025, the PLRA’s exhaustion requirements do not apply and the statute
does not bar his claims. AC ¶ 14; ECF No. 1.
Moreover, “PLRA exhaustion is an ‘affirmative defense,”’ not a “pleading requirement”:
plaintiffs “are not required to specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.”
Perttu v. Richards, 605 U.S. 460, 469 (2025) (quoting Jones, 549 U.S. at 212, 216). Pineda need
not have pled, as Defendants suggest, that he filed a grievance or appealed any denial of his
complaints. See Perttu, 65 U.S. at 469; Jones, 549 U.S. at 216 (“We conclude that failure to
exhaust is an affirmative defense under the PLRA, and that inmates are not required to specially
plead or demonstrate exhaustion in their complaints.”); cf. MTD at 5. The PLRA therefore does
not bar Pineda’s claims on multiple grounds.
II. Pineda Plausibly States a First Amendment Free Exercise Claim
Turning to the merits, the Court first addresses Pineda’s claim under the First Amendment
Free Exercise Clause. AC ¶¶ 36–42. “The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment,
applicable to the States under the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that ‘Congress shall make no
law . . . prohibiting the free exercise’ of religion.” Fulton v. City of Philadelphia, 593 U.S. 522,
532 (2021) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. I). Its protections do not stop at a prison’s walls;
incarcerated people “have long been understood to retain some measure of the constitutional
protection afforded by the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause.” Ford v. McGinnis, 352 F.3d
582, 588 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974)).
“In the prison context, however, ‘the right to free exercise of religion’ is balanced against
‘the interests of prison officials charged with complex duties arising from administration of the
penal system.’” Kravitz v. Purcell, 87 F.4th 111, 127–28 (2d Cir. 2023) (quoting Benjamin v.
Coughlin, 905 F.2d 571, 574 (2d Cir. 1990)). “Therefore, an infringement of the free exercise of
religion is permissible only if it is ‘reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’” Id.
(quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)). To evaluate a free exercise claim, then, “a
court must assess “(1) whether the practice asserted is religious in the person’s scheme of beliefs,
and whether the belief is sincerely held; (2) whether the challenged practice of the prison
officials infringes upon the religious belief; and (3) whether the challenged practice of the prison
officials furthers . . . legitimate penological objective[s].” Kravitz, 87 F.4th at 128 (quoting Farid
v. Smith, 850 F.2d 917, 926 (2d Cir. 1988)).
The Second Circuit has also recently made clear that “[i]n the context of a § 1983 claim
for a violation of the First Amendment, there is no requirement to show that the governmental
burden on religious beliefs was ‘substantial.’” Id. at 127. “Rather, a plaintiff may carry the
burden of proving a free exercise violation . . . by showing that a government entity has burdened
his sincere religious practice pursuant to a policy that is not ‘neutral’ or ‘generally applicable.’”
Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); see id. at 124 (explaining that, since 1990,
“the Supreme Court has treated a showing of the plaintiff’s sincerity to be sufficient to establish
a prima facie free exercise violation and has not referenced a substantial burden requirement”)
(citing Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist., 597 U.S. 507, 525 (2022); Fulton, 593 U.S. at 523;
Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531–47 (1993); Emp. Div.,
Dept. of Human Res. of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879–81 (1990)).
The substantial burden requirement led to a long “line of troubling decisions,” the Second
Circuit explained, because it ushered courts into the “misguided enterprise” of “measuring the
devotional import of certain religious practices.” Kravitz, 87 F.4th at 125 (quoting McEachin v.
McGuinnis, 357 F.3d 197, 202 (2d Cir. 2004)) (cleaned up). But “[i]t is not within the judicial
ken to question the centrality of particular beliefs or practices to a faith, or the validity of
particular litigants’ interpretations of those creeds,” the Circuit has cautioned. McEachin, 357
F.3d at 201 (quoting Hernandez v. Comm’r, 490 U.S. 680, 699, (1989)). Courts must “resist the
dangerous temptation to try to judge the significance of particular devotional obligations to an
observant practitioner of faith.” Id. at 201.
Here, then, the application is straightforward. Pineda is a self-described “practicing Jew”
who observes “kosher dietary laws as a fundamental tenet of his faith.” AC ¶ 13. He affirms that
his “Jewish faith and observance of kosher dietary laws constitute sincerely held religious
beliefs.” Id. ¶ 39. Defendants’ repeated decisions to withhold his kosher meals for a prolonged
period of time—six days—doubtless infringed upon his religious beliefs. See id. ¶¶ 18, 21, 26–
28, 31, 40. And Defendants offer no legitimate penological objectives to justify their actions. See
MTD at 5–7; ECF No. 30 (“Reply”) at 1–2. As alleged, Defendants targeted Pineda individually
and for no reason; they were not acting pursuant to a “neutral” or “generally applicable” policy.
See Kravitz, 87 F.4th at 127.
Defendants respond by mistakenly relying on cases that undertake the “misguided
enterprise” of “measuring the devotional import of certain religious practices.” Id. at 125; see
MTD at 6–7 (citing Washington v. Afify, 968 F. Supp. 2d 532, 537–38 (W.D.N.Y. 2013); Lewis v.
Zon, 920 F. Supp. 2d 379, 385–86 (W.D.N.Y. 2013); Jean-Laurent v. Los, No. 12-CV-132 (S) (F),
2015 WL 1015383, at *6–7 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 9, 2015); Odom v. Dixon, 04-CV-889 (F), 2008 WL
466255, at *10–12 (W.D.N.Y. Feb. 15, 2008); Thomas v. Picio, 04-CV-3174 (KMW) (RLE),
2008 WL 820740, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2008); Peterson v. Price, 06-CV-106 (FS), 2007 WL
2893009, at *6 (N.D.W. Va. Sept. 28, 2007)). These cases, which largely hail from outside of this
District and require plaintiffs to demonstrate that they are suffering a “substantial burden” on
their religious beliefs, are inapposite. See Kravitz, 87 F.4th at 125. Because Pineda alleges “that
his sincere religious beliefs were burdened,” and Defendants provide no legitimate penological
justification for their actions, “that is enough[.]” Id. at 129.
Pineda’s First Amendment Free Exercise claim survives Defendants’ motion to dismiss.
III. Pineda Plausibly Alleges Deliberate Indifference Under the Eighth or
Fourteenth Amendment
Next, the Court considers Pineda’s allegations regarding his conditions of confinement,
which he styles as an Eighth Amendment claim and levies only against Arroyo and LaMonica.
AC ¶¶ 43–50. First, the Court sets out the general standards that govern such claims. Then, it
analyzes what it construes as Pineda’s two specific allegations, that: (1) being deprived of food
for six days constituted cruel and unusual punishment, and (2) Defendants were deliberately
indifferent to his attendant medical issues as a result of the lack of food. The Court denies
Defendants’ motion to dismiss as to both challenged conditions.
“The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of ‘cruel and unusual punishments.’”
Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 125 (2d Cir. 2013) (quoting U.S. Const. amend. VIII). “To
demonstrate that the conditions of [one’s] confinement constitute cruel and unusual punishment,
the plaintiff must satisfy both an objective test and a subjective test.” Jolly v. Coughlin, 76 F.3d
468, 480 (2d Cir. 1996). The plaintiff “must allege that: (1) objectively, the deprivation [he]
suffered was ‘sufficiently serious that he was denied the minimal civilized measure of life’s
necessities,’ and (2) subjectively, the defendant official acted with ‘a sufficiently culpable state of
mind . . . , such as deliberate indifference to inmate health or safety.’” Walker, 717 F.3d at 125
(quoting Gaston v. Coughlin, 249 F.3d 156, 164 (2d Cir. 2001)); see id. (quoting Rhodes v.
Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981) (explaining that “conditions of confinement may not
‘involve the wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain’”).
The Supreme Court has extended these protections “to pretrial detainees under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, reasoning that ‘the due process rights of a person
[detained but not convicted] are at least as great as the Eighth Amendment protections available
to a convicted prisoner.’” Darby v. Greenman, 14 F.4th 124, 128 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting City of
Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983)). “Plaintiff does not explicitly state in the
Amended Complaint whether he is a detainee or inmate.” McCray v. Westchester Cnty., No. 18-
CV-3494 (NSR), 2021 WL 5597158, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 30, 2021). “Regardless of his
classification, however, the Constitution requires that prison officials ‘provide humane
conditions of confinement’ and ‘ensure that inmates receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and
medical care.’” Id. (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994)).
The objective test is the same under both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Darnell v. Pineiro, 849 F.3d 17, 30 (2d Cir. 2017). To meet the objective element, “the inmate
must show that the conditions, either alone or in combination, pose an unreasonable risk of
serious damage to his health.” Id. (citation omitted). This unreasonable risk to health includes
“the risk of serious damage to physical and mental soundness.” Id. (cleaned up). “There is no
static test to determine whether a deprivation is sufficiently serious; instead, the conditions
themselves must be evaluated in light of contemporary standards of decency.” Id. (cleaned up).
“In other words, the prisoner must show that the risk of which he complains is not one that
today’s society chooses to tolerate.” Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 36 (1993). Conditions of
confinement may also be “aggregated to rise to the level of a constitutional violation, but ‘only
when they have a mutually enforcing effect that produces the deprivation of a single, identifiable
human need such as food, warmth, or exercise.’” Darnell, 849 F.3d at 30 (quoting Walker, 717
F.3d at 125).
The subjective test differs, however, between the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments.
Under the Eighth Amendment, to “meet the subjective element, the plaintiff must show that the
defendant acted with ‘more than mere negligence.’” Walker, 717 F.3d at 125 (internal citation
omitted). “‘[T]he prison official must know of, and disregard, an excessive risk to inmate health
or safety.’” Id. (internal citation omitted); see also Jolly, 76 F.3d at 481 (explaining that
deliberate indifference is “the subjective prong of the Eighth Amendment inquiry”).
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, by contrast, the subjective element is “more properly
considered a mens rea prong that requires a showing of recklessness, which is defined
objectively.” Strange v. Westchester Cnty. Dep’t of Corr., No. 17-CV-9968 (NSR), 2018 WL
3910829, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 2018) (citing Darnell, 849 F.3d at 32, 35). Someone who is
detained pretrial must therefore plead facts that demonstrate “that the defendant-official acted
intentionally to impose the alleged condition, or recklessly failed to act with reasonable care to
mitigate the risk that the condition posed to the pretrial detainee[—]even though the defendant-
official knew, or should have known, that the condition posed an excessive risk to health or
safety.” Darnell, 849 F.3d at 35. Because this standard is “defined objectively,” it “can be
violated when an official does not have subjective awareness that the official’s acts . . . have
subjected the pretrial detainee to a substantial risk of harm.” Id.; see also McCray, 2021 WL
5597158, at *4.
A. Pineda’s Claim Regarding Food Deprivation Survives
Construing the Amended Complaint “liberally to raise the strongest arguments it
suggests,” the Court finds that Pineda sufficiently states a claim under either the Eighth or
Fourteenth Amendment based on the allegations that the jail effectively deprived him food for
several days. Walker, 717 F.3d at 124 (cleaned up). Although “courts in this Circuit have held
that being denied a single meal does not give rise to a constitutional deprivation,” Rush v.
Fischer, 923 F. Supp. 2d 545, 555 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Rush v. Canfield, 649 F.
App’x 70 (2d Cir. 2016), “under certain circumstances a substantial deprivation of food may well
be recognized as being of constitutional dimension,” Robles v. Coughlin, 725 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir.
1983); see also Jackson v. Marks, 722 F. App’x 106, 107 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Robles, 725
F.2d at 15) (“‘[A] substantial deprivation of food’ can cause serious physical harm sufficient to
find cruel and unusual punishment[.]”).
The Constitution “require[s] that prisoners be served nutritionally adequate food that is
prepared and served under conditions which do not present an immediate danger to the health
and well-being of the inmates.” Robles v. Coughlin, 725 F.2d 12, 15 (2d Cir. 1983) (cleaned up).
So when food does present such a danger—either because it cannot be safely consumed or
because prison officials have withheld it—courts in this Circuit have allowed plaintiffs’ claims to
proceed. See, e.g., Willey v. Kirkpatrick, 801 F. 3d 51, 69 (2d Cir. 2015) (finding plaintiff’s
allegations that he was routinely served stale bread and rotten cabbage as part of a restricted diet
sufficient to state a facially plausible claim under the Eighth Amendment); Phelps v. Kapnolas,
308 F.3d 180, 186–87 (2d Cir. 2002) (reversing district court’s decision dismissing plaintiff’s
Eighth Amendment claim that prison officials deprived him of a nutritionally adequate diet for
fourteen straight days); Colson v. Mingo, No. 18-CV-2765 (JGLC), 2024 WL 1018582, at *14
(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2024) (denying summary judgment where plaintiff was deprived of food and
water for at least fifteen hours, was deprived of medication and medical care, and experienced
“severely unsanitary conditions”); McCray v. Westchester Cnty., 2021 WL 5597158, at *5
(collecting cases) (plaintiff’s allegations that he was served rotten and stale food, resulting in
nausea, vomiting, significant weight loss, and mental health issues, were sufficient to pass the
objective prong under both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments); Salgado v. DuBois, No. 17-
CV-6040 (NSR), 2019 WL 1409808, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2019) (“rotting and insect-
infested food” satisfied the objective prong)
Here, Pineda alleges that Arroyo and LaMonica’s actions, taken together, had the
“mutually enforcing effect” of depriving him of food for six days. Darnell, 849 F.3d at 30; AC
¶¶ 32–34, 46–49. That deprivation—of a “single, identifiable human need”—is enough to meet
the objective prong under both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Darnell, 849 F.3d at 30;
see Jabbar v. Fischer, 683 F.3d 54, 57 (2d Cir. 2012) (cleaned up) (“We have held that prisoners
may not be deprived of their basic human needs—e.g., food . . . .”). Pineda has also sufficiently
alleged that he suffered a “distinct and palpable injury” as a result of that deprivation. McCray,
2021 WL 5597158, at *5 (quoting M.F. v. Reish, No. 95-CV-4904 (SAS), 1996 WL 345953, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. June 21, 1996)). “Going without food for multiple days created a serious medical
need,” he alleges, “including extreme hunger, weakness, dizziness, and weight loss,” as well as
“severe emotional distress, humiliation, and spiritual anguish from being forced to choose
between violating his religious beliefs and going without food.” AC ¶¶ 33–34, 45. These “risk[s]
of serious damage to [his] physical and mental soundness” are sufficient to, at this stage, move
his claim forward. Darnell, 849 F.3d at 30 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
Pineda’s allegations are also sufficient to meet the subjective prong under both the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments. According to the Amended Complaint, Arroyo and LaMonica
knew of and disregarded the excessive risks to Plaintiff’s health and safety, or recklessly failed to
act with reasonable care to mitigate those risks once they knew about them. See AC ¶¶ 27, 31,
47, 48. Therefore, Pineda’s food-related conditions of confinement claim survives Defendants’
motion to dismiss.
B. Pineda’s Medical Indifference Claim Survives
The Court now turns to the other basis for Pineda’s conditions of confinement claim: that
Arroyo and LaMonica were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs. Medical indifference
claims follow a similar rubric to food-related conditions of confinement claims. First, the
“alleged deprivation of adequate medical care must be ‘sufficiently serious.’” Salahuddin v.
Goord, 467 F.3d 263, 279 (2d Cir.2006) (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834) (internal quotations
omitted). “In determining the seriousness of a medical condition, courts look to certain factors,
including: (1) ‘whether a reasonable doctor or patient would find [it] important and worthy of
comment’; (2) ‘whether the condition significantly affects an individual’s daily activities’; (3)
‘and whether it causes chronic and substantial pain.’” Randle v. Alexander, 960 F. Supp. 2d 457,
480 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 280).
Second, the plaintiff must satisfy the subjective element—demonstrating “that the
defendant acted with ‘deliberate indifference.’” Vega v. Semple, 963 F.3d 259, 273 (2d Cir. 2020).
“Deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment standard means the official must know of
and disregard an excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. (cleaned up). The prison official
“must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of
serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. The Supreme Court has long held,
for instance, that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the
‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ proscribed by the Eighth Amendment[] . . . whether
the indifference is manifested by prison doctors in their response to the prisoner’s needs or by
prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care.” Darby, 14 F.4th at
128 (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104–05 (1976)).
“[A] detainee asserting a Fourteenth Amendment claim for deliberate indifference to his
medical needs,” meanwhile, “can allege either that the defendants knew that failing to provide
the complained of medical treatment would pose a substantial risk to his health or that the
defendants should have known that failing to provide the omitted medical treatment would pose a
substantial risk to the detainee’s health.” Charles v. Orange Cnty., 925 F.3d 73, 87 (2d Cir. 2019).
Here, too, Pineda’s claim passes muster. Again “accepting all factual allegations in the
[Amended Complaint] as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff’s favor,”
Goldstein, 516 F.3d at 56, Pineda has stated a claim for medical indifference under the Eighth or
Fourteenth Amendment. As an initial matter, Pineda has sufficiently alleged that the claimed
deprivation of medical care was sufficiently serious. First, if someone has not eaten for six days
and is then discouraged from seeking medical care, “a reasonable doctor or patient would find
[it] important and worthy of comment.” Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 280. Second, the Court can draw
the reasonable inference that Pineda’s “extreme hunger, weakness, dizziness, and weight loss,”
along with his emotional distress, “significantly affect[ed] [his] daily activities.” Id.; AC ¶¶ 33–
34. And third, the Court can reasonably infer that these medical conditions caused Pineda
chronic and substantial pain. See Salahuddin, 467 F.3d at 280. Pineda thus satisfies the objective
element of his medical indifference claim.
Pineda also demonstrates that Arroyo and LaMonica acted with deliberate indifference—
meeting the subjective element of his medical indifference claim. Just as they did with Pineda’s
food deprivation claim, both Arroyo and LaMonica knew of and disregarded the excessive risks
to Plaintiff’s health and safety in the medical context, as well, or recklessly failed to act with
reasonable care to mitigate those risks once they knew about them. See AC ¶¶ 27, 31, 47–48.
Both Arroyo and LaMonica knew that Pineda was suffering but actively chose to not do anything
to help alleviate his symptoms; in fact, they tried to make them worse. See id. Arroyo’s alleged
statement that he “would love to see [Pineda’s] health take a downhill turn and to be the one
responsible” could not be much more clear. AC ¶ 27.
Defendants push back by highlighting that Pineda did, in fact, receive medical care. MTD
at 11. But their argument misses the point. Pineda does not dispute that he received an
appointment with a nurse on or about May 11, 2025, once he began to experience physical
symptoms and requested medical attention. AC ¶¶ 23–24. Indeed, at that check-up, the nurse
relayed to Arroyo and LaMonica that Pineda needed to be served kosher food. Id. ¶¶ 25, 27.
Instead, Pineda’s argument turns on his allegations that subsequent to his May 11 evaluation, he
never received any medical care—because at that very evaluation, Arroyo allegedly stated that
he would love to see Pineda’s health decline. AC ¶ 27. LaMonica, meanwhile, continued to
discourage other jail officials from working to alleviate Pineda’s health problems following that
appointment. Id. ¶ 31. In other words, that Pineda received an appointment with a nurse is not the
point; it is that Arroyo and LaMonica learned about the excessive risks Pineda faced to his health
and safety at that very check-up—then allegedly chose to disregard them. See AC ¶¶ 27, 31, 47–
48; Vega, 963 F.3d at 273.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s medical indifference claim also survives Defendants’ motion to
dismiss.
IV. Pineda Fails to Establish Monell Liability
Next, the Court evaluates Pineda’s claim for municipal liability pursuant to Monell v.
Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978). AC ¶¶ 51–56. A claim for municipal liability under
Section 1983 requires a plaintiff to “plead and prove three elements: (1) an official policy or
custom that (2) causes the plaintiff to be subjected to (3) a denial of a constitutional right.” Wray
v. City of New York, 490 F.3d 189, 195 (2d Cir. 2007) (quoting Batista v. Rodriguez, 702 F.2d
393, 397 (2d Cir. 1983)). A plaintiff may satisfy the “policy or custom” requirement by alleging
one of the following:
(1) [A] formal policy officially endorsed by the municipality; (2)
actions taken by government officials responsible for establishing
the municipal policies that caused the particular deprivation in
question; (3) a practice so consistent and widespread that, although
not expressly authorized, constitutes a custom or usage of which a
supervising policy-maker must have been aware; or (4) a failure by
policymakers to provide adequate training or supervision to
subordinates to such an extent that it amounts to deliberate
indifference to the rights of those who come into contact with the
municipal employees.
Brandon v. City of New York, 705 F. Supp. 2d 261, 276–77 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (internal citations
omitted); see also Patterson v. County of Oneida, 375 F.3d 206, 226–27 (2d Cir. 2004)
(describing methods of establishing Monell liability).
Moreover, a plaintiff must establish a causal link between the municipality’s policy,
custom or practice and the alleged constitutional injury. See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471
U.S. 808, 824 n.8 (1985) (“The fact that a municipal ‘policy’ might lead to ‘police misconduct’ is
hardly sufficient to satisfy Monell’s requirement that the particular policy be the ‘moving force’
behind a constitutional violation. There must at least be an affirmative link between[, for
example,] the training inadequacies alleged, and the particular constitutional violation at issue.”).
Here, Pineda’s conclusory argument that the “constitutional violations suffered by
Plaintiff resulted from policies, customs, or practices of Dutchess County and the Sheriff’s
Office” is plainly insufficient to state a claim for municipal liability under Monell. AC ¶ 53.
Pineda pleads no other facts to support this broad, vague allegation. See generally AC. Because a
“‘general and conclusory allegation’ of a municipal policy or custom fails to state a facially
plausible Monell claim,” Pineda’s municipal liability claim is dismissed with prejudice.
Valdiviezo v. Boyer, 752 F. App’x 29, 31 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Littlejohn v. City of New York,
795 F.3d 297, 315 (2d Cir. 2015); see infra Section VII (denying leave to amend).
V. Pineda Alleges Sufficient Facts to Demonstrate That Arroyo and LaMonica, Not
Imperati, Were Personally Involved in the Alleged Violations
Defendants next assert two additional affirmative defenses. First, Defendants argue that
Pineda’s claims against the Individual Defendants must fail because those Defendants—Officer
Arroyo, Sergeant LaMonica, and Sheriff Imperati—were not personally involved in the
constitutional violations Pineda alleges. MTD at 15–17. “To state a claim for damages under
Section 1983, the plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to demonstrate that defendants were
personally or directly involved in the violation[.]” Alvarado v. Westchester Cnty., 22 F. Supp. 3d
208, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 2014); see also Grullon v. City of New Haven, 720 F.3d 133, 138–39 (2d Cir.
2013) (collecting cases).
To establish such liability, Pineda must show that each “defendant, through the official’s
own individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Tangreti v. Bachmann, 983 F.3d 609, 618
(2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676). A plaintiff may establish personal involvement
by showing that:
(1) the defendant participated directly in the alleged constitutional
violation, (2) the defendant, after being informed of the violation
through a report or appeal, failed to remedy the wrong, (3) the
defendant created a policy or custom under which unconstitutional
practices occurred, or allowed the continuance of such a policy or
custom, (4) the defendant was grossly negligent in supervising
subordinates who committed the wrongful acts, or (5) the defendant
exhibited deliberate indifference to the rights of inmates by failing
to act on information indicating that unconstitutional acts were
occurring.
Grullon, 720 F.3d at 139 (2d Cir. 2013) (cleaned up).
In the context of Section 1983 supervisory claims, a plaintiff “must demonstrate both that
the defendant was ‘aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk
of serious harm existed, and that the defendant also drew the inference.’” Elting v. Lassiter, No.
22-CV-8573 (PGG), 2023 WL 8699454, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 2023) (quoting Tangreti, 983
F.3d at 619) (cleaned up). “Individual liability under § 1983 may not be based on a theory of
respondeat superior or vicarious liability.” Lloyd v. City of New York, 43 F. Supp. 3d 254, 266
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (citations omitted).
Here, Pineda seeks punitive damages against Officer Arroyo and Sergeant LaMonica in
their individual capacities, as well as general compensatory damages. AC at 10. And he pleads
sufficient facts to demonstrate that both Arroyo and LaMonica were personally involved in the
alleged constitutional violations at issue. Arroyo, for his part, told Pineda during a medical
evaluation that he “would love to see [Pineda’s] health take a downhill turn and to be the one
responsible.” AC ¶ 27. LaMonica, meanwhile, was present for the same medical evaluation and
discouraged another jail official from trying to source kosher meals for Pineda—implying that
such a solution “would not be supported.” Id. ¶ 31.
Even if the Court were to assume that the defendants did not “participate[] directly in the
alleged constitutional violation[s],” which it does not, Pineda pleads enough facts to sufficiently
demonstrate that Arroyo and LaMonica both “failed to remedy the wrong” after being informed
of the alleged violations or “exhibited deliberate indifference to the rights of inmates by failing to
act on information indicating that unconstitutional acts were occurring.” Grullon, 720 F.3d at
139. Therefore, both Arroyo and LaMonica were sufficiently personally involved in the alleged
violations for Pineda to seek damages from them under Section 1983.
By contrast, Pineda alleges no facts to demonstrate that Sheriff Imperati was personally
involved in the constitutional violations he alleges. Pineda only asserts that Imperati was
“ultimately responsible for the operation, policies, and personnel of the Dutchess County Jail,”
AC ¶ 9, and that Imperati was deliberately indifferent to the “systemic failures” that caused
Pineda’s injuries. Id. ¶ 56. Pineda does not demonstrate that Imperati was “aware of facts from
which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm existed” or that
Imperati “drew the inference.” Tangreti, 983 F.3d at 619. Because “[i]ndividual liability under
§ 1983 may not be based on a theory of respondeat superior or vicarious liability,” Lloyd, 43 F.
Supp. 3d at 266, Pineda cannot demonstrate that Imperati was liable merely because he was
“ultimately responsible” for what happened at the Dutchess County Jail, AC ¶ 9.
Accordingly, to the extent Pineda seeks compensatory damages from Sheriff Imperati,
those claims are also dismissed with prejudice.
VI. Neither Arroyo nor LaMonica Are Entitled to Qualified Immunity
With Pineda’s claims against Imperati dismissed, the Court next assesses Defendants’
contention that Arroyo and LaMonica are entitled to qualified immunity. MTD at 17–18.
“[Q]ualified immunity shields federal and state officials from money damages unless the plaintiff
pleads facts showing (1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that
the right was ‘clearly established’ at the time of the challenged conduct.” Sabir v. Williams, 52
F.4th 51, 58 (2d Cir. 2022), cert. dismissed, 143 S. Ct. 2694 (2023) (quoting Francis v. Fiacco,
942 F.3d 126, 139 (2d Cir. 2019)) (cleaned up).
“A Government official’s conduct violates clearly established law when, at the time of the
challenged conduct, the contours of a right are sufficiently clear that every reasonable official
would have understood that what he is doing violates that right.” Vega, 963 F.3d at 274 (quoting
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)). This doctrine prevents officials from lacking a
“fair warning that his or her actions were unlawful.” Id. (quoting Terebesi v. Torreso, 764 F.3d
217, 230 (2d Cir. 2014)); see also Hurd v. Fredenburgh, 984 F.3d 1075, 1089 (2d Cir. 2021)
(quoting Okin v. Vill. of Cornwall-On-Hudson Police Dep’t, 577 F.3d 415, 433 (2d Cir. 2009))
(“The principle of qualified immunity ensures that before they are subjected to suit, officers are
on notice their conduct is unlawful.”). Courts “consider the specificity with which a right is
defined, the existence of Supreme Court or Court of Appeals case law on the subject, and the
understanding of a reasonable officer in light of preexisting law” to determine whether that
officer is entitled to qualified immunity. Chamberlain Est. of Chamberlain v. City of White
Plains, 960 F.3d 100, 110 (2d Cir. 2020) (quoting Terebesi, 764 F.3d at 231), abrogated on other
grounds by Case v. Montana, 146 S. Ct. 500 (2026).
Because qualified immunity is an affirmative defense, the defendant bears the burden of
proof. Lore v. City of Syracuse, 670 F.3d 127, 149 (2d Cir. 2012). Courts are “sensitive to the
notion that qualified immunity should be resolved ‘at the earliest possible stage in the
litigation.’” Tanvir v. Tanzin, 894 F.3d 449, 472 (2d Cir. 2018) (quoting Hunter v. Bryant, 502
U.S. 224, 227 (1991)). At the same time, “as a general rule, the defense of qualified immunity
cannot support the grant of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.” Chamberlain Est., 960 F.3d at 110 (cleaned
up). Instead, “qualified immunity is often best decided on a motion for summary judgment when
the details of the alleged deprivations are more fully developed.” Walker, 717 F.3d at 130
(citation omitted).
A defendant asserting a qualified immunity defense at this pre-discovery phase thus faces
a “formidable hurdle.” McKenna v. Wright, 386 F.3d 432, 434 (2d Cir. 2004). The facts
supporting the defense must appear on the face of the complaint and a court will grant a motion
to dismiss only when “it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim that would entitle him to relief.” Id. at 436. When addressing qualified
immunity in advance of full merits discovery, “the question to be answered is whether a
reasonable government officer, confronted with the facts as alleged by plaintiff, could reasonably
have believed that his actions did not violate some settled constitutional right.” In re New York
City Policing During Summer 2020 Demonstrations, 548 F. Supp. 3d 383, 412 (S.D.N.Y. 2021).
In answering that question, “plaintiffs are entitled to all reasonable inferences from the facts
alleged, not only those that support their claim, but also those that defeat the immunity defense.”
Sabir, 52 F.4th at 64 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
Assuming without deciding that Arroyo and LaMonica violated a constitutional right, see
supra Sections II and III, the Court turns to whether “the right[s] at issue [were] clearly
established at the time of the challenged conduct,” Sabir, 52 F.4th at 63 (cleaned up). Pineda’s
First Amendment right to freely exercise his religion was clearly established at the time of the
alleged infractions. The Second Circuit has long made clear: “to deny prison inmates the
provision of food that satisfies the dictates of their faith does unconstitutionally burden their free
exercise rights.” McEachin, 357 F.3d at 203 (emphasis added) (citing Ford, 352 F.3d at 597
(holding that prisoners have a “clearly established” right “to a diet consistent with [their]
religious scruples”); Bass v. Coughlin, 976 F.2d 98, 99 (2d Cir. 1992) (per curiam) (reaffirming
Kahane v. Carlson, 527 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1975) (finding that an Orthodox Jewish rabbi had
a right to the provision of kosher meals while confined))); see also Jackson v. Mann, 196 F.3d
316, 321 (2d Cir. 1999) (denying qualified immunity to prison officials who refused an inmate’s
requests for a kosher diet consistent with his religious beliefs).
Pineda’s constitutional protections against jail officials’ deliberate indifference to his
medical needs, meanwhile, were just as clearly established at the time of the alleged violations.
As noted above, the Supreme Court has left no doubt that “deliberate indifference to serious
medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain’ proscribed
by the Eighth Amendment[,] . . . whether the indifference is manifested by prison doctors in their
response to the prisoner’s needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access
to medical care.’” Darby, 14 F.4th at 128 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104–05). That has long
been the law: “A prisoner’s Eighth Amendment right to be free from deliberate indifference to
his serious medical needs is quite clearly established and has been for some time.” Benjamin v.
Schwartz, 299 F. Supp. 2d 196, 201 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), aff’d sub nom. Benjamin v. Koeningsmann,
204 F. App’x 979 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Darnell, 849 F.3d at 29 (same as to Fourteenth
Amendment rights for individuals detained pretrial). Cases from the Second Circuit, cited above
in Section III(A), have also long established an incarcerated individual’s right to adequate
nutrition.
Taking the facts in the Amended Complaint as true and making all inferences in
Plaintiff’s favor, then, “[e]very reasonable official would have understood that” depriving Pineda
of kosher meals and ignoring the attendant medical consequences of that decision—including
Arroyo admitting that he “would love to see [Pineda’s] health take a downhill turn and to be the
one responsible”—violated Pineda’s clearly established constitutional rights. Vega, 963 F.3d at
274 (quoting al-Kidd, 563 U.S. at 741); AC ¶ 27. In other words, at this stage, the Court can
readily conclude that both Arroyo and LaMonica were “on notice” that their conduct was
unlawful, Okin, 577 F.3d at 433, and neither have cleared the “formidable hurdle” before them,
McKenna, 386 F.3d at 434. As the Court has explained, see supra Sections II and III, it is not
“beyond doubt that [Pineda] can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle
him to relief,” McKenna, 386 F.3d at 436 (internal citation omitted). Accordingly, neither Arroyo
nor LaMonica are entitled to qualified immunity.
VII. The Court Denies Leave to Amend
Finally, the Court sua sponte denies Pineda leave to amend the claims against the County
and Sheriff Imperati that are insufficiently pled. “Leave to amend, though liberally granted, may
properly be denied for: ‘undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant,
repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the
opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, futility of amendment, etc.’” Ruotolo v.
City of New York, 514 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182
(1962)).
Here, further amendment would be futile. Pineda has not sought to amend his claims and
has identified no facts that would alter the Court’s outcome. See Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d
99, 112 (2d Cir. 2000) (stating that requests to replead should be denied when “[t]he problem
with [the pleading] is substantive” and “better pleading will not cure it”). Additionally, Pineda
has already filed an Amended Complaint once in response to Defendants’ earlier motion to
dismiss. AC; see also Ruotolo, 514 F.3d at 191 (affirming denial of leave to amend “given the
previous opportunities to amend”). He was therefore on notice of the deficiencies in his
complaint but failed to add sufficient allegations to address them. Therefore, the Court denies
Pineda leave to amend the dismissed claims.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and
DENIED in part. Plaintiff’s First Amendment Free Exercise claim survives. See supra Section II.
So, too, do his deliberate indifference claims under either the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendment.
See supra Section III. Plaintiff’s conclusory claim against the County under Monell, however, is
dismissed with prejudice. See supra Section IV. And the Court concludes that Plaintiff has failed
to plead facts establishing Imperati’s personal involvement in any of the violations he alleges.
See supra Section V. Accordingly, all of Plaintiff’s claims against Dutchess County and Sherriff
Imperati are dismissed with prejudice. See supra Sections IV, V. All other claims survive.
By separate order, the Court refers the parties to Magistrate Judge Reznik for general
pretrial management.
The Clerk of Court is respectfully directed to terminate ECF No. 20 and to terminate
Defendants Dutchess County and Sherriff Kirk Imperatt.
Dated: March 30, 2026
White Plains, New York
SO ORDERED.
© \easica Charke
JESSICA G. L. CLARKE
United States District Judge
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