The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 KRISTEN GOHN, No. 2:25-cv-03430-JAM-DMC
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. ORDER GRANTING TRUMARK FINANCIAL
CREDIT UNION’S MOTION TO DISMISS
14 TRUMARK FINANCIAL CREDIT
UNION; TRIVERITY, INC.;
15 EXPERIAN INFORMATION
SOLUTIONS, INC.; TRANS UNION
16 LLC; and EQUIFAX INFORMATION
SERVICES, LLC,
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Defendants.
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19 Plaintiff Kristen Gohn, who became the victim of identity
20 theft in 2021, brings several causes of action against a credit
21 union, debt collector, and the credit reporting agencies,
22 alleging violations of state and federal fair credit reporting
23 and debt collection acts. The credit union in question,
24 Defendant TruMark Financial Credit Union (“TruMark”), which is
25 organized under the laws of and headquartered in Pennsylvania,
26 now moves to dismiss Plaintiff’s claims against it for lack of
27 personal jurisdiction, arguing it lacks sufficient minimum
28 contacts with California to satisfy due process requirements.
1 As discussed further below, the Court agrees and finds that
2 the Court lacks personal jurisdiction over TruMark. Accordingly,
3 the Court grants dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims against TruMark
4 without leave to amend.
5 I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
6 Plaintiff, a citizen of California, became aware she was the
7 victim of identity theft in November 2021 when she received a
8 call from Best Buy asking for an individual named “Kristen
9 Roberson,” a name Plaintiff has never used. First Am. Compl.
10 (“FAC”) ¶¶ 28–31, ECF No. 20. Plaintiff subsequently received
11 alerts that multiple hard inquiries had been made on her credit
12 file that she did not authorize. Id. ¶ 32. Plaintiff reviewed
13 her credit reports and discovered multiple accounts, inquiries,
14 addresses, phone numbers, and personal identifiers falsely
15 associated with her, including the name “Kristen Roberson,” a
16 fraudulent address at 4820 Westminster Avenue, Philadelphia, PA
17 19131, and a phone number 302-459-6008. Id. ¶ 33.
18 Of note here, the fraudster opened several accounts at
19 TruMark, a credit union organized under the laws of and
20 headquartered in Pennsylvania. Id. ¶¶ 16, 37; Monari Decl. ¶¶ 6–
21 9, ECF No. 27-1. The fraudster opened credit card account ending
22 4323 on September 22, 2021, which was charged off for more than
23 $15,000; credit account ending 0004 on September 15, 2021, which
24 was charged off for more than $5,800; and credit account ending
25 0001 on September 22, 2021, which was charged off for nearly
26 $15,000. FAC ¶ 37. Those accounts were opened using the false
27 name, false Pennsylvania address, and false phone number listed
28 above. Id. ¶ 42.
1 At the time the fraudulent TruMark accounts were opened,
2 TruMark had accessed and reviewed a consumer credit profile
3 associated with Plaintiff’s Social Security number. Id. ¶ 38.
4 That credit profile identified Plaintiff as a California
5 resident, reflecting longstanding California addresses,
6 California-based credit activity, and a credit history tied to
7 the State of California. Id. ¶ 39. The identity used to open
8 the TruMark accounts did not match Plaintiff’s true legal
9 identity, as Plaintiff’s correct surname is “Rogerson” (a name
10 she has not used since 2019), while the fraudulent applications
11 and accounts listed the surname “Roberson.” Id. ¶ 40. Based on
12 this, Plaintiff alleges that TruMark knew that the identity used
13 to open the accounts belonged to a California citizen, but still
14 permitted the fraudster to open several accounts with the
15 fraudster’s false name, false Pennsylvania address, and false
16 phone number. Id. ¶¶ 41–42.
17 On October 16, 2024, Plaintiff sent a comprehensive written
18 dispute package to Defendants Trans Union LLC, Experian
19 Information Solutions, Inc., and Equifax Information Services,
20 LLC (collectively, the Credit Reporting Agencies, or “CRAs”),
21 which included her identity-theft affidavit, police report,
22 annotated disclosures, identity documents, and proof of
23 residence. Id. ¶ 43. This dispute was transmitted to TruMark
24 through the CRAs. Id. ¶ 44. The CRAs reviewed Plaintiff’s
25 dispute package and verified the “fraudulent” TruMark accounts as
26 belonging to Plaintiff. Id. ¶¶ 45–47. Thus, the TruMark
27 accounts remained on Plaintiff’s credit reports. Id. ¶ 48.
28 Plaintiff alleges the CRAs and TruMark failed to conduct a
1 reasonable investigation into Plaintiff’s dispute, as they
2 ignored “clear” evidence provided by Plaintiff that the accounts
3 were fraudulent. Id. ¶¶ 49–87.
4 Based on these allegations, Plaintiff brings two causes of
5 action against TruMark for (1) Violation of the Fair Credit
6 Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681x; and (2) Violation of the
7 California Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act, Cal. Civ. Code
8 §§ 1785.1 et seq. Id. ¶¶ 122–31. TruMark moves to dismiss these
9 claims under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2), 12(b)(3),
10 and 12(b)(6) or, alternatively, to transfer venue under 28 U.S.C.
11 § 1404(a) to a district court in Pennsylvania. See Mot. Dismiss
12 or Transfer (“Mot.”), ECF No. 27. This matter is fully briefed
13 and was submitted without oral argument under Local Rule 230(g).
14 See Pl.’s Opp’n (“Opp’n”), ECF No. 33; TruMark’s Reply (“Reply”),
15 ECF No. 36; ECF No. 42.
16 II. LEGAL STANDARD
17 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2) provides that a
18 defendant may move to dismiss a complaint for lack of personal
19 jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2). In opposing a motion to
20 dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears
21 the burden of establishing jurisdiction is proper. Picot v.
22 Weston, 780 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2015). Where the
23 defendant’s motion is based on written materials rather than an
24 evidentiary hearing, the plaintiff need only make a prima facie
25 showing of jurisdictional facts to withstand the motion to
26 dismiss. Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d
27 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 2011).
28 ///
1 The court may consider evidence presented in affidavits to
2 assist it in its determination. Doe v. Unocal Corp., 248 F.3d
3 915, 922 (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by Daimler
4 AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117, 126 (2014). “Uncontroverted
5 allegations in the complaint are taken as true, but in the face
6 of a contradictory affidavit, the ‘plaintiff cannot simply rest
7 on the bare allegations of its complaint.’” Yamashita v. LG
8 Chem, Ltd., 62 F.4th 496, 502 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Mavrix,
9 647 F.3d at 1223); see also Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech.
10 Assocs., Inc., 557 F.2d 1280, 1284 (9th Cir. 1977) (a court “may
11 not assume the truth of allegations in a pleading which are
12 contradicted by affidavit”). Rather, the plaintiff must “come
13 forward with facts, by affidavit or otherwise, supporting
14 personal jurisdiction.” Scott v. Breeland, 792 F.2d 925, 927
15 (9th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted).
16 Where, as here, no federal statute authorizes personal
17 jurisdiction, the law of the state in which the district court
18 sits applies. Core-Vent Corp. v. Nobel Indus. AB, 11 F.3d 1482,
19 1484 (9th Cir. 1993). California’s long-arm jurisdictional
20 statute is coextensive with federal due process requirements.
21 Id. Due process requires that the defendant “have certain
22 minimum contacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance
23 of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and
24 substantial justice.’” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S.
25 310, 316 (1945) (citation omitted). “Depending on the strength
26 of those contacts, there are two forms that personal jurisdiction
27 may take: general and specific.” Picot, 780 F.3d at 1211.
28 ///
1 General jurisdiction exists when the defendant is domiciled
2 in the forum state or has contacts with the forum state that are
3 so “continuous and systematic” as to render the defendant “at
4 home” in that forum. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v.
5 Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). Specific jurisdiction exists
6 when a suit arises out of or relates to the defendant’s contacts
7 with the forum. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 284 (2014). In
8 the Ninth Circuit, specific jurisdiction is determined by a
9 three-prong test: “(1) the defendant must either ‘purposefully
10 direct his activities’ toward the forum or ‘purposefully avail[ ]
11 himself of the privileges of conducting activities in the forum’;
12 (2) ‘the claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the
13 defendant’s forum-related activities’; and (3) ‘the exercise of
14 jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice,
15 i.e. it must be reasonable.’” Axiom Foods, Inc. v. Acerchem
16 Int’l, Inc., 874 F.3d 1064, 1068 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Dole
17 Food Co., Inc. v. Watts, 303 F.3d 1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002)).
18 “The plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the first two
19 prongs of the test[,]” while the burden of the third prong shifts
20 to the defendant. Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374
21 F.3d 797, 802 (9th Cir. 2004). “If any of the three requirements
22 is not satisfied, jurisdiction in the forum would deprive the
23 defendant of due process of law.” Omeluk v. Langsten Slip &
24 Batbyggeri A/S, 52 F.3d 267, 270 (9th Cir. 1995).
25 III. OPINION
26 A. Sanctions
27 As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s
28 Opposition is 21 pages in violation of this Court’s Order re
1 Filing Requirements that such filings are limited to 15 pages.
2 See ECF No. 4-2. Thus, the Court will impose monetary sanctions
3 of $50.00 per page, or $300.00, against Plaintiff.
4 B. Personal Jurisdiction
5 TruMark argues that the Court lacks both general and
6 specific personal jurisdiction over TruMark. Mot. at 7–11.
7 TruMark argues that the Court lacks general jurisdiction because
8 TruMark is domiciled in Pennsylvania, not California. Id. at 7–
9 8; see also Monari Decl. ¶¶ 6–9 (attesting that TruMark is
10 organized under the laws of and headquartered in Pennsylvania).
11 TruMark also argues that the Court lacks specific jurisdiction
12 because TruMark operates solely within Pennsylvania and has never
13 purposefully directed any activities towards California;
14 Plaintiff’s claims arise solely out of contact with TruMark in
15 Pennsylvania, not California; and exercising jurisdiction would
16 pose an unreasonable burden “on TruMark—a regionally based not-
17 for-profit that does not offer nationwide credit services—by
18 having to defend an action in a jurisdiction where it has never
19 before filed or defended a lawsuit, thousands of miles away from
20 its home . . . .” Mot. at 8–11. Thus, TruMark contends
21 Plaintiff’s claims against it should be dismissed. Id. at 11.
22 In opposition, Plaintiff concedes that the Court may not
23 assert general jurisdiction over TruMark. See generally Opp’n.
24 However, Plaintiff argues that the Court may assert specific
25 jurisdiction over TruMark because TruMark purposefully directed
26 tortious conduct at Plaintiff in California by opening credit
27 accounts with her personal information despite knowing of the
28 “glaring mismatch between the identity in the credit profile and
1 the identity on the applications”; Plaintiff’s claims arise out
2 of TruMark’s contacts with California as TruMark “knowingly
3 extended credit using a consumer credit profile tied to a
4 California resident while ignoring clear indicators of fraud”;
5 and, given that Plaintiff is the victim of fraud and California
6 has an interest in protecting its citizens, it would be fair and
7 reasonable to subject TruMark to personal jurisdiction in
8 California. Id. at 6–15.
9 The Court disagrees with Plaintiff and finds that it lacks
10 personal jurisdiction over TruMark. As stated above, courts in
11 this circuit apply a three-part test to determine whether they
12 can exercise specific personal jurisdiction over a defendant:
13 “(1) the defendant must either ‘purposefully direct his
14 activities’ toward the forum or ‘purposefully avail[ ] himself of
15 the privileges of conducting activities in the forum’; (2) ‘the
16 claim must be one which arises out of or relates to the
17 defendant’s forum-related activities’; and (3) ‘the exercise of
18 jurisdiction must comport with fair play and substantial justice,
19 i.e. it must be reasonable.’” Axiom Foods, 874 F.3d at 1068.
20 The plaintiff bears the burden of satisfying the first two prongs
21 of the test. Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 802. “If the plaintiff
22 fails to satisfy either of these prongs, personal jurisdiction is
23 not established in the forum state.” Id.
24 Plaintiff has failed to meet this burden here. With respect
25 to the first prong, the purposeful availment analysis is most
26 often used in suits sounding in contract, while the purposeful
27 direction analysis is most often used in suits sounding in tort.
28 Id. As Plaintiff’s claims sound in tort, the Parties agree that
1 the purposeful direction test is appropriate here. See Mot. at
2 9-10; Opp’n at 10–11. “[T]he purposeful direction test requires
3 that the defendant (1) commit an intentional act, that is
4 (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, and (3) which causes harm
5 that the defendant knows will be suffered in the forum state.”
6 Briskin v. Shopify, Inc., 135 F.4th 739, 751 (9th Cir. 2025) (en
7 banc).
8 Here, Plaintiff argues that “there is no question that
9 Trumark’s conduct satisfies the purposeful direction test.”
10 Opp’n at 10. Plaintiff contends that, before approving the
11 accounts at issue, Trumark intentionally accessed and reviewed a
12 consumer credit profile associated with Plaintiff’s Social
13 Security number which unmistakably identified Plaintiff as a
14 California resident and reflected a longstanding California
15 credit history, which contradicted the name, Pennsylvania
16 address, and phone number used to apply for the Trumark accounts.
17 Id. These allegations “demonstrate that Trumark knowingly
18 directed its conduct at a California consumer by accessing and
19 relying on Plaintiff’s California credit profile while extending
20 credit to a plainly inconsistent identity,” thereby intentionally
21 harming a California resident. Id. at 11.
22 The Court disagrees that such conduct satisfies the
23 purposeful direction test. Within the purposeful direction test,
24 the “expressly aimed” analysis “looks to the defendant’s contacts
25 with the forum State itself, not the defendant’s contacts with
26 persons who reside there.” Walden, 571 U.S. at 285. Simply put,
27 “the plaintiff cannot be the only link between the defendant and
28 the forum. Rather, it is the defendant’s conduct that must form
1 the necessary connection with the forum State that is the basis
2 for its jurisdiction over him.” Id. “The proper question is not
3 where the plaintiff experienced a particular injury or effect but
4 whether the defendant’s conduct connects him to the forum in a
5 meaningful way.” Janus v. Freeman, 840 F. App’x 928, 930 (9th
6 Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Thus, to satisfy the purposeful
7 direction test, Plaintiff must show that TruMark expressly aimed
8 its conduct at California. Plaintiff fails to do so.
9 In support of its Motion to Dismiss, TruMark provides a
10 declaration from TruMark representative John Monari, who attests
11 that TruMark is organized under the laws of Pennsylvania, is
12 headquartered in Pennsylvania, and has never maintained a
13 presence in, or conducted any business in, California. Monari
14 Decl. ¶¶ 1–36. Monari further attests that TruMark limits its
15 membership to “anyone who lives, works, worships, volunteers,
16 attends school, or is a family member of a credit union member in
17 the Southeastern Pennsylvania Counties of Bucks, Chester,
18 Delaware, Montgomery, and Philadelphia.” Id. ¶ 37.
19 “[M]embership is not available to persons who are residents of
20 the State of California at the time a membership application is
21 submitted.” Id. ¶ 40. Monari explains that “[o]n or about
22 August 30, 2021, an individual by the name of Kristen Roberson
23 applied for membership at TruMark.” Id. ¶ 42. As part of her
24 application, Roberson reported having a permanent present address
25 at 4820 Westminster Avenue, Philadelphia, PA 19131, with a
26 telephone number of 302-459-6008, and an email address of
27 k8roberson8@gmail.com. Id. ¶ 43. Monari provides copies of a
28 Pennsylvania driver’s license and utility bill Roberson submitted
1 along with the application to confirm her Westminster Avenue
2 address. Id. ¶ 44. Monari attests that “[m]embership at TruMark
3 was offered to Roberson exclusively based on the zip code of her
4 Pennsylvania Address, which confirmed Roberson’s residence in
5 Philadelphia County, Pennsylvania, making her an eligible
6 applicant.” Id. ¶ 45.
7 This evidence persuasively demonstrates that TruMark did not
8 expressly aim any conduct at California, as TruMark neither
9 conducted any business in California, nor intentionally directed
10 any business activities (including offers of membership to its
11 credit union) towards California citizens. Plaintiff does not
12 contest this evidence. Rather, Plaintiff argues that TruMark
13 “knew or reasonably should have known” it was offering membership
14 to a California citizen based on the differences between
15 Plaintiff’s credit profile and the false name, Pennsylvania
16 address, and phone number used for the credit applications.
17 Opp’n at 10–11. Even if this were true, it is insufficient to
18 satisfy the purposeful direction test. A theory of
19 individualized targeting, which Plaintiff appears to utilize
20 here, “alleges that a defendant ‘engaged in wrongful conduct
21 targeted at a plaintiff whom the defendant knows to be a resident
22 of the forum state.’” Axiom Foods, 874 F.3d at 1069. In Walden,
23 571 U.S. 277, however, the Supreme Court held that a defendant’s
24 “actions in Georgia did not create sufficient contacts with
25 Nevada simply because he allegedly directed his conduct at
26 plaintiffs whom he knew had Nevada connections.” Id. at 289.
27 Following Walden, district courts in this Circuit have recognized
28 that a “theory of individualized targeting, which relies on a
1 plaintiff’s strong connection to a forum and the defendant’s
2 knowledge that the plaintiff is a resident of that forum and will
3 experience foreseeable harm in that forum, on its own will no
4 longer support a finding of express aiming.” Liggett v. Utah
5 Higher Ed. Assistance Auth., No. 8:19-cv-01589-JLS-ADS, 2020 WL
6 1972286, at *6 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 3, 2020) (quoting Deveroux v. TT
7 Mktg. Inc., No. 1:18-CV-487 AWI SAB, 2018 WL 3968249, at *2 (E.D.
8 Cal. Aug. 16, 2018) (internal quotation marks and alterations
9 omitted)). Rather, the “personal jurisdiction analysis must
10 focus on the defendant’s contacts with the forum state, not the
11 defendant’s contacts with a resident of the forum.” Picot, 780
12 F.3d at 1214.
13 The Court finds that TruMark did not expressly aim its
14 conduct at California by, for example, sending correspondence to
15 Plaintiff at a California address. Plaintiff’s argument is that
16 TruMark should have known of Plaintiff’s California connections
17 when it authorized the accounts at issue. Opp’n at 8. This
18 falls short of meeting the purposeful direction standard. See,
19 e.g., id. at 1214–15 (affirming dismissal for lack of personal
20 jurisdiction when plaintiff alleged defendant’s tortious conduct
21 targeted him, a California resident, because defendant engaged in
22 his allegedly tortious conduct “without entering California,
23 contacting any person in California, or otherwise reaching out to
24 California”); Deveroux, 2018 WL 3968249, at *5 (concluding that
25 “direct targeting alone is not sufficient” when the plaintiff
26 alleged that the defendant misreported plaintiff’s debt while
27 knowing that the plaintiff was a resident of the forum state, as
28 “[t]here must be contacts by the defendant with the forum, not
~——e REIN IIR IEE IE IRI EINE IIE IORI EIEIO IIE OSE ED eNO □□□□
1] merely with a forum resident”).
2 Given that Plaintiff has failed to carry her burden of
3 showing TruMark purposefully directed any conduct towards
4 California and is therefore unable to meet the first prong of the
5 | personal jurisdiction test, the Court need not analyze the
6 | remaining two requirements. TruMark’s Motion to Dismiss is
7 granted.
8 Iv. ORDER
9 For the reasons above, TruMark Financial Credit Union’s
10 Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 27) is GRANTED. Plaintiff’s First and
11 Second Causes of Action are DISMISSED against TruMark without
12 leave to amend since further amendment would be futile.
13 In addition, Counsel for Plaintiff is ordered to pay $300
14 to the Clerk of Court no later than June 8, 2026.
15 IT IS SO ORDERED.
16 Dated: June 2, 2026
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HN A. MENDEZ.
1s Fee UNITED pe acl JUDGE
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