Opinion

Rahal

Court
District Court, S.D. New York
Filed
Mar 17, 2026
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 41.7%

The opinion

BPLEULRUNICALLY Gib

DOC #:

DATE FILED:__ □□□□□□

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

OWN YOUR HUNGER LLC, LIGHTEN UP FOODS, 25-CV-4544 (VM)

and DEFIANT FOODS LLC,

DECISION AND ORDER

Plaintiffs,

- against -

LINUS TECHNOLOGY, INC., EPOGEE LLC, and

PETER RAHAL,

Defendants.

VICTOR MARRERO, United States District Judge.

Plaintiffs OWN Your Hunger LLC, Lighten Up Foods, and

Defiant Foods, LLC (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) brought this

antitrust action against defendants Linus Technology, Inc.,

d/b/a “David Protein”, Epogee LLC, and Peter Rahal

(collectively, “Defendants”). On February 4, 2026, this Court

granted Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ Second

Amended Complaint (“SAC”). (See “MTD D&O”, Dkt. No. 77.) The

Decision and Order granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss

provided that Plaintiffs could move for leave to amend their

Complaint by filing a letter brief so moving within ten days

of the date of that Decision and Order. (See id. at 31-32.)

Plaintiffs timely filed a letter brief seeking leave to amend

on February 6, 2026. (See “Mot.”, Dkt. No. 78.) Defendants

filed a letter in opposition on February 11, 2026. (See

“Opp’n”, Dkt. No. 79.)

I. DISCUSSION

A court should “freely give” leave to amend “when justice

so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). Leave should be “freely

given” “[i]n the absence of any apparent or declared reason—

such as undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the party

of the movant, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by

amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the

opposing party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [or]

futility of amendment.” Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182

(1962). It is within the “sound discretion of the district

court to grant or deny leave to amend.” McCarthy v. Dun &

Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 200 (2d Cir. 2007).

The Court will grant Plaintiffs’ request for leave to

amend. The central issue animating this Court’s Decision and

Order granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss was Plaintiffs’

failure to define the product markets where they allege harm

to competition occurs. (See MTD D&O at 11–14.) Plaintiffs now

propose to cure that deficiency by alleging a relevant product

market: High “Calories from Protein” (“CFP”) Protein Bars

sold in the United States. (Mot. at 1.) Plaintiffs state that

they will define that market via allegations of Defendants’

own business documents and the differences in price and

physical properties between high CFP bars and other protein

bars. (See id. at 1–2.) Those allegations are responsive to

the pleading deficiencies identified in this Court’s previous

Decision and Order.

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs’ proposed market

definition is implausible and thus that amendment should be

denied as futile. (See Opp’n at 1-3.) “Futility is a

determination, as a matter of law, that proposed amendments

would fail to cure prior deficiencies or to state a claim

under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”

Panther Partners Inc. v. Ikanos Commc’ns, Inc., 681 F.3d 114,

119 (2d Cir. 2012). Neither basis for futility is met here.

First, Plaintiffs’ proposed allegations are responsive to the

pleading deficiencies identified in this Court’s Decision and

Order, specifically the lack of a consistently defined

relevant market supported by allegations of reasonable

interchangeability of use from the perspective of consumers.

Second, Defendants have not established that those proposed

allegations will prove insufficient to state a claim. Given

the fact-bound nature of the market definition inquiry,

denial of leave to amend based on the sufficiency of

Plaintiffs’ proposed market definition is not appropriate

here. See Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 199–200 (2d Cir.

2001) (describing market definition as a “deeply fact-

intensive inquiry” and collecting cases). Defendants’

arguments as to the viability of Plaintiffs’ proposed market

definition are better left for full argument and

consideration on a motion to dismiss.

Defendants’ additional arguments as to why leave to

amend should be denied as futile are also not persuasive.

Defendants argue that Plaintiffs lack antitrust standing to

sue for harm to competition in the proposed market and that

Defendants’ status as a patentholder immunizes the conduct

alleged here. The Court’s Decision and Order addressed

neither of those issues, and Defendants have not demonstrated

that either issue renders amendment futile.

II. ORDER

For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs’ motion for leave

to amend their complaint is GRANTED. Plaintiffs shall file an

amended complaint within twenty-one (21) days of the date of

this Order.

SO ORDERED.

Dated: 17 March 2026

New York, New York

U.S.D.Jd.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.