The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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ALEXANDER ARCHER BROWN,
Plaintiff, REPORT &
RECOMMENDATION
-against-
25-CV-4883 (GHW) (JW)
DESMOND BROWN, et al.,
Defendants.
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To the Honorable Gregory H. Woods, United States District Judge:
Plaintiff Alexander Archer Brown, proceeding pro se, brings this Action
against Defendants Desmond Brown, Trevor Patton, Della Patton, Asia Patton,
Marisha Gordon, Lorraine Gordon, Noel Gordon, North Bronx Seventh-Day
Adventist Church (“North Bronx SDA Church”), Google LLC (“Google”), Apple LLC
(“Apple”), and White Plains Hospital (collectively, the “Defendants”). Pending before
the Court are motions to dismiss by (1) Defendant Apple at Dkt. No. 24; (2)
Defendants Desmond Brown, Trevor Patton, Della Patton, Asia Patton, Marisha
Gordon, Lorraine Gordon, and Noel Gordon (collectively, the “Individual
Defendants”) at Dkt. No. 54; (3) Defendant Google at Dkt. No. 56; (4) Defendant White
Plains Hospital at Dkt. No. 68; and (5) Defendant North Bronx SDA Church at Dkt.
No. 62. For reasons stated more fully below, the Court finds that the amended
complaint is frivolous and therefore recommends that Defendants’ motions to dismiss
be GRANTED and the case be closed.
BACKGROUND
A. Procedural history
On June 10, 2025, Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a complaint. Dkt.
No. 1. He paid the filing fee on the same day. On June 12, 2025, this case was
referred to this Court for general pretrial purposes and all dispositive motions
requiring a report and recommendation. Dkt. No. 6.
On July 7, 2025, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint on his own accord, which
is the operative pleading. Dkt. No. 13 (“Am. Compl.”). On July 18, 2025, Defendant
Apple filed a motion to dismiss. Dkt. No. 24–25. On September 9, 2025, Individual
Defendants, Google, White Plains Hospital, and North Bronx SDA Church filed
separate motions to dismiss. Dkt. Nos. 54–65. On September 18, 2025, Plaintiff filed
an omnibus memorandum of law in opposition to all Defendants’ motions to dismiss.
Dkt. No. 68 (“Pltf.’s Opp.”). On September 24, 2025, Apple, North Bronx SDA Church,
White Plains Hospital, and Individual Defendants filed separate replies. Dkt. Nos.
70-73. On September 25, 2025, Google filed its reply. Dkt. Nos. 74. The Court
considers all motions to dismiss fully briefed.
B. The amended complaint
The following allegations are taken from (1) the amended complaint, which is
103 pages long, including attachments; and (2) Plaintiff’s opposition memorandum,
which is 84 pages inclusive of attachments.1 Plaintiff includes as attachments to the
1 The Court’s “mandate to read the papers of pro se litigants generously makes it
appropriate to consider [a] plaintiff’s additional materials, such as [the] opposition
2
amended complaint two “personal statement[s]”: one that is 28 pages (see Am. Compl.
at 59–89); and another that is 14 pages, “submitted for the record” and addressed to
“Your Honor and members of the jury.” See Am. Compl. 89–103.
The amended complaint includes allegations regarding multiple events
spanning four years. The Court has attempted to summarize Plaintiff’s allegations
and has limited its summary to those allegations relevant to Plaintiff’s enumerated
causes of action against named Defendants.
Plaintiff brings suit against the following Defendants: (1) Individual
Defendants, who comprise of Plaintiff’s family members and former friends, church,
and community members (see Am. Compl. ¶¶ 2–8); (2) North Bronx SDA Church, (3)
Apple, (4) Google, and (5) White Plains Hospital.
Plaintiff alleges experiencing multiple incidents, spanning from 2021 to 2025
and across different cities that were “disturbing and coordinated incidents, which []
were driven by jealousy, control, religious manipulation, and financial motive among
members of his family, religious community, and others.” Id. at ¶ 21. He alleges that
“Defendants’ actions reflect[] an orchestrated attempt to silence Plaintiff, discredit
memorandum.” Williams v. Barometre, No. 20 Civ. 7644 (KMK), 2022 WL 903068,
at *2 n.4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2022) (quotation marks and citation omitted); see also
Floyd v. Rosen, No. 21 Civ. 1668 (KMK), 2022 WL 1451405, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 9,
2022) (considering exhibits attached to pro se opposition memorandum). The Court
may consider factual allegations raised in a pro se plaintiff’s opposition “to the extent
that those allegations are consistent with the Amended Complaint,” and will do so
here. Veras v. Jacobson, No. 18 Civ. 6724 (KMK), 2020 WL 5659551, at *1 n.1
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2020).
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his standing, interfere with his role as a mandated reporter, and endanger both his
and his mother’s safety.” Pltf.’s Opp. at 1.
Plaintiff alleges multiple instances where he was drugged, had his phone
stolen, had his financial accounts accessed without his consent, was poisoned, and
was illegally surveilled. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21–25, 28–29, 34–37. In many of these
instances, Plaintiff does not name who was involved. The Court includes names
where available.
In June 2021, Plaintiff was drugged after consuming a drink while at a social
event in Fullerton, California and thereafter “lost consciousness and awoke on
the side of the road with his shoes removed, keys and phone stolen, and his
pant pockets cut open.” Id. at ¶ 22.
In February 2023, Plaintiff’s phone was stolen while he was in Las Vegas,
Nevada. Id. at ¶ 31. An “impersonator” sent messages to Plaintiff’s phone
contacts and “received thousands of dollars” from these unauthorized requests.
Id.
In July 2023, Plaintiff was again drugged “after consuming a single drink” at
Mango’s Tropical Café in Miami, Florida, and subsequently woke up on the
street without his phone. Id. at ¶ 23. His stolen phone “was used to log into
Plaintiff’s personal accounts . . . from unauthorized locations.” Id. at ¶ 24.
Plaintiff later tracked his phone to Brooklyn, New York, where he has “only
limited connections, raising serious concerns about targeted surveillance.” Id.
at ¶¶ 27–28. This “same device was used to access Plaintiff’s shared Google
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Home and door camera system, allowing strangers to watch Plaintiff and his
disabled mother, Charmaine Brown, inside their Bronx apartment.” Id. at ¶
29.
Plaintiff’s phone was stolen again in July 2023 while he was in South Beach,
Miami, and “his iCloud, Google, Facebook, and Instagram accounts were
repeatedly tampered with. Plaintiff believes this was a targeted campaign to
socially isolate him and seize control of his social media accounts, digital
records, and ultimately, his estate.” Id. at ¶ 30.
Plaintiff further alleges that “Defendants coordinated in gang stalking,
including real-world surveillance, forced alienation from family, reputation attacks,
and narrative manipulation.” Id. at ¶ 48. For instance, when trying to contact the
hospital during his mother’s November 2024 hospitalization at White Plains
Hospital, hospital staff told him that his mother “does not have a son” and
subsequently placed Plaintiff under psychiatric hold, “allegedly due to false mental
health claims circulated by individuals close to the Defendants.” Id. at ¶¶ 35–36.
Hospital staff then “compelled” Plaintiff to undergo unnecessary mental health
questioning, including inquiries about “hallucination[] and social ideation,
fabricating a narrative of instability.” Pltf.’s Opp. at 6. Plaintiff asserts that he
“believes these actions were orchestrated in coordination with his relatives seeking
to discredit him and control his mother’s affairs.” Id.
Plaintiff also alleges that “Defendants, including Trevor Patton and members
of the North Bronx SDA Church, spread false rumors that Plaintiff was using drugs,
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hallucinating, or experiencing undiagnosed psychological disorders.” Am. Compl. ¶¶
37–38. Plaintiff asserts that these statements were defamatory and led to “social
alienation, career loss, and estrangement from longstanding community members
and professional connections.” Id. at ¶ 40.
Plaintiff also avers instances in which he believes his mother was under
“psychological manipulation” or under surveillance. Id. at ¶ 45. For instance, in early
2023, Plaintiff recounts “feeling very strange, with symptoms including
disorientation and discomfort” after drinking water at his mother’s home, which
“raised serious concerns.” Id. at ¶ 32. During that same time period, Plaintiff “began
noticing behavioral inconsistencies and contradictions in statements made by his
mother, which added to his suspicion that she may have been pressured,
manipulated, or recorded without her full awareness.” Id. For instance, while
attending a funeral in November 2024 at North Bronx SDA Church, his mother gave
“hesitant and fearful responses after encountering Plaintiff . . . and later claimed to
have used a distant restroom despite others being available leading Plaintiff to
suspect she was intimidated or coached.” Id. at ¶ 44. Plaintiff also alleges that North
Bronx SDA Church intentionally withheld video evidence from the funeral of
“aggressive or suspicious interactions between [Defendant] Desmond Brown,” non-
party Victor Brown, and Plaintiff’s mother in order to “cover up psychological coercion
or potential abuse.” Id. at ¶¶ 42–43.
Plaintiff also alleges instances in which unknown persons–one dressed as an
Amazon driver, and another man in black clothing–were recorded via his Google
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Home camera approaching his home. Id. at ¶ 46. Plaintiff alleges that his mother
stated, “‘they move fast,’ indicating fear and familiarity.” Id. Plaintiff alleges
another instance where, moments after Defendant Della Patton asked him, “Are you
the one running in the green jacket?” an individual ran past in a green jacket,
“suggesting real-time tracking or surveillance.” Id. at ¶ 47.
Plaintiff further asserts that Defendants Lorraine Gordon, Marisha Gordon,
and Noel Gordon “coordinated” to tamper with his mother’s trust in November 2024,
including removing Plaintiff as his mother’s power of attorney. Id. at ¶¶ 52–53. He
further alleges that in November 2024, Defendants attempted to poison him at a bar
operated by Defendant Marisha Gordon because “he discovered a sharp aluminum
soda can tab at the bottom of his drink[,] an object which could only have been placed
deliberately.” Id. at ¶ 51. He asserts that the timing of the incident, “immediately
following the signing of estate documents . . ., underscores the financial motive behind
the conspiracy.” Pltf.’s Opp. at 6.
a. References to persons not named as Defendants in this action
Throughout the amended complaint, Plaintiff alleges facts regarding non-
parties, without any context. For instance, Plaintiff alleges that after he woke up
after being drugged in Fullerton, California in June 2021, “[a] witness, Savanna, later
informed Plaintiff that she contacted Reginald Louis, a known associate of Darnell
Gordon, to return and help, but he refused.” Am. Compl. ¶ 22. Plaintiff asserts that
Darnell Gordon was present during the 2023 phone theft in Las Vegas, “further tying
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these events together.” Id. Neither Savanna nor Darnell Gordon are parties to this
case.
b. Causes of action
Plaintiff enumerates three federal claims for relief against all Defendants: (1)
a Fourteenth Amendment familial association claim; (2) a conspiracy to violate civil
rights claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1985; and (3) a civil Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) claim pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1964. Plaintiff also
asserts several state law causes of action for (1) invasion of privacy, (2) defamation,
(3) slander, (4) elder abuse, (5) fraud and forgery, (6) identity theft, (7) intentional
infliction of emotional distress, (8) medical negligence, and (9) obstruction of justice.
Plaintiff seeks a wide array of declaratory, injunctive, and monetary relief,
which includes the following: compensatory damages of $10,000,000; punitive
damages; a declaratory judgment “invalidating any trust or estate documents
procured through fraud or coercion;” injunctive relief barring Defendants from
“further contact, harassment, surveillance, or medical interference;” “an order
compelling production of any withheld evidence, including video footage, electronic
records, or medical logs;” “protective relief for Plaintiff’s mother;” and referral “to
appropriate law enforcement or prosecutorial authorities for criminal investigation.”
Id. at ¶¶ 114–121.
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LEGAL STANDARD
A. Rule 12(b)(6)
To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint must allege
sufficient facts, taken as true, to state a plausible claim for relief.” Johnson v.
Priceline.com, Inc., 711 F.3d 271, 275 (2d Cir. 2013) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly,
550 U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007). “[A] complaint does not need to contain detailed or
elaborate factual allegations, but only allegations sufficient to raise an entitlement
to relief above the speculative level.” Caldwell v. Sutton, No. 19 Civ. 5236 (VEC),
2020 WL 4057750, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 20, 2020) (citing Keiler v. Harlequin Enters.,
Ltd., 751 F.3d 64, 70 (2d Cir. 2014)). For a Plaintiff “to ‘nudge[] their claims across
the line from conceivable to plausible,’ they must ‘raise a reasonable expectation that
discovery will reveal evidence’ of the wrongdoing alleged, ‘even if it strikes a savvy
judge that actual proof of those facts is improbable.’” Citizens United v.
Schneiderman, 882 F.3d 374 (2d Cir. 2018) (cleaned up).
Generally, the Court accepts all factual allegations in a complaint as true and
draws all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to a plaintiff. Caldwell,
2020 WL 4057750, at *2 (citing Gibbons v. Malone, 703 F.3d 595, 599 (2d Cir. 2013);
In re NYSE Specialists Sec. Litig., 503 F.3d 89, 95 (2d Cir. 2007). The Court is not,
however, “bound to accept as true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555).
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B. Rule 8
The Court is obliged to construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572
F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret them to raise the “strongest [claims] that
they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 474 (2d Cir. 2006)
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in original). But
although pro se litigants enjoy the Court's “special solicitude,” Ruotolo v. I.R.S., 28
F.3d 6, 8 (2d Cir. 1994) (per curiam), their pleadings must still comply with Rule 8 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires a complaint to make a short and
plain statement showing that the pleader is entitled to relief. The complaint “should
be plain because the principal function of pleadings under the Federal Rules is to give
the adverse party fair notice of the claim asserted so as to enable him to answer and
prepare for trial.” Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir.1988). A complaint
states a claim for relief if the claim is plausible. Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678–79 (citing
Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). In reviewing a complaint for plausibility, the Court
accepts all well-pleaded factual allegations as true and draws all reasonable
inferences in the pleader's favor. Id. But the Court need not accept “[t]hreadbare
recitals of the elements of a cause of action,” which are essentially legal conclusions.
Id. at 678.
While a complaint's statement of claim must contain sufficient factual detail,
it should not be “prolix” (i.e., lengthy) or contain unnecessary details. See
Salahuddin, 861 F.2d at 42 (noting that, under Rule 8(a)(2), the statement of claim
“should be short because ‘[u]nnecessary prolixity in a pleading places an unjustified
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burden on the court and the party who must respond to it because they are forced to
select the relevant material from a mass of verbiage’”) (citation omitted); Prezzi v.
Schelter, 469 F.2d 691, 692 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding that complaint did not comply with
Rule 8 because “it contained a labyrinthian prolixity of unrelated and vituperative
charges that defied comprehension”). “Complaints which ramble, which needlessly
speculate, accuse and condemn, and which contain circuitous diatribes far removed
from the heart of the claim do not comport with these goals and this system.” Barsella
v. United States, No. 90 Civ. 1815 (JES), 135 F.R.D. 64, 66 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 1991)
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Further, “[i]t is well-established in
this Circuit that plaintiffs cannot simply ‘lump’ defendants together for pleading
purposes.” Monterey Bay Mil. House., LLC v. Ambac Assurance Corp., No. 19 Civ.
9193 (PGG), 531 F.Supp.3d 673, 728 (S.D.N.Y. 2021).
C. The Court’s inherent authority to dismiss frivolous suits
“The Court has inherent authority to dismiss an action on the Court's own
motion (sua sponte), even when a party has paid the fees to bring the action, if the
Court determines that the action is frivolous.” Yi Sun v. Saslovsky, No. 19 Civ. 10858
(LTS), 2020 WL 6828666, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 6, 2020) (collecting cases). Frivolous
suits are those that lack “an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Lin v. Lin, No.
22 Civ. 09263 (RA), 2022 WL 16926295, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 2022)
(quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989)). “[A] court may dismiss a
claim as factually frivolous where the facts alleged are clearly baseless, a category
encompassing allegations that are fanciful, fantastic, and delusional.” Id. (cleaned
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up). “As those words suggest, a finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate when
the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or wholly incredible, whether or not
there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.” Id.; see also
Livingston v. Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998) (“[A]n action
is ‘frivolous’ when either: (1) the factual contentions are clearly baseless . . .; or (2)
the claim is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory.”).
DISCUSSION
A. The amended complaint is frivolous
Defendants’ motions to dismiss raise several legal issues, including Plaintiff’s
failure to comply with Rule 8 and Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Procedure.
However, before analyzing those arguments in depth, the court instead turns to the
threshold issue of frivolousness. While Defendants do not raise arguments based on
frivolousness, the Court recommends dismissing the action sua sponte because “the
factual contentions are clearly baseless, . . . the product of delusion or
fantasy.” Livingston, 141 F.3d at 437.
Even when read with the “special solicitude” afforded to pro se pleadings, the
Court finds that Plaintiff does not provide any plausible factual support for his
claims. Instead, the amended complaint is rife with incoherent and irrational
allegations. For one, Plaintiff frequently makes conclusory statements with either
no detail or an implausible explanation. As discussed more fully above, Plaintiff
alleges numerous troubling incidents, spanning multiple years and occurring in
multiple states, where Plaintiff was drugged, had his phone stolen, surveilled without
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his consent, or otherwise harmed. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21–25, 28–29, 34–37. While
Plaintiff asserts his belief that these events were “disturbing and coordinated
incidents [by Defendant and others] which [] were driven by jealousy, control,
religious manipulation, and financial motive” (Id. ¶ 21), a “[p]laintiff's beliefs–
however strongly he may hold them–are not facts.” Nobile v. Queen Laticia of Spain,
No. 23 Civ. 9081 (LTS), 2023 WL 8258336, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 27, 2023) (citation
omitted). Here, Plaintiff fails to provide any factual allegations connecting any of the
events to each other, let alone to Defendants.
Plaintiff also makes incoherent assertions that are delusional and irrational,
many of which appear to be unrelated to the claims at issue. For instance, without
providing any context or additional information, Plaintiff asserts that while his
mother was hospitalized at White Plains Hospital, hospital staff told him that his
mother “does not have a son” and placed Plaintiff under psychiatric hold due to “false
mental health claims circulated by individuals close to the Defendants.” Am. Compl.
¶ 35–36. Plaintiff also alleges that he “began feeling very strange” after drinking
water at his mother’s home. Id. at ¶ 32.
Further, Plaintiff includes irrelevant facts involving persons who are not
parties to the case or who otherwise appear irrelevant. For example, the complaint
references non-parties named Savanna and Darnell Gordon, but provides little
context as to who they are or how they relate to the case. See, e.g., Am. Compl. ¶ 22
(alleging that upon waking up after being drugged “[a] witness, Savanna, later
13
informed Plaintiff that she contacted Reginald Louis, a known associate of Darnell
Gordon, to return and help, but he refused.”).
Taken together, the amended complaints’ allegations that Defendants (who
comprise of a mix of Plaintiff’s friends, family, church members, Apple, and Google)
were conspiring against Plaintiff, “are attenuated to the point of being implausible.”
Kim v. New Jersey, 25 Civ. 8315 (KPF), 2025 WL 3013080, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28,
2025). As such, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s allegations “amount to conclusory
claims and suspicions that are not plausible and must be dismissed as frivolous.” Id.
B. The amended complaint does not comply with Rule 8
Plaintiff’s amended complaint should also be dismissed for the independent
reason for failure to comply with Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Here, the 104-page amended complaint does not comply with Rule 8 because it
does not provide a short and plain statement of Plaintiff’s claims. Instead, and as
discussed more fully above, Plaintiff’s inclusion of unrelated facts and background
makes it difficult for the Court, and certainly Defendants, to fully understand how
the alleged facts provide a basis for Plaintiff’s claims as to each individual Defendant.
Further, the amended complaint engages in impermissible group pleading
when describing the alleged events, particularly for the federal conspiracy and civil
RICO claims. For instance, Plaintiff asserts that Defendants collectively conspired
with each other to physically, psychologically, and financially harm Plaintiff. But
Plaintiff’s amended complaint asserts only conclusory allegations against each
Defendant and instead, makes allegations as to Defendants as if they were one. See,
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e.g., Am. Compl. ¶ 36 (alleging that White Plains Hospital staff placed Plaintiff under
a psychiatric hold “allegedly due to false mental health claims circulated by
individuals close to Defendants.”) (emphasis added); id. at ¶ 51 (asserting that
“Defendants” attempted to poison him at a bar “operated by Defendant Marisha
Gordon when he discovered a sharp aluminum soda can tab at the bottom of his
drink.”); id. at ¶ 55 (alleging that “Defendants. . . altered, falsified, or fabricated
medical records to support forced detainment and false mental health claims.”)
(emphasis added). Thus, the amended complaint fails to distinguish each
Defendants’ conduct, making it “virtually impossible to link the various defendants
to [Plaintiff’s] alleged injuries.” Mendes Da Costa v. Marcucilli, 675 Fed. Appx. 15
(2d. Cir. 2017); see Farmer v. Cnty. of Westchester, No. 18 Civ. 2691 (NSR), 2021 WL
4199944, *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2021) (dismissing complaint under Rule 8(a)(2)
because “the vast majority of allegations” relating to the defendant were “jointly
alleged against most of the other [d]efendants without providing any factual basis to
distinguish their conduct”).
C. Federal claims
Assuming arguendo that Plaintiff’s amended complaint is not frivolous and
that it complies with Rule 8, the federal causes of action still falter for the
independent reason of failing to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6).
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a. Fourteenth Amendment familial association claim against all
Defendants (Count I)
“The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees a substantive right under the Due
Process Clause to intimate familial association.” Gorman v. Rensselaer Cnty., 910
F.3d 40, 47 (2d Cir. 2018). “A claim for infringement of the right to familial
association requires conduct so shocking, arbitrary, and egregious that the Due
Process Clause would not countenance it even were it accompanied by full procedural
protection.” Id. (cleaned up). In addition, “a claim under the Due Process Clause for
infringement of the right to familial associations requires the allegation that state
action was specifically intended to interfere with the family relationship.” Id. at 48
(emphasis added).
Plaintiff asserts that Defendants violated Plaintiff’s fundamental right to
familial association by “misrepresenting Plaintiff’s identity to medical providers,
obstructing his legal access to his mother [], and participating in efforts to isolate
her.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 68–70. But his claim fails for three reasons. First, the amended
complaint fails to allege that Defendants are state actors or that their actions
constituted state action.2 See Gorman, 910 F.3d at 47. Second, Plaintiff does not
allege that any Defendants’ action, whether taken by the state or private entities,
was specifically intended to interfere with the family relationship—in this case, with
2 While Plaintiff does not allege state action, the Court takes judicial notice that
White Plains Hospital is a private, not-for-profit hospital (which is a part of
Montefiore), and not a state-run facility. See White Plains Hospital – Who we are,
https://www.wphospital.org/about-us/who-we-are/ (last visited Feb. 3, 2026).
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Plaintiff’s relationship with his mother. See Moore v. City of New York, No. 22 Civ.
10957 (LGS), 2024 WL 3361193, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2024) (dismissing familial
association claim because the complaint failed to allege such “shocking” conduct or
that “state action was specifically intended to interfere with the family
relationship.”). Lastly, the amended complaint fails to allege facts that Defendants’
actions constituted shocking, arbitrary or egregious behavior. See id.
The Court therefore recommends GRANTING Defendants’ motion to dismiss
as to Plaintiff’s Fourteenth Amendment familial association claim.
b. Section 1985 conspiracy claim against all Defendants (Count II)
“To state a civil rights conspiracy under § 1985(3), a plaintiff must allege: 1) a
conspiracy; 2) for the purpose of depriving, either directly or indirectly, any person or
class of persons of the equal protection of the laws, or of equal privileges and
immunities under the laws; and 3) an act in furtherance of the conspiracy; 4) whereby
a person is either injured in his person or property or deprived of any right or privilege
of a citizen of the United States.” Gray v. Town of Darien, 927 F.2d 69, 73 (2d Cir.
1991). The conspiracy must be “motivated by some racial or perhaps otherwise class-
based, invidious discriminatory animus.” Cine SK8, Inc. v. Town of Henrietta, 507
F.3d 778, 791 (2d Cir.2007). A plaintiff asserting a conspiracy claim under Section
1985 must plausibly allege “some factual basis supporting a meeting of the minds,
such that defendants entered into an agreement, express or tacit, to achieve the
unlawful end.” Webb v. Goord, 340 F.3d 105, 110 (2d Cir. 2003).
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Plaintiff asserts, without specific factual details, that Defendants, motivated
by “jealousy, control, religious manipulation, and financial motive,” “fabricated
narratives of mental illness, false medical reporting, obstruction of justice, and
interference with Plaintiff’s legal rights and reputation” and that Plaintiff’s
“reputation, finances, and mental and emotional health were harmed.” Am. Compl.
¶¶ 72–73.
These conclusory allegations fail to plausibly state a Section 1985 conspiracy
claim for multiple reasons. First, the amended complaint fails to allege, “except in
the most conclusory fashion, that any such meeting of the minds occurred among any
or all of the [D]efendants.” Webb, 340 F.3d at 110–11 (affirming dismissal of § 1985
claim for failure to state a claim). Second, the amended complaint makes no showing
that the conspiracy was motivated by “some racial or perhaps otherwise class-based,
invidious discriminatory animus.” Cine SK8, Inc., 507 F.3d at 791. To the contrary,
Plaintiff alleges that Defendants were motivated by “jealousy, control, religious
manipulation, and financial motive.” Am. Compl. ¶ 21; see Fox v. City of New York,
No. 03 Civ. 2268 (FM), 2004 WL 856299, *9 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 20, 2004). Jealousy,
control, and financial motive are not considered “invidious discriminatory animus.”
And while “class-based animus” includes religion-based discrimination (see
Colombrito v. Kelly, 764 F.2d 122, 130 (2d Cir.1985)), Plaintiff provides no facts,
beyond conclusory statements, suggesting that any of Defendants’ allegedly
conspiratorial acts were based on Plaintiff’s religious class.
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The Court therefore recommends that the motion to dismiss the Section 1985
conspiracy cause of action be GRANTED.
c. Civil RICO cause of action against all Defendants (Count III)
To establish a RICO violation, Plaintiffs must show “(1) conduct (2) of an
enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity.” Acklin v. Eichner, No.
20 Civ. 7042 (GHW), 2021 WL 4442819, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2021) (quoting Kim
v. Kimm, 884 F.3d 98, 103 (2d Cir. 2018)). Here, Plaintiff’s RICO cause of action fails
for failure to plead both the existence of an enterprise and a pattern of racketeering
activity.
An “enterprise” “includes any individual, partnership, corporation, association,
or other legal entity, and any union or group of individuals associated in fact although
not a legal entity.” 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4). To constitute an “enterprise,” defendants
must associate together for a common purpose of engaging in a particular fraudulent
course of conduct, and work together to achieve that purpose. U.S. v. Turkette, 452
U.S. 576, 583 (1981); First Cap. Asset Mgmt., Inc. v. Satinwood, Inc., 385 F.3d 159,
173–174 (2d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). An enterprise is demonstrated by
allegations “of an ongoing organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that the
various associates function as a continuing unit.” Turkette, 452 U.S. at 583. There
must be some factual allegations regarding the hierarchy, organization, and activity
of the alleged enterprise from which it can be inferred that its members functioned
as a unit. First Cap., 385 F.3d at 174–75 (citations omitted). The allegations in the
complaint must also establish that the defendants participated in the operation or
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management of the enterprise by having some part in directing the enterprise's
affairs. Reeves v. Ernst & Young, 507 U.S. 170, 179 (1993).
“Under any prong of § 1962, a plaintiff in a civil RICO suit must establish a
‘pattern of racketeering activity.’” GICC Cap. Corp. v. Tech. Fin. Grp., Inc., 67 F.3d
463, 465 (2d Cir. 1995). This means that Plaintiff “must plead at least two predicate
acts [], and must show that the predicate acts are related and that they amount to,
or pose a threat of, continuing criminal activity.” Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. §
1961(5) and H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989)). Additionally,
Plaintiffs must adequately plead each element of a substantive RICO claim for each
defendant. See DeFalco v. Bernas, 244 F.3d 286, 306 (2d Cir. 2001). That said, to be
liable for a RICO violation, a defendant “need not himself have committed or agreed
to commit the two or more predicate acts” constituting the RICO violations, but must
have “kn[own] about and agreed to facilitate the scheme.” Acklin, 2021 WL 4442819,
at *4 (citation omitted).
The amended complaint contains the following allegations in support of the
RICO claim: (1) that Defendants, “acting in concert” for over two years, “constitute
an enterprise in interstate activity as defined by RICO”; (2) that the “enterprise
carried out repeated acts of wire fraud, identity theft, forgery, obstruction of justice,
and misuse of technology for illegal surveillance,” and (3) that these “repeated actions
over multiple years represent an enterprise engaged in criminal conduct with the
intent to silence, exploit, or financially harm the Plaintiff and his mother.” Am.
Compl. ¶¶ 62, 74–77.
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Such conclusory pleadings are wholly insufficient to state a RICO cause of
action. First, Plaintiff fails to adequately plead an ongoing joint enterprise. Beyond
lumping Defendants together and generally asserting that they used the enterprise
to perpetrate illegal conduct, Plaintiff fails “to allege information regarding the
hierarchy, organization, activities of the alleged enterprise, and—critically in this
case—explain each participant's role in the alleged fraudulent or illegal conduct.”
Acklin, 2021 WL 4442819, at *4 (citing Beter v. Murdoch, No. 17 Civ. 10247 (GBD),
2018 WL 3323162, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 22, 2018). “This type of slapdash group
pleading is insufficient to plead the existence of an enterprise.” Id. at *5 (citing Lewis
v. Legal Servicing, LLC, No.19 Civ. 8085 (PAE) (OTW), 2020 WL 7390233, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 18, 2020) (“A complaint which simply groups together the individuals
and entities involved in an alleged racketeering act and calls them an enterprise is
not a RICO enterprise.”)).
Second, the amended complaint fails to plead a pattern of racketeering activity.
Plaintiff pleads “wire fraud, identity theft, forgery, obstruction of justice, and misuse
of technology” as the predicate acts, most of which are forms of “racketeering activity”
for purposes of RICO. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(B). However, the amended complaint
fails to show that these predicate acts are related, or that that each Defendant knew
about these illegal acts and agreed to facilitate the scheme. See Smartix Int’l Corp.
v. MasterCard Int’l LLC, 06 CV 5174 (GBD), 2008 WL 4444554, *8 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
30, 2008) (holding that racketeering activity cannot be demonstrated “by merely
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stringing together a handful of discrete acts that allegedly were committed by at least
one of the defendants”).
Accordingly, the Court recommends that the motion to dismiss the RICO cause
of action be GRANTED pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
D. State claims
Because Plaintiff’s federal claims fail in their entirety, this Court recommends
declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims. 28
U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). When a district court has original jurisdiction over claims in a
case, it “shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related
to claims in the action . . . that they form part of the same case or controversy under
Article III.’” F5 Capital v. Pappas, 856 F.3d 61, 77 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting 28 U.S.C.
§ 1367(a)); see also United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)
(“Pendent jurisdiction . . . exists whenever there is a claim ‘arising under [the]
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their Authority,’ and the relationship between that claim and the state
claim permits the conclusion that the entire action before the court comprises but one
constitutional ‘case.’”) (quoting U.S. Const. art. III, § 2). Claims are considered “‘part
of the same case or controversy’ if they ‘derive from a common nucleus of operative
fact.’” Shahriar v. Smith & Wollensky Rest. Grp., Inc., 659 F.3d 234, 245 (2d Cir.
2011) (quoting Briarpatch Ltd., L.P. v. Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373 F.3d 296, 308 (2d
Cir. 2004)).
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The decision to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a state law claim is by
nature discretionary. City of Chicago v. Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 173
(1997). Where claims satisfy the “same case or controversy” test under 28 U.S.C. §
1367(a), however, “the discretion to decline supplemental jurisdiction is available
only if founded upon an enumerated category of subsection 1367(c).” Shahriar, 659
F.3d at 245 (quoting Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v. Russian Kurier, Inc., 140 F.3d
442, 448 (2d Cir. 1998)). Subsection 1367(c) permits a court to decline to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction if:
(1) the claim raises a novel or complex issue of State law, (2) the
claim substantially predominates over the claim or claims over
which the district court has original jurisdiction, (3) the district court
has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction, or (4)
in exceptional circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for
declining jurisdiction.
28 U.S.C. § 1367(c). Here, subsection (3) would apply if the Court dismisses all of the
claims over which it had original jurisdiction.
Both the Second Circuit and the Supreme Court of the United States have
“held that when the federal claims are dismissed the ‘state claims should be dismissed
as well.’” In re Merrill Lynch Ltd. P’ships Litig., 154 F.3d 56, 61 (2d Cir. 1998)
(quoting Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726). “Although this is not a mandatory rule, the Supreme
Court has stated that ‘in the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated
before trial, the balance of factors to be considered under the pendant jurisdiction
doctrine-judicial economy, convenience, fairness and comity–will point toward
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declining jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims.’” Id. (quoting Carnegie-
Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n. 7 (1988)).
Moreover, resolution of the state-law claims in state court will avoid “needless
decisions of state law” by this Court, which promotes the interests of comity and
justice. Moran v. Tryax Realty Mgmt., Inc., No. 15 Civ. 08570 (RJS), 2016 WL
3023326, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 23, 2016) (quoting Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726). Declining
to exercise supplemental jurisdiction will not be unfair. To the contrary, by declining
supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, the Court preserves Plaintiff’s
opportunity to file similar claims in state court in the future. Although the exercise
of supplemental jurisdiction is discretionary, an analysis of the relevant factors in the
usual case “will point toward declining jurisdiction over the remaining state-law
claims.” In re Merrill Lynch, 154 F.3d at 61 (citing Cohill, 484 U.S. at 350 n.7). So
too here.
Having considered the factors articulated in Gibbs, the Court recommends
declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law claims
should Plaintiff’s federal causes of action be dismissed.
E. Leave to amend
Generally, “pro se litigants should be given leave to amend a complaint if a
liberal reading of the complaint gives any indication that a valid claim might be
stated.” Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2d Cir.2000) (citing Gomez v. USAA
Fed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir.1999)). However, it is not required where
it would be futile. Salahuddin, 861 F.2d at 42. Given the frivolous nature of
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Plaintiff’s amended complaint, there is no indication that Plaintiff is in possession of
facts that would cure the deficiencies identified above. See, e.g., Kim v. New Jersey,
25 Civ. 8315 (KPF), 2025 WL 3013080, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2025) (denying leave
to amend and dismissing action as frivolous because “the defects in Plaintiff’s
Complaint cannot be cured with an amendment); Gallop v. Cheney, 642 F.3d 364, 369
(2d. Cir 2011) (affirming denial of leave to amend because there was no “indication
that [plaintiff] could—or would—provide additional allegations that might lead to a
different result.”); Leib-Podry v. Tobias, 22 Civ. 8614 (VEC) (JW), 2024 WL 1421152,
at *10 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2024), report and recommendation adopted, 2024 WL
1134597 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2024) (dismissing plaintiff's complaint as time-barred
and factually frivolous and therefore, declining leave to amend).
Because the Court finds that Plaintiff’s amended complaint cannot be cured
with an amendment, this Court recommends declining to grant leave to amend and
dismissing the action.
RECOMMENDATION
For all the foregoing reasons, the Court recommends that the Motions to
Dismiss at Dkt. No. 53, 54, 56, 58, and 62 be GRANTED in their entirety and that
the case be closed.
FILING OF OBJECTIONS TO THIS REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, the parties shall have fourteen days from service of this Report to file
written objections. See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 6. Such objections, and any responses to
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objections shall be filed with the Clerk of Court and on ECF. Any requests for an
extension of time for filing objections must be directed to Judge Woods. Failure to
file objections within fourteen days will result in a waiver of objections and
will preclude appellate review. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); Cephas
v. Nash, 328 F.3d 98, 107 (2d Cir. 2003).
SO ORDERED.
DATED: □□ York, New York
February 10, 2026 mW
United States Magistrate Judge
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