Huang

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MONROE DIVISION

SHENGYING HUANG DOCKET NO. 3:26-cv-01542

VERSUS JUDGE ALEXANDER C. VAN HOOK

LIZA BOWEN, ET AL MAGISTRATE JUDGE LEBLANC

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Before the court is a petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241

by pro se petitioner Shengying Huang on May 11, 2026. Doc. 1. Huang is an immigration detainee

in the custody of the Department of Homeland Security/U.S. Immigration and Customs

Enforcement (“DHS/ICE”) and is currently detained at the Richwood Correctional Center in

Monroe, Louisiana.

This matter has been referred to the undersigned for review, report, and recommendation

in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636 and the standing orders of this Court. For the reasons stated

below, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the matter be DENIED and DISMISSED WITHOUT

PREJUDICE.

I. BACKGROUND

Huang is a native and citizen of China. She has been in ICE custody since January 3, 2025.

Doc. 1, p. 4. She was ordered removed on September 29, 2025 (id.) and appealed that decision on

October 17, 2025 (id. at p. 5). According to the EOIR Automated Case Information website,1 the

appeal was dismissed on May 28, 2026.

1 https://acis.eoir.justice.gov/en/caseInformation

II. LAW & ANALYSIS

A. Screening of Habeas Corpus Petitions

A district court may apply any or all of the rules governing habeas petitions filed under 28

U.S.C. § 2254 to those filed under § 2241. See Rule 1(b), Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the

United States District Courts. Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases authorizes preliminary

review of such petitions, and states that they must be summarily dismissed “[i]f it plainly appears

from the petition and any attached exhibits that the petitioner is not entitled to relief.” Id. at Rule

4. To avoid summary dismissal under Rule 4, the petition must contain factual allegations pointing

to a “real possibility of constitutional error.” Id. at Rule 4, advisory committee note (quoting Aubut

v. Maine, 431 F.2d 688, 689 (1st Cir. 1970)). Accordingly, we review the pleadings and exhibits

before us to determine whether any right to relief is indicated, or whether the petition must be

dismissed.

B. Analysis

At the time she filed the instant petition, Huang was in pre-removal-order detention. On

September 29, 2025, an Immigration Judge ordered her removed and that order became final on

May 28, 2026, when her appeal of the Immigration Judge’s finding was dismissed.2 Since then,

she has been in post-removal-order detention. See 8 U.S.C. § 1231.

Under § 1231(a)(1)(A), ICE has 90 days to remove an alien after she is ordered removed.

However, the United States Supreme Court has held that § 1231 permits the detention beyond 90

2An order of removal “shall become final upon the earlier of--(i) a determination by the Board of Immigration Appeals

affirming such order; or (ii) the expiration of the period in which the alien is permitted to seek review of such order by

the Board of Immigration Appeals.” See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(47)(B). 8 C.F.R. 3.38 requires that a Notice of Appeal shall

be received by the Board of Appeals within 30 calendar days of the Immigration Judge’s ruling. See Smith v. Conner,

250 F.3d 277 (5th Cir. 2001).

days for a period reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United States.

See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001). Detention for up to six months after the removal

order becomes final is presumptively reasonable. Id.

After six months, however, once the alien provides good reason to believe that there is no

significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the government must

respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing. The six-month presumption does not mean

that every alien not removed must be released after six months. To the contrary, an alien may be

held in confinement until it has been determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal

in the reasonably foreseeable future. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.

Because Huang’s removal order became final on May 28, 2026, she has not been in post-

removal-order detention longer than the presumptively reasonable six-month period set forth in

Zadvydas. Thus, the instant habeas petition should be dismissed as premature. See Okpoju v. Ridge,

115 F. App’x 302 (5th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 1066, 125 S. Ct. 2528, 161 L. Ed. 2d

1120 (2005); see also Chance v. Napolitano, 453 F. App’x 535 (5th Cir. 2011); Agyei-Kodie v.

Holder, 418 F. App’x 317, 318 (5th Cir. 2011) (although 90-day period had expired, challenge to

detention was premature because Petitioner had not been in post-removal-order custody more than

six months).

III.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, Huang’s petition fails to state a claim for relief under 28

U.S.C. § 2241. Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the petition be DENIED and

DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C) and Rule 72(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil

Procedure, the parties have fourteen (14) days from receipt of this Report and Recommendation to

file written objections with the Clerk of Court. Failure to file written objections to the proposed

factual findings and/or the proposed legal conclusions reflected in this Report and

Recommendation within fourteen (14) days of receipt shall bar an aggrieved party from attacking

either the factual findings or the legal conclusions accepted by the District Court, except upon

grounds of plain error. See Douglass v. United Services Automobile Ass’n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1429-30

(Sth Cir. 1996).

THUS DONE AND SIGNED in chambers this 8th day of June, 2026.

UNITED STTES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

-4-