Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

FORT MYERS DIVISION

KIMBALL LODGE

CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION,

Case No. 2:24-cv-662-KCD-NPM

INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

WRIGHT NATIONAL FLOOD

INSURANCE COMPANY,

Defendant,

/

ORDER

Plaintiff Kimball Lodge Condominium Association, Inc. allegedly

suffered flood damage during Hurricane Ian. It sought coverage from its

insurer, Defendant Wright National Flood Insurance Company, but

eventually filed this breach-of-contract lawsuit after Wright paid only a

portion of the claim. (Doc. 1.)1 To assess the scope and cost of the damage,

Wright retained John W. Crawford, a professional engineer, to evaluate the

property. Unhappy with his findings, the Association now moves to exclude

Crawford’s testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 702. (Doc. 38.) In the

Association’s view, his report strays from technical engineering analysis and

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all internal quotation marks, citations, case history, and

alterations have been omitted in this and later citations.

crosses into the realm of impermissible legal conclusions. Wright opposes the

motion. (Doc. 39.)

Federal Rule of Evidence 702 tasks district courts with a critical

gatekeeping role: keeping unreliable expert testimony out of the courtroom.

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993). To make it

through the gate, the party offering the expert must show three things: the

expert is qualified to testify competently, the methodology underlying the

testimony is sufficiently reliable, and the testimony will help the trier of fact

understand the evidence or resolve a disputed fact. City of Tuscaloosa v.

Harcros Chemicals, Inc., 158 F.3d 548, 562 (11th Cir. 1998). But playing

gatekeeper does not mean supplanting the adversary system. See Quiet Tech.

DC-8, Inc. v. Hurel-Dubois UK Ltd., 326 F.3d 1333, 1341 (11th Cir. 2003). So

long as an expert grounds their opinion in reliable principles, “[v]igorous

cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction

on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking

shaky but admissible evidence.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596.

The Association asks the Court to strike Crawford’s opinions, pointing

to five conclusions it claims are disguised legal instructions. (Doc. 38 at 3-5.)

Its motion promises that Crawford’s full “Flood Damage Assessment” is

attached, yet there was no exhibit provided. Wright spots the missing exhibit

and flags it in a footnote. (Doc. 39 at 2 n.5.) But Wright then leaves the Court

similarly empty-handed, choosing not to attach the report to its own

response.

That leaves the Court with a Daubert motion untethered to a Daubert

record. The gatekeeping function under Rule 702 demands a rigorous, hands-

on review of the expert’s methodology. See United States v. Frazier, 387 F.3d

1244, 1260 (11th Cir. 2004) (“This function inherently require[s] the trial

court to conduct an exacting analysis of the foundations of expert opinions to

ensure they meet the standards for admissibility under Rule 702.”). We have

to look at what data the expert used, what principles he applied, and how he

connected the dots from the facts to his conclusions. A court simply cannot

perform that exacting analysis based on an adversary’s five-bullet-point

paraphrase of the expert’s findings. Without seeing Crawford’s report, the

Court has no way to tell whether he is reliably applying engineering

expertise or impermissibly interpreting the insurance contract. Because the

record is missing the very document the Court has been asked to evaluate,

the Association’s motion is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE.

One last point. The Association is not asking to exclude Crawford.

Rather, it takes aim at a few opinions that are allegedly impermissible legal

conclusions. That kind of granular line-drawing is almost always better left

for trial. And because this case will be a bench trial (Doc. 32), the ordinary

fears of a jury being led astray by improper expert testimony are not present.

See United States v. Brown, 415 F.8d 1257, 1268-69 (11th Cir. 2005). If

Wright attempts to elicit the disputed opinions on the stand, the Association

can raise its objections in real time. The Court can then hear the testimony in

context, separate the technical engineering analysis from any improper

contract interpretation, and give the testimony exactly the weight it deserves.

ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on July 7, 2026.

Kyle C. Dudek

United States District Judge