Walton

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

ROBERT ALLEN WALTON, II, :

Plaintiff, : CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:25-CV-2461

v. : (JUDGE MANNION)

LACKAWANNA COUNTY, :

Defendant. :

MEMORANDUM

Presently before the Court is Lackawanna County’s (“Defendant”)

motion to dismiss Robert Allen Walton, II’s (“Plaintiff”) complaint for failure to

state a claim upon which relief can be granted. (Doc. 4). For the reasons set

forth below, Defendant’s motion will be DENIED.

I. BACKGROUND

This action arises out of alleged violations of the United States

Constitution brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983, the Americans with

Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §12101, et seq., and the Rehabilitation

Act (“RA”), 29 U.S.C. §794, et seq. (Doc. 1). On February 2, 2024, Plaintiff

was committed to the Lackawanna County Prison (“LCP”) for a probation

violation. (Doc. 1, ¶8). Prior to his incarceration, Plaintiff was diagnosed with

keratoconus, which is a medical condition that causes blurry vision. Id., ¶9.

According to Plaintiff, the only treatment for keratoconus is the “use of rigid,

gas permeable contact lenses, or ‘scleral lenses[,]’” which “must be removed

each night with the use of a small, plunger-like device made of silicone.” Id.,

¶¶10-13. Plaintiff states that the “[f]ailure to remove the scleral lenses each

day may result in an increased risk of infection and damage to the cornea[.]”

Id.

Prior to his time of incarceration, Plaintiff had been using scleral lenses

to treat his condition. Id., ¶14. According to Plaintiff, when he reported to

LCP, he advised the staff and medical personnel about his condition and the

plunger device required to remove his scleral lenses each day. Id., ¶¶15-16.

During his initial intake, Plaintiff underwent an eye examination, whereupon

LCP medical personnel ordered artificial tears eye drops to be administered

to Plaintiff each morning and night as needed, however, Plaintiff did not

receive access to the eye drops until approximately forty days into his

incarceration. Id., ¶19.

According to Plaintiff, on February 10, 2024, Plaintiff complained about

left eye itchiness during a visit with a mental health provider at LCP—the

provider documented that Plaintiff had not yet received his scleral lenses but

likely meant that he had not yet received his scleral lens remover. Id., ¶20.

The same day, Plaintiff was given an urgent medical referral for right eye

erythema and drainage. Id., ¶21.

According to Plaintiff, Defendant did not have scleral lens removals on

its list of approved medical devices and used that basis to deny inmates the

necessary tool to preserve their eyesight. Id., ¶24. Plaintiff alleges that

numerous times, his requests for the device were ignored, and that when

friends attempted to deliver the device for Plaintiff’s use, LCP staff stated

that “if the plungers were not on the commissary list, then [Plaintiff] could not

have them.” Id., ¶¶22, 25, 28. Additionally, on February 16, 2024, Plaintiff

submitted a medical request slip for a mattress and a scleral contact lens

remover; in LCP’s February 18, 2024 response, Plaintiff was told why he was

denied the mattress, but there was no answer about the scleral lens remover.

Id., ¶¶29-30.

Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “has a pattern of denying inmates

access to scleral lens removers, a medical necessity for individuals with

keratoconus.” Id., ¶33. In United States v. Madison, No. 3:22-CR-160

(M.D.Pa. June 8, 2022), (Doc. 21), Madison needed to request contact care,

including removers, due to an injury he was sustaining from his contacts.

Plaintiff avers that after Madison turned to the Court in a state of emergency,

LCP provided Madison with the scleral lens removers. (Doc. 1, ¶¶34-36).

Plaintiff was without scleral lens removers for nearly forty days. Id.,

¶38. During such time, Plaintiff avers that he was unable to remove the

lenses, and experienced significant pain and discomfort. Id., ¶39. Ultimately,

LCP provided Plaintiff with a scleral lens remover, and the artificial tears eye

drops which were ordered at his intake. Id., ¶42. When LCP staff provided

Plaintiff with the remover, they returned the majority of the request slips he

had submitted. Id., ¶43. Plaintiff needed multiple attempts to remove the

lenses from his eyes due to their adhesion to his eyeballs. Id., ¶44. He took

two days without wearing the lenses due to the pain he was experiencing.

Id., ¶46. Plaintiff was released from LCP on March 19, 2024. Id., ¶47. Upon

his release, Plaintiff visited his eye doctor, who diagnosed Plaintiff with

corneal neovascularization. Id., ¶49.

Plaintiff commenced the underlying action on December 18, 2025.

(Doc. 1). On January 23, 2026, Defendant filed the immediate motion to

dismiss and brief in support. (Docs. 4, 5). Plaintiff filed his brief in opposition

on February 4, 2026. (Doc. 7). Defendant’s period to file a reply brief has

lapsed. See M.D.Pa.R. 7.7. Accordingly, this matter is ripe for disposition.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain

“a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled

to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). This standard “does not require detailed

factual allegations, but it demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-

unlawfully-harmed me accusation.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678

(2009) (internal quotations omitted). A complaint that contains only “labels

and conclusions,” or a “formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of

action” does not comply with Rule 8. Id.

A defendant may move to dismiss a complaint “for failure to state a

claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The moving

party bears the burden of showing that no claim has been stated, and

dismissal is appropriate only if, accepting all the facts alleged in the

complaint as true, the plaintiff has failed to plead “enough facts to state a

claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Hedges v. United States, 404 F.3d

744, 750 (3d Cir. 2005); Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570

(2007) (abrogating “no set of facts” language found in Conley v. Gibson, 355

U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). The facts alleged must be sufficient to “raise a right

to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. This

requirement “calls for enough fact[s] to raise a reasonable expectation that

discovery will reveal evidence of” necessary elements of the plaintiff’s cause

of action. Id.

“To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient

factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on

its face.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Facial plausibility is achieved “when the

plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

Plausibility does not require probability but “more than a sheer possibility that

a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. Facts “merely consistent with” liability

do not satisfy this standard. Id.

As noted above, the Court at this stage accepts the complaint’s factual

allegations as true. This tenet “is inapplicable to legal conclusions.” Id.

(“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

conclusory statements, do not suffice.”). “Determining whether a complaint

states a plausible claim for relief” is “a context-specific task that requires the

reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Id. at

679. The federal pleading standard requires that district courts conduct a

two-part analysis:

First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be

separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint’s

well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal

conclusions. Second, a District Court must then determine

whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to

show that the plaintiff has a plausible claim for relief. In other

words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff’s

entitlement to relief. A complaint has to show such an

entitlement with its facts.

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009) (internal

citations and quotations omitted).

In considering a motion to dismiss, the Court generally relies on the

complaint, attached exhibits, and matters of public record. See Sands v.

McCormick, 502 F.3d 263 (3d Cir. 2007). The Court may also consider

“undisputedly authentic document[s] that a defendant attaches as an exhibit

to a motion to dismiss if the plaintiff’s claims are based on the [attached]

documents.” Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus., 998 F.2d

1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993). Moreover, “documents whose contents are

alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity no party questions, but which

are not physically attached to the pleading, may be considered.” Pryor v.

Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d 548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002). However,

the Court may not rely on other parts of the record in determining a motion

to dismiss. See Jordan v. Fox, Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, 20 F.3d

1250,1261 (3d Cir. 1994).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Count I: Denial of Medical Care Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1983

Count I of Plaintiff’s complaint is brought under 42 U.S.C. §1983.

“[§]1983 imposes civil liability upon any person who, acting under the color

of state law, deprives another individual of any rights, privileges, or

immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”

Shuman v. Penn Manor School Dist., 422 F.3d 141, 146 (3d Cir. 2005). By

itself, §1983 does not create any rights, “but provides a remedy for violations

of those rights created by the Constitution or federal law.” Morse v. Lower

Merion School Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 907 (3d Cir. 1997) (citing Baker v.

McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n. 3 (1979)). “The Eighth Amendment, through

its prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, prohibits the imposition of

‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain contrary to contemporary

standards of decency.’” Pearson v. Prison Health Serv., 850 F.3d 526, 534

(3d Cir. 2017) (quoting Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 32, 113 S.Ct. 2475,

125 L.Ed.2d 22 (1993)).

“[A] § 1983 claim against a municipality may proceed in two ways.”

Forrest v. Parry, 930 F.3d 93, 105 (3d Cir. 2019). One way for a plaintiff to

present a claim against a municipality is to assert “that an unconstitutional

policy or custom of the municipality led to his or her injuries.” Id. Another way

for a plaintiff to present a claim against a municipality is to assert that his or

her injuries “were caused by a failure or inadequacy by the municipality that

‘reflects a deliberate or conscious choice.’” Id. (quoting Estate of Roman v.

City of Newark, 914 F.3d 789, 798 (3d Cir. 2019)). Plaintiff asserts both types

of claims against Defendant. The Court addresses each in turn.

a. Policy (Monell) Claim

A Monell claim under §1983 is a claim against a municipality or other

similar entity. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436

U.S. 658, 694 (1978) (“[A] local government may . . . be sued . . . when

execution of a government's policy or custom . . . inflicts the injury that the

government as an entity is responsible under §1983.”). To establish a claim

against a municipal entity under the policy strand of liability, Plaintiff must

show “that ‘a [local] government’s policy or custom . . . inflicted the injury’ in

question.” Evans v. Columbia Cnty., 711 F.Supp.3d 256, 310 (M.D.Pa. 2024)

(internal citations omitted). Namely:

[A] policy is made when a decisionmaker possess[ing] final

authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action

issues an official proclamation, policy, or edict . . . “Custom, on

the other hand, can be proven by showing that a given course

of conduct, although not specifically endorsed or authorized by

law, is so well-settled and permanent as virtually to constitute

law.” . . . A plaintiff “must identify a custom or policy, and

specify what exactly that custom or policy was” . . . Further, “a

plaintiff [asserting] that a policy or custom led to his or her

injuries must be referring to an unconstitutional policy or

custom” . . . And whether asserting a policy or a custom, “a

plaintiff must show that an official who has the power to make

policy is responsible for either the affirmative proclamation of

a policy or acquiescence in a well-settled custom.”

Evans, 711 F.Supp.3d at 310 (internal citations omitted). Moreover:

Showing a policy or custom is not enough . . . “A plaintiff must

also [show] that the policy or custom was the ‘proximate cause’

of his injuries” . . . “He may do so by “demonstrating an

‘affirmative link’ between the policy or custom and the

particular constitutional violation he alleges” . . . “This is done

for a custom if [the plaintiff] demonstrates that [the

municipality] had knowledge of ‘similar unlawful conduct in the

past, ... failed to take precautions against future violations, and

that [its] failure, at least in part, led to [his] injury.’”

Id.

Here, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “had policies and/or practices

that resulted in the violation of [Plaintiff’s] rights under the Fourteenth and/or

Eighth Amendments.” (Doc. 1, ¶58). He goes on to state that Defendant had

policies and/or customs which involved “failing to provide adequate medical

attention for inmates in immediate need of the same, insufficient guidelines

for approval of medical devices for use within the LCP, and/or denying

inmates necessary medical devices.” Id., ¶59. In particular, Plaintiff avers

that Defendant had a policy which only allowed inmates access to medical

devices or supplies on a pre-approved list without consideration of “an

inmate’s individualized and personal medical needs.” Id., ¶61.

Plaintiff provided some factual support for these aversions, stating that

“on two separate occasions, [Plaintiff’s] friends attempted to deliver the

necessary plungers to LCP for his use; however[,] [Defendant’s] staff turned

them away, stating that, if the plungers were not on the commissary list, then

[Plaintiff] could not have them.” Id., ¶25. Plaintiff also refers to the experience

of another inmate, who made repeated requests for scleral contact removers

and LCP staff denied his requests until the Court intervened. Id., ¶¶34-38.

These facts support a plausible claim that Defendant maintained policies or

customs which involved blanket denials of inmate requests for certain

medical devices. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

The question then becomes whether Plaintiff has provided sufficient

facts to support a plausible claim that the policy or custom led to his injury.

Evans, 711 F.Supp.3d at 310. Here, Plaintiff avers that but-for Defendant’s

policy, he would have been able to remove the scleral lenses from his eyes.

(Doc. 1, ¶39). Ultimately, because his contacts were stuck to his eyeballs for

nearly forty days, Plaintiff was diagnosed with corneal neovascularization.

Id., ¶49. These factual averments, if true, support a plausible claim that

Plaintiff suffered an injury due to Defendant’s policy of denying medical

devices to inmates if such devices were not listed on a pre-approved list.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Therefore, to the extent that Defendant’s motion to

dismiss seeks to dismiss Plaintiff’s §1983 Monell claim, it is denied.

b. Deliberate Indifference Claim

The Court now turns to Plaintiff’s §1983 deliberate indifference claim.

To make a prima facie case of Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual

punishment based on the denial of or deliberate indifference to medical care,

as alleged here, “a plaintiff must show that ‘(1) he had a serious medical

need, (2) the defendants were deliberately indifferent to that need; and (3)

the deliberate indifference caused harm to the plaintiff.’” Durham v. Kelley,

82 F.4th 217, 229 (3d Cir. 2023).

Moreover:

[A] plaintiff must make an “objective” showing that the

deprivation was “sufficiently serious,” or that the result of the

defendant’s denial was sufficiently serious. Additionally, the

plaintiff must make a “subjective” showing that defendant

acted with a “sufficiently culpable state of mind.” . . . The

“deliberate indifference to serious medical needs” standards is

obviously met when pain is intentionally inflicted on a prisoner,

when the denial of reasonable requests for medical treatment

exposes the inmate to undue suffering or the threat of tangible

residual injury, or when, despite a clear need for medical care,

there is an intentional refusal to provide that care.

Ayers v. Bradford Cnty., No. 1:08-CV-1148, 2009 WL 801867, at *3 (M.D.Pa.

Mar. 25, 2009).

In Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976), the Supreme Court held that

prison officials violated the Eighth Amendment when they acted deliberately

indifferent to a prisoner's serious medical needs by “intentionally denying or

delaying access to medical care or interfering with the treatment once

prescribed.” Pearson, 850 F.3d at 534 (quoting Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05).

“This . . . does not mean, however, that every claim by a prisoner that he has

not received adequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eighth

Amendment. An accident, although it may produce added anguish, is not on

that basis alone to be characterized as wanton infliction of unnecessary

pain.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 105. Mere negligence does not violate the Eighth

Amendment. Id. at 106.

The issue whether Plaintiff pleaded sufficient facts to show a plausible

claim that: (1) Plaintiff’s keratoconus is, objectively, a sufficiently serious

medical condition that requires the use of a scleral contact remover; (2) that

Defendant was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff’s need for a scleral contact

remover; and (3) the deliberate indifference caused harm to Plaintiff.

Durham, 82 F.4th at 229. The Court answers in the affirmative.

“A medical need is serious if it ‘has been diagnosed by a physician as

requiring treatment’ or if it ‘is so obvious that a lay person would easily

recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.’” Evans, 711 F.Supp.3d at

276 (quoting Monmouth Cnty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834

F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987)). Additionally, “if ‘unnecessary and wanton

infliction of pain’ results as a consequence of denial or delay in the provision

of adequate medical care, the medical need is of the serious nature

contemplated by the [E]ighth [A]mendment.” Evans, 711 F.Supp.3d at 276

(internal citations omitted).

Here, Plaintiff has a diagnosis of keratoconus, which is a condition that

causes blurry vision. (Doc. 1, ¶9). Plaintiff avers that the only way to treat his

condition is by the use of “rigid, gas permeable contact lenses, or ‘scleral

lenses.’” Id., ¶10. Further, Plaintiff states that “[t]o avoid damage to the eye,

scleral lenses must be removed each night with the use of a small, plunger-

like device made of silicone . . . [f]ailure to remove scleral lenses each day

may result in an increased risk of infection and damage to the cornea[.]” Id.,

¶¶13-14. Though this Court has not contemplated whether keratoconus is a

serious medical condition, other jurisdictions have found that it is. See

Donald v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 982 F.3d 451, 459 (7th Cir. 2020)

(“‘[P]reexisting and underlying eye issues,’ including . . . keratoconus, ‘are

objectively serious medical concerns’” (internal citations omitted)); see also

Williams v. Luther, No. 3:20-CV-30-KT, 2024 WL 3572344, at *7 (W.D.Pa.

June 25, 2024) (“The parties do not dispute that the eye condition,

keratoconus, was serious.”). The Court therefore holds that Plaintiff has

pleaded sufficient facts to show that his medical condition is serious. Evans,

711 F.Supp.3d at 276.

The next inquiry is whether Plaintiff pleaded sufficient facts to show

that Defendant acted with deliberate indifference. Id. As mentioned,

deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment is a subjective

standard. Ayers, 2009 WL 801867, at *3, supra. “To act with deliberate

indifference to serious medical needs is to recklessly disregard a substantial

risk of serious harm.” Evans, 711 F.Supp.3d at 276 (quoting Giles v.

Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 330 (3d Cir. 2009)). “To act with deliberate

indifference, the prison official must have known of the substantial risk of

serious harm and must have disregarded that risk by failing to take

reasonable measures to abate it.” Evans, 711 F.Supp.3d at 276 (citing

Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1970)). “[T]he official must both be

aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial

risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id.

“But to demonstrate a defendant's deliberate indifference an inmate

need not show that the defendant intentionally sought to cause the inmate

harm or acted with knowledge that harm to the inmate probably would result

from the defendant's act or failure to act.” Evans, 711 F.Supp.3d at 300

(quoting Chavarriaga v. New Jersey Dep't of Corr., 806 F.3d 210, 227 (3d

Cir. 2015)). “Though purposeful conduct would show at least deliberate

indifference, an inmate satisfies her burden to make that showing if she

demonstrates that the defendant acted or failed to act despite having

knowledge that her actions or inaction, as the case may be, would subject

the inmate to a substantial risk of serious harm.” Id. “The proof necessary to

show that there was a substantial risk of harm is less demanding than the

proof needed to show that there was a probable risk of harm.” Id.

Here, Plaintiff has alleged that on numerous occasions, he advised

LCP staff of his diagnosis, use of scleral lenses, and need for a scleral lens

remover. (Doc. 1, ¶¶15-35). Plaintiff alleges that these requests were ignored

or outright denied. Id., ¶¶25, 27-31, 35, 38. Plaintiff further states that when

LCP finally provided him with the scleral lens remover, it also gave him the

majority of the request slips he submitted. Id., ¶43. Plaintiff avers that

Defendant was placed on notice of the risk of harm because Plaintiff was

treated for eye erythema and drainage while LCP allegedly continued to deny

the scleral eye remover. Id., ¶¶21-22. Moreover, Plaintiff draws the Court’s

attention to another case in which an inmate suffered from an injury due to

LCP’s alleged failure to provide the inmate with appropriate contact lens

equipment, including a scleral lens remover. (Doc. 1, ¶34); see also United

States v. Madison, No. 3:22-CR-160 (M.D.Pa. June 8, 2022) (Doc. 21).

These facts, taken as true, amount to a plausible claim that Defendant acted

with deliberate indifference toward Plaintiff’s medical diagnosis. Evans, 711

F.Supp.3d at 276.

Finally, the Court considers whether Plaintiff pleaded facts sufficient to

make a plausible claim that Defendant’s alleged deliberate indifference

caused harm to Plaintiff. Durham, 82 F.4th at 229. Here, Plaintiff avers that

immediately after he removed the scleral lenses, he left them out for two

days because of the pain and damage. (Doc. 1, ¶46). Moreover, upon his

release from LCP, Plaintiff visited his optometrist, who purportedly

diagnosed him with corneal neovascularization as a result of the inability to

remove the scleral lenses from his eyes for forty days. Id., ¶49. Plaintiff

alleges that “as a result of the injuries he sustained due to the deliberate

indifference of [Defendant], [Plaintiff] has suffered extreme pain and

emotional distress; worsening vision; an increased risk of the need for a

corneal transplant; and an increased risk of vision loss.” Id., ¶53.

Plaintiff has pleaded sufficient facts to make a plausible deliberate

indifference §1983 claim. To the extent Defendant’s motion seeks the

dismissal of Plaintiff’s claim that Defendant was deliberately indifferent to

Plaintiff’s medical needs, the motion is denied.

B. Counts II and III: Disability Law Claims

Counts II and III of Plaintiff’s complaint assert claims against Defendant

based on federal disability law: Count II is pursuant to Title II of the ADA and

Count III is pursuant to the RA. (Doc. 1 at 11, 14). Regarding the two:

For decades, the ADA and the RA have served as “twin pillars

of federal disability discrimination law,” working in tandem to

“secure the rights of individuals with disabilities to

independence and full inclusion in American society” . . .

Functionally, the ADA and the RA impose the “same

prohibition,” but they cover different entities . . . Along with

proscribing discriminatory animus, both statutes also impose

on covered entities an affirmative obligation to make

“reasonable accommodations” for persons with disabilities so

that they can meaningfully access their programs, services,

and activities . . . As then-Judge Jackson has observed, this

duty is at its apex in the prison context “because inmates

necessarily rely totally upon [prisons] for all of their needs

while in custody and do not have the freedom to obtain such

services (or the accommodations that permit them to access

those services) elsewhere.”

Montanez v. Price, 154 F.4th 127, 144 (3d Cir. 2025) (internal citations

omitted).

Except for causation, the substantive standards for determining liability

under the ADA and the RA are identical, and the same remedies are

available under both Acts. Id. (citing Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767

F.3d 247, 275 (3d Cir. 2014); 29 U.S.C. §794(a) (authorizing injunctive relief

and money damages); 42 U.S.C. §12133 (same)). To state a claim for

disability-based discrimination, Plaintiff must allege that: “(1) he is a qualified

individual; (2) with a disability; (3) who was excluded from participation in or

denied the benefits of the services, programs, or other activities for which a

public entity is responsible, or was otherwise subjected to discrimination by

a public entity; (4) by reason of his disability.” Montanez v. Price, 154 F.4th

127, 146 (3d Cir. 2025) (citing Haberle v. Troxell, 885 F.3d 170, 178 (3d Cir.

2018)).

Here, Plaintiff has easily pleaded sufficient facts to support a plausible

claim as to the first two elements. Plaintiff, like all prisoners, is a qualified

individual covered by the ADA and RA. Montanez, 154 F.4th at 146. A

“disability” is any “physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one

or more major life activities[.]” Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. §12102(1)(A)).

Undoubtedly, Plaintiff’s keratoconus, particularly the symptom of blurry

vision, substantially interferes with major life activities such as seeing,

reading, writing, and performing manual tasks. See 28 C.F.R.

§35.108(c)(1)(i); see also Medina v. Cty. of New York, No. 20-3763, 2023

WL 6276682, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2023) (“Plaintiff’s keratoconus is a

disability because it substantially interferes with his ability to see, read, and

write, which are all expressly defined as major life activities under the

regulations implementing the ADA.”).

Regarding the third element, the phrases “service, program, or activity”

of Title II of the ADA and “program and activity” of §504 of the RA are

“extremely broad in scope and include[] anything a public entity does.”

Montanez, 154 F.4th at 147 (internal citations omitted). This includes

healthcare and providing necessities for hygiene. See id. Therefore, the

activity of providing Plaintiff with appropriate medical necessities, such as a

scleral lens remover, could be plausibly construed as an activity from which

Plaintiff was excluded. Id.

Finally, the Court considers whether Plaintiff pleaded sufficient facts to

establish the final element. “A plaintiff can meet the fourth element of a prima

facie case—discrimination ‘by reason of his disability’—by showing invidious

discrimination or a failure to provide reasonable accommodations.” Id. at 148

(quoting Haberle, 885 F.3d at 179-80). The duty is triggered when a disabled

person’s need for an accommodation because known because (1) he

requested the accommodation, or (2) his disability and need for an

accommodation are open and apparent. Id. (internal citations omitted). Here,

Plaintiff has pleaded, on multiple occasions, that he requested a device to

accommodate his keratoconus diagnosis. (Doc. 1, ¶¶15, 25, 27-31).

The Court finds that Plaintiff has pleaded facts sufficient to support a

plausible claim of discrimination under the ADA and RA. Any dismissal of

Plaintiff’s claims pursuant to the ADA and RA would be clear error. Thus,

Defendant’s motion, to the extent it seeks dismissal from Counts II and III

from Plaintiff’s complaint, is denied.

IV. CONCLUSION

The Court concludes that Plaintiff has stated plausible claims upon

which relief can be granted. Therefore, Defendant’s motion to dismiss will be

DENIED in its entirety. An appropriate order shall follow.

s/ Malachy E. Mannion

MALACHY E. MANNION

United States District Judge

DATE: July 7, 2026

25-2461-01