LEWINSON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

PENSACOLA DIVISION

STANFORD D. LEWINSON,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 3:25cv1817-TKW-HTC

BURDETT,

Defendant.

________________________/

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

Plaintiff Stanford D. Lewinson, a prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma

pauperis, initiated this action by filing a complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 relating

to a use of force incident that occurred on August 18, 2025. Doc. 1. Defendant

Burdett has filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for Lewinson’s failure to

truthfully disclose his litigation history as required on the Court’s complaint form.

Doc. 31. Lewinson responded in opposition. Doc. 34. Upon review of the parties’

submissions and the relevant law, the undersigned finds Burdett’s motion should be

GRANTED and Lewinson’s complaint be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE

for his failure to truthfully disclose his litigation history.

This Court’s Local Rules require prisoners and pro se litigants to use the

Court’s complaint form when filing a civil rights complaint. See N.D. Fla. Loc. R.

5.7(A). Section VIII of the form requires litigants to disclose specific prior litigation

history. Section VIII.A required Lewinson to disclose his prior litigation history

pertaining to “any case in federal court, including federal appellate court, dismissed

as frivolous, as malicious, for failure to state a claim, or prior to service.” Doc. 1 at

12. Section VIII.B required him to disclose “any other lawsuits or appeals in state

or federal court dealing with the same fact or issue involved in this case.” Id. at 13

(emphasis in original). And Section VIII.C required him to disclose “any other

lawsuit, habeas corpus petition, or appeal in state or federal court either challenging

[his] conviction or relating to the conditions of [his] confinement.” Id. (emphasis

in original). The complaint form warns plaintiffs that “failure to disclose all prior

state and federal cases—including, but not limited to civil cases, habeas cases, and

appeals—may result in the dismissal of this case.” Id. at 11 (emphasis in original).

Moreover, the complaint form advises plaintiffs to “err on the side of caution” if they

are uncertain about whether a case should be identified. Id.

Despite signing the amended complaint under “penalty of perjury, that all of

the information … included on or with [the] form, including [his] litigation history,

is true and correct,” (Doc. 1 at 18-19), Lewinson did not truthfully disclose his

litigation history. In fact, Lewinson did not disclose any cases in the litigation

history section. But based on Burdett’s motion to dismiss and an independent

review, the undersigned takes judicial notice that Lewinson failed to include at least

the following three cases: (1) Lewinson v. State of Florida, Case No. 2016-735 (Fla.

5th DCA 2016) (challenging Lewinson’s criminal conviction); (2) Lewinson v. State

of Florida, Case No. 2017-2940 (Fla. 5th DCA 2017) (appealing the state court’s

August 2017 resentencing); and (3) Lewinson v. State of Florida, Case No. 2025-

1777 (Fla. 6th DCA 2025) (appealing the state court’s denial of postconviction

relief). These cases were filed before the instant complaint and should have been

disclosed under Section VIII.C.

Lewinson admits he failed to disclose “at least (5) appeals in the state court

between 2014 and 2021” but argues dismissal is not appropriate for several reasons,

none of which are persuasive. Doc. 34. First, Lewinson argues that “appointed

counsel was the one who filed those appeals,” therefore “he answered the questions

no because he never filed a lawsuit before.” Doc. 34 at 1 (emphasis in original).

This argument is disingenuous. As an initial matter, the state court docket indicates

Case No. 2025-1777 was a pro se filing appealing the denial of a 3.850 motion,

which is a motion incarcerated individuals may file to challenge their judgment or

sentence. See Osceola County Case. No. 2014 CF 4196, Doc. 7/28/2025

(“Acknowledgement of [Fla. 6th DCA, Case No. 2025-1777] with Order Regarding

Brief”); Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850. Therefore, Lewinson—not his court-appointed

counsel—was the one who filed at least one of the appeals he should have disclosed

on the form.

Regardless, Lewinson’s position that he did not believe he needed to disclose

those cases filed by counsel is simply untenable. The questions do not make that

distinction. Lawyers act only behalf of their clients. See Maracich v. Spears, 570

U.S. 48, 61 (2013) (“It is no less true than trite that lawyers must operate in a three-

fold capacity, as self-employed businessmen as it were, as trusted agents of their

clients, and as assistants to the court in search of a just solution to disputes.”). And

the form directed Lewinson to “err on the side of caution.” Doc. 1 at 11. Thus,

Lewinson’s alleged “misunderstanding” of the form does not “excuse the

misrepresentation” or make “dismissal without prejudice” any less appropriate.

Redmon v. Lake Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 414 F. App’x 221, 226 (11th Cir. 2011)

(affirming district court’s dismissal based on failure to disclose where plaintiff

objected that he “misunderstood” the form); Merritt v. Dep't of Corr., No.

5:19cv144/TKW/MJF, 2020 WL 6703794, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 13, 2020) (rejecting

inmate’s argument that he should be allowed to amend his complaint to disclose his

litigation history where his failure to do so was allegedly based on an “honest

mistake”).

Second, Lewinson argues that “if by chance [he] answered the question wrong

it wasn’t intentionally it was only a lack of education and knowledge.” Doc. 34 at

2. Whether Lewinson’s failure to truthfully disclose his litigation history was

intentional is irrelevant. See Jenkins v. Hutcheson, 708 F. App’x 647, 648-49 (11th

Cir. 2018) (affirming district court’s sanction of dismissal because the plaintiff’s

failure to disclose prior lawsuits, even though unintentional, frustrated district

court’s ability to perform its screening function under the PLRA); Lebarr v. Fla.

Dep’t of Corr., Case No. 5:21cv233-TKW-MJF, 2022 WL 2438357, at *1 (N.D. Fla.

July 5, 2022) (rejecting argument that a failure to disclose was a “simple mistake”

because even if true, “a sanction is warranted to deter Plaintiff and others from

carelessly filling out the civil rights complaint form, and under the circumstances,

dismissal without prejudice is the appropriate sanction.”).

If the Court excused a prisoner’s failure to truthfully disclose his litigation

history based on a conclusory allegation of “lack of education and knowledge,”

almost all prisoners would use that excuse to avoid the consequences of their

misrepresentations. To the extent Lewinson is unsure of the cases he has filed, he

can obtain a listing of those cases from the clerks of court. See Burrell v. Warden I,

857 F. App’x 624, 624-25 (11th Cir. 2021) (affirming district court’s dismissal for

failure to disclose even though prisoner claimed he lacked memory of an omitted

lawsuit); Sheffield v. Brown, Case No. 5:23cv238/TKW/MJF, 2023 WL 9105658 at

*3 (N.D. Fla. Dec. 14, 2023) (“Plaintiff could have requested his litigation history

from the appropriate clerks of the various courts … .”).

The Court has the inherent power to dismiss a complaint for failure to disclose

even a single case. See McNair v. Johnson, 143 F.4th 1301 (11th Cir. 2025)

(recognizing court’s inherent authority to dismiss an action for failure to truthfully

disclose litigation history when requested to do so on complaint form). It also has

the inherent power to dismiss based on a failure to comply with orders of the Court,

this Court’s local rules, or for abusing the judicial process. Id. at 1308; see also N.D.

Fla. Loc. R. 41.1 (“If a party fails to comply with an applicable rule or a court order,

the Court may strike a pleading, dismiss a claim, enter a default on a claim, take

other appropriate action, or issue an order to show cause why any of these actions

should not be taken.”).

Thus, an appropriate sanction for Lewinson’s failure to truthfully disclose his

litigation history is to dismiss this case without prejudice. See Bratton v. Sec’y Dep’t

of Corr., 2012 WL 2913171, at *1 (M.D. Fla. July 16, 2012) (dismissing case without

prejudice when prisoner failed to disclose one prior federal case that was dismissed

under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)); Johnson v. Crawson, No. 5:08cv300/RS/EMT, 2010

WL 1380247, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Mar. 3, 2010) (same); see also Strickland v. United

States, 739 F. App’x 587, 588 (11th Cir. 2018) (“A sanction less than dismissal would

signal that a failure to disclose filings is an infraction without consequence.”). “If

the requirement for prisoner plaintiffs to disclose their prior lawsuits is to serve its

purpose, a plaintiff must provide accurate information. If word got around the

prisons that inaccurate or incomplete information could be provided with no

effective sanction, the form would serve little purpose.” Rodriguez v. Inch, No.

4:19cv191/RH/HTC, Doc. 52 (N.D. Fla. June 7, 2020).

Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED that:

1. Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 31) be GRANTED and this case

be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE for Lewinson’s failure to truthfully

disclose his litigation history.

2. The clerk close the file.

At Pensacola, Florida, this 8th day of June, 2026.

/s/ Hope Thai Cannon

HOPE THAI CANNON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

NOTICE TO THE PARTIES

Objections to these proposed findings and recommendations must be filed within

fourteen (14) days of the date of the Report and Recommendation. Any different

deadline that may appear on the electronic docket is for the court’s internal use only

and does not control. An objecting party must serve a copy of its objections upon all

other parties. A party who fails to object to the magistrate judge’s findings or

recommendations contained in a report and recommendation waives the right to

challenge on appeal the district court’s order based on the unobjected-to factual and

legal conclusions. See 11th Cir. Rule 3-1.