Opinion

Parker

Court
District Court, S.D. Illinois
Filed
Jul 7, 2026
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 41.6%

The opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EDWARD WILLIAMS, #B80477, )

)

Plaintiff, )

)

vs. ) Case No. 25-cv-00004-SMY

)

JOSHUA PARKER )

and DANIEL MONTI, )

)

Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

YANDLE, Chief District Judge:

Plaintiff Edward Williams filed this action against Joshua Parker and Daniel Monti under

42 U.S.C. § 1983 for their alleged failure to protect him from an inmate attack, in violation of the

Eighth Amendment. (Doc. 1). Defendant Parker now moves for summary judgment based on

Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his administrative remedies in compliance with the Prison Litigation

Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). (Doc. 47). Plaintiff opposes the motion. (Doc. 51).

Because the undisputed facts establish that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his remedies against this

defendant, Defendant Parker’s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Internal Affairs Officer Joshua

Parker and Warden Daniel Montiafter he was attacked by Inmate Carter at Centralia Correctional

Center on September 9, 2024. Plaintiff alleges that this was not his first attack by another inmate.

(Doc. 1, p. 15). Inmate Robinson almost killed Plaintiff after smoking drugs and attacking him at

Western Illinois Correctional Center on March 18, 2022. After transferring to Centralia, Plaintiff

informed Officer Parker about his prior assault on July 2, 2024 and that Inmate Carter posed a

threat to his safety because healso smokeddrugs. Officer Parker promised to move Plaintiffifhe

reported anyharm caused byInmate Carter. Id.

Plaintiff wrote a letter to Officer Parker on August 15, 2024 to report Inmate Carter’s

threats of physical harm and to request separation from him. Officer Parker did not respond to

Plaintiff’s first request,and Warden Monti ignored his second request a week later. Plaintiff then

filed an emergency grievance to request protection from Inmate Carter on September1, 2024.

Warden Monti deemed it an emergency on September 3, 2024 and forwarded it to a grievance

officer for a referral to internal affairs on September 4, 2024. Following an investigation by

internal affairs, the grievance officer recommended denying it based on informationgathered two

months earlier, and Warden Monti concurred. Id. at 10-11, 15. Inmate Carter attacked Plaintiff

and knocked out threeof his teethon September 9, 2024. Id.

The Court screened the pro se Complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and allowed Plaintiff

to proceed with the following claim:

Count 1: Eighth Amendment claim against Warden Monti and Internal Affairs

Officer Parker for failing to intervene and protect Plaintiff from an attack

by Inmate Carter on or around September 9, 2024.

(Doc. 15). A First Amendment retaliation claim (Count 2) was dismissed without prejudice for

failure to state a claim for relief against either defendant. Id. In their Answers, Defendants Monti

and Parker both asserted an affirmative defense based on Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust

administrative remedies before filing this lawsuit. (Doc. 26). Defendant Monti later withdrew his

affirmative defense. (Docs. 35, 37).

MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Defendant Parker moves for summary judgment based on Plaintiff’s failure to exhaust his

administrative remedies before filing suit, in violation of the Prison Litigation Reform Act

(PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). (Doc. 47). Parker claims Plaintiff submitted only two potentially

relevant grievances to the ARB: Grievance 1: #K7-0924-954E (dated September 1, 2024) and

Grievance 2: #K7-1024-1194E (dated October 17, 2024). Neither grievance names Parker in

connection with Plaintiff’s complaint that prison staff failed to protect him from a cellmate attack.

Id.

Plaintiff does not dispute any proposed findings of fact set forth by Parker. He merely

summarizes the allegations in the Complaint and he asks that summary judgment be denied based

on them. (Doc. 51 at 1-2).

FINDINGS OF FACT

The following material facts are undisputed for purposes of the pending motion (see

Defendant’s Findings of Fact (Def. FOF) at Doc. 48; see also Plaintiff’s Response at Doc. 51):

Centralia keeps a copy of each grievance it receives and each response issued by a person with

knowledge of the incident. (Def. FOF 9-11; Doc. 48-5). The facility also maintains a grievance

log that tracks the topic of each inmate grievance, the date each inmate grievance was received for

first level review, the date each inmate grievance was received for second level review, whether

the grievance was denied, and the date each grievance was returned to the inmate. (Def. FOF 6-

8; Doc. 48-4 and 48-5).

The Administrative Review Board (ARB) maintains a separate grievance log known as

IGRVwhich tracks all grievances the ARB receives from each offender. (Def. FOF 3-4; Doc. 48-

2). IGRV tracks the topic of each grievance, location of the grievant at the time of the incident,

location of the grievant at the time of the grievance, a brief description of the grievance, and the

date the grievance was heard or decided by the ARB. (Def. FOF 5; Doc. 48-3).

According to these records, Centralia received five grievances from Plaintiff between

January 2024 and December 2024. (Def. FOF 14; Doc. 48-5, 48-6, and 48-7). The ARB has a

record of four grievances submitted during this time. (Def. FOF 12; Doc. 48-2). Of these, only

twopotentially pertain to Officer Parker:Grievance1:#K7-0924-954E (dated September 1, 2024)

and Grievance2: #K7-1024-1194E (dated October 17, 2024). (Def. FOF 13; Doc. 48-2).

Grievance1: #K7-0924-954E

In Grievance K7-0924-954E dated September 1, 2024, Plaintiff complained he was not

getting along with his cellmate. (Def. FOF 13; Doc. 48-2). Plaintiff states that he wrote Warden

Monti a letter about a possible failure to protectclaim arising from incidents involving his current

cellmate who threatened him with violence after smoking drugs. Plaintiff also explained that his

current cellmate reminded him of a past cellmate who attacked him after smoking. Id.

Grievance K7-0924-954E was received for the first level of review on September 3, 2024.

It was sent to the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) for review and deemed an emergency.

It was received and denied at the second level of review on September 4, 2024. Plaintiff appealed

the grievance to the ARB on September 11, 2024. He attached a newly drafted “Affidavit of a

Full Complaint” dated September 15, 2024. Id. Plaintiff’s affidavit describes an altercation he

had with his cellmate and he blames internal affairs for the incident. The ARB received the appeal

on September 23, 2024 and denied it. Acting Director Latoya Hughes concurred with the decision.

Plaintiff did not mention Officer Parker in Grievance K7-0924-954E or the Affidavit. Id.

Grievance 2: #K7-1024-1194E

In Grievance K7-1024-1194E dated October 17, 2024, Plaintiff complained that he was

not getting along with his new cellmate. (Def. FOF 13; Doc. 48-2). He noted that his current

cellmate smoked the same drugs that his former cellmate smoked before attacking him. Id.

Grievance K7-1024-1194E was received for first level review on October 18, 2024. It was sent to

the CAO and deemed an emergency. The grievance was received for second level review on

October 21, 2024 and was denied as moot because Plaintiff’s cellmate was no longer housed in

the same cell. Id. Plaintiff appealed to the ARB on October 25, 2024. The ARB received the

appeal on October 30, 2024and denied it on the merits on November 20, 2024. Id.

LEGAL STANDARDS

Summary judgment is proper if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the

movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED.R. CIV.P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,

477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Any doubt about the existence of a genuine issue must be resolved in

favor of the nonmoving party, i.e., the prisoner. Lawrence v. Kenosha Cty., 391 F.3d 837, 841

(7th Cir. 2004). The district court’s role on summary judgment is generally not to weigh evidence

or judge witness credibility.

When presented with a motion for summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion, however,

the district court’s approach to factual disputes is different. In Pavey, the Seventh Circuit Court

of Appeals instructed district courts to conduct an evidentiary hearing to resolve contested issues

of fact concerning exhaustion. Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d at 742. The Supreme Court partially

overruled Pavey in Perttu v. Richards, 605 U.S. 460, 464 (June 18, 2025), when it held that

exhaustion disputes must be reserved for a jury if contested facts on exhaustion are intertwined

withfactual disputeson the merits of a claim. Therefore, when the district court is presented with

a motion for summary judgment on exhaustion with disputed material facts, it must consider

whether intertwinement between exhaustion and the merits requires a jury trial. Here, there is no

intertwinement requiring a jury trial1 and no material factual disputes requiring a Pavey hearing.

See Doss v. Gilkey, 649 F. Supp. 2d 905, 912 (S.D. Ill. 2009). Thepending motion for summary

judgment can be resolved without a Pavey hearing.

1 Unlike Perttu, the material facts surrounding exhaustion are not disputed. There is no intertwinement between the

facts underlying exhaustion and the merits of the claim against Officer Parker. The questions about exhaustion can be

resolved without addressing the questions on the merits, so Perttu poses no barrier.

The Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a), requires a prisoner to

exhaust all available administrative remedies before bringing a suit in federal court about the

conditions of his confinement. Pavey v. Conley, 544 F.3d 739, 740 (7th Cir. 2008). To properly

exhaust, the prisoner must “file complaints and appeals in the place, and at the time, the prison’s

administrative rules require.” Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002).

“[A] prisoner who does not properly take each step within the administrative process has failed to

exhaust state remedies.” Id. at 1024. “The exhaustion requirement is an affirmative defense,

which the defendants bear the burden of proving.” Pavey v. Conley, 663 F.3d 899, 903 (7th Cir.

2011); Thomas v. Reese, 787 F.3d 845, 847 (7th Cir. 2015).

The Illinois Administrative Code describes the process that inmates in IDOC custody

follow to exhaust administrative remedies. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.800, et seq. (2017).

According to it, an inmate facing an emergency may submit an emergency grievance directly to

the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO) (Warden). 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.840(c). If the

CAO deems the grievance an emergency, it is expedited for processing in whatever manner the

CAO specifies. Id. If the grievance describesno emergency,itis denied as a non-emergency and

must be resubmitted in accordance with the standard grievance procedure. Id.

To comply withthe standard procedure, aninmate must file his grievance with a counselor

within 60 days of the incident giving rise to the grievance. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.830(e). If

the grievance is not resolved informally through the counselor, it must be submitted in writing to

a grievance officer, who reports his or her findings and recommendations in writing to the CAO

within 2 months after receiving the written grievance, when reasonably feasible. 20 ILL.ADMIN.

CODE § 504.830(e). The CAO then provides the inmate with a written decision. Id. If the inmate

is not satisfied with the CAO’s response, he files an appeal with the IDOC Director through the

Administrative Review Board (ARB) within 30 days of the CAO’s decision. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE

§ 504.850(a). The inmate must attach copies of responses from the grievance officer and CAO to

his appeal. Id. The ARB then considers the matter and submits a written report of its findings and

recommendations to the Director, who makes a final determination within 6 months of receipt of

the matter, when reasonably feasible. 20 ILL.ADMIN. CODE §§ 504.850(d), (e).

DISCUSSION

The undisputed material facts support Officer Parker’s request for summary judgment.

Plaintiff was admittedly aware of the inmate grievance process and used it to file two grievances

that are applicable to his claim against Officer Parker:Grievance 1: #K7-0924-954E and Grievance

2: #K7-1024-1194E. (Doc. 51, pp. 7-8). However, neither of these grievances identified Officer

Parker in connection with his claim, generally or specifically.

The grievance forms used by Plaintiff explicitly instructed the grievant to: “[p]rovide

information including a description of what happened, when and where it happened, and the name

or identifying information for each person involved.” Id. at 26. The IDOC grievance process

provides that an inmate grievance must contain factual details about each aspect of the inmate’s

complaint, including what happened, when, where, and the name(s) of the person(s) involved in

the matter. 20 ILL. ADMIN. CODE § 504.810(c). If the inmate does not know the name(s), the

inmate must describe each person with as much detail as possible. Id. The PLRA only requires a

grievance to “alert the prison to the nature of the wrong for which redress is sought” and afford

prison officials the opportunity to respond. See Westefer v. Snyder, 422 F.3d 570, 580 (7th Cir.

2005) (citing Strong v. David, 297 F.3d 646, 650 (7th Cir. 2002)); Pavey, 663 F.3d at 905-06.

Here, Plaintiff failed to put the prison on notice of his grievance against Officer Parker

under any of these standards. InGrievance 1: #K7-0924-954E (dated September 1, 2024), Plaintiff

stated:

On 8/15/2024, I wrote a letter telling warden Monti about a possible failure to protect. I

first told him what happened to me on 3/18/2022 in another failure to protect case number

3:24-cv-0320-JRM. Three weeks before that, I brought it to the Internal Affairs. They call

me over to the Internal Affairs Office to ask me did me or my cellie Inmate Carter get along

with each other. I told them the only problem that I had with my cellie Inmate Carter is that

he smokes that stuff 5 or 6 times a day. . . .

(Doc. 1, pp. 8-9; Doc. 48-2, pp. 10-11; Doc. 51, pp. 26-27). In an “Affidavit of Full Complaint”

added later, he again mentioned “internal affairs” but not Officer Parker by name or description.

(Doc. 48-2, pp. 1-13).

In Grievance 2: #K7-1024-1194E (dated October 17, 2024), Plaintiff stated:

On last week Friday, October 12, 2024, yall put a cellie in the cell with name Vincent D.

Jones inmate R-34732, who smokes those same drugs that my other cellie smoke, Inmate

Carter R-06136, that knocked out 3 bottom teeth, and I told yall about. . . .”

(Doc. 48-2, pp. 4-5). Again, Plaintiff did not name or describe Officer Parker nor mention internal

affairs in the second grievance.

Plaintiff attempts to create a genuine issue of material fact by asserting in his Complaint

(Doc. 1, p. 15) and Response (Doc. 51, p. 1) that he first wrote “Internal Affairs Officer Parker”

about the issue on August 15, 2024. However, he does not support this statement with any

evidence or citations to the record.

Plaintiff’s remaining arguments focus on the merits of his claim against Officer Parker,

but, this case has not reached the merits stage. Because the undisputed facts and law support

Officer Parker’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of exhaustion, the claim against him

will be dismissed without prejudice.

DISPOSITION

The Motion for Summary Judgment on the Issue of Exhaustion of Administrative

Remedies filed by Joshua Parker (Doc. 47) is GRANTED. COUNT 1 against JOSHUA

PARKER is DISMISSED without prejudice based on Plaintiff's failure to exhaust his

administrative remedies before filing suit in federal court against this individual. Defendant

JOSHUA PARKER is DISMISSSED without prejudice from this action, with judgment to enter

accordingly at the close of this case.

COUNT 1 will proceed against this Defendant Daniel Monti. The Court will enter a

separate Scheduling and Discovery Order lifting the stay on merits discovery for COUNT 1

against DANIEL MONTI. The Clerk’s Office is DIRECTED to TERMINATE Defendant

JOSHUA PARKER as a party in CM/ECF.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: July 7, 2026 News M. Coll

STACIM.YANDLE

Chief U.S. District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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