More

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

11 AL-MON JUMOKE JOHNSON, No. 2:26-cv-00475 CSK P

12 Plaintiff,

13 v. ORDER

14 OFFICER MORE, et al.,

15 Defendants.

16

17 Plaintiff is a state prisoner proceeding pro se. Plaintiff seeks relief pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

18 § 1983 and requested leave to proceed in forma pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. This

19 proceeding was referred to this Court by Local Rule 302 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).

20 Plaintiff submitted a declaration that makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a).

21 Accordingly, the request to proceed in forma pauperis is granted.

22 Plaintiff is required to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. 28 U.S.C.

23 §§ 1914(a), 1915(b)(1). By this order, plaintiff is assessed an initial partial filing fee in

24 accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). By separate order, the Court will

25 direct the appropriate agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account

26 and forward it to the Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff is obligated to make monthly

27 payments of twenty percent of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s trust account.

28 These payments will be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time

1 the amount in plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00, until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C.

2 § 1915(b)(2).

3 Plaintiff is granted an opportunity to elect to proceed with his potentially colorable Eighth

4 Amendment claim against defendant Navarro, or may elect to amend his complaint as discussed

5 below.

6 I. SCREENING STANDARDS

7 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

8 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

9 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner raised claims that are legally

10 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

11 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), (2).

12 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.

13 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th

14 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous when it is based on an

15 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,

16 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully

17 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

18 Cir. 1989), superseded by statute as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir.

19 2000) (“[A] judge may dismiss [in forma pauperis] claims which are based on indisputably

20 meritless legal theories or whose factual contentions are clearly baseless.”); Franklin, 745 F.2d at

21 1227.

22 Rule 8(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure “requires only ‘a short and plain

23 statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ in order to ‘give the

24 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Bell Atlantic

25 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).

26 In order to survive dismissal for failure to state a claim, a complaint must contain more than “a

27 formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action;” it must contain factual allegations

28 sufficient “to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555.

1 However, “[s]pecific facts are not necessary; the statement [of facts] need only ‘give the

2 defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.’” Erickson v.

3 Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93 (2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555, citations and internal

4 quotations marks omitted). In reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court must accept as

5 true the allegations of the complaint in question, Erickson, 551 U.S. at 93, and construe the

6 pleading in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236

7 (1974), overruled on other grounds, Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183 (1984).

8 II. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT

9 To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) the violation of a federal

10 constitutional or statutory right; and (2) that the violation was committed by a person acting under

11 the color of state law. See West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988); Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d

12 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). An individual defendant is not liable on a civil rights claim unless the

13 facts establish the defendant’s personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or a causal

14 connection between the defendant’s wrongful conduct and the alleged constitutional deprivation.

15 See Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 646 (9th Cir. 1989); Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44

16 (9th Cir. 1978). That is, plaintiff may not sue any official on the theory that the official is liable

17 for the unconstitutional conduct of his or her subordinates. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679

18 (2009). The requisite causal connection between a supervisor’s wrongful conduct and the

19 violation of the prisoner’s constitutional rights can be established in a number of ways, including

20 by demonstrating that a supervisor’s own culpable action or inaction in the training, supervision,

21 or control of his subordinates was a cause of plaintiff’s injury. Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202,

22 1208 (9th Cir. 2011).

23 III. DISCUSSION

24 Named as defendants are floor officers More and Ainsworth and control tower officer

25 Navarro. (ECF No. 1 at 2.) Plaintiff alleges that on December 26, 2025, plaintiff was assaulted

26 by an inmate during dayroom while the officer in the tower just watched and did nothing. (Id. at

27 3.) The inmate who attacked plaintiff had a weapon and threatened that if plaintiff tried to leave

28 the building or told correctional staff, plaintiff would be killed. (Id.) For days after, plaintiff was

1 forced by this inmate and other inmates to stay in plaintiff’s cell until plaintiff’s eyes “went

2 down” because they were swollen. (Id.) Plaintiff was told by other inmates that the other inmates

3 who had threatened plaintiff’s life intended to stab plaintiff that week. (Id.) Plaintiff then

4 devised a plan to escape from the building and alert correctional staff about what had happened.

5 (Id.) Plaintiff was placed into protective custody. (Id.) The inmate who assaulted plaintiff

6 received a rules violation. (Id.) The officers claimed they had no knowledge of the assault until

7 they viewed the video of the incident nearly a month later. (Id.) As his legal claim, plaintiff

8 alleges violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Id.)

9 Although plaintiff does not identify by name the tower officer who allegedly watched the

10 assault on plaintiff and failed to intervene, it appears that defendant Navarro is this tower officer.

11 This Court finds that plaintiff states a potentially colorable Eighth Amendment claim against

12 defendant Navarro.

13 The complaint contains no specific allegations against defendants More and Ainsworth.

14 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides as follows:

15 Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects, or causes

to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation

16 of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution .

. . shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,

17 or other proper proceeding for redress.

18 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

19 actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

20 Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

21 (1976). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, within the

22 meaning of § 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative acts or

23 omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

24 complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978).

25 Moreover, supervisory personnel are generally not liable under § 1983 for the actions of

26 their employees under a theory of respondeat superior and, therefore, when a named defendant

27 holds a supervisorial position, the causal link between him and the claimed constitutional

28 violation must be specifically alleged. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979);

1 Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979). Vague

2 and conclusory allegations concerning the involvement of official personnel in civil rights

3 violations are not sufficient. See Ivey v. Board of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

4 The claims against defendants More and Ainsworth are dismissed because these

5 defendants are not linked to the alleged deprivations. If plaintiff files an amended complaint,

6 plaintiff shall allege facts demonstrating how defendants More and Ainsworth violated plaintiff’s

7 constitutional rights.

8 IV. PLAINTIFF’S OPTIONS

9 Plaintiff may proceed forthwith to serve defendant Navarro and pursue his potentially

10 cognizable Eighth Amendment claim against only defendant Navarro, or he may delay serving

11 any defendant and attempt to state a cognizable claim against defendants More and Ainsworth.

12 If plaintiff elects to proceed forthwith against defendant Navarro, against whom he stated a

13 potentially cognizable Eighth Amendment claim for relief, then within thirty days plaintiff must

14 so elect on the attached form. In this event the Court will construe plaintiff’s election as consent

15 to dismissal of the Eighth Amendment claims against defendants More and Ainsworth without

16 prejudice. Under this option, plaintiff does not need to file an amended complaint.

17 Or, plaintiff may delay serving any defendant and attempt again to state a cognizable

18 claim against defendants More and Ainsworth. If plaintiff elects to attempt to amend his

19 complaint to state a cognizable claim against defendants More and Ainsworth, plaintiff has thirty

20 days to amend. Plaintiff is not granted leave to add new claims or new defendants.

21 Any amended complaint must show the federal court has jurisdiction, the action is brought

22 in the right place, plaintiff has complied with the California Government Claims Act, and plaintiff

23 is entitled to relief if plaintiff’s allegations are true. It must contain a request for particular relief.

24 Plaintiff must identify as a defendant only persons who personally participated in a substantial

25 way in depriving plaintiff of a federal constitutional right. Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743

26 (9th Cir. 1978) (a person subjects another to the deprivation of a constitutional right if he does an

27 act, participates in another’s act, or omits to perform an act he is legally required to do that causes

28 the alleged deprivation).

1 A district court must construe a pro se pleading “liberally” to determine if it states a claim

2 and, prior to dismissal, tell a plaintiff of deficiencies in his complaint and give plaintiff an

3 opportunity to cure them. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000). While

4 detailed factual allegations are not required, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of

5 action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

6 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Plaintiff

7 must set forth “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is

8 plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp., 550 U.S. at 570).

9 A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the

10 defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility

standard is not akin to a “probability requirement,” but it asks for

11 more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.

Where a complaint pleads facts that are merely consistent with a

12 defendant’s liability, it stops short of the line between possibility and

plausibility of entitlement to relief.

13

14 Ashcroft, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations and quotation marks omitted). Although legal conclusions

15 can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations, and are

16 not entitled to the assumption of truth. Id.

17 An amended complaint must be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading.

18 Local Rule 220; see Ramirez v. County of San Bernardino, 806 F.3d 1002, 1008 (9th Cir. 2015)

19 (“an ‘amended complaint supersedes the original, the latter being treated thereafter as non-

20 existent.’” (internal citation omitted)). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original

21 pleading is superseded. Plaintiff is not granted leave to add new claims or new defendants.

22 V. CONCLUSION

23 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

24 1. Plaintiff’s request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is granted.

25 2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff

26 is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C.

27 § 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the

28 Director of the California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation filed concurrently

1 |} herewith.

2 3. Claims against defendants More and Ainsworth are dismissed with leave to amend.

3 || Within thirty days of service of this order, plaintiff may amend his complaint to attempt to state

4 || cognizable claims against defendants More and Ainsworth. Plaintiff is not obligated to amend his

5 || complaint.

6 4. The allegations in the complaint are sufficient to state a potentially cognizable Eighth

7 || Amendment claim against defendant Navarro. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. If plaintiff chooses to

8 || proceed solely as to such claim, plaintiff shall so indicate on the attached form and return it to the

9 || Court within thirty days from the date of this order. In this event, the Court will construe

10 | plaintiffs election to proceed forthwith as consent to an order dismissing the defective claims

11 | without prejudice.

12 5. Failure to comply with this order will result in a recommendation that this action be

13 || dismissed.

14

15 || Dated: May 29, 2026 A aA

6 Aan Spe |

CHI SOO KIM

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

18

19

20 | John475.14.0pt/2

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

1

2

3

4

5

6

7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

8 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

9

10 AL-MON JUMOKE JOHNSON, No. 2:26-cv-00475 CSK P

11 Plaintiff,

12 v. NOTICE OF ELECTION

13 OFFICER MORE, et al.,

14 Defendants.

15

Plaintiff elects to proceed as follows:

16

______ Plaintiff opts to proceed with his Eighth Amendment claim against

17

defendant Navarro. Under this option, plaintiff consents to dismissal of the

18 Eighth Amendment claims against defendants More and Ainsworth,

without prejudice.

19

OR

20

_____ Plaintiff opts to file an amended complaint and delay service of process.

21

22 DATED:

23 _______________________________

Plaintiff

24

25

26

27

28