Schultz

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 CHARLES-CLIFTON BEAL., 2:25-cv-3636-CKD P

12 Plaintiff,

13 v. ORDER

14 JASON SCHULTZ, et al.,

15 Defendants.

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17 Plaintiff Charles-Clifton Beal is a state prisoner proceeding without counsel and seeking

18 relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This matter was referred to the undersigned by Local Rule 302.

19 See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). For the reasons set forth below, the complaint fails to state a claim and

20 should be dismissed with leave to amend.

21 I. In Forma Pauperis

22 Plaintiff requests to proceed in forma pauperis. Plaintiff’s declaration in support of the

23 motion to proceed in forma pauperis makes the showing required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). The

24 motion is granted. By separate order, plaintiff will be assessed an initial partial filing fee in

25 accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). The order will direct the appropriate

26 agency to collect the initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account and forward it to the

27 Clerk of the Court. Thereafter, plaintiff will be obligated for monthly payments of twenty percent

28 of the preceding month’s income credited to plaintiff’s prison trust account. These payments will

1 be forwarded by the appropriate agency to the Clerk of the Court each time the amount in

2 plaintiff’s account exceeds $10.00 until the filing fee is paid in full. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

3 II. Screening Requirement

4 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a

5 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The

6 court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are legally

7 “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek

8 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1),(2).

9 A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.

10 Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1227-28 (9th

11 Cir. 1984). The court may, therefore, dismiss a claim as frivolous where it is based on an

12 indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are clearly baseless. Neitzke,

13 490 U.S. at 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully

14 pleaded, has an arguable legal and factual basis. See Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th

15 Cir. 1989); Franklin, 745 F.2d at 1227.

16 In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than

17 “naked assertions,” “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause

18 of action.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-557 (2007). In other words,

19 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory

20 statements do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Furthermore, a claim

21 upon which the court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A

22 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

23 the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S.

24 at 678. When considering whether a complaint states a claim upon which relief can be granted,

25 the court must accept the allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 93-94 (2007), and

26 construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416

27 U.S. 232, 236 (1974).

28 /////

1 III. Allegations in the Complaint

2 In Claim One, plaintiff alleges that the law librarian, not named as a defendant, and Jason

3 Schultz, the warden at CSP-Sac “will not get and/or give…federal IRA forms to file…to

4 exercise” his religion. (ECF No. 1 at 5.) In Claim Two, plaintiff alleges that his conditions of

5 confinement are in violation of the Eight Amendment based on unsanitary conditions. Id. at 6. In

6 Claim Three, plaintiff alleges that on three occasions his mail was not sent to the IRS, and on two

7 occasions, his mail was not sent to federal court. Id. at 7. In Claim Four, plaintiff alleges that

8 John and Jane Does in the mail room stopped legal mail to the IRS and federal court. Id. at 8. In

9 Claim Five, plaintiff alleges “35 years was remove (sic) the next prison put it back on it is

10 retaliation.” Id. at 9. Named defendants are “Jason Schultz, Warden; Timothy William

11 Wagstaffe, DA; Song Kim, PD; and Jason B. Chin, Judge.” Id. at 1.

12 IV. Legal Standards

13 A. Linkage Requirement

14 The civil rights statute requires that there be an actual connection or link between the

15 actions of the defendants and the deprivation alleged to have been suffered by plaintiff. See

16 Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362

17 (1976). The Ninth Circuit has held that “[a] person ‘subjects' another to the deprivation of a

18 constitutional right, within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates

19 in another's affirmative acts or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that

20 causes the deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th

21 Cir. 1978) (citation omitted). In order to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff must

22 link each named defendant with some affirmative act or omission that demonstrates a violation of

23 plaintiff's federal rights.

24 B. Supervisory Liability

25 Government officials may not be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of their

26 subordinates under a theory of respondeat superior. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677 (2009)

27 (“In a § 1983 suit ... the term “supervisory liability” is a misnomer. Absent vicarious liability,

28 each Government official, his or her title notwithstanding is only liable for his or her own

1 misconduct.”). When the named defendant holds a supervisory position, the causal link between

2 the defendant and the claimed constitutional violation must be specifically alleged; that is, a

3 plaintiff must allege some facts indicating that the defendant either personally participated in or

4 directed the alleged deprivation of constitutional rights or knew of the violations and failed to act

5 to prevent them. See Fayle v. Stapley, 607 F.2d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1979); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d

6 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989); Mosher v. Saalfeld, 589 F.2d 438, 441 (9th Cir. 1978).

7 C. Mail

8 Under the First Amendment, prisoners have a right to send and receive mail. Witherow v.

9 Paff, 52 F.3d 264, 265 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). However, a prison may adopt regulations or

10 practices for inmate mail which limit a prisoner’s First Amendment rights as long as the

11 regulations are “reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.” Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S.

12 78, 89, (1987). “When a prison regulation affects outgoing mail as opposed to incoming mail,

13 there must be a ‘closer fit between the regulation and the purpose it serves.’” Witherow, 52 F.3d

14 at 265 (quoting Thornburgh v. Abbott, 490 U.S. 401, 412 (1989)). Courts have also afforded

15 greater protection to legal mail than non-legal mail. See Thornburgh, 490 U.S. at 413. Isolated

16 incidents of mail interference or tampering will not support a claim under section 1983 for

17 violation of plaintiff's constitutional rights. See Davis v. Goord, 320 F.3d 346, 351 (2d. Cir.

18 2003); Gardner v. Howard, 109 F.3d 427, 431 (8th Cir. 1997); Smith v. Maschner, 899 F.2d 940,

19 944 (10th Cir. 1990); see also Crofton v. Roe, 170 F.3d 957, 961 (9th Cir. 1999) (emphasizing

20 that a temporary delay or isolated incident of delay of mail does not violate a prisoner's First

21 Amendment rights). Generally, such isolated incidents must be accompanied by evidence of an

22 improper motive on the part of prison officials or result in interference with an inmate’s right of

23 access to the courts or counsel in order to rise to the level of a constitutional violation. See Smith,

24 899 F.2d at 944.

25 D. Access to Courts

26 A prison’s interference with legal mail may also violate an inmate’s right of access to the

27 courts which is protected by the First Amendment’s right to petition the government and the due

28 process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279, 290-291 (7th

1 Cir. 2004) (discussing the development of cases concerning a prisoner’s right of access to the

2 courts). Prison officials may not actively interfere with an inmate’s right to litigate. Silva v.

3 Vittorio, 658 F.3d 1090, 1103 (9th Cir. 2011), overruled on other grounds by Richey v. Dahne,

4 807 F.3d 1202, 1209 n. 6 (9th Cir. 2015). In order to state a claim for the denial of access to the

5 courts, a plaintiff must allege he suffered an actual injury, which is prejudice with respect to

6 contemplated or existing litigation, such as the inability to meet a filing deadline or present a

7 nonfrivolous claim. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349 (1996).

8 E. Conditions of Confinement

9 Under the Eighth Amendment, prison officials have a duty to protect prisoners from

10 harmful conditions of confinement. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 833 (1994). A prison

11 official may be held liable for subjecting an inmate to harmful conditions of confinement if an

12 inmate suffers a sufficiently serious injury, and the prison official was deliberately indifferent to

13 the risk of harm. Id. at 834, 837. The relevant inquiry is whether prison officials, “acting with

14 deliberate indifference, exposed a prisoner to a sufficiently substantial risk of serious damage to

15 his future health.” Id. at 834 (internal quotation omitted).

16 V. Analysis

17 The court has reviewed plaintiff’s complaint and finds that it fails to state a claim upon

18 which relief can be granted under federal law. The complaint is largely unintelligible, and

19 although there are allegations regarding issues with plaintiff’s mail, there are no specifics nor any

20 named defendants other than the warden, Jason Schultz, who is likely not liable for any harms

21 based on supervisory liability alone. The complaint also names a number of defendants with no

22 factual allegations at all. The court will, however, grant leave to file an amended complaint.

23 VI. Plain Language Summary for Pro Se Party

24 The following information is meant to explain this order in plain English and is not

25 intended as legal advice. The court has reviewed the allegations in your complaint and determined

26 that they do not state any claim against the defendants. Your complaint is being dismissed, but

27 you are being given the chance to fix the problems identified in this screening order.

28 Although you are not required to do so, you may file an amended complaint within 30

1 days from the date of this order. If you choose to file an amended complaint, pay particular

2 attention to the legal standards identified in this order which may apply to your claims.

3 VII. Amended Complaint

4 If plaintiff chooses to amend the complaint, plaintiff must demonstrate how the conditions

5 complained of have resulted in a deprivation of plaintiff’s constitutional rights. See Ellis v.

6 Cassidy, 625 F.2d 227 (9th Cir. 1980). Also, in his amended complaint, plaintiff must allege in

7 specific terms how each named defendant is involved. There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C.

8 § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or connection between a defendant’s actions and the

9 claimed deprivation. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976). Furthermore, vague and conclusory

10 allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient. Ivey v. Board of

11 Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

12 Finally, plaintiff is informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to

13 make plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended

14 complaint be complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a

15 general rule, an amended complaint supersedes the original complaint. See Loux v. Rhay, 375

16 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 1967). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, the original pleading no

17 longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original

18 complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged.

19 VIII. Plain Language Summary for Pro Se Party

20 The following information is meant to explain this order in plain English and is not

21 intended as legal advice.

22 The court has reviewed the allegations in your complaint and determined that service of

23 the complaint is not appropriate because you do not sufficiently describe what happened or

24 explain your belief as to why it happened. Your complaint is being dismissed, but you are being

25 given the chance to fix the problems identified in this screening order.

26 Although you are not required to do so, you may file an amended complaint within 30

27 days from the date of this order. If you choose to file an amended complaint, pay particular

28 attention to the legal standards identified in this order which may apply to your claims.

1 IX. CONCLUSION

2 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

3 1. Plaintiffs request for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED.

4 2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. All fees

5 || shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the California Department of

6 || Corrections filed concurrently herewith.

7 3. Plaintiff's complaint is dismissed.

8 4. Plaintiff is granted thirty days from the date of service of this order to file an amended

9 || complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of Civil

10 || Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must bear the docket

11 || number assigned this case and must be labeled “Amended Complaint.” Failure to file an

12 || amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a recommendation that this action

13 || be dismissed.

14 | Dated: May 27, 2026 / a □□ / a Ly a

16 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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