Opinion

Brown

Court
District Court, E.D. California
Filed
May 26, 2026
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 41.6%

The opinion

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 LARRY OKEITH EASTER, Case No. 2:26-cv-0842-DJC-JDP (PS)

12 Plaintiff,

13 v. ORDER

14 JERRY BROWN, et al.,

15 Defendants.

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17 Plaintiff brings this action against former California Governor Jerry Brown and former

18 Virgina Governor John Dalton. His claims, as articulated, are not cognizable. I will dismiss the

19 complaint and give plaintiff an opportunity to remedy the deficiencies identified below. I will

20 also grant plaintiff’s in forma pauperis application, which makes the required showing.

21 Screening and Pleading Requirements

22 A federal court must screen the complaint of any claimant seeking permission to proceed

23 in forma pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). The court must identify any cognizable claims and

24 dismiss any portion of the complaint that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim upon

25 which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such

26 relief. Id.

27 A complaint must contain a short and plain statement that plaintiff is entitled to relief,

28 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and provide “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its

1 face,” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). The plausibility standard does not

2 require detailed allegations, but legal conclusions do not suffice. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S.

3 662, 678 (2009). If the allegations “do not permit the court to infer more than the mere

4 possibility of misconduct,” the complaint states no claim. Id. at 679. The complaint need not

5 identify “a precise legal theory.” Kobold v. Good Samaritan Reg’l Med. Ctr., 832 F.3d 1024,

6 1038 (9th Cir. 2016). Instead, what plaintiff must state is a “claim”—a set of “allegations that

7 give rise to an enforceable right to relief.” Nagrampa v. MailCoups, Inc., 469 F.3d 1257, 1264

8 n.2 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) (citations omitted).

9 The court must construe a pro se litigant’s complaint liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404

10 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam). The court may dismiss a pro se litigant’s complaint “if it

11 appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which

12 would entitle him to relief.” Hayes v. Idaho Corr. Ctr., 849 F.3d 1204, 1208 (9th Cir. 2017).

13 However, “‘a liberal interpretation of a civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements

14 of the claim that were not initially pled.’” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251,

15 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).

16 Analysis

17 Plaintiff asserts claims for violation of his Eighth, Ninth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth

18 Amendments rights against California’s and Virgina’s former Governors in three seemingly

19 independent factual scenarios. ECF No. 1. First, plaintiff alleges that he was living in Los

20 Angeles in 1980 when the State of Virigina extradited him for an “untried indictment.” Id. at 6.

21 He states that he was held in a Virigina jail for about two years before being released. Id. After

22 he was released, he committed crimes in Virigina and spent approximately ten years in prison. Id.

23 Plaintiff claims that he was then “involuntary[il]y held” from 1997 until 2016 in Virigina. Id. He

24 returned to California in 2018. Id.

25 Plaintiff next alleges that John and Mickey Chohany, contractors for the Commonwealth

26 Jamestown Yorktown Foundation, lied to the Virigina Department of Education by stating that

27 plaintiff was not employed by the Foundation from 2008 through 2016. Id. This lie caused

28 plaintiff issues with the Virgina unemployment office. Id. at 6-7.

1 Finally plaintiff alleges that he was discharged from the United States Army after he

2 completed basic training because he refused to “commit suicide if the com center [he] was

3 working [in] was invaded, by blowing it up” and because he would not go to Germany after the

4 Holy Spirit warned him that he would die if he left the United Staes. Id. Plaintiff states that

5 because he did not have a complete nervous breakdown, he was offered an honorable discharge as

6 a trainee but did not qualify for any benefits. Id. Plaintiff initially received treatment at the

7 Medical College of Virginia but was transferred to the Veteran’s Affairs hospital. The VA

8 informed plaintiff that he was eligible for a pension because he had completed basic training. Id.

9 Plaintiff seeks to have his pension restored and back pay from 1977.

10 Plaintiff’s constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are barred by the Eleventh

11 Amendment. “The Eleventh Amendment has been authoritatively construed to deprive federal

12 courts of jurisdiction over suits by private parties against unconsenting States.” Seven Up Pete

13 Venture v. Schweitzer, 523 F.3d 948, 952 (9th Cir. 2008) (citing Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517

14 U.S. 44, 54 (1996)).

15 This immunity, however, is not absolute. States can be subject to suit in federal court if

16 (1) Congress enacts a law that authorizes such a suit, or (2) the state consents to be sued in a

17 federal forum. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,

18 670 (1999). “Congress may abrogate the [s]tates’ Eleventh Amendment immunity when it both

19 unequivocally intends to do so and ‘acts pursuant to a valid grant of constitutional authority.’”

20 Bd. of Trs. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 363 (2001) (quoting Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S.

21 62, 73 (2000)). Section 1983 did not abrogate the states’ sovereign immunity under the Eleventh

22 Amendment, Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 341 (1979), and California has not consented to suit

23 for section 1983 claims, Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025-26 (9th Cir. 1999).

24 Accordingly, the Eleventh Amendment bars plaintiff’s constitutional claims.

25 The complaint is dismissed with leave to amend. Plaintiff may file an amended complaint

26 that explains why, if at all, his claims should proceed. Any amended complaint will entirely

27 supersede the initial one and must be complete in itself. It should be titled “First Amended

28 Complaint” and be filed within thirty days of this order’s entry.

] Accordingly, it is ORDERED that:

2 1. Plaintiff's complaint, ECF No. 1, is DISMISSED with leave to amend.

3 2. Within thirty days from service of this order, plaintiff shall file either (1) an amended

4 | complaint or (2) notice of voluntary dismissal of this action without prejudice.

5 3. Failure to timely file either an amended complaint or notice of voluntary dismissal may

6 | result in the imposition of sanctions, including a recommendation that this action be dismissed

7 | with prejudice pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b).

8 4. The Clerk of Court shall send plaintiff a complaint form with this order.

9 5. Plaintiff's application to proceed in forma pauperis, ECF No. 2, is GRANTED.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: _ May 25, 2026 aw——

13 JEREMY D. PETERSON

14 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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