The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 AMOS NKONGOLO MUBANGA, Case No.: 26-cv-02565-JO-AHG
12 Plaintiff,
13 ORDER GRANTING PETITION
FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS
14 v.
15 MARKWAYNE MULLIN, et al.
16 Defendant.
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20 For the reasons stated on the record at oral argument on June 4, 2026 (Dkt. 16) and
21 in Faizi v. Larose, No. 25-CV-02974-JO-MSB, --- F.Supp.3d ---, 2026 WL 1112035, at *3
22 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 2026), the Court finds that (1) it has jurisdiction to address Petitioner’s
23 challenge to his prolonged immigration detention, and (2) Petitioner’s immigration
24 detention without a bond hearing has exceeded constitutional limits.
25 Given these findings, the Court now considers the appropriate remedy for
26 Petitioner’s unconstitutionally prolonged detention. The traditional habeas remedy was
27 limited to unconditional release from unlawful custody: “[T]he essence of habeas corpus
28 is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality of that custody, and . . . the traditional
1 function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411
2 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). Over the years, habeas law has evolved to permit intermediate relief
3 short of outright release—such as ordering a bond hearing or a retrial—to give the
4 government an opportunity to cure a constitutional deficiency. See, e.g., Hilton v.
5 Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 775 (1987) (“[F]ederal courts may delay the release of a
6 successful habeas petitioner in order to provide the State an opportunity to correct the
7 constitutional violation found by the court.”). Contrary to the government’s unsupported
8 assertions,1 however, these developments expand rather than constrain the Court’s toolkit
9 of potential habeas remedies; the Court is not barred from providing the traditional remedy
10 of release simply because intermediate relief options exist. As the Ninth Circuit has
11 explained, although a habeas court is no longer “required to order petitioner’s immediate
12 release from physical custody,” it remains “free to fashion the remedy as law and justice
13 require.” See Burnett v. Lampert, 432 F.3d 996, 999 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation
14 marks and citations omitted). Accordingly, the Court finds that it retains its full discretion
15 to fashion equitable relief as appropriate and necessary. See id. (“A federal court is vested
16 with the largest power to control and direct the form of judgment to be entered in cases
17 brought up before it on habeas corpus.”); see also Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 200
18 (1973) (“In shaping equity decrees, the trial court is vested with broad discretionary power
19 . . . Moreover, in constitutional adjudication as elsewhere, equitable remedies are a special
20 blend of what is necessary, what is fair, and what is workable.”); Brown v. Board of
21 Education, 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) (“Traditionally, equity has been characterized by a
22 practical flexibility in shaping its remedies and by a facility for adjusting and reconciling
23 public and private needs.”).
24 While this Court has previously ordered bond hearings in prolonged detention
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1 The government cites a line of Ninth Circuit cases ordering a bond hearing as the remedy for prolonged
27 immigration detention. See Dkt. 17 at 3–4. While a bond hearing is certainly a permissible remedy, none
of the cited cases support the proposition that a bond hearing is the sole available remedy under the
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1 cases, it finds that recent developments in the immigration court system have rendered a
2 bond hearing an inadequate remedy in this case. Numerous courts in this circuit—
3 including this one—have ruled that immigration judges in recent months failed to comply
4 with habeas courts’ orders to provide noncitizens with constitutionally adequate bond
5 hearings.3 As one sister court observed, “[t]he mounting evidence that bond determination
6 hearings conducted in Immigration Court . . . have preordained outcomes has become
7 impossible to ignore.” Singh v. Valdez, No. 26-CV-1109-WJM, 2026 WL 890240, at *5
8 (D. Colo. Apr. 1, 2026) (citation omitted).4 When faced with court orders to provide a new
9 bond hearing, the government has, in many cases, conducted sham hearings that merely
10 prolong unlawful detention,5 rather than using the “opportunity to correct the constitutional
11 violation found by the court.” See Hilton, 481 U.S. at 775 (explaining that the purpose of
12 procedural relief is to afford the state an opportunity to correct a constitutional violation).
13 As a result, successful habeas petitioners are suffering additional weeks or months of
14 unlawful detention while pursuing further court orders to enforce a constitutional right that
15 has already been adjudicated in their favor—i.e., that they are entitled to a due process
16 bond hearing to justify their detention. In light of these circumstances, the Court finds that
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19 2 See, e.g., Faizi, No. 25-CV-02974-JO-MSB, --- F.Supp.3d ---, 2026 WL 1112035.
3 See, e.g., Tiboko-Tifuh v. Noem, No. 26-CV-1215-JO-DEB, 2026 WL 1603795 (S.D. Cal. June 4, 2026);
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Lin v. Noem, No. 3:26-cv-00807-JO-DEB, Dkt. 27 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 20, 2026); Perez Velasquez v. Bondi,
21 No. 26-CV-01759-GPC-DDL, 2026 WL 1042479 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 16, 2026); Soriano v. Hernandez, No.
2:26-CV-00900-DGE, --- F.Supp.3d ---, 2026 WL 969764, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 10, 2026); Miri v.
22 Bondi, No. 5:26-CV-00698-MEMF-MAR, 2026 WL 622302 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2026); Zaitsev v. Warden
of Adelanto ICE Processing Center, No. 2:26-CV-00454-SPG-AS, 2026 WL 391429, at *10 (C.D. Cal.
23 Feb. 9, 2026); W.T.M. v. Bondi, No. 2:25-CV-02428-RAJ-BAT, 2026 WL 262583 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 30,
2026).
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4 From 2013 to 2022, a noncitizen was more likely to be granted than denied bond, but this has changed
25 radically in recent months. See Immigration Bonds in the Second Trump Administration, Boundless
Immigration Blog (May 11, 2026), https://bklg.org/blog/immigration-bonds-in-second-trump-
26 admin/#bond-grants-and-denials-by-immigration-judge. In the first six months of the current presidential
administration, the bond grant rate was similar to historical rates. See id. However, the grant rate
27 plummeted beginning in July 2025, and 2026 has seen the lowest grant rate on record, with immigration
judges denying two-thirds of bond requests. See id.
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1 ordering a bond hearing would not sufficiently protect Petitioner’s constitutional rights and
2 orders his immediate release.6
3 I. CONCLUSION
4 For the reasons stated above, the Court GRANTS the habeas petitions and ORDERS
5 as follows:
6 1. Respondents shall RELEASE Petitioner by 5 p.m. on July 7, 2026. Respondents
7 shall file an affidavit attesting to Petitioner’s release by 5 p.m. on the following
8 business day.
9 2. The Court ENJOINS Respondents from redetaining Petitioner during the
10 pendency of his removal proceedings without first providing an individualized
11 bond hearing before a neutral immigration judge where the government bears
12 the burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner is a
13 danger to the community or such a flight risk that no amount of bond or
14 alternative conditions of release “would suffice to ensure his future appearance.”
15 Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 983 (9th Cir. 2017); see id. at 990–91 n.18;
16 see also Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196, 1203 (9th Cir. 2011). In setting the
17 amount of bond, the immigration judge must consider Petitioner’s financial
18 circumstances and alternative conditions of release as set forth in Hernandez,
19 872 F.3d at 990–91. The immigration judge shall not deny bond on the basis
20 that (i) 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b) requires or authorizes mandatory detention; or
21 (ii) BIA precedent deprives the immigration judge of jurisdiction to decide bond.
22 If requested by Petitioner, Respondents shall produce a transcript or
23 transcription of the recorded bond hearing.
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6 In doing so, the Court joins a growing number of courts nationwide that have declined to order a new
26 bond hearing in similar cases “involving unlawful detention under § 1225(b) because . . . doing so would
effectively allow the Government to transform an unlawful detention into a lawful one through post-hoc
27 justifications.” See Zheng v. Rokosky, No. 26-CV-01689, 2026 WL 800203, at *11 (D.N.J. Mar. 23, 2026)
(ordering release of detainee who was unlawfully detained under § 1225 when he should have been subject
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l 3. Respondents shall file a declaration attesting to full compliance with these
2 obligations. Respondents are ENJOINED from redetaining Petitioner until 48
3 hours after filing the declaration.
4 4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close the case.
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6 IT IS SO ORDERED.
g Dated: July 6, 2026 —
Qa
10 Ho florable J insook Ohta
United States District Judge
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