Opinion

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4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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7 SERGIO HERIBERTO DIAZ LUQUE, Case No. 1:26-cv-03457-NW

8 Petitioner,

ORDER GRANTING PETITION FOR

9 v. WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

10 WARDEN, CALIFORNIA CITY Re: ECF Nos. 1, 2

CORRECTIONAL CENTER, et al.,

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Respondents.

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14 This habeas action concerns the detention of Petitioner Sergio Heriberto Diaz Luque

15 (“Petitioner”), a noncitizen who has lived in the United States for nearly seven years. Based on

16 the Government’s new interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) as mandating detention for all

17 noncitizens present in the United States without admission, Petitioner was detained without any

18 finding of changed circumstances demonstrating that he was a flight risk or danger to the

19 community. This matter is before the Court on Petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus and motion for

20 temporary restraining order. See ECF Nos. 1, 2. For the reasons explained below, the Court

21 GRANTS Petitioner’s writ of habeas corpus, and resolves the motion for temporary restraining

22 order as moot.

23 I. BACKGROUND

24 Petitioner is a citizen of Honduras who entered the United States in July 2019 with his son.

25 ECF No. 1 ¶ 1. Upon entry, he and his son were “encountered by a Border Patrol Agent in the Rio

26 Grande Valley,” and “arrested and transported to the Conna Holding Facility … for further

27 processing[.]” ECF No. 6-1 at 2. The Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) then elected to

1 Nationality Act.” Id. at 3. Since his release nearly seven years ago, Petitioner has applied for asylum,

2 with an active appeal pending before the Board of Immigration Appeals, and has worked to

3 financially support his wife and two children, both of whom live in the United States. ECF No. 1

4 ¶¶ 10–13. Petitioner was also recently convicted of driving under the influence; he completed a

5 short sentence for the conviction on March 26, 2026. Id. ¶ 4.

6 On the day of his release, Petitioner was re-detained by Immigrations and Customers

7 Enforcement (“ICE”). Id. ¶ 6. He is now being held at the California City Immigration

8 Processing Center. Id. ¶ 7. On May 5, 2026, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus,

9 arguing that his re-detention without a finding of flight risk or danger violates the Immigration and

10 Nationality Act (“INA”) (count 1) and the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment (count 2).

11 Id. at 9–10. He requests that the Court either grant his immediate release or order a bond hearing

12 before an immigration judge. Id. at 10. In Respondents’ three-page opposition, the Government

13 relies entirely on its new interpretation of 8 U.S.C.§ 1225(b)(2) (“Section 1225”) as mandating

14 Petitioner’s detention, a position Petitioner disputes in his reply. See ECF No. 6 at 1–2.

15 II. LEGAL STANDARD

16 The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every

17 individual detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004)

18 (citing U.S. Const., art. I, § 9, cl. 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in

19 custody upon the legality of that custody, and ... the traditional function of the writ is to secure

20 release from illegal custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas

21 corpus may be granted to a petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the

22 Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has

23 served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its

24 protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). Accordingly, a

25 district court’s habeas jurisdiction includes challenges to immigration detention. See Zadvydas v.

26 Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001).

27 III. DISCUSSION

1 1) and the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment (count 2). Because Petitioner’s procedural

2 due process claim affords Petitioner all the relief to which he is entitled—namely, release and a

3 pre-deprivation hearing prior to re-detention—the Court need not and does not reach Petitioner’s

4 other remaining claim for relief.

5 A. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) Does Not Apply to Petitioner.

6 Before turning to Petitioner’s due process claim, the Court addresses whether Petitioner

7 may be mandatorily detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) as Respondents contend. See ECF No.

8 6. This Court—as well as the majority throughout the United States—have already concluded

9 that applying Section 1225 to non-citizens like Petitioner who are re-detained within the interior of

10 the United States “(1) disregards the plain meaning of section 1225(b)(2)(A); (2) disregards the

11 relationship between sections 1225 and 1226; (3) would render a recent amendment to section

12 1226(c) superfluous; and (4) is inconsistent with decades of prior statutory interpretation and

13 practice.” Lepe v. Andrews, 801 F.Supp.3d 1104, 1112 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025) (collecting

14 cases); see also Lopez-Campos v. Raycraft, No. 25-1965, 2026 WL 1283891, at *4-11 (6th Cir.

15 May 11, 2026); Barbosa da Cunha v. Freden, No. 25-3141-PR, 2026 WL 1146044, at *4-9 (2d

16 Cir. Apr. 28, 2026); Castanon-Nava v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 25-3050, 2026 WL

17 1223250, at *21 (7th Cir. May 5, 2026); Hernandez Alvarez v. Warden, Fed. Det. Ctr. Miami, No.

18 25-14065, 2026 WL 1243395, at *21 (11th Cir. May 6, 2026); Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock, 802

19 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1304 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30, 2025); Menjivar Sanchez v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-

20 01187-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 2959274, at *3-7 (E.D.Cal. Oct. 17, 2025) (collecting cases);

21 Shoimov v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-CV-1603 CSK, 2026 WL 35624, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2026);

22 Singh v. Bondi et al., No. 1:26-CV-0396 DC CSK P, 2026 WL 469169, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 19,

23 2026); Sharan S. v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-01427-KESSKO (HC), 2025 WL 3167826, at *5

24 (E.D.Cal. Nov. 12, 2025); Ramirez Clavijo v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-06248-BLF, 2025 WL 2419263,

25 at *3 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2025). As such, Section 1225(b)(2) is not a lawful basis for detention.

26 Further, Petitioner’s single DUI conviction does not justify application of Section 1225.

27 Respondents do not point to any portions of the statute or case law that supports the Government’s

1 are in accord. Llanes Tellez v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-08982-PCP, 2025 WL 3677937, at *4 (N.D.

2 Cal. Dec. 18, 2025); Dicxon Jose P.C v. Warden, California City Det. Facility, No. 1:26-CV-

3 02658-TLN-CSK, 2026 WL 1045516, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2026).

4 B. Petitioner’s Re-Detention Violated Due Process.

5 As the Government makes no further argument regarding the basis for Petitioner’s

6 detention, the Court next turns to Petitioner’s due process claim. Petitioner’s constitutional

7 challenge is analyzed “in two steps: the first asks whether there exists a protected liberty interest

8 under the Due Process Clause, and the second examines the procedures necessary to ensure any

9 deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the Constitution.” Garcia v. Andrews,

10 No. 2:25-cv-01884-TLN-SCR, 2025 WL 1927596, at *2 (E.D. Cal. July 14, 2025) (citing

11 Kentucky Dep’t. of Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989)).

12 1. Liberty Interest

13 Petitioner contends that his July 2019 release from immigration custody by the affirmative

14 act of the Government pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226, and then the nearly 7 years of freedom that

15 followed, gave rise to a protected liberty interest. ECF No. 10 at 4; see also Dkt. 6-1. The Court

16 agrees.

17 The regulations that authorize immigration authorities to release a noncitizen on his own

18 recognizance require that the noncitizen “demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer that such

19 release would not pose a danger to property or persons” and that the noncitizen is “likely to appear

20 for any future proceeding.” 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8). “Release [therefore] reflects a determination

21 by the government that the noncitizen is not a danger to the community or a flight risk.” Saravia

22 v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff’d sub nom. Saravia for A.H. v.

23 Sessions, 905 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2018). “Thus, DHS may generally not re-arrest a previously

24 released noncitizen absent a change in circumstances.” Singh, 2026 WL 468159, at * 2 (internal

25 quotation omitted).

26 The record before the Court indicates that immigration authorities determined that

27 Petitioner was neither a flight risk nor dangerous when they chose to release him into the United

1 the community—he has applied for asylum, works in his community, and provides for his wife

2 and children. See ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 10–13. Respondents do not rebut any of these facts.

3 As such, the Government’s election to “release Petitioner under § 1226(a) provided

4 Petitioner with a liberty interest that is protected by the Due Process Clause.” Oliveros v. Kaiser,

5 No. 25-CV-07117-BLF, 2026 WL 1162724, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 29, 2026); see also Ortega v.

6 Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 969 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (“Just as people on preparole, parole, and

7 probation status have a liberty interest, so too does [the noncitizen] have a liberty interest in

8 remaining out of custody on bond.”); Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F.Supp. 3d 1025, 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2025)

9 (“[E]ven when ICE has the initial discretion to detain or release a noncitizen pending removal

10 proceedings, after that individual is released from custody she has a protected liberty interest in

11 remaining out of custody.”); He v. Lyons, No. 25-cv-10639-JSC, 2026 WL 280074, at *3 (N.D.

12 Cal. Feb. 3, 2026) (“Courts throughout the Ninth Circuit have concluded individuals released from

13 immigration custody on bond have a protectable liberty interest in remaining out of custody on

14 bond.”); Guillermo M. R. v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-05436-RFL, 2025 WL 1983677, at *4 (N.D. Cal.

15 July 17, 2025) (recognizing that “the liberty interest that arises upon release [from immigration

16 detention] is inherent in the Due Process Clause”); Ortega v. Kaiser, No. 25-cv-05259-JST, 2025

17 WL 1771438, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June 26, 2025) (collecting cases finding that noncitizens who have

18 been released have a strong liberty interest). Because Petitioner was released from DHS custody

19 on his own recognizance nearly seven years ago, he maintains a protected liberty interest in

20 remaining out of custody.

21 2. Due Process

22 Many courts have applied the test established by the Supreme Court in Mathews v.

23 Eldridge in considering what process is due in the immigration context. See Rodriguez Diaz v.

24 Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1206 (9th Cir. 2022). There are three factors relevant to the due process

25 inquiry under the Mathews framework: (1) “the private interest that will be affected by the official

26 action,” (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation ... and the probable value, if any, of additional or

27 substitute procedural safeguards,” and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function

1 requirement would entail.” Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).

2 As to the first Mathews factor, the Court finds that Petitioner has a substantial private

3 interest in remaining out of immigration custody because he has been released pending civil

4 removal proceedings for almost seven years. In the intervening years he has developed ties in his

5 community working and supporting his family. “[His] detention denies [him] that freedom.”

6 Omer G.G. v. Kaiser, 815 F. Supp. 3d 1098, 1111 (E.D. Cal. 2025).

7 Turning to the second factor, “the risk of an erroneous deprivation [of liberty] is high”

8 when, as here, “[the petitioner] has not received any bond or custody redetermination hearing.”

9 A.E. v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-00107-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 1424382, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 16,

10 2025). Civil immigration detention, which is “nonpunitive in purpose and effect[,]” is justified

11 when a noncitizen presents a risk of flight or danger to the community. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at

12 690; Padilla v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Env’t, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2023);

13 Sharan S., 2025 WL 3167826, at *8 (“Under section 1226(a), petitioner would be entitled to a

14 bond hearing, and any custody redetermination would have to be based on whether petitioner is ‘a

15 threat to national security, a danger to the community at large, likely to abscond, or otherwise a

16 poor bail risk.’”) (quoting In re Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (BIA 2006)). The record before

17 the Court indicates that there was no independent finding of changed circumstances by a neutral

18 arbiter before Petitioner was re-detained. As there have been no procedural safeguards to

19 determine if Petitioner’s re-detention is justified, “the probable value of additional procedural

20 safeguards, i.e., a bond hearing, is high.” A.E., 2025 WL 1424382, at *5.

21 The final Mathews factor also weighs in Petitioner’s favor. Although the Government has

22 a strong interest in enforcing the immigration laws, its’ interest in detaining Petitioner without a

23 hearing is “low.” Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2019); Doe v. Becerra,

24 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1093–95 (E.D. Cal. 2025). In immigration court, custody hearings are

25 routine and impose a “minimal” cost. Id. at 1094. “If the government wishes to re-arrest

26 [Petitioner] at any point, it has the power to take steps toward doing so; but its interest in doing so

27 without a hearing is low.” Ortega, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 970.

1 IV. CONCLUSION AND ORDER

2 For the reasons stated above, the Petition is GRANTED. IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

3 1. Respondents immediately release Petitioner Sergio Heriberto Diaz Luque (A213-

4 || 277-088) from their custody.

5 2. Respondents shall not impose any additional restrictions on Petitioner, unless they

6 || are determined to be necessary at a future pre-deprivation and/or custody hearing.

7 3. If the Government seeks to re-detain Petitioner, it must provide no less than seven

8 (7) days’ notice to Petitioner and must hold a pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral arbiter

9 || pursuant to section 1226(a) and its implementing regulations, at which Petitioner’s eligibility for

10 || bond must be considered. This Order does not address the circumstances in which Respondents

11 may detain Petitioner in the event Petitioner becomes subject to an executable final order of

12 || removal.

13 4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case and enter judgment for

§ 14 Petitioner.

15 IT IS SO ORDERED.

16 || Dated: May 26, 2026 .

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17

Noél Wise

18 United States District Judge

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