Walker

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

WESTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

MONROE DIVISION

SALLIE WALKER CASE NO. 3:25-CV-00339

VERSUS JUDGE TERRY A. DOUGHTY

JACKSON PARISH CORRECTIONAL MAG. JUDGE KAYLA D.

CENTER MCCLUSKY

MEMORANDUM RULING

Pending before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 23]

filed by Defendant, Jackson Parish Correctional Center (“JPCC”). Plaintiff, Sallie

Walker (“Walker”), opposes the Motion [Doc. No. 28]. JPCC filed a reply [Doc. No. 29],

and Walker filed a Sur-reply [Doc. No. 32].

After carefully considering parties’ filings and applicable law, the Motion is

GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

I. Background

This is an employment discrimination case. JPCC hired Walker on May 30,

2008, as a deputy and corrections/detention officer.1 Walker worked for JPCC for

about fourteen and a half years before her discharge.2 On March 16, 2022, Walker’s

supervisor, Sergeant Lowring (“Lowring”), struck Walker in both arms during work

hours.3 Walker reported the assault to another supervisor, Lieutenant Jordan

(“Jordan”), the same day.4 JPCC then conducted its own internal investigation and

1 [Doc. No. 23-2, p. 6].

2 [Doc. No. 23-1, p. 5].

3 [Doc. No. 23-2, pp. 66, 69]

4 [Id. at p. 66].

confirmed Lowring struck Walker and twice shook her chair while she sat on it.5 The

assault injured Walker, resulting in “adhesive capsulitis of [her] right shoulder.”6

Upon completing its investigation, JPCC fired Lowring on March 23 2022.7 On

February 13, 2023, Lowring pled guilty to simple battery for assaulting Walker and

received two years of probation.8

Following the assault, Walker’s physician placed her on medical leave under

the Family Medical and Leave Act (“FMLA”) due to her shoulder injury.9 Walker

claims she began FMLA leave on November 3, 2022.10 Yet the record reflects that

Walker’s FMLA leave started on November 16, 2022.11 Walker continued treating her

injury during her FMLA leave and did not physically return to work except when she

brought excuses from her treating physician. 12 On December 7, 2022, Walker brought

in an excuse that excused her from work for eight more weeks, through February 1,

2023.13 A month later, on January 17, 2023, Walker brought in another excuse that

sought to excuse her from work for six more weeks, through February 28, 2023.14 It

is unclear from the record whether JPCC accepted either excuse as an FMLA

extension. According to JPCC, Walker’s FMLA leave exhausted on or about January

31, 2023.15

5 [Doc. No. 23-2, p. 69].

6 [Doc. No. 23-2, p. 5].

7 [Doc. No. 23-2, pp. 67, 69].

8 [Doc. No. 23-2, p. 28]; [Doc. No. 28 p. 10]. Neither party disputes that the assault occurred.

9 [Doc. No. 23-2, p. 27].

10 [Doc. No. 28, p. 11].

11 [Doc. No. 23-2, pp. 33, 36].

12 [Id. at pp. 33, 38]; [Doc. No. 25-8, p. 1].

13 [Doc. No. 28, p. 11]; [Doc. No. 25-8, p. 1].

14 [Doc. No. 28, p. 4]; [Doc. No. 23-2, p. 38].

15 [Doc. No. 23-2, p. 33].

On February 6, 2023, JPCC sent Walker a letter, informing her that she

exhausted all of her FMLA leave.16 They also advised her that they could consider

giving her further extended leave under the Americans with Disabilities Act

reasonable accommodations if she provided additional medical information.17 JPCC

further stated in the letter that if Walker did not respond to the letter by February

21, 2023, they would have to separate her employment.18 Walker received this letter

on February 6, 2023, but did not respond.19

The record reflects the parties’ dispute the exact date of Walker’s discharge.

Walker claims JPCC fired her on February 22, 2023, one day after JPCC’s response

deadline and the day she received notice of termination from JPCC.20 The Louisiana

Workforce Commission’s Notice of Separation also lists Walker’s “Date of Separation”

as February 22, 2023,21 as does JPCC’s employee status change report.22 JPCC,

however, claims they fired Walker the following day on February 23, 2023.23

JPCC gave multiple reasons for Walker’s discharge. The first reason was that

Walker “[exhausted] all FMLA [leave]” and she did not respond to the ultimatum

letter sent on February 6, 2023.24 The next day, JPCC listed, in its own employee

status change report, that they fired Walker for “[e]xcessive absence/ [tardiness].”25

16 [Doc. No. 23-1, p. 6].

17 [Doc. No. 28, p. 13]; [Doc. No. 23-2, pp. 40, 49].

18 [Doc. No. 23-2, p. 40].

19 [Doc. No. 23-1, p. 6]; [Doc. No. 23-2, p. 41].

20 [Doc. No. 28, p. 14]; [Doc. No. 28-10, pp. 10–11].

21 [Doc. No. 23-2, p. 58].

22 [Id. at p. 61].

23 [Id. at p. 57].

24 [Id. at p. 58].

25 [Id. at p. 61].

On November 2, 2023, Walker filed a charge of race discrimination, retaliation,

harassment, and other forms of discrimination with the Equal Employment

Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”).26 Then, on March 18, 2025, Walker filed suit in

this Court, alleging state and federal claims.27 The EEOC issued Walker a right-to-

sue notice in April 2025, about a month after she filed this suit.28

The parties briefed all relevant issues, and the matter is ripe.

II. Law and Analysis

A. Standard of Review

A court will grant summary judgment “if the movant shows that there is no

genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a

matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a). If the movant meets their initial burden of

showing no genuine issue of material fact, “the burden shifts to the nonmoving party

to produce evidence or designate specific facts showing the existence of a genuine

issue for trial.” Distribuidora Mari Jose, S.A. de C.V. v. Transmaritime, Inc., 738 F.3d

703, 706 (5th Cir. 2013) (citation modified). A fact is “material” when proof of its

existence or nonexistence would affect the lawsuit’s outcome under applicable law in

the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). In other words,

“the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute will not defeat an otherwise

properly supported motion for summary judgment.” Id. at 247–48. And a dispute

about a material fact is “genuine” only if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact

finder could render a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.

26 [Doc. No. 23-4, p. 1].

27 [Doc. No. 23-1, p. 7].

28 [Doc. No. 23-5, p. 1].

While courts will “resolve factual controversies in favor of the nonmoving

party,” an actual controversy exists only “when both parties have submitted evidence

of contradictory facts.” Little v. Liquid Air. Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994).

But summary judgment is appropriate when the evidence is “merely colorable or is

not significantly probative.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (1986) (citation modified).

Moreover, “a party cannot defeat summary judgment with conclusory

allegations, unsubstantiated assertions, or only a scintilla of evidence.” Turner v.

Baylor Richardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 343 (5th Cir. 2007) (citation modified).

Courts “may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence” and “must

resolve all ambiguities and draw all permissible inferences in favor of the non-moving

party.” Total E & P USA Inc. v. Kerr–McGee Oil and Gas Corp., 719 F.3d 424, 434

(5th Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).

Finally—and importantly—there can be no genuine dispute as to a material

fact when a party “fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an

element essential to that party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden

of proof of trial.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986).

B. Analysis

Walker’s complaint brings multiple claims under different theories. The Court

analyzes the claims as follows: first, the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law-

based state law claim; second, the racial discrimination claims based on two theories

(failure to promote and termination); third, the hostile work environment claim; and

fourth, the retaliation claims under two theories (Title VII and FMLA).

1. Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law

Claims under Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law (“LEDL”) are

subject to a one-year prescriptive period. La. Stat. Ann. § 23.303(D). As an exception,

the statute suspends prescription during the pendency of an administrative review

or investigation before the EEOC or the Louisiana Commission on Human Rights,

but for no more than six months. Id. Thus, a plaintiff has up to eighteen months from

the date of the last alleged discriminatory act to file a claim under the LEDL. O’Neal

v. Cargill, Inc., 178 F. Supp. 3d 408, 417 (E.D. La. 2016). Walker does not dispute

JPCC’s request to dismiss her LEDL claim for being untimely.29 Nevertheless,

applying § 23.303(D), the Court finds Walker’s LEDL claim is untimely and has

therefore prescribed.

Walker claims the last discriminatory act she faced occurred when JPCC

discharged her on or about February 22, 2023.30 But Walker did not file this action

until March 18, 2025—almost twenty-five months from the date of discharge and—

far beyond the one-year prescriptive period.31 Even if Walker’s EEOC filing

suspended the prescriptive period for six months, she still had to file her suit on or

before August 22, 2024, to not exceed the eighteen months allotted. She did not. Thus,

Walker’s LEDL claim has prescribed no matter what.

Walker’s claim is not only untimely, but there is also the question of whether

this claim was ever properly pled. Walker only references LEDL once in her first

29 [Doc. No. 28, p. 1].

30 [Id. at p. 14]; [Doc. No. 28-10, pp. 10–11].

31 [Doc. No. 23.1, p. 7].

amended complaint’s jurisdictional statement.32 Because the claim does not appear

in any of Walker’s substantive pleadings, the Court finds that this strongly suggests

the claim was not properly pled.

Nonetheless, the Court need not decide the pleading issue because the claim is

certainly time-barred. JPCC’s Motion is therefore GRANTED as to Walker’s claim

of discriminatory discharge under the LEDL.

2. Title VII – Racial Discrimination

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits workplace discrimination

based on protected characteristics, including race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. When a

discrimination claim relies on circumstantial evidence, courts may use the McDonnell

Douglas burden-shifting framework. Watkins v. Tregre, 997 F.3d 275, 281 (5th Cir.

2021); see also McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802–04 (1973).

Walker argues, and the Court analyzes, her discrimination claim under two

theories: (1) Walker claims that she was denied a permanent position within the

booking department based on her race,33 and (2) that she was discriminatorily

discharged based on her race.34

a. Failure to Promote Based on Race

Walker argues that JPCC discriminated against her by denying her a position

within the booking department, despite her being more qualified than the woman

who received the position.35 She further asserts that the only difference between the

32 [Doc. No. 23-2, p. 23].

33 [Id. at pp. 24, 28].

34 [Id. at p. 24].

35 [Id.].

less qualified selectee and herself was their skin color.36 JPCC responds that even

assuming that the alleged denial occurred, the claim is untimely.37 The Court agrees

with JPCC that Walker’s failure to promote claim fails for two reasons. First, Walker

never applied for the booking position, so she suffered no adverse employment action.

Second, even if a denial occurred, the claim is untimely.

Walker must satisfy two federal deadlines to bring her claim under Title VII

in Louisiana. First, Walker must file a charge of discrimination with the EEOC

within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act. 42 U.S.C § 2000e-5(e)(1); EEOC v.

Council for Advancement of Soc. Servs. & Educ., 753 F. Supp. 3d 507, 512 (W.D. La.

2024). Second, Walker must file suit in federal court within 90 days of receiving a

right-to-sue letter from the EEOC. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); Taylor v. Books A

Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 379 (5th Cir. 2002). A failure to promote is a discrete act,

so the 300-day period runs from the date the promotion is denied. Nat’l R.R.

Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 102–03 (2002).

Here, Walker concedes, in her deposition, that she never applied for the open

booking position.38 Thus, the Court finds that Walker was not denied the booking

position because she never applied for it. Even if the denial occurred, however,

Walker testified during her deposition that this incident occurred prior to 2020.39

Walker did not file her EEOC claim until November 2, 2023, three years after the

36 [Id.].

37 [Doc. No. 23-1, pp. 7–8].

38 [Doc. No. 23-2, p. 11]; Walker confirms in her deposition that although she spoke to the head of the

booking department about the position, she never went through “proper procedure” to apply.

39 [Id. at pp. 11–12]; When asked by counsel about incident and if it was “[within] the last few years,

like ’20-’22,” Walker responded by clearly stating “[it] was before.”

alleged event.40 Since she filed her EEOC claim more than 300 days after the incident

occurred, it is untimely. Because the claim is time-barred, the Court does not address

the merits of her claim under the McDonnell Douglas framework.

Walker also argues that the promotion denials are admissible as “background

evidence” in support of her hostile work environment claim, but that is misplaced.41

“The admissibility of past employment practices is an” evidentiary issue that is

“better addressed through motions in limine.” See Xu v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Fla.,

833 F. Supp. 2d 1338, 1345 n.2 (N.D. Fla. 2011), abrogated on other grounds by Lewis

v. City of Union City, Georgia, 918 F.3d 1213 (11th Cir. 2019). Accordingly, the Court

does not address this issue further.

Therefore, JPCC’s Motion is GRANTED as to Walker’s claim of failure to

promote based on race.

b. Termination Based on Race

Walker claims that JPCC discharged her employment due to her race as a

black woman.42 Walker also claims her white supervisors treated her unfairly and

that “white employees were selected for advancement and key assignments over black

employees.”43 JPCC argues that Walker cannot establish a prima facie case because

she offers no competent evidence that race caused her discharge, and that they

terminated Walker’s employment because she “was unable to do her job after FMLA

40 [Doc. No. 23-1, p. 5]; [Doc. No. 23-4, p. 1].

41 [Doc. No. 28, p. 22].

42 [Doc. No. 23-2, p. 24].

43 [Doc. No. 23-3, p. 10].

leave.”44 The Court agrees with JPCC that has Walker failed to establish a prima

facie case showing discriminatory discharge based on race.

Walker relies on circumstantial evidence for this claim, so the McDonnell

Douglas framework governs. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802–04. Walker must

first establish a prima facie case of discrimination. Turner, 476 F.3d 337, 345. To do

so, Walker must show: (1) she belongs to a protected class; (2) she was qualified for

the position at issue; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) that she

was replaced by someone outside of the protected class, OR was treated less favorably

than other similarly situated employees outside the protected group. Ayorinde v.

Team Indus. Servs. Inc., 121 F.4th 500, 507 (5th Cir. 2024).

Applying this standard to the facts here, Walker satisfies the first three

elements. She belongs to a protected class as a black woman.45 She shows she is

qualified for her position based on her fifteen years of work experience at JPCC, and

she suffered an adverse employment action when she was discharged on February

23, 2023.46 The fourth element is where Walker’s claim fails. Because Walker does

not claim anyone outside of her protected class took her position as a correctional

officer, she must satisfy the second prong of the fourth element by establishing

someone who was similarly situated and outside of her protected class was treated

more favorably than her when under “nearly identical circumstances.” Id.; Lee v.

Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 574 F.3d. 253, 260 (5th Cir. 2009). The Fifth Circuit

44 [Doc. No. 23-1, p. 13]; [Doc. No. 29, p. 1].

45 [Doc. No. 23-2, p. 28].

46 [Doc. No. 28, p. 6].

holds that employees are “similarly situated” when they: (1) hold the same job or

responsibilities, (2) share the same supervisor or have their employment status

determined by the same person, and (3) have essentially comparable violation

histories. Id.; see West v. City of Houston, Texas, 960 F.3d 736, 740 (5th Cir. 2020).

On this record, Walker has failed to identify any employee who is similarly

situated to her. Walker points to Jordan, her white supervisor, as a comparator, but

the Court finds that showing unpersuasive.47 Walker was a correctional officer and

had different jobs or responsibilities from her supervisor, Jordan.48 Additionally, their

conduct is not “nearly identical.” West, 960 F.3d at 740. JPCC asserts that Walker

was discharged because she failed to do her job after exhausting medical leave.49 If

JPCC fired Jordan, it would be due to his failure to supervise, not for his failure to

complete the job as a corrections officer. Finally, there is nothing in the record to

support that either party had similar violation histories. Because Walker failed to

establish a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge, the Court need not address

the rest of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework.

For these reasons, the Court finds Jordan is not a similarly situated

comparator to Walker. Because Walker fails to identify a similarly situated

comparator outside of her protected class, she fails to meet her initial burden of

establishing a prima facie case. Therefore, JPCC’s Motion is GRANTED as to

Walker’s claim of race-based discriminatory discharge.

47 [Id. at p. 17].

48 [Id. at p. 22].

49 [Doc. No. 29, p. 1].

3. Title VII – Hostile Work Environment

Walker alleges that she faced a hostile work environment at JPCC when

Lowring assaulted her in March 2022, and subsequent retaliatory ostracism by her

coworkers after she reported said assault.50 JPCC argues that Walker’s claim is time-

barred for two reasons: (1) she lacks competent evidence that her EEOC charge was

timely, and (2) the continuing violation doctrine cannot salvage her claim because she

fails to identify an act of harassment within the 300-day statutory window.51 Walker

responds that her claim is timely under the continuing violation doctrine.52

For Walker’s hostile work environment claim to survive summary judgment,

she must show (1) she belongs to a protected group; (2) she received unwelcome

harassment; (3) the harassment complained of was based on race; (4) the harassment

complained of affected a term, condition, or privilege of employment; and (5) the

employer knew or should have known of the harassment in question and failed to

take prompt remedial action. Wantou v. Wal-Mart Stores Texas, L.L.C., 23 F.4th, 422,

433 (5th Cir. 2022) (quoting Ramsey v. Henderson, 286 F.3d 264, 268 (5th Cir. 2002)).

The Court need not decide if Walker has come forward with sufficient evidence

that the alleged ostracism occurred. Rather, assuming that the alleged ostracism

occurred, Walker’s claim fails on two independent grounds: (1) Walker’s EEOC charge

was untimely, and (2) the continuing violations doctrine does not save the claim

because the alleged harassment was not severe or pervasive.

50 [Doc. No. 28, pp. 10, 11, 20].

51 [Doc. No. 23-1, p. 8]; [Doc. No. 29, p. 2].

52 [Doc. No. 28, p. 19].

a. Walker’s EEOC charge was untimely

Before filing a hostile work environment claim, the plaintiff must file a charge

of discrimination with the EEOC within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment

practice. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1).

Walker filed her charge of discrimination with the EEOC on November 2, 2023.

To be timely, Walker had to file the charge within 300 days of any act that contributed

to the hostile work environment. EEOC v. WC&M Enterprise, Inc., 496 F.3d 393, 398

(5th Cir. 2007). Counting back 300 days from the date of filing, only acts on or after

January 6, 2023, fall within that period. Walker does not dispute that the March 16,

2022, assault falls outside of this window, as it happened about twenty months prior

to Walker filing her EEOC charge.53 Standing alone, the assault cannot render the

charge timely, as it is years outside of the 300-day window. Walker’s claim only

survives if the continuing violation doctrine applies.

b. The continuing violation doctrine does not save

Walker’s claim because the alleged retaliatory

ostracism was not severe or pervasive.

Walker claims she is saved under the continuing violation doctrine because, in

addition the assault, she faced she faced retaliatory ostracism from coworkers from

“March 2022 through early 2023.”54 JPCC argues that Walker fails to save her claim

through the continuing violation doctrine because she has no evidence of an act of

harassment taking place within the standard 300-day window.55 The Court disagrees

53 [Doc. No. 28, p. 20]; [Doc. No. 23-1, p. 5]; [Doc. No. 28, p. 6].

54 [Doc. No. 28, p. 6]; [Doc. No. 23-3, p. 6].

55 [Doc. No. 23-1, p. 8].

with Walker that the continuing violation doctrine makes the entire course of conduct

actionable, including both the March 2022 incident and the alleged retaliatory

ostracism56

To save a hostile work environment claim under the continuing violation

doctrine, Walker must: 1) file an EEOC charge within 300 days of any action that

contributed to the hostile work environment, and (2) if this requirement is met, then

the court may consider all acts alleged to have contributed to the hostile environment,

even those outside the 300-day period. WC&M, 496 F.3d at 398 (citing Nat’l R.R.

Passenger Corp., 535 U.S. at 117, 122.) The doctrine does not lower the substantive

threshold of a hostile work environment claim. The conduct must still be severe or

pervasive enough to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive work

environment. Wantou, 23 F.4th at 433. This determination is fact-intensive and

considers the totality of the circumstances, including the conduct’s frequency,

severity, whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, and whether it

unreasonably interferes with the employee’s job performance. Id. Isolated incidents,

unless extremely serious, are not of the kind of harassment that alters the terms and

conditions of employment. Saketkoo v. Administrators of Tulane Educ. Fund, 31 F.4th

990, 1003 (5th Cir. 2022).

Here, only the alleged retaliatory ostracism could potentially fall within the

300-day window. Walker contends that her coworkers excluded her and occasionally-

made disparaging comments that she was “faking [her injury]” and was “not really

56 [Doc. No. 28, p. 18].

hurt.”57 Even crediting this testimony, such behavior amounts at most to “simple

teasing,” and “offhand comments,” that are “isolated incidents,” which do not arise to

the level of harassment sufficiently severe or pervasive enough to alter the terms and

conditions of employment to create an abusive working environment, unless

extremely serious. Wantou, 23 F.4th at 433. Accordingly, the Court finds that the

continuing violation doctrine does not save the claim because the alleged retaliatory

ostracism fails to reach the level of severity or pervasiveness needed to alter the

conditions of her employment to create an abusive working environment.58 Id.

The record further shows that much of the alleged retaliatory ostracism

occurred while Walker was on her FMLA leave and largely absent from JPCC. Walker

began FMLA leave in November 2022, and did not return to JPCC, except for

sporadic, brief visits to JPCC’s human resources department to drop off doctor’s

excuses.59 The type of harassment Walker describes is not severe or pervasive enough

to interfere with someone’s employment, especially when they are not working in or

regularly exposed to the workplace environment.60 See Kurth v. Gonzales, 472 F.

Supp. 2d 874, 883 (E.D. Tex. 2007) (recognizing that harassment outside the

workplace may be actionable but rejecting hostile work environment theories where

plaintiff was on extended leave such that there was “no existing work environment”);

see also Oliver v. Roehm Am., LLC, No. 21-CV-1831, 2022 WL 11763644, at *15 (E.D.

La. Oct. 20, 2022) (dismissing a hostile work environment claim at the pleading stage

57 [Id.].

58 [Doc. No. 28, p. 11]; [Doc. No. 23-4, p. 1].

59 [Doc. No. 28, p. 11]; [Doc. No. 23-3, p. 6].

60 [Doc. No. 25-8, p. 1].

where alleged conduct could not have interfered with work performance because

plaintiff was on FMLA leave).

Therefore, the Court finds Walker’s hostile work environment claim

unavailing. It is not only untimely but the alleged acts are also not severe or

pervasive. Walker has not provided sufficient evidence to meet her burden of making

a prima facie case. Accordingly, JPCC’s Motion is GRANTED as to Walker’s claim of

a hostile work environment.

4. Retaliation

Retaliation claims under both Title VII and the FMLA are analyzed using the

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework when a plaintiff’s claims are based

on circumstantial evidence. Wheat v. Florida. Par. Juvenile Justice Comm’n, 811 F.3d

702, 705 (5th Cir. 2016); see McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802–04.

McDonnell Douglas provides a three-step framework used for analyzing

retaliation claims. First, Walker must establish a prima facie case of unlawful

retaliation. Brown v. Wal-Mart Stores E., L.P., 969 F.3d 571, 577 (5th Cir. 2020). The

requirements of a prima facie case vary depending on the type of claim that is being

brought. Patrick v. Ridge, 394 F.3d 311, 315 (5th Cir. 2004). If Walker establishes a

prima facie case, the burden shifts to the JPCC to rebut the presumption by giving a

“legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its decision.” Brown, 969 F.3d at 577.

Finally, if JPCC makes this showing, the burden shifts again to Walker to prove that

the proffered reason was merely a pretext for discrimination. Id.

Walker advances two retaliation theories: (1) retaliatory discharge under Title

VII for engaging in protected activity by reporting assault by her supervisor; and (2)

retaliatory discharge under the FMLA based on protected activity by taking leave

under the FMLA.61 The Court analyzes each in turn.

a. Title VII Retaliation

Title VII “prohibits an employer from discriminating against an employee

because that individual made a charge, testified, assisted or participated in a Title

VII proceeding or investigation.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a); Ladner v. Walmart, 834 F.

App’x. 893, 895–96 (5th Cir. 2020). Because Walker relies on circumstantial evidence,

the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework governs. Ladner, 834 F. App’x. at

896.

To establish a prima facie case, Walker must show: (1) she engaged in a

protected activity; (2) she suffered a materially adverse employment action; and (3) a

causal link exists between the protected activity and the adverse employment action.

Wright v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., 990 F.3d 428, 433 (5th Cir. 2021). Walker contends

that she faced “unlawful retaliation” for reporting discriminatory conduct she faced

during work hours.62 JPCC argues that Walker cannot meet her prima facie case, as

she cannot establish a causal link because she cannot show close temporal proximity

between the adverse action and protected activity.63 Thus, there is no dispute from

either party that Walker engaged in a protected activity or suffered an adverse action.

61 [Doc. No. 23-2, pp. 29, 30].

62 [Id. at p. 29].

63 [Doc. No. 23-1, p. 14].

Rather, the claim turns on the third element, whether there is a sufficient causal

link between the report of the assault and the discharge.64

Here, Walker was discharged from JPCC on or around February 22, 2023,

approximately eleven months after reporting the March 2022 assault to her

supervisors.65 JPCC claims that this gap of eleven months is “too long to sustain a

prima facie claim of causation based solely on temporal proximity.”66 JPCC cites

Ganheart v. Brown, to argue that a five month interval between the protected activity

and adverse employment action is too long of a period to show a causal link solely on

temporal proximity. See 740 F. App’x. 386, 390–91 (5th Cir. 2018). At the prima facie

stage, temporal proximity can support an inference of causation, but only when the

timing between the protected activity and adverse employment action is “very close”

and connected to the “decisionmaker’s knowledge of the protected activity.” Clark

County. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 273 (2001) (per curiam); Thompson v.

Somervell Cnty., Tex., 431 Fed. App’x. 338, 342 (5th Cir. 2011).

The Court finds that even assuming JPCC knew that Walker reported the

assault, the eleven-month lapse is far outside the “very close” temporal proximity

required to establish a causal link on its own. See Lyons v. Katy Indep. Sch. Dist., 964

F.3d 298, 305 (5th Cir. 2020) (holding a five-month gap is insufficient to establish a

causal link based on timing alone); Ganheart, 740 Fed. App’x. at 391 (same); Brown

v. AT&T Servs. Inc., 236 F. Supp. 3d 1000, 1008 (S.D. Tex. 2017) (finding a seven-

64 [Id. at p. 13].

65 [Doc. No. 28, p. 7].

66 [Doc. No. 23-1, p. 14].

month gap is insufficient to show a causal link based on timing alone). Since the Fifth

Circuit repeatedly finds gaps of five to seven months too remote to support causation,

Walker’s eleven-month gap cannot, by itself, establish the required causal link.

In such cases, the Fifth Circuit requires the plaintiff point to other evidence of

a causal link to consider in addition to temporal proximity, such as employment

records that do not support dismissal, or an employer’s departure from typical policies

and procedures. Feist v. Louisiana, Dep’t of Justice, Office of the Atty. Gen., 730 F.3d

450, 454–55 (5th Cir. 2013). Walker fails to make this showing as she did not point

any additional evidence for the Court to consider. While Walker makes this argument

to support her FMLA retaliation claim, she does not make such an argument (or any

argument) for her Title VII retaliation claim.67

The Court notes that Walker failed to effectively argue this claim due to poor

briefing, as her first amended complaint only mentioned Title VII once in the

jurisdictional statement. The Court reached the above conclusion after scouring

through the record. Nonetheless, the Court agrees with JPCC that Walker failed to

establish a prima facie case of Title VII retaliation, so the remaining steps of

McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework are not applicable and do not need to

be addressed further. Accordingly, JPCC’s Motion is GRANTED as to Walker’s claim

of Title VII retaliation.

67 [Doc. No. 28, p. 25].

b. FMLA

The FMLA prohibits employers from retaliating against employees who

exercise their FMLA rights. Campos v. Steves & Sons, Inc., 10 F.4th 515, 527 (5th

Cir. 2021) (citing Mauder v. Metro. Transit Auth. of Harris Cnty., Tex., 446 F.3d 574,

580 (5th Cir. 2006). Because Walker relies on circumstantial evidence, the McDonnell

Douglas burden-shifting framework governs. Campos, 10 F.4th at 527.

To establish a prima facie case of FMLA retaliation, Walker must show: (1) she

was engaged in a protected activity under the FMLA; (2) she suffered an adverse

employment action; and (3) she was treated less favorably than an employee who had

not requested leave under the FMLA OR the adverse decision was made because she

sought protection under the FMLA. Id. If Walker makes this showing, the burden

shifts to JPCC to offer a “legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the adverse

employment action.” Houston v. Texas Dep’t of Agric., 17 F.4th 576, 582 (5th Cir.

2021). If JPCC gives such reasons, the burden shifts back to Walker to prove by a

preponderance of the evidence that JPCC’s stated reason is pretext for retaliation.

Id.

Walker contends that JPCC discharged her for “[failing] to return to work,”

even though her medical team had not authorized her to do so.68 JPCC responds that

Walker cannot establish a prima facie case, nor can she establish that the reason for

discharge was pretext for retaliation.69 The Court disagrees.

68 [Doc. No. 23-2, p. 30].

69 [Doc. No. 23-1, p. 14].

The Court finds that Walker can establish a prima facie case of FMLA

retaliation. Walker satisfies the first two elements of her prima facie case: she

engaged in protective activity under the FMLA (taking leave due to her shoulder

injury) and suffered an adverse employment action when JPCC discharged her on or

around February 22, 2023.70 The dispute centers on the second prong of the third

element. Because the record contains no evidence of similarly situated employees who

requested FMLA leave, the Court considers whether the discharge occurred because

Walker sought protection under the FMLA. Campos, 10 F.4th at 527.

Causation may be inferred from temporal proximity between the protected

activity and the adverse action, but only when the timing is “very close” and the

relevant decisionmaker knew of the protected activity. Breeden, 532 U.S. at 273;

Thompson, 431 Fed. App’x. at 342. Here, the timing of Walker’s discharge in relation

to her FMLA leave, together with JPCC’s knowledge of the FMLA leave, supports an

inference of causation at the prima facie stage.

The record reflects that Walker began FMLA leave on November 16, 2022,71

and JPCC fired her on February 22, 2023.72 Although the FMLA generally provides

eligible employees up to twelve workweeks of leave, Mauder, 446 F.3d at 579,

Walker’s physician certified her leave until or around January 31, 2023, regardless

of when she started.73 Walker’s termination occurred approximately one month after

70 [Doc. No. 23-2, p. 33]; [Doc. No. 28, p. 14]; [Doc. No. 28-10, pp. 10–11].

71 Although Walker claims she start FMLA on November 3, 2022, the record unequivocally shows she

started FMLA leave on November 16, 2022. [Doc. No. 28, p. 6]; [Doc. No. 23-2, pp. 33, 36].

72 [Doc. No. 28, p. 4]; [Doc. No. 28-10, pp. 10–11].

73 [Doc. No. 23-2, pp. 34, 36].

her certified FMLA leave ended. This very close temporal proximity is sufficient to

establish a prima facie case under Campos, where the Fifth Circuit held an adverse

action occurring about one month after FMLA leave expired was sufficiently close in

time to create a causal link. Campos, 10 F.4th at 528. The burden therefore shifts to

JPCC to articulate a legitimate, nonretaliatory reason for the discharge. Id.

Even assuming JPCC meets that burden, the Court finds evidence creating a

genuine issue of material fact as to pretext. The Fifth Circuit recognizes that an

employer’s shifting or post hoc explanations for discharge can support an inference of

pretext. See Campos, 10 F.4th at 530 (holding an employer’s shifting reasons for

termination created an inference for pretext”); Burton v. Freescale Semiconductor,

Inc., 798 F.3d 222, 238 (5th Cir. 2015) (holding employers’ explanations for discharge

postdating the decision are “potentially manufactured”).

Here, the record shows that JPCC gave various reasons for Walker’s discharge.

First, Walker’s Termination Information sheet, dated February 23, 2023, lists

“[e]xcessive absence/[tardiness].”74 Second, JPCC’s Separation Notice to the

Louisiana Workforce Commission states that Walker “exhausted all FMLA” and did

not respond to JPCC’s February 6, 2023, letter, which they sent by certified mail and

which Walker received on February 7, 2023.75 Third, JPCC’s reply brief asserts

Walker was discharged because she “remained unable to do her job after exhausting

FMLA leave,”76 a reason that does not appear outside this Motion. These shifting

74 [Id. at p. 62].

75 [Id. at p. 58].

76 [Doc. No. 29, p. 1].

reasons for Walker’s discharge create a genuine dispute of fact over JPCC’s true

rationale for firing Walker.

While JPCC may argue that its stated reasons are merely variations on the

same theme, the Court cannot weigh that characterization. Campos, 10 F.4th at 530.

The record reflects multiple, differing explanations for Walker’s termination, and

under Campos, such inconsistencies create “ample fact questions for consideration.”

Id. Accordingly, the record shows a genuine dispute of material fact on pretext.

Therefore, the Court finds Walker has established a prima facie case of FMLA

retaliation. Although JPCC offers seemingly legitimate, nonretaliatory reasons for

firing Walker, their reasons are shifting and are post hoc explanations that suggests

pretext. As such, JPCC’s Motion is DENIED as to Walker’s FMLA retaliation claim.

III. Conclusion

For the above-stated reasons,

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that JPCC’s Motion for

Summary Judgment [Doc. No. 23] is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that JPCC’s

Motion is GRANTED as to Walker’s claim under the Louisiana Employment

Discrimination Law, and this claim is DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that JPCC’s

Motion is GRANTED as to Walker’s Title VII-based race discrimination, hostile work

environment, and retaliation claims, and these claims are DISMISSED WITH

PREJUDICE.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that JPCC’s Motion is DENIED as to Walker’s

claim for retaliation under the FMLA.

MONROE, LOUISIANA, this 6th day of July 2026

TERRY A. Dour ry/

U D STATES DISTRICT JUD

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