Grant

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA

ELLEN GRANT CIVIL ACTION

VERSUS NO. 24-2616

ST. JOHN THE BAPTIST PARISH SECTION “O”

SCHOOL BOARD

ORDER AND REASONS

Before the Court is a Rule 12(b)(6) motion1 to dismiss filed by Defendant St.

John the Baptist Parish School Board (“the School Board”). The School Board seeks

to dismiss the claims asserted by Plaintiff Ellen Grant in her Complaint.2 Grant

brings claims for racial and disability discrimination under Title VII, Section 1981,

the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Louisiana Employment Discrimination

Law. For the following reasons, Defendant’s motion to dismiss is GRANTED.

I. BACKGROUND

This case arises from Plaintiff Ellen Grant’s claim that she experienced racial

and disability discrimination at the hands of her employer, the St. John the Baptist

Parish School Board. Grant, an African American woman, works as a social worker

for the School Board and alleges she was paid substantially less than other social

workers, including three Caucasian female co-workers. She also alleges she

experienced other unfair treatment, including withholding of benefits and a heavier

workload than her colleagues. The Court accepts all well-pleaded allegations as true

1 ECF No. 8.

2 ECF No. 1.

for purposes of this Rule 12(b)(6) motion. See Sonnier v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.

Co., 509 F.3d 673, 675 (5th Cir. 2007).

Grant was hired as a social worker by the School Board in September of 1999.

She is currently assigned to the St. John Alternative Program School in LaPlace,

Louisiana. Grant’s first line supervisor is the St. John Alternative Program

Administrator. Corey Lambert served in this position from June 2023. Cleo Perry has

served as the School Board’s superintendent since January 2024.3

As compared to other social workers, Grant was required to carry the heaviest

caseload in the district. In addition to servicing all students at the St. John

Alternative Program School, Grant’s roster includes students at several other

campuses, which requires her to travel to the other schools. By contrast, Cindy

Graham—a Caucasian social worker—serviced students at only two campuses before

her retirement. After Graham’s retirement, those students were transferred to

Grant’s roster without any prior communication that Grant would now be responsible

for these students.4

From December 2021 through March 2022, Grant’s first line supervisor at the

time, Robert Schaff, assigned Grant duties as a counselor in addition to her duties as

a social worker. Grant was the only social worker in the district who was also required

to act as a counselor. When Grant complained to Schaff about the unequal treatment,

3 ECF No. 1 ¶¶15-19.

4 Id. ¶ 20.

2

Schaff failed to take any action to assist Grant.5 In February 2022, Schaff denied

Grant’s request for stipends and duty pay.6 The Director of HR similarly failed to act

on any of Grant’s complaints about the unequal workload.7

In March 2022, Grant was injured by two female students fighting and needed

to undergo multiple surgeries. Grant was on medical leave from March 2022 through

January 25, 2023, while recovering from the surgeries caused by the injury.

Throughout her medical leave, Grant continued to email HR and the Superintendent

with her complaints of unequal pay. On August 9, 2022, Interim Superintendent

Johnson denied Grant’s request to adjust her pay.8

In January 2023, Payroll Clerk Donna Duhe changed Grant’s leave coding from

assault/battery by a student to physical contact with a student. According to the

district policy, employees who are injured while acting in their official capacity

because of assault/battery by a student receive assault/battery leave as defined under

L.A. R.S. 17:1201(C) without reduction in pay or benefits. The change in leave coding

for Grant’s medical leave forced her to exhaust all sick leave. Her retirement

contributions ended and she was required to pay insurance premiums. 9 Grant filed

a workman’s compensation claim in response to the issue with coding her leave. She

discovered that while she was out on leave, the HR department of the School Board

5 Id. ¶ 22-23.

6 Id. ¶ 25.

7 Id. ¶¶ 24-26.

8 Id. ¶¶ 27-31.

9 Id. ¶¶ 33-36.

3

falsified a statement indicating the Board had offered Grant light duty work, which

had not happened.10

Less than a week after Grant returned from medical leave, Schaff (who was no

longer Grant’s direct supervisor) assigned Grant almost 100 students to service,

eighty of whom were high need/at risk, and fifteen of whom were special needs

students who had not been given any services for the six months prior. Grant also

discovered that Schaff had failed to assign any other social worker to provide services

for students previously assigned to Grant while she was out on medical leave.11

Throughout February 2023, although he was not her supervisor, Schaff continued to

assign work to Grant, including work that fell outside Grant’s job description and was

not required of any other social workers. Grant’s emails to HR about the disparity

went unanswered.12

On April 17, 2023, a male student injured Grant’s hand jumping in and out of

a classroom window. Grant was not able to return to work until a nerve conduction

study was completed. While she was on medical leave, Schaff allegedly informed the

male student and his mother that he would attempt to get Grant fired. In October

2023, Schaff emailed Dr. Spies, Director of Special Education, stating the student had

not injured Grant.13

10 Id. ¶¶ 35-38.

11 Id. ¶¶ 39-41.

12 Id. ¶¶ 42-43.

13 Id. ¶ 44. The Complaint reads, “In October 2023, Mr. Schaff falsified a statement in an email

to Dr. Spies, Director of Special Education, stating that he did not JB injured Mrs. Grant.”

4

Grant was cleared to return to work on June 2, 2023. Once again, the district

had not placed her on medical leave for assault. On July 25, 2023, Grant emailed Dr.

Curt Green, the HR Director, incident details from the April 17, 2023, assault by the

student. Grant’s email included a video showing the student attempting to leave the

classroom and a photo where the student had jumped in and out of the window. Dr.

Green stated that the superintendent must address her complaints. Grant continued

to send emails to the superintendent, the interim superintendent, and new HR

director but never received a reply.14

Schaff was transferred out of his position in April 2024. Grant alleges that

numerous grievances were filed against Schaff in 2023 and 2024.15

On July 7, 2023, Grant filed a Charge of Discrimination with the Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”). On August 8, 2024, Grant received

the Notice of Right to Sue letter from the Department of Justice for her Title VII,

ADA and retaliation claims included in her Charge of Discrimination.16

According to Grant, she suffered racial discrimination as she was required to

work more and was paid less than her Caucasian female coworkers. She also alleges

she suffered retaliation by employees at the School Board for her complaints of

discriminatory treatment. Finally, she also alleges that she is a qualified individual

14 Id. ¶¶ 45-47.

15 Id. ¶¶ 49-50.

16 Id. ¶ 9.

5

with a disability within the meaning of the ADA due to her onsite job injuries to her

hand and was discriminated against due to her disability.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2). A complaint that does not

meet Rule 8(a)(2)’s pleading standard should be dismissed for failing to state a claim

upon which relief can be granted. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6). “[T]he pleading standard

Rule 8 announces does not require ‘detailed factual allegations,’ but it demands more

than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroft v.

Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell. Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544,

555 (2007)). “A pleading that offers ‘labels and conclusions’ or ‘a formulaic recitations

of the elements of a cause of action will not do.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at

555). “Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]’ devoid of ‘further

factual enhancement.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557).

When considering a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the Court “accept[s] all

well-pleaded facts as true and view[s] all facts in the light most favorable to the

plaintiff.” Thompson v. City of Waco, Texas, 764 F.3d 500, 502 (5th Cir. 2014) (citation

omitted). The Court “need not, however, accept the plaintiff’s legal conclusions as

true.” Id. at 502-03; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (“[W]e are not bound to accept as

true a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”).

6

Ultimately, “[t]o survive a motion to dismiss” under Rule 12(b)(6), “a complaint

must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that

is plausible on its face.’” Id. (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). “A claim has facial

plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw

the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.

(citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). “Although ‘[courts] accept all well-pled facts as

true, construing all reasonable inferences in the complaint in the light most favorable

to the plaintiff, conclusory allegations, unwarranted factual inferences, or legal

conclusions are not accepted as true.’” Hodge v. Engleman, 90 F.4th 840, 843 (5th Cir.

2024) (quoting Allen v. Hays, 65 F.4th 736, 743 (5th Cir. 2023)).

III. ANALYSIS

Grant asserts claims under (1) Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) for disparate

treatment of unequal pay because of her race; (2) 42 U.S.C. § 1981 via § 1983 for

unequal pay and racial discrimination;17 (3) Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) for

retaliation; (4) the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 121101, et seq. (the

“ADA”) for disability discrimination; and (5) the Louisiana Employment

Discrimination Law (the “LEDL”) based on Disability, LA. R.S. § 23:301, et seq.

17 Grant brings racial discrimination claims under both 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and Title VII of the

Civil Rights Act of 1964. Both statutes prohibit racial discrimination in employment. See CBOCS West,

Inc. v. Humphries, 553 U.S. 442, 455-57 (2008). They differ, however, in their procedural requirements

and pleading standards. See Williams v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 818 F. App’x 315, 325 (5th Cir. 2020). The

Court will first address Grant’s Title VII racial discrimination claim before turning to the Section 1981

claim.

7

A. Title VII – Disparate Treatment Claim

i. Claims of Pay Disparity Are Not Time-Barred

The Court first considers whether Grant is procedurally barred from asserting

her Title VII claims. A private plaintiff suing under Title VII must exhaust her

administrative remedies by timely filing a charge with the EEOC and receiving a

right-to-sue notice before seeking relief from the Court. Taylor v. Books A Million,

Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378-79 (5th Cir. 2002); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(f)(1).

Under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e), a plaintiff must file an EEOC charge within 180

days after the allegedly unlawful employment practice. That period is extended to

300 days if “the person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a State or

local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from such practice.” 42 U.S.C. §

2000e–5(e).

The Louisiana Commission on Human Rights has authority to remedy

employment discrimination, rendering Louisiana a “deferral” state. See La. Rev. Stat.

Ann. § 51:2231, et seq. When a claimant submits an EEOC charge in a deferral state,

“the claimant is deemed to have initially instituted proceedings with the state agency

and the 300–day period is triggered.” Conner v. Louisiana Dep’t of Health & Hosps.,

247 F. App’x 480, 481 (5th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). Accordingly, when a

claimant submits an EEOC charge in Louisiana, the plaintiff’s charge of

discrimination must be filed within 300 days of the alleged discriminatory act. A

charge is deemed filed with the EEOC “upon receipt of the document.” 29 C.F.R. §

8

1601.13(a)(4)(ii)(A); see Cargo v. Kansas City Southern, 2009 WL 3012760, at *1–2

(W.D. La. 2009).

Here, Grant filed her EEOC charge on July 7, 2023. She received her notice of

right to sue letter from the Department of Justice for her Title VII claims on August

8, 2024.18 The parties agree that under the 300-day limitations period, any alleged

retaliatory acts under Title VII that Grant experienced before September 10, 2022

fall outside the actionable window and are time-barred.19

As Grant points out, however, when it comes to claims of unequal pay, the Lilly

Ledbetter Fair Pay Act of 2009 amended Title VII to restart the statute of limitations

with each discriminatory pay period. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(3)(A). The Ledbetter

Act “makes each paycheck at an allegedly discriminatory rate a separate, discrete act

of discrimination, effectively resetting the statute of limitations for filing an EEOC

charge.” Niwayama v. Texas Tech Univ., 590 F. App’x 351, 356 (5th Cir. 2014). The

Act allows a plaintiff to recover “back pay for up to two years preceding the filing of

the charge,” provided that the “unlawful employment practices” that occurred during

the filing period are “similar or related to unlawful employment practices with regard

to discrimination in compensation that occurred outside the time for filing a charge.”

Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(3)(B)).

18 ECF No. 1 ¶ 9.

19 ECF No. 14 at 3 (Pl. Opp.); ECF No. 15 at 1-2 (Def. Reply).

9

The thrust of Grant’s Title VII disparate treatment claim is that she was “paid

less than her colleagues in violation of the pay scale” and “required to cover a heavier

workload” than her Caucasian colleagues without compensation for those additional

responsibilities.20 Grant alleges that her discriminatory pay disparity persisted

through the relevant period and was never corrected.21 Accordingly, the Court will

consider Grant’s allegations of unequal pay for the work performed throughout the

time period alleged.

ii. Grant Fails to Plead a Title VII Disparate Treatment

Claim

Grant brings a disparate treatment claim for unequal pay under Title VII.

Title VII makes it unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against any individual

with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment,

because of such individual’s race[.]” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1). Disparate-treatment

discrimination “addresses employment actions that treat an employee worse than

others based on the employee’s race . . . In such disparate-treatment cases, proof and

finding of discriminatory motive is required.” Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783, 787

(5th Cir. 2006). There are “two ultimate elements a plaintiff must plead to support a

disparate treatment claim under Title VII: (1) an ‘adverse employment action,’ (2)

taken against a plaintiff ‘because of her protected status.’” Cicalese v. Univ. of Texas

20 ECF No. 1 ¶ 58.

21 Id. ¶¶ 24, 30-31.

10

Med. Branch, 924 F.3d 762, 767 (5th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted) (emphasis in

original); Pacheco, 448 F.3d at 787 (a “discriminatory motive is required” for disparate

treatment claims). Plaintiffs can ultimately prove discriminatory motive through

direct or circumstantial evidence. Portis v. First Nat’l Bank of New Albany, Miss., 34

F.3d 325, 328 (5th Cir. 1994).

The School Board argues that Grant’s Complaint should be dismissed because

she fails to allege facts sufficient to infer that she was treated less favorably than

similarly situated Caucasian employees, and thus, fails to allege that she was

discriminated against due to her race. In response, Grant distinguishes the School

Board’s chief case22 by pointing out that it was decided at the summary judgment

stage, where the McDonnell Douglas23 burden-shifting framework requires plaintiffs

who lack direct evidence of discrimination to establish a prima facie case of

discrimination using circumstantial evidence. According to Grant, the School Board

inappropriately heightens the pleading standard at the motion-to-dismiss stage,

which does not require a plaintiff to prove a prima facie case.

It is true that the Fifth Circuit has held that a district court errs by “requiring

a plaintiff to plead something more than the ‘ultimate elements’ of a claim.” Cicalese,

924 F.3d at 767 (citation omitted). In fact, “[a] court . . . inappropriately heightens

the pleading standard by subjecting a plaintiff's allegations to a rigorous factual or

22 Ross v. Judson Indep. Sch. Dist., 993 F.3d 315 (5th Cir. 2021).

23 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).

11

evidentiary analysis under the McDonnell Douglas framework in response to a

motion to dismiss.” Id. But “the prima facie standard nonetheless has some relevance

at the motion-to-dismiss stage.” Besser v. Texas Gen. Land Off., 834 F. App’x 876, 881

(5th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the Court will not

conduct a “rigorous factual or evidentiary analysis,” but it can use the prima facie

standard as a tool to discern whether a plaintiff relying on circumstantial evidence

“has plausibly alleged the ultimate elements of the disparate treatment claim.”

Cicalese, 924 F.3d at 767.

Under this standard, the Court finds that Grant has failed to adequately allege

the ultimate elements of a disparate treatment claim of unequal pay. Again, a

disparate treatment claim requires pleading “(1) an ‘adverse employment action,’ (2)

taken against a plaintiff ‘because of her protected status.’” Id. (emphasis in original)

(citation omitted); see also Raj v. Louisiana State Univ., 714 F.3d 322, 326, 331 (5th

Cir. 2013) (plaintiff must plead sufficient “facts, direct or circumstantial, that would

suggest [the employer’s] actions were based on [the plaintiff’s] race . . . or that [the

employer] treated similarly situated employees of other races . . . more favorably.”).

And a “prima facie case of wage discrimination under Title VII requires a plaintiff to

show that [she] was a member of a protected class and that [she] was paid less than

a non-member for work requiring substantially the same responsibility.” Rodriguez

v. City of Corpus Christi, 129 F.4th 890, 899 (5th Cir. 2025) (emphasis in original)

(citation omitted).

12

Here, Grant falls short of pleading that her allegedly unequal pay as compared

to her Caucasian colleagues was “because of” her race. Cicalese, 924 F.3d at 767.

While Grant cites numerous facially unfair actions undertaken against her by her

supervisor, Schaff, she fails to allege facts permitting an inference that Schaff (or

anyone else at the School Board) was motivated to discriminate against her due to

her race. Grant relies on identifying three Caucasian colleagues—also social workers

with the School Board—who were allegedly paid more despite having lower caseloads

than Grant.24 But Grant fails to allege that these colleagues were in fact similarly

situated to her—other than in sharing the title “social worker”—which dooms her

Complaint as currently pleaded. That is because salaries can differ among workers

with the same job title due to factors such as types of job responsibilities, experience,

or tenure with the employer (indeed, at least one of the named comparators “recently

retired,” suggesting a longer tenure with the School Board than Grant).25 Without

allegations that the comparator employees were “similarly situated” to Grant, the

Court cannot automatically infer that any pay disparities as compared to her

Caucasian colleagues existed because of race. See Montgomery v. Clayton Homes Inc.,

65 F. App’x 508 (5th Cir. 2003) (explaining that in an unequal pay claim under Title

VII “job content and actual job requirements, not the job title, classification or

description, are determinative”); Rodriguez, 129 F.4th at 899 (for a prima facie case

24 ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 19-20.

25 Id. ¶ 20.

13

of wage discrimination, a plaintiff will need to show she was paid less for work

requiring “substantially the same responsibility”).26

Grant relies on Cicalese v. Univ. of Texas Med. Branch to support her

contention that pointing to comparators with the same job title suffices to allege

discrimination at the pleading stage. But that case demonstrates why Grant’s

complaint falls short. 924 F.3d 762 (5th Cir. 2019). In Cicalese, the Fifth Circuit

reversed the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs’ complaint, which alleged

discrimination based on national original. Id. at 768. The court faulted the district

court for, inter alia, “scrutinizing whether Appellants’ fellow employees were really

‘similarly situated,’” at the motion to dismiss stage. Id. According to Grant, dismissal

of her complaint at this stage would suffer the same fault.

The plaintiffs in Cicalese, however, had also alleged their supervisors had

made “derogatory statements about Italians.” Id. Here, by contrast, Grant not only

fails to allege any facts supporting the contention that the comparator social workers

were, in fact, similarly situated beyond mere job title; she also fails to point to any

other facts that could support an inference of racially biased motivation. Grant’s

Complaint therefore falls short of alleging sufficient “facts, direct or circumstantial,

that would suggest [the employer’s] actions were based on [the plaintiff’s] race . . . or

26 The Court reiterates that, at the motion to dismiss stage, Grant need not prove a prima facie

case of discrimination. See id. But as her complaint stands now, it is not possible to infer from the facts

alleged whether Grant was discriminated against “because of” her race, in part because it is unknown

whether Grant was, in fact, similarly situated to her cited comparators beyond mere job title.

14

that [the employer] treated similarly situated employees of other races . . . more

favorably.” Raj, 714 F.3d at 326, 331; see e.g., id. (affirming dismissal of complaint

where plaintiff alleged his “salary was the lowest of all similarly-qualified professors

throughout his employment” but failed to allege “that LSU treated similarly situated

employees of other races or national origin more favorably”); Thomas v. Dallas Indep.

Sch. Dist., 2024 WL 2874367, at *5 (5th Cir. June 7, 2024) (holding that plaintiff

adequately pleaded an age discrimination claim where the plaintiff pleaded she “had

significantly more experience . . . than many of the candidates who were hired”);

Blanchard v. Tulane Univ., 636 F. Supp. 3d 642, 658 (E.D. La. 2022) (denying motion

to dismiss where plaintiff alleged his circumstances were “nearly identical” to

comparator and yet still received unequal pay). Accordingly, because her Complaint

fails to state a claim under Title VII, the claim is dismissed.27

B. Section 1981 Racial Discrimination Claim

27 In her Opposition to Defendant’s motion to dismiss, Grant asserts that she also brings a

claim for racial discrimination under the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Act, La. R.S.S.

§23301 et. seq. (“LEDL”). ECF No. 14 at 1. Her Complaint, however, only appears to plead a claim for

disability discrimination under the LEDL. See id. ¶¶ 75-78 (pleading “Count 5: Louisiana Employment

Discrimination Law based on Disability LA. R.S. § 23:301 et. Seq” and asserting a claim for

“discrimination based on disability, retaliation, failure to accommodate, and hostile work

environment/harassment”). The LEDL prohibits an employer from discriminating against an

individual based on his race, color, religion, sex, age or national origin and is similar in scope to Title

VII’s prohibitions against discrimination. Federal courts therefore look to Title VII jurisprudence to

interpret the LEDL. Baker v. Fedex Ground Package Sys., 278 F. App’x. 322, 327 (5th Cir.2008) (“We

look to federal employment discrimination jurisprudence when interpreting Louisiana’s anti-

discrimination laws.”) (citing Smith v. Amedisys, Inc., 298 F.3d 434, 448 (5th Cir. 2002)). To the extent

Grant did intend to plead a racial discrimination claim under the LEDL, that claim also fails for the

same reason as the Title VII claim. See id.

15

Grant also brings a claim against the School Board under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, via

§ 1983, for racial discrimination by denying her equal pay. See Encalarade v. New

Orleans Ctr. for Creative Arts/Riverfront, 2010 WL 2854275, at *1 (E.D. La. July 19,

2010) (holding because § 1981 does not provide a separate cause of action against

state actors, a plaintiff “must assert a cause of action against state actors under §

1983 to remedy violations of civil rights under § 1981”) (quoting Oden v. Oktibbeha

County, Miss., 246 F.3d 458, 462–63 (5th Cir. 2001)). As with the Title VII claim,

Grant alleges that Defendants violated Section 1981 by denying her equal pay and

requiring her to take on extra duties as compared to her Caucasian colleagues.28 For

the following reasons, the Court finds that Grant fails to plead a claim under Section

1981.

Section 1981 “provides a remedy for racial discrimination in contracting.”

Williams v. Waste Mgmt., Inc., 818 F. App’x 315, 325 (5th Cir. 2020). “To state a claim

of discrimination under Section 1981, ‘a plaintiff must allege facts in support of the

following elements: (1) the plaintiff is a member of a racial minority; (2) an intent to

discriminate on the basis of race by the defendant; and (3) the discrimination

concerns one or more of the activities enumerated in the statute.’” Sherrod v. United

Way Worldwide, 821 F. App’x 311, 316 (5th Cir. 2020) (quoting Green v. State Bar of

Tex., 27 F.3d 1083, 1086 (5th Cir. 1994)). Because Section 1981 claims of racial

28 ECF No. 1 ¶ 55.

16

discrimination are “governed by the same evidentiary framework applicable to claims

of employment discrimination brought under Title VII,” courts typically rely on Title

VII cases when analyzing Section 1981 claims. Mendoza v. Helicopter, 548 F. App’x

127, 128 (5th Cir. 2013) (relying on Title VII caselaw to analyze Section 1981 claim).29

Although Section 1981 and Title VII claims are similar, a plaintiff pleading a

violation of Section 1981 is also required to show that race was the but-for cause of

the discrimination. See Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of African Am.-Owned Media,

589 U.S. 327, 333 (2020). This means the plaintiff must plead that “but for race, [she]

would not have suffered the loss of a legally protected right,” and her complaint must

contain “sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is

plausible on its face under the but-for causation standard.” Id. at 341 (citation

omitted). “Under this standard, a plaintiff must demonstrate that, but for the

defendant’s unlawful conduct, [her] alleged injury would not have occurred.” Id. at

331.

The Court has already found that Grant’s Title VII claim of unequal pay due

to racial discrimination fails. For the same reasons, and because the plaintiff must

plead that race was the but-for cause of her unequal treatment when bringing a

Section 1981 racial discrimination claim, the Court similarly finds that Grant’s

29 Unlike Title VII, however, Section 1981 does not have an exhaustion requirement, and is

subject to a four-year statute of limitations. See Shaw v. Ciox Health, LLC, 2020 WL 12846622, at *4

(E.D. La. July 8, 2020); 28 U.S.C. § 1658; Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 541 U.S. 369 (2004).

17

Complaint fails to state a claim under Section 1981. Accordingly, that claim is

dismissed.

C. Title VII Retaliation Claim

Defendant next challenges Grant’s Title VII retaliation claim. According to the

School Board, Grant failed to adequately allege that an adverse employment action

occurred against her as a result of her engaging in a protected activity. The Court

agrees with the School Board for the following reasons.

The Court first notes that several of Grant’s alleged instances of retaliation fall

before September 10, 2022. As discussed, the parties agree that under the 300-day

limitations period, any alleged retaliatory acts under Title VII that Grant

experienced before September 10, 2022 fall outside the actionable window and are

time-barred.30 See Conner, 247 F. App’x at 481 (300-day period to file an EEOC charge

in Louisiana); Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114 (2002) (holding

that “each retaliatory adverse employment decision constitutes a separate actionable

‘unlawful employment practice’” and therefore is subject to the filing period deadline).

Accordingly, as to the Title VII claims, the Court considers only claims of retaliation

that occurred after September 10, 2022.31

30 ECF No. 14 at 3 (Pl. Opp.); ECF No. 15 at 1-2 (Def. Reply).

31 To the extent Grant also brings an LEDL retaliation claim, that claim is “subject to a

prescriptive period of one year,” which is only suspended (for up to six months) “during the pendency

of any administrative review or investigation of the claim conducted by [the EEOC] or the Louisiana

Commission on Human Rights.” La. R. S. § 23:303(D); see also ECF No. 1 ¶¶ 75-78 (alleging the School

Board is liable to Grant “under the Louisiana Employment Discrimination Law (“LEDL”), La. R.S. §

23:301 et. seq. as described in the preceding paragraphs for discrimination based on disability,

18

To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff alleging Title VII retaliation must

plead facts showing: “(1) that the plaintiff engaged in activity protected by Title VII;

(2) that an adverse employment action occurred; and (3) that a causal link existed

between the protected activity and the adverse action.” Banks v. E. Baton Rouge Par.

Sch. Bd., 320 F.3d 570, 575 (5th Cir. 2003) (internal quotation marks omitted). At

this stage, a plaintiff need not establish a prima facie case of retaliation, but she

“‘must plead sufficient facts on all of the ultimate elements to make her case

plausible.’” Jenkins v. La. Workforce Comm’n, 713 F. App’x 242, 244 (5th Cir. 2017)

(quoting Chhim v. Univ. of Texas, 836 F.3d 467, 470 (5th Cir. 2016)).

Beginning with the second element, Grant sufficiently pleads facts to show she

experienced “adverse employment action[s]” after September 2022. Banks, 320 F.3d

at 575. She alleges, for example, that she was denied proper medical leave for

assault/battery by a student and lost health and retirement benefits as a result.32 She

also alleges that, after complaining to HR of Schaff’s discriminatory treatment

towards her, Schaff assigned more work to Grant than to her Caucasian colleagues,

and that Schaff told a student who had injured Grant that he would try to get her

retaliation, failure to accommodate, and hostile work environment/harassment.”) The LEDL’s

prescriptive period runs from the date that “the conduct occurred/abated.” Jones v. City of Monroe,

2019 WL 5488603, at *10 (W.D. La. Oct. 8, 2019). Here, Grant filed her Complaint on November 6,

2024. The parties agree that the Court can consider Grant’s claims that occurred one year and six

months before Grant filed her complaint in this court. The parties thus agree the Court can only

consider Grant’s claims under the LEDL that occurred on or after May 6, 2023. Under the facts alleged

here, Grant’s LEDL claim therefore fails for the same reasons as her Title VII retaliation claim.

32 Id. ¶¶ 35-38.

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fired.33 These actions would dissuade a reasonable worker from complaining about

discriminatory treatment. See Johnson v. Bd. of Supervisors of Louisiana State Univ.

& Agric. & Mech. Coll., 90 F.4th 449, 460 (5th Cir. 2024) (holding that an adverse

action for purposes of Title VII retaliation “need only be one that a reasonable

employee would have found ‘materially adverse’ meaning it might have dissuaded a

reasonable worker from making or supporting protected activity”) (cleaned up); see

also Martinez v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, 2023 WL 6518165, at *4 (5th Cir. Oct. 5,

2023) (“An employment decision tends to be materially adverse when it changes job

title, grade, hours, salary, or benefits or effects a diminution in prestige or change in

standing among . . . co-workers.”) (cleaned up).

Grant’s allegations fall short, however, on the first and third elements of a

retaliation claim. It is true that a protected activity under Title VII can consist of

“‘oppos[ing] any practice made an unlawful employment practice by [Title VII].’”

E.E.O.C. v. Rite Way Serv., Inc., 819 F.3d 235, 239 (5th Cir. 2016) (quoting 42 U.S.C.

§ 2000e–3(a)). The complained-of employment practice does not need to be in fact

unlawful so long as the employee “demonstrate[s] that she had at least a ‘reasonable

belief’ that the practices she opposed were unlawful.” Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d

300, 304 (5th Cir. 1996) (quoting Payne v. McLemore’s Wholesale & Retail Stores, 654

F.2d 1130, 1140 (5th Cir. 1981)). Thus, internally complaining about an employment

33 Id. ¶¶ 41-44.

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practice—as Grant did here—may constitute protected activity, as long as the

complainant “reasonably believed the employment practice to be unlawful.” EEOC v.

Rite Way Serv., Inc., 819 F.3d 235, 242 (5th Cir. 2016) (finding that “[t]he statute,

case law, and interest in uniformity and ease of application support applying the

‘reasonable belief’ standard to retaliation cases involving both proactive and reactive

opposition”).

Grant alleges she made multiple internal complaints regarding her unequal

pay and her heavier caseload as compared to her Caucasian co-workers. For example,

Grant alleges she “reach[ed] out to HR, Payroll and her superiors about her unequal

pay while out on medical leave,” and that she emailed HR in February 2023 to address

the disparity in her workload as compared to a Caucasian colleague.34 Even though

the Court has found that Grant’s allegations did not suffice to state a claim for

discrimination under Title VII or Section 1983, Grant has sufficiently pled that she

had a “reasonable belief” she was being discriminated against due to race in receiving

lower pay than her Caucasian colleagues. Rite Way, 819 F.3d at 240. In substance,

these allegations satisfy the first prong of the pleading requirement, where a

protected activity includes “oppos[ing] a practice made an unlawful employment

practice by Title VII.” Id. (cleaned up); see also Tureaud v. Grambling State Univ.,

294 F. App’x 909, 914-15 (5th Cir. 2008) (“An informal complaint to a supervisor

34 Id. ¶¶ 40-41.

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regarding an unlawful employment practice may satisfy the opposition requirement

of a Title VII retaliation claim.”).

But Grant’s medical leave took place from March 2022 through January 25,

2023, and so included the time-barred period.35 Although Grant alleges she

complained of unequal pay “while out on medical leave,” she does not specify if any of

these complaints occurred after September 10, 2022. The Complaint therefore fails to

allege that Grant only engaged in a protected activity during the period that is not

time-barred. Accordingly, that claim is dismissed.

D. Title VII Hostile Work Environment Claim

Although not enumerated as a separate count in her Complaint, Grant argues

in her opposition that she also brings a hostile work environment claim under both

Title VII and the LEDL. Assuming that Grant did intend to state a hostile work

environment claim under Title VII, the Court finds that those claims also fail.

To prevail on a hostile work environment claim under both Title VII and the

LEDL, a plaintiff must prove that: “(1) she belongs to a protected group; (2) she was

subjected to unwelcome harassment; (3) the harassment complained of was based on

race; (4) the harassment complained of affected a term, condition, or privilege of

employment; (5) the employer knew or should have known of the harassment in

35 Id. ¶¶ 29-30.

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question and failed to take prompt remedial action.” Ramsey v. Henderson, 286 F.3d

264, 268 (5th Cir. 2002).

Grant’s Complaint fails on the third element for the same reasons her Title VII

claim fail: she fails to allege adequate facts to support an inference that any perceived

harassment was “based on race.” Although she alleges many facts demonstrating that

her supervisor, Schaff, may have behaved unfairly towards her—and without

determining that those allegations rise to the level of harassment—none of Grant’s

allegations points to a purported harassment that was racially motivated. See, e.g.,

Decou-Snowton v. Par., 2022 WL 4245492, at *7 (E.D. La. Sept. 15, 2022) (“No matter

how toxic or unpleasant the environment was, Snowton points to no comments or

actions that were based on race or gender, thus, nothing sustains a race- or gender-

based hostile work environment claim.”) (citing Baker v. FedEx Ground Package

System, Inc., 278 F. App’x. 322, 329 (5th Cir. 2008) (“The phrases ‘fired girl walking’

and ‘stupid’ are not ‘based on race’ and, thereby, do not sustain a race-based hostile

work environment claim.)). Accordingly, the motion to dismiss Grant’s hostile work

environment claim is granted and the claim is dismissed.

E. ADA and LEDL Disability Discrimination Claims

Finally, Plaintiff Grant also brings claims against the School Board for

violation of her rights under the ADA and LEDL. Grant alleges she experienced

disability discrimination because she did not receive correct “leave coding” for the

medical leave she took after she was injured by students in March 2022 and April

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2023. Because the LEDL is “patterned” after the ADA, the results of the Court’s

analysis under either statute “must, necessarily, be the same.” Crain v. Schlumberger

Tech. Co., 187 F. Supp. 3d 732, 738 (E.D. La. 2016) (quoting Mincey v. Dow Chem.

Co., 217 F. Supp. 2d 737, 742 (M.D. La. 2002)).

i. Time Barred Claims

The Court once again notes that many of Plaintiff’s claims are time-barred.

“Before a plaintiff may file her ADA claim in federal court, she must exhaust her

administrative remedies.” Patton v. Jacobs Eng’g Grp., Inc., 874 F.3d 437, 443 (5th

Cir. 2017). “Specifically, the plaintiff must file a charge of discrimination with the

EEOC within . . . 300 days if the charge is filed with a state or local agency . . . .” Id.

(citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(e)(1)). The parties again agree that under the 300-day

limitations period, any alleged discriminatory or retaliatory acts under the ADA that

Grant experienced before September 10, 2022 fall outside the actionable window and

are time-barred.36 See, e.g., Smith v. Gen. Motors, L.L.C., 2025 WL 1693524, at *3

(5th Cir. June 17, 2025) (“Almost all of the acts alleged in Smith’s Second Amended

Complaint occurred before February 22, 2022 and are time barred.”)

Similarly, a claim under the LEDL is “subject to a prescriptive period of one

year,” which is only suspended (for up to six months) “during the pendency of any

administrative review or investigation of the claim conducted by [the EEOC] or the

36 ECF No. 14 at 3 (Pl. Opp.); ECF No. 15 at 1-2 (Def. Reply).

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Louisiana Commission on Human Rights.” La. R. S. § 23:303(D). The LEDL’s

prescriptive period runs from the date that “the conduct occurred/abated.” Jones v.

City of Monroe, 2019 WL 5488603, at *10 (W.D. La. Oct. 8, 2019). Here, Grant filed

her Complaint on November 6, 2024. The parties agree that the Court can consider

Grant’s claims that occurred one year and six months before Grant filed her

complaint in this court. The parties thus agree the Court can only consider Grant’s

claims under the LEDL that occurred on or after May 6, 2023.37

ii. Disability Discrimination Claims

The ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating against a “qualified

individual with a disability on the basis of that disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A

plaintiff states a prima facie case of discrimination by showing: “(1) that [s]he has a

disability; (2) that [s]he was qualified for the job; [and] (3) that [s]he was subject to

an adverse employment decision on account of his disability.” E.E.O.C. v. LHC Grp.,

Inc., 773 F.3d 688, 697 (5th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and citation

omitted). The plaintiff does not need to “submit evidence to establish a prima facie

case of discrimination at th[e motion to dismiss] stage,” but she does need to “plead

sufficient facts on all of the ultimate elements of a disparate treatment claim to make

[her] case plausible.” Chhim v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 836 F.3d 467, 470 (5th Cir.

2016) (per curiam) (citations omitted).

37 See ECF No. 14 at 5; ECF No. 15 at 3.

25

Here, Grant fails to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim for

discrimination. For one, she fails to allege that she has a disability within the

meaning of the ADA. See LHC Grp, 773 F.3d at 697. An individual is considered

disabled under the ADA if he or she (1) has “a physical or mental impairment that

substantially limits one or more major life activities”; (2) has “a record of such

impairment”; or (3) is “regarded as having such impairment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1).

Grant alleges that a student injured her hand in April 2023 and recites that the injury

“limited her major life activities while recovering from the injuries and surgeries.”

But she does not specify whether any injury persisted after she returned from medical

leave six weeks later or allege facts supporting the conclusion that her “life activities”

were substantially impaired. These deficiencies doom her claim. See Mora v. Univ. of

Texas Sw. Med. Ctr., 469 F. App’x 295, 297 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that the plaintiff’s

failure to specify which of her “life activities” were substantially limited was “fatal to

stating a valid claim for relief”).

Moreover, Grant’s Complaint also fails to allege facts that would establish she

was “subject to an adverse employment decision on account of [her] disability.” LHC

Grp., Inc., 773 F.3d at 697. Although Grant alleges the School Board erroneously

failed to place her on “assault leave” following her hand injury caused by a student

in April 2023, she does not allege that she experienced any particular adverse

employment decision “on account of” her disability. Id. Indeed, as the School Board

points out, it is difficult to see how affording Grant medical leave (even if she alleges

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it was erroneously granted without pay) could constitute discrimination on account

of her disability. Accordingly, the Court dismisses Grant’s ADA and LEDL claims.

F. Leave to Amend

Grant requests leave to amend her complaint.38 The Court will “freely give

leave [to amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a). In determining

whether to grant leave to amend, the Court considers factors such as “undue delay,

bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, repeated failure to cure

deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice to the opposing

party by virtue of allowance of the amendment, [and] futility of amendment.” Foman

v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). Grant has not previously amended her Complaint

and it is not clear that amendment would be futile. Nor do any of the other factors

appear to apply. The Court therefore grants Grant leave amend her Complaint, if she

chooses, to remedy the deficiencies outlined here.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED that Defendant St. John the Baptist Parish School

Board’s motion39 to dismiss the claims against it is GRANTED. Plaintiff Ellen

Grant’s claims are DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Plaintiff has 30

days to amend her complaint to remedy the deficiencies in her pleading. Failure to

timely amend will result in dismissal of the complaint with prejudice.

38 ECF No. 14.

39 ECF No. 8.

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New Orleans, Louisiana, this 2nd day of July, 2026.

BRANDON S. LONG

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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