The opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA
GAINESVILLE DIVISION
GERALD HODGES,
Plaintiff,
vs.
Case No.: 1:25-cv-107-MW-ZCB
JASON RHODES, et al.,
Defendants.
/
ORDER
This is a pro se prisoner civil rights case brought under 42 U.S.C. §
1983. In the past two months, Plaintiff has inundated the Court with at
least fifteen motions and requests. (Docs. 73, 74, 85, 87, 88, 91, 92, 93,
94, 95, 96, 101, 114, 115, 116). Defendants have also filed two discovery
motions. (Docs. 104, 109). This order resolves all but two of those filings.
I. Background
Plaintiff asserts Eighth Amendment claims against two
correctional officers and a prison nurse regarding an alleged use of force.
(Doc. 49). The scheduling order established that the “due date of any
requested discovery must be no later than May 25, 2026.” (Doc. 53 at 1).
As to discovery sought by Plaintiff from seven non-party inmates and
prison employees (see Doc. 65), the discovery deadline was extended to
July 24, 2026. (Doc. 80 at 7-8). But the May 25, 2026, discovery deadline
remained in effect for all other discovery. (Id. at 7-8). And the scheduling
order provides that “no motions to compel discovery may be filed after
5:00 p.m. (Central Time) on the day discovery closes.” (Doc. 53 at 4).
II. Discussion
As noted above, all but two of the pending discovery motions will be
resolved by way of this order. Given the number of pending motions and
the fact that the Court is writing for the benefit of the parties, the Court
will limit its discussion to what is necessary to resolve the motions.
A. Plaintiff’s June 18, 2026, motions to compel
On June 18, 2026,1 Plaintiff filed three motions to compel regarding
discovery requests served on Defendants. (Docs. 114, 115, 116). The
deadline to seek discovery from Defendants expired on May 25, 2026.
(Doc. 53 at 1; Doc. 80 at 7-8). Thus, Plaintiff’s June 18, 2026, motions to
compel are untimely because they were filed after the relevant discovery
deadline had expired. (Doc. 53 at 4) (stating that no motions to compel
1 The prison mail stamps reflect a filing date of June 18, 2026. (Doc. 114
at 1; Doc. 115 at 3; Doc. 116 at 3). See Daker v. Comm’r, Georgia Dep’t of
Corr., 820 F.3d 1278, 1286 (11th Cir. 2016) (“Under the prison mailbox
rule, a pro se prisoner’s court filing is deemed filed on the date it is
delivered to prison authorities for mailing.” (cleaned up)).
may be filed after the discovery deadline). And Plaintiff has not shown
good cause for excusing his untimeliness.2 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s June
18, 2026, motions to compel (Docs. 114, 115, 116) will be denied as
untimely. See El-Saba v. Univ. of S. Ala., 738 F. App’x 640, 645 (11th
Cir. 2018) (noting a district court acts “well within its discretion” when it
denies as untimely a motion to compel that was filed after discovery
expired); see also Walker v. Economy Premier Assurance Co., 3:21cv366,
2023 WL 3398097, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 5, 2023) (denying as untimely a
2 The motions could also be denied because Plaintiff failed to comply with
Rule 31’s requirements when he merely sent a list of questions to each
Defendant. See Cargill v. Ala. Dep’t of Corr., 2021 WL 11152964, at *1-2
(M.D. Ala. Dec. 15, 2021) (discussing Rule 31 and denying motion to
depose by written questions) (“In lieu of a deposition officer actually
asking the questions and a court reporter transcribing the deponents’
verbal responses, plaintiff proposes that the deponents simply hand write
their answers and sign them under oath. In other words, the proposed
form would, upon completion, essentially be a declaration. Such a
procedure is not permitted by Rule 31.” (cleaned up)). And the
interrogatories sent to Defendant Krause on May 8, 2026 (Doc. 116 at 1),
were untimely because the 30-day deadline for Defendant Krause to
respond, Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(2), fell past the May 25, 2026, discovery
deadline. See Richardson v. Bradley, No. 3:17cv921, 2019 WL 13562029,
at *2 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 8, 2019) (denying motion to compel because the
underlying interrogatories were untimely); see also Diehl v. United
States, No. 24-10616, 2026 WL 280061, at *3 (11th Cir. Feb. 3, 2026)
(“The discovery deadline in the case was January 3, 2023, which meant
that all discovery requests needed to be filed on or before December 1,
2022. Diehl’s second discovery request was dated December 3, 2022, and
the mailing envelope indicated it wasn’t given to the BOP until December
8, 2022. In either event, the request was untimely.”).
motion to compel filed after the discovery deadline expired).
B. Plaintiff’s “Requests”
Plaintiff has also filed multiple “Requests” related to discovery and
various discovery motions. (Docs. 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 101). Several of these
requests, however, are either moot or improper.
1. Plaintiff’s May 20, 2026, request
On May 20, 2026, Plaintiff requested leave for Plaintiff’s family to
contact the four non-party inmates from whom Plaintiff sought
declarations (see Docs. 65, 98). (Doc. 91). Such leave is unnecessary
because the Court already provided Plaintiff with a reasonable procedure
to conduct discovery on the four inmates. (See Doc. 80). Involving
Plaintiff’s family in that procedure is unwarranted, and Plaintiff’s family
members (unless licensed as attorneys) are not permitted to represent
Plaintiff in this litigation. In any event, this request is now moot because
responses from the four inmates have been provided to Plaintiff. (See
Doc. 111). Thus, Plaintiff’s May 20, 2026, request (Doc. 91) will be denied.
2. Plaintiff’s May 21, 2026, request for Rule 35 examination
On May 21, 2026, Plaintiff filed a Rule 35 request for a non-FDOC
doctor to examine him. (Doc. 92). “While the Court may, upon a party’s
motion, order a party to undergo a medical examination under Rule 35 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 35 only authorizes the Court
to compel a party to submit to a physical or mental evaluation at another
party’s request; it does not, however, authorize the Court to pay for such
an examination and does not authorize the Court to provide expert
services for an indigent party proceeding pro se and seeking his own
examination.” Wheeler v. Polite, 2023 WL 3765239, at *2 (M.D. Ga. June
1, 2023). Because Plaintiff seeks a Rule 35 examination for himself, and
there is no indication that Plaintiff has the means to pay for the
examination, Plaintiff’s May 21, 2026, request (Doc. 92) will be denied.3
See Wheeler, 2023 WL 3765239, at *2 (denying prisoner’s Rule 35 request
3 Even if Plaintiff could seek a Rule 35 examination for himself, his
conclusory request and assertion of bias by FDOC medical staff does not
show good cause for allowing such an examination. See Wheeler, 2023
WL 3765239, at *2 (“Rule 35 also requires a party to show good cause to
compel a medical exam, which requires an affirmative showing by the
movant that the physical or mental condition of the party in question is
genuinely in controversy and that the exam requested is appropriate . . .
. Plaintiff has not shown that the specific examination requested is
required—in fact, Plaintiff has barely specified what kind of examination
he believes he needs or why.” (cleaned up)); see also Clark v. Fye, 2020
WL 2482119, at *2 (M.D. Ga. Jan. 13, 2020) (“Plaintiff has not established
good cause for an examination under Rule 35. His motion rests on mere
conclusory statements that his prior examinations were biased because
the companies which performed the examinations were used by
defendants.” (cleaned up)), adopted in relevant part, 2020 WL 999754
(M.D. Ga. Mar. 2, 2020).
to be examined by medical professionals not associated with the prison).4
3. Plaintiff’s May 21, 2026, request for a subpoena
On May 21, 2026, Plaintiff requested a subpoena for “the official
who’s in charge of the records at Cross City C.I.” so Defendants “can have
[the records] with them doing interrogatories, admissions, produce
documents, and deposition upon written questions.” (Doc. 93).
“A pro se plaintiff may be entitled to the issuance of a subpoena
commanding the production of documents from non-parties upon Court
approval. However, the Court will consider granting such a request only
if the documents sought from the non-party are not equally available to
Plaintiff and the production sought by Plaintiff must fall within the scope
of proper discovery under Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1), which provides that
parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter
relevant to a party’s claim or defense or any relevant information
4 See also Brown v. United States, 74 F. App’x 611, 614-15 (7th Cir. 2003)
(“Rule 35 . . . does not vest the court with authority to appoint an expert
to examine a party wishing an examination of himself. Rather, under
appropriate circumstances, it would allow the court to order a party to
submit to a physical examination at the request of an opposing party.
Brown seeks to compel the government to bear the cost of and
responsibility for hiring an expert witness to testify on his behalf in order
to establish a fundamental element of his case. However, no civil litigant,
even an indigent one, has a legal right to such aid.”).
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.
Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(c)(1), the Court has an obligation to ensure
that a requested subpoena would not pose an undue burden or expense
on the person responding to the subpoena.” Heaggins v. Thomas, 2021
WL 5456974, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 22, 2021) (cleaned up).
Plaintiff’s request for a subpoena does not comply with Rule 45.
The request fails to identify what documents Plaintiff seeks and fails to
identify the prison official in possession of those documents. (Doc. 93 at
1-2). This is insufficient under Rule 45. See Heaggins, 2021 WL 5456974,
at *3 (“A motion for issuance of a subpoena duces tecum should be
supported by clear identification of the documents sought and a showing
that the records are obtainable only through the identified third party.”).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s May 21, 2026, request for a subpoena (Doc.
93) will be denied. See Wright v. Young, No. 4:10cv474, 2012 WL
3206538, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 6, 2012) (noting that “a pro se plaintiff may
be entitled to the issuance of a subpoena commanding the production of
documents from a non-party only upon Court approval” and that a
subpoena request must “be accompanied by a description of what records
he is seeking from each non-party and what relevance the records have
to his claim” (cleaned up)); see also Wromas v. Mursch, No. 3:20cv2698,
2022 WL 22878022, at *1 (N.D. Fla. June 9, 2022) (denying prisoner’s
request for subpoena where he “has not identified any specific documents
or specific categories of documents or electronically stored information
that he is seeking” and instead “has simply stated in the broadest of
terms that he wants Centurion to produce evidence” (cleaned up)).
4. Plaintiff’s May 21, 2026, request to disregard
On May 21, 2026, Plaintiff filed a request to “disregard the motion
or dismiss the motion for an order compelling discovery against
Defendant Krause . . . .” (Doc. 94). The Court construes this request as
a notice of withdrawal of Plaintiff’s May 18, 2026, motion to compel filed
against Defendant Krause (Doc. 88). Thus, the Court will grant
Plaintiff’s May 21, 2026, request (Doc. 94) and terminate the May 18,
2026, motion to compel filed against Defendant Krause (Doc. 88) as moot.
5. Plaintiff’s May 20, 2026, request to decline additional time
On May 20, 2026, Plaintiff filed a request for the Court to decline
Defendant Peeks’ additional time to respond to Plaintiff’s discovery
requests (Docs. 72, 75). (Doc. 95). Aside from asking the Court to deny
Defendant Peeks’ request for additional time to respond to Plaintiff’s
discovery requests (see Doc. 81), Plaintiff also asks the Court to “grant
the order that the defendant, Kody Peeks, and defense counsel pay the
Plaintiff the reasonable expense fees.” (Doc. 95 at 3).
Plaintiff’s May 20, 2026, request appears to have been intended as
a reply to Defendant Peeks’ response (Doc. 81) to Plaintiff’s May 5, 2026,
motions to compel (Docs. 73, 74). But Plaintiff was not authorized to
submit a reply in support of his motions to compel nor are there
extraordinary circumstances warranting one. See N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 7.1(I)
(stating that a “party ordinarily may not file a reply memorandum in
support of a motion” and that the Court may only grant leave to reply “in
extraordinary circumstances”); see also Grlpwr, LLC v. Rodriguez, No.
3:23cv16480, 2023 WL 6509501, at *1 (N.D. Fla. July 27, 2023) (noting
that the standard under Local Rule 7.1(I) “is difficult to meet (as it should
be) and it requires more than a party simply wanting to get the last word
on its motion or to point out something that the Court is capable of
discerning on its own without further briefing”).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s May 20, 2026, request (Doc. 95) will be
stricken as an unauthorized reply in violation of Local Rule 7.1(I).5 See
5 Even if Plaintiff’s May 20, 2026, filing was not intended to be a reply,
his request for the Court to decline Defendant Peeks additional time to
respond to Plaintiff’s discovery requests is moot because Defendant
Peeks has already been granted additional time to respond. (See Doc.
82). And Defendant Peeks filed a notice indicating that responses to the
discovery requests were provided to Plaintiff. (Doc. 90).
Kaimowitz v. Supervisor of Elections, No. 1:16cv257, 2016 WL 6594110,
at *1 n.2 (N.D. Fla. Oct. 25, 2016) (“Plaintiff has not obtained leave to file
the reply memorandum and therefore the filing is unauthorized and due
to be stricken.”), adopted, 2016 WL 6573973 (N.D. Fla. Nov. 4, 2016).
6. Plaintiff’s June 2, 2026, request for sanctions
On June 2, 2026, Plaintiff filed a request for sanctions. (Doc. 101).
Given Plaintiff’s references to his discovery requests and Defendants’
responses to his motions to compel, this filing also appears to be nothing
more than another unauthorized reply in support of Plaintiff’s earlier-
filed motions to compel. Thus, Plaintiff’s June 2, 2026, request for
sanctions (Doc. 101) will be stricken as an unauthorized reply in violation
of Local Rule 7.1(I). See Kaimowitz, 2016 WL 6594110, at *1 n.2.
C. Plaintiff’s May 5, 2026, motions to compel
On May 5, 2026, Plaintiff filed motions to compel regarding
discovery requests served on Defendant Peeks. (Docs. 73, 74). In
response, Defendant Peeks’ counsel explained that he had difficulty
contacting Defendant Peeks and sought additional time to respond to
Plaintiff’s discovery requests (Docs. 72, 75). (Doc. 81 at 1-2). The Court
granted additional time, allowing Defendant Peeks until May 25, 2026,
to respond to the discovery requests. (Doc. 82).
Defendant Peeks has indicated that he has served responses to the
discovery requests at issue (Docs. 72, 75). (Doc. 90). Because Defendant
Peeks has now responded to the discovery requests, Plaintiff’s May 5,
2026, motions to compel (Docs. 73, 74) will be denied as moot.6
6 Plaintiff’s motions to compel each seek $200 in expenses under Rule
37(a). Such awards are not warranted here. As to Plaintiff’s
interrogatory-related motion to compel (Doc. 74), there is no indication
that Plaintiff attempted “in good faith to obtain the . . . discovery without
court action[.]” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A)(i). Nor does Plaintiff’s motion
include a certification indicating that he conferred or attempted to confer
prior to filing the motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(1)(B). Indeed,
Defendant Peeks’ response notes that Plaintiff made no attempts to
confer prior to the filing of the motion despite Plaintiff and Defendant
Peeks’ counsel speaking on May 5, 2026—the same day the motion was
filed. (Doc. 81 at 2). The same is true of the admission-related motion to
compel (Doc. 73) because there is no indication Plaintiff attempted to
confer prior to filing the motion. See Elite Mitigation Servs., LLC v.
Westchester Surplus Lines Ins. Co., No. 5:19cv381, 2020 WL 6122067, at
*3 (N.D. Fla. Apr. 6, 2020) (noting Rule 36 provides that “Rule 37(a)(5)
applies to an award of expenses for bringing a motion regarding the
sufficiency of an answer or objection” (cleaned up)).
And even if Plaintiff had moved for expenses under Rule 37(c)(2),
such a request is premature at this stage of the case. See Bruggemann v.
Amacore Grp., Inc., 2011 WL 1899251, at *4 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 1, 2011)
(“Rule 37(c)(2), which deals only with admissions, imposes a look-back
approach for dealing with sanctions. If the receiving party
inappropriately denies the admission or inappropriately says it cannot
truthfully admit or deny, the rule does not give a pretrial hearing on
sanctions to the litigant demanding answers to the admissions. Instead,
the rule envisions posttrial relief in the form of a requirement that the
party improperly refusing the admission pay the expenses of the other
side in making the necessary proof at trial.” (cleaned up)); Odom v.
Roberts, 337 F.R.D. 347, 353 (N.D. Fla. 2020) (“Since Rule 36 does not
provide a mechanism for determining whether the responses are
D. Plaintiff’s May 14, 2026, motion to compel
On May 14, 2026, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel regarding
discovery requests served on Defendant Peeks. (Doc. 85). In response,
Defendant Peeks states that discovery responses were sent to Plaintiff’s
classification officer and Plaintiff directly for viewing. (Doc. 86). Because
Defendant Peeks has responded to the discovery requests, Plaintiff’s May
14, 2026, motion to compel (Doc. 85) will be denied as moot.7
E. Plaintiff’s May 25, 2026, motion to compel
On May 25, 2026, Plaintiff filed a motion to compel regarding
warranted by the evidence thus far accumulated, Rule 37(c) is intended
to provide posttrial relief in the form of requiring the party who
improperly refused to admit to pay the expenses of the other side in
making the necessary proof at trial.”).
7 As with the May 5, 2026, motions to compel (Docs. 73, 74), Plaintiff is
not entitled to an award of expenses under Rule 37(a) for his May 14,
2026, motion to compel (Doc. 85) because there is no indication that
Plaintiff attempted to obtain the discovery without Court action or
conferred with Defendants prior to filing the motion. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
37(a)(5)(A)(i), (d)(1)(B). And it appears Defendant Peeks had already
responded to Plaintiff’s discovery requests prior to Plaintiff filing his
motion to compel on May 14, 2026—thereby precluding an award of
expenses under Rule 37(a). (Doc. 86 at 2) (noting a “response has already
been submitted to plaintiff); see Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(5)(A) (“If the motion
is granted—or if the . . . requested discovery is provided after the motion
was filed—the court must . . . require the party or deponent whose
conduct necessitated the motion, the party or attorney advising that
conduct, or both to pay the movant’s reasonable expenses incurred in
making the motion . . . .” (cleaned up and emphasis added)).
requests for production (RFPs) served on Defendants Krause and Rhodes.
(Doc. 96). Plaintiff asks the Court to overrule Defendant Krause’s
objections to RFPs 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6, and Defendant Rhodes’ objections to
RFPs 3, 5, and 8. (Id. at 1-2). Defendants assert that they have produced
all responsive documents in their possession. (Docs. 102, 105).
Under Rule 34(a), a party must produce non-privileged documents
that are responsive to a request for production so long as the documents
are in the party’s “possession, custody, or control.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
34(a)(1). But a court “cannot compel” a party “to produce a [document]
that it does not possess, control, or have in its possession.” Hollywood
Beach Hotel Owners Ass’n. v. Continental Casualty Co., 2011 WL
13217005, at *1 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 23, 2011). “The party seeking production
bears the burden of establishing that the opposing party has control over
the documents sought.” Al-Saadi v. Annchery Fajas USA, Inc., 2021 WL
8773350, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Nov. 29, 2021) (cleaned up); see also Hollywood
Beach Hotel Owners Ass’n, 2011 WL 13217005, at *1 (explaining that the
party seeking discovery must overcome the opposing party’s assertion
that it lacks possession, custody, or control of the documents sought).
Here, Plaintiff has not met his burden of showing that Defendants
have possession of the documents sought by Plaintiff. And while some of
Defendants’ objections may not be the model of clarity, the Court find
that the at-issue RFPs are irrelevant and overly broad.
1. The RFPs served on Defendant Krause
As to Defendant Krause, RFPs 3, 4, and 5 seek prison camera
footage of the alleged use of force on Plaintiff and grievance documents.
(Doc. 96 at 3-4). Plaintiff has not met his burden of showing that
Defendant Krause, as a medical employee of the prison, has possession
of the prison camera footage or grievance documents sought by RFPs 3,
4, and 5. See Annabel v. Heyns, 2014 WL 1207802, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Mar.
24, 2014) (denying motion to compel prison medical employee to produce
prisoner’s medical documents, prison camera footage, and other prison
documents because the medical employee was not an officer or employee
of the department of corrections and had no control over prison records),
aff’d, No. 16-2398, 2018 WL 4870866 (6th Cir. Apr. 10, 2018).
RFPs 2 and 6 vaguely seek “copies of policy and procedure as RN,
Nurse what rules must be follower” and “a copy of the sorn oath sworn
oath signed by the defendant in order to become a nurse.” (Doc. 96 at 3-
4). Because these two RFPs fail to identify specific records and seek
documents that are immaterial to the elements of Plaintiff’s Eighth
Amendment claims, the Court finds RFPs 2 and 6 are overly broad and
seek irrelevant documents. See Pediatric Servs. of Am., Inc. v. Kendrick,
No. 3:18cv1372, 2019 WL 580786, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 17, 2019) (“[W]hen
relevancy is not apparent, the burden is on the party seeking discovery
to show the relevancy of the discovery request.”).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s May 25, 2026, motion to compel (Doc. 96)
will be denied as to Defendant Krause.
2. The RFPs served on Defendant Rhodes
As to Defendant Rhodes, RFPs 3, 5, and 8 seek prison camera
footage of the alleged use of force on Plaintiff, copies of FDOC rules (Fla.
Admin. Code § 33-208.002), and Cross City C.I. policies. (Doc. 96 at 8,
10). In response to RFP 3, Defendant Rhodes states that there is no video
footage of the alleged use of force. (Id. at 8). Other than asking the Court
to overrule this response, Plaintiff has provided nothing to meet his
burden of showing that video footage of the incident exists or that
Defendant Rhodes is in possession of such footage. See Tibbetts Lumber
Co., LLC v. Amerisure Mut. Ins. Co., 2021 WL 1966492, at *1-2 (M.D. Fla.
May 17, 2021) (stating that a “court cannot compel a party to produce
documents that it does not have in its possession, custody, or control, or
documents that do not exist” and noting that, “as a matter of practical
reality, the Court must accept, at face value, a party’s representation that
it has fully produced all materials that are discoverable” because courts
“have no means to test the veracity of such avowals, other than to
appropriately sanction a recalcitrant party for failing to responsibly
honor its discovery obligations” (cleaned up)).
In response to RFPs 5 and 8, Defendant Rhodes states that legal
research is an improper discovery request and that the sought prison
policies are irrelevant and not in Defendant Rhodes’ possession. (Doc. 96
at 8, 10). As noted above regarding the RFPs to Defendant Krause, a
violation of prison policy or procedure is immaterial to whether or not the
Eighth Amendment was violated. Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiff
has not met his burden of showing that the documents sought by RFPs 5
and 8 are relevant to this case. See Tenet Fla., Inc. on Behalf of Coral
Gables Hosp. v. Glob. Excel Mgmt., Inc., 2019 WL 1253403, at *2 (S.D.
Fla. Mar. 19, 2019) (“After a properly stated objection is presented, the
proponent of a motion to compel seeking to overrule the objection must
prove relevance of the requested discovery.”).
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s May 25, 2026, motion to compel (Doc. 96)
will be denied as to Defendant Rhodes.
F. Defendants Peeks’ and Rhodes’ June 12, 2026, motion to
strike
On June 12, 2026, Defendants Peeks and Rhodes moved to strike
Plaintiff’s discovery requests as untimely. (Doc. 104). Defendants argue
that Plaintiff served requests for admission, interrogatories, and
requests for production on May 7 and 11, 2026, which did not allow
Defendants sufficient time to respond before the May 25, 2026, discovery
deadline. (Id. at 2-5). Plaintiff opposes the motion but does not appear
to dispute that the discovery requests were sent on May 7 and 11, 2026.
(Doc. 112 at 1-2).
Responses to interrogatories, requests for production, and requests
for admission are due within 30 days after the discovery requests were
served. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 33(b)(2), 34(b)(2)(A), 36(a)(3). Because the 30-
day deadline for Defendants Peeks and Rhodes to respond Plaintiff’s May
7 and 11, 2026, discovery requests fell past the May 25, 2026, discovery
deadline, Plaintiff’s discovery requests were untimely when served. See
Diehl v. United States, No. 24-10616, 2026 WL 280061, at *3 (11th Cir.
Feb. 3, 2026) (“The discovery deadline in the case was January 3, 2023,
which meant that all discovery requests needed to be filed on or before
December 1, 2022. Diehl’s second discovery request was dated December
3, 2022, and the mailing envelope indicated it wasn’t given to the BOP
until December 8, 2022. In either event, the request was untimely.”).
Accordingly, Defendants’ June 12, 2026, motion to strike (Doc. 104)
will be granted and Plaintiff’s May 7 and 11, 2026, discovery requests
served on Defendants Peeks and Rhodes will be stricken as untimely. See
Terry v. Sacred Heart Health Sys., Inc., No. 3:21cv830, 2022 WL
23011622, at *2 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 12, 2022) (noting a party is “under no
obligation to comply” with “an untimely discovery request”).
G. The two remaining motions
The Court has now resolved all pending discovery motions except
for Plaintiff’s May 15, 2026, motion to compel filed against Defendant
Rhodes (Doc. 87) and Defendant’s Krause’s June 18, 2026, motion for
protective order (Doc. 109). It does not appear that responses to these
two motions have been filed.8 The Court will direct responses to be filed
8 Defendant Peeks’ response (Doc. 86) to a different motion to compel
(Doc. 85) appears to also address the discovery requests served on
Defendant Rhodes at issue in Plaintiff’s May 15, 2026, motion to compel
(Doc. 87). But the Court will require a standalone response to avoid any
uncertainty as to Defendant Rhodes’ position. As to Defendant Krause’s
motion for protective order (Doc. 109), Plaintiff was ordered to respond
within fourteen days of the motion being filed on June 18, 2026. (Doc.
110). That deadline has not yet passed and Plaintiff has yet to respond.
Thus, the Court will grant a short extension for Plaintiff to respond.
before issuing a ruling.
III. Conclusion
For the reasons above, it is ORDERED that:
1. Plaintiff’s June 18, 2026, motions to compel (Docs. 114, 115,
116); Plaintiff’s May 21, 2026, requests (Docs. 92, 93); and Plaintiff’s May
25, 2026, motion to compel (Doc. 96) are DENIED.
2. Plaintiff’s May 20, 2026, request (Doc. 91); Plaintiff’s May 5,
2026, motions to compel (Docs. 73, 74); and Plaintiff’s May 14, 2026,
motion to compel (Doc. 85) are DENIED as moot.
3. Plaintiff’s May 21, 2026, request to disregard (Doc. 94) is
GRANTED to the extent that the Clerk of Court is directed to
TERMINATE as moot Plaintiff’s May 18, 2026, motion to compel filed
against Defendant Krause (Doc. 88).
4. Plaintiff’s May 20, 2026, request (Doc. 95); and Plaintiff’s
June 2, 2026, request for sanctions (Doc. 101) are STRICKEN as
unauthorized replies in violation of Local Rule 7.1(I).
5. Defendants Peeks’ and Rhodes’ June 12, 2026, motion to
strike (Doc. 104) is GRANTED to the extent that Plaintiff’s May 7 and
11, 2026, discovery requests to Defendants Peeks and Rhodes are
STRICKEN as untimely.
6. Within fourteen days of the date of this order:
a. Defendant Rhodes shall file a response to Plaintiff’s May 15,
2026, motion to compel (Doc. 87); AND
b. Plaintiff shall file a response to Defendant Krause’s June 18,
2026, motion for protective order (Doc. 109).
SO ORDERED this 6th day of July 2026.
/s/ Zachary C. Bolitho
Zachary C. Bolitho
United States Magistrate Judge