Christian Aleksander Vargas

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

In re: FOR PUBLICATION

CHRISTIAN ALEKSANDER VARGAS, Chapter 13

Debtor. Case No. 25-12734 (JPM)

APPEARANCES

CHRISTIAN ALEKSANDER VARGAS

Pro Se Debtor

155 E 2nd St. Apartment 2D

New York, NY 10009

FRIEDMAN VARTOLO, LLP

Counsel for the Creditor

1325 Franklin Ave, Suite 160

Garden City, NY 11530

By: Michael Rozea

CHAPTER 13 TRUSTEE

Standing Chapter 13 Trustee

399 Knollwood Rd., Suite 102

White Plains, NY 10603

By: Thomas C. Frost

UNITED STATES TRUSTEE

Office of the U.S. Trustee, Region 2

Alexander Hamilton Custom House

One Bowling Green, Room 534

New York, NY 10004

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER GRANTING IN PART

THE DEBTOR’S MOTION FOR STAY PENDING APPEAL

JOHN P. MASTANDO III

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

Before the Court is the motion (the “Motion”), dated June 30, 2026, of pro se debtor

Christian Aleksander Vargas (the “Debtor”), for an order granting a stay pending appeal pursuant

to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8007 on an emergency basis. (Dkt. No. 37). The Motion

seeks, inter alia, imposition of a stay of a scheduled foreclosure sale of the Debtor’s residential

property located at 155 East 2nd Street, Apartment 2D, New York 10009 (the “Property”),

pending the Debtor’s appeal of the Court’s Memorandum Opinion and Order, dated June 26, 2026

(the “Memorandum Opinion”). (Dkt. No. 35). Secured Creditor U.S. Bank (the “Creditor”)

filed a response on July 5, 2026 (the “Response”). (Dkt. No. 42).

The Court held an emergency hearing to consider the Motion on July 6, 2026 (the

“Hearing”). Having considered the parties’ submissions, the arguments presented at the Hearing,

and the record as a whole, the Court finds that the circumstances of this case warrant a limited stay

pending appeal, subject to the conditions outlined below.1 Thus, the Motion is GRANTED IN

PART.

II. BACKGROUND

This matter arises from the Debtor’s appeal of the Court’s ruling denying the Debtor’s

request to vacate a prior order granting stay relief in favor of the Creditor. On March 23, 2026,

the Court issued an order granting the Creditor’s motion for relief from the automatic stay to permit

foreclosure of the Property under applicable state law (the “Stay Relief Order”), noting that no

1 During the Hearing, the Court indicated that it would grant the Motion subject to the

conditions stated on the record, and that this written opinion would follow.

objections had been filed by the Chapter 13 Trustee and the Debtor failed to appear at the hearing

on the stay relief motion. (Dkt. No. 23).

On April 28, 2026, the Debtor filed a motion to vacate the Stay Relief Order, arguing that

the Court should not have granted stay relief because the Creditor’s filings were based on outdated

information, because the Debtor had attempted to prosecute this Chapter 13 case in good faith, and

because the Debtor sought to cure any mortgage arrears through an amended Chapter 13 plan.

(Dkt. No. 25). On June 26, 2026, the Court issued the Memorandum Opinion denying the Debtor’s

motion to vacate the Stay Relief Order. (Dkt. No. 35). In the Memorandum Opinion, the Court

found that the Debtor had failed to satisfy his burden to demonstrate extraordinary or unusual

circumstances warranting relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) and Federal Rule of

Bankruptcy Procedure 9024. (Id.).

On June 30, 2026, the Debtor filed a notice of appeal of the Memorandum Opinion with

the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York. See In re Vargas, 26-CV-

05587-RA (S.D.N.Y. filed July 1, 2026) (the “District Court Action”). (Dkt. No. 36). On June

24, 2026, and July 1, 2026, the Debtor submitted two emergency letters to the Court alleging that

the Creditor has scheduled a foreclosure sale of the Property for July 7, 2026, at 1:15 p.m. (the

“Letters”) (See Emails from Debtor to Chambers, dated June 24, 2026 and July 1, 2026). In the

Letters, the Debtor requested an “emergency hearing to grant interim relief” preventing the

scheduled foreclosure sale “while [his] appellate rights are pursued.” (Id.).

Also on June 30, 2026, the Debtor filed the instant Motion seeking a stay pending appeal

under Rule 8007(a)(1). (Dkt. No. 37). The Debtor asserts that the Motion does not seek to

“relitigate the entire Rule 60 motion” but rather “seeks only a short preservation order so that the

appeal is not rendered practically meaningless by a sale of the Debtor’s cooperative shares,

proprietary-lease rights, and related dwelling rights before appellate review can occur.” (Id.). The

Debtor further argues that “the need for emergency relief is concrete,” given the scheduled

foreclosure sale of the Property on July 7, 2026. (Id.). If that sale goes through, the Debtor argues,

he will suffer irreparable harm, including the loss of his primary residence and potential loss of

employment because he works from home, which would materially impair his ability to fund a

feasible Chapter 13 plan. (Id.). In addition to relief under Rule 8007, the Debtor seeks (1) an

“emergency hearing before July 7, 2026”; (2) an order prohibiting the Creditor, its servicing agent

SN Servicing Corporation, or any related parties from “conduct[ing], complet[ing], accept[ing]

bids for, contract[ing] for, or transfer[ring] the collateral pending appeal”; and (3) “written

payment instructions from SN Servicing Corporation for ongoing contractual payments without

requiring the Debtor to accept a modification, loss-mitigation agreement, or other non-plan

agreement[.]” (Id.).

On July 1, 2026, the Court granted the Debtor’s request for an emergency hearing and

directed the Creditor to file a response by July 6, 2026. (Dkt. No. 40). On July 5, 2026, the

Creditor filed the Response as directed. (Dkt. No. 42). The Creditor argues that a stay pending

appeal is unwarranted because: (i) the Debtor is unlikely to succeed on the merits; (ii) the Debtor

will not suffer irreparable injury absent a stay; (iii) a stay would substantially impair the

“Creditor’s rights to exercise its state-law remedies”; (iv) and the “public interest in sound case

management in the bankruptcy process” counsels against granting a stay. (Id.). Most importantly,

the Creditor asserts that the Debtor has failed to establish irreparable injury because other options

remain available to him, including: (1) “amending his Chapter 13 plan” to address all outstanding

prepetition and post-petition arrears; (2) “requesting an injunction after [entry of the Stay Relief]

Order”; (3) “seeking loss mitigation in accordance with [the] Court’s procedures”; and (4)

“dismissing this case” and “fil[ing] a new case to impose the automatic stay” before the scheduled

foreclosure sale. (Id.).

Also on July 5, 2026, the Debtor filed an amended Chapter 13 plan (the “Amended Plan”).

(Dkt. No. 43). The Amended Plan proposes the following payments: (1) monthly plan payments

of $800.00 to the Chapter 13 Trustee for 30 months; (2) irregular payments of $7,400.00 from the

Debtor’s alleged bonus income, to be made in ten designated months from August 2026 through

November 2028; (3) monthly payments of $1,496.48 to the Creditor through SN Servicing

Corporation, to be applied against prepetition mortgage arrears of $90,721.37; and (4) monthly

payments of $289.40 to “NHS of NYC/Community First/HPD” (“NHS of NYC”), which the

Debtor identifies as holding a $12,500 prepetition secured claim but which has not filed a proof of

claim. (Id.).

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8007 governs requests for a stay pending appeal.

Rule 8007(a)(1) provides that, “[o]rdinarily, a party must move first in the bankruptcy court” for

“a stay of a judgment, order, or decree of the bankruptcy court pending appeal.” Fed. R. Bankr.

P. 8007(a)(1)(A). If relief is first sought in the bankruptcy court and denied, or if “moving first in

the bankruptcy court would be impracticable,” the movant may seek relief in the district court,

bankruptcy appellate panel, or court of appeals where the appeal is pending. See Fed. R. Bankr.

P. 8007(b).

In determining whether to grant a stay pending appeal, courts apply the four-factor test

articulated by the Supreme Court in Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418 (2009). Those factors are: (1)

“whether the stay applicant has made a strong showing that he is likely to succeed on the merits”;

(2) “whether the applicant will be irreparably injured absent a stay”; (3) “whether issuance of the

stay will substantially injure the other parties interested in the proceedings”; and (4) “where the

public interest lies.” Id. at 426 (citing Hilton v. Braunskill, 481 U.S. 770, 776 (1987)); see also

Radiance Capital Receivables Twelve LLC v. Campbell, No. 23-35668 (KYP), 2026 WL 1540685,

at *3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2026) (citing In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp., 361 B.R. 337, 346

(S.D.N.Y. 2007)).

While no single factor is dispositive, the Supreme Court has held that likelihood of success

on the merits and irreparable injury are the “most critical” factors. See Nken, 556 U.S. at 434.

“The decision as to whether or not to grant a stay of an order pending appeal lies within the sound

discretion of the court.” In re Broadway Realty I Co., LLC, 677 B.R. 786, 806 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

2026). Stays pending appeal under Rule 8007 “are the exception, not the rule, and are granted

only in limited circumstances.” See In re LATAM Airlines Grp. S.A., No. 20-11254 (JLG), 2022

WL 2657345, at *4 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 8, 2022) (quoting In re Brown, No. 18-10617, 2020 WL

3264057, at *5 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2020)). The party seeking a stay pending appeal

therefore “carries a heavy burden.” Id. (quoting In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp., 333 B.R. 649,

659 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)).

If the bankruptcy court grants a stay pending appeal, Rule 8007(c) permits the court to

“condition relief on filing a bond or other security with the bankruptcy court.” Fed. R. Bankr. P.

8007(c); see also In re Simpson, No. 17-10442, 2018 WL 1940378, at *12 (Bankr. D. Vt. Apr. 23,

2018) (citing In re Swift Aire Lines, Inc., 21 B.R. 12, 14 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1982)) (noting that the

court may, under Rule 8007(c), “condition the issuance of a stay upon furnishing a supersedeas

bond or other appropriate security”). The bankruptcy court has wide discretion to require the

posting of a bond or other security as a condition of a stay pending appeal. See In re Motors

Liquidation Co., 539 B.R. 676, 686 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing In re Overmyer, 53 B.R. 952,

955 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1985)).

IV. ANALYSIS

1. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

The Court finds that the first factor weighs against a stay pending appeal. To establish a

“a strong showing that [the movant] is likely to succeed on the merits,” Nken, 556 U.S. at 426,

“[i]t is not enough [to show] that the chance of success on the merits [is] better than negligible.”

Radiance Capital, 2026 WL 1540685, at *3. Instead, the movant must show “‘a substantial

possibility, although less than a likelihood, of success on appeal.” United States Equal Emp.

Opportunity Comm’n v. AAM Holding Corp., No. 24 MISC. 103 (LGS), 2024 WL 3710151, at *2

(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 7, 2024) (quoting Mohammed v. Reno, 309 F.3d 95, 101, n.9 (2d Cir. 2002)). The

merits factor “can be satisfied if there are ‘serious questions’ going to the merits of the dispute and

the [movant] is able to establish that the balance of hardships tips decidedly in [his] favor.” In re

A2P SMS Antitrust Litig., No. 12-CV-2656, 2014 WL 4247744, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2014)

(quoting Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598 F.3d

30, 35 (2d Cir. 2010)).

Where the subject of appeal is a court order denying Rule 60(b) relief, the movant faces a

particularly demanding burden. Because the decision as to whether to grant Rule 60(b) lies within

the bankruptcy court’s discretion, an order denying Rule 60(b) is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

See Rodriguez v. United States, No. 90 CR. 890 (PKL), 2005 WL 1398591, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. June

14, 2005) (citing Transaero, Inc. v. La Fuerza Aerea Boliviana, 162 F.3d 724, 729 (2d Cir. 1998))

(holding that the standard of review for an order granting or denying a Rule 60(b) abuse of

discretion); see also In re 8 West 58th St. Hosp., LLC, No. 14-11524 (SHL), 2015 WL 9311525,

at *3 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 21, 2015) (holding that whether to grant a Rule 60(b) motion is

committed to “the sound discretion of the trial court”). Thus, to prevail on appeal, the movant

must show that the order denying Rule 60(b) was based “on an erroneous view of the law or on a

clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384,

405 (1990); see also De La Fuente v. DCI Telecomms., Inc., 259 F.Supp.2d 250, 258 n.4 (S.D.N.Y.

2003).

The Debtor has not made that showing. The issue on appeal is whether the Court abused

its discretion in denying the Debtor’s motion to vacate the Stay Relief Order under Rule 60(b), not

whether the Court would decide the underlying Stay Relief Motion differently on a renewed

record. According to the Debtor, the Memorandum Opinion relied in part on his failure to appear

at the hearings on the Stay Relief Motion and his failure to show good cause for not acting sooner.

(Dkt. No. 37). The Debtor now alleges that he has “contemporaneous evidence,” including “call

records [of] his attempts to reach the Court,” showing that he attempted in good faith to access two

missed online hearings—on February 26, 2026, and March 19, 2026—and that he tried to obtain

the meeting information immediately before those hearings. (Id.).

But that is not enough. Even assuming the Debtor can show that he attempted to access

the hearings, that evidence would address only one aspect of the Rule 60(b) analysis: whether the

Debtor had good cause for failing to appear or act sooner. (See Memorandum Opinion, Dkt. No.

35, at 5) (citing Kotlicky v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 817 F.2d 6, 9 (2d Cir. 1987)). It does not

establish that the Stay Relief Order was entered based on a mistake of law, a clearly erroneous

assessment of the record, newly discovered evidence, misconduct by the Creditor, or any other

basis warranting Rule 60(b) relief. See Cooter, 496 U.S. at 405; see also De La Fuente, 259

F.Supp.2d at 258. Nor does it address the other grounds on which the Court denied vacatur,

including the Debtor’s failure to present highly convincing evidence, his attempt to relitigate

arguments that could have been raised earlier, and the hardship to the Creditor from further delay

in exercising state-law remedies (which is mitigated herein by the conditions placed on the stay

pending appeal, see infra Section V). (See Memorandum Opinion, Dkt. No. 35, at 5).

2. Irreparable Injury

The second factor, irreparable injury, weighs in favor of a stay pending appeal. “A showing

of probable irreparable harm is the ‘principal prerequisite’ for the issuance of a stay pursuant to

Rule 8007, and such harm must be ‘neither remote nor speculative, but actual and imminent.’” In

re Sabine Oil & Gas Corp., 548 B.R. 674, 681 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2016). To be “irreparable,” the

injury must be “certain and imminent,” meaning that it is a type “for which a monetary award does

not adequately compensate.” Ayyad-Ramallo v. Marine Terrace Assocs. LLC, No. 13-CV-7038

PKC, 2014 WL 2993448, at *4 (E.D.N.Y. July 2, 2014) (citing Wisdom Import Sales Co. v. Labatt

Brewing Co., 339 F.3d 101, 113-14 (2d Cir. 2003)). For that reason, courts have held that “the

fact that the movant’s property will be sold absent a stay does not automatically constitute

irreparable harm.” In re 473 W. End Realty Corp., 507 B.R. 496, 507 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014); see

also In re Giambrone, 600 B.R. 207, 213 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 2019) (finding that the imminent sale

of a debtor’s non-resident, investment property does not constitute irreparable harm because it can

be remedied by monetary damages). An eviction, on the other hand, may constitute irreparable

harm where “the party facing eviction also faced the real threat” of being left without a home.

Greer v. Mehiel, No. 15-CV-6119(AJN), 2016 WL 828128, at *9 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2016); see

also Wiesner v. 321 W. 16th St. Assocs., No. 00-CV-1423 (RWS), 2000 WL 1191075, at *7

(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 22, 2000) (finding irreparable injury where the party subject to eviction “could

[not] find alternative, affordable housing”).

Where the property subject to foreclosure is the movant’s primary residence, the risk of

foreclosure may constitute irreparable harm if the movant shows that the loss of property presents

an “actual and imminent” threat that cannot be adequately remedied by monetary damages. See,

e.g., G.L.A.D. Enterprises, LLC v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co. as Tr. for Am. Home Mortg. Inv.

Tr. 2006-1, No. 23-CV-3985 (CS), 2023 WL 5127835, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2023) (internal

quotations omitted) (“[W]here the property is a primary residence and the sale of that property

would have catastrophic financial and practical repercussions, including eviction, courts have

found irreparable harm.”); Buco v. Frost (In re Buco), 25-CV-05496 (MMG), 2025 WL 2070767,

at *2 (S.D.N.Y. July 23, 2025) (finding the appellant did not show irreparable harm despite the

fact that he may lose his primary residence because he did “not contend that the foreclosure sale

will leave him without a place to live”); In re Mongiello, No. 24-CV-694 (CS), 2024 WL 729865,

at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2024) (finding no irreparable harm where the debtor-appellant failed to

show a “real threat” of being left without a home, knew eviction “was reasonably imminent” for

months or longer, and “apparently filed the bankruptcy only to forestall the eviction”); In re

Magnale Farms, LLC, No. 17-61344, 2018 WL 1664849, at *5 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Apr. 3, 2018)

(finding irreparable harm where the principal of debtor LLC would lose his residence if debtor lost

the property at issue).

Here, the Court finds that the Debtor has satisfied his burden to show irreparable injury.

The scheduled foreclosure sale is not remote or speculative. According to the Debtor, the Creditor

has scheduled the foreclosure sale for July 7, 2026. (Dkt. No. 37). The Property is the Debtor’s

primary residence. (Id.). The Debtor also represents that he works from home and that loss of the

Property may result in loss of employment, which would materially impair his ability to fund a

feasible Chapter 13 plan. (Id.; see also Memorandum Opinion, Dkt. No. 35). If the foreclosure

sale proceeds before appellate review, the Debtor may lose not only his residence, but also the

practical ability to pursue the reorganization he seeks through this Chapter 13 case. Those harms

cannot be remedied by a monetary award. The second factor therefore weighs in favor of granting

a limited stay pending appeal.

3. Injury to the Other Party

The third factor, possibility of injury to the other party, weighs in favor of granting a stay

pending appeal subject to the conditions set forth infra Section V. To prevail on this factor, “the

party seeking a stay must … establish that the non-moving party or other parties will not suffer

substantial harm if the stay is granted.” G.L.A.D. Enterprises, 2023 WL 5127835, at *2 (quoting

473 W. End Realty, 507 B.R. at 507). “In other words, the moving party must show that the balance

of harms tips in favor of granting the stay.” Adelphia, 361 B.R. at 349.

The Court finds that the balance of harms favors granting a limited stay. Here, the Debtor

seeks narrow relief. He “does not seek to eliminate the Movant’s debt, discharge any lien, or

permanently bar state-law remedies” and “seeks only to prevent an irreversible sale while appellate

review is pursued on an emergency basis.” (Dkt. No. 37). The requested stay merely preserves

the status quo (with conditions) pending appeal without altering the Creditor’s claim, lien rights,

or ability to pursue foreclosure if the stay is later lifted. (Id.). As explained above, the injury to

the Debtor absent a stay is likely to be substantial and irreparable. If the scheduled foreclosure

sale proceeds before the District Court resolves the appeal, the Debtor may lose his primary

residence and potentially lose his employment, which may materially impair his ability to fund a

feasible Chapter 13 plan.

By contrast, the only identifiable harm to the Creditor from a stay (subject to the conditions

set forth herein) is a temporary delay in conducting the scheduled foreclosure sale. The Court

finds that delay, in the context of this case, is unlikely to prejudice the Creditor and does not

amount to substantial harm.

Furthermore, nothing in the record shows that the Property is rapidly deteriorating in value,

that the Creditor’s collateral position will materially worsen during the pendency of a limited stay,

or that any other circumstance exists suggesting that postponing the scheduled foreclosure sale

would substantially harm the Creditor. Because the requested stay is temporary and narrow, any

prejudice to the Creditor from a short delay is outweighed by the risk of irreparable harm to the

Debtor if the scheduled foreclosure sale proceeds before appellate review. The third factor

therefore weighs in favor of granting a stay pending appeal.

4. Public Interest

Finally, the Court finds that the public interest weighs neither in favor nor against granting

a stay pending appeal. In general, “[c]ourts recognize that the public interest disfavors stays

because the public interest favors the expedient administration of the bankruptcy proceedings.”

LATAM Airlines, 2022 WL 2657345, at *11; see also In re GOL Linhas Aereas Inteligentes S.A.,

No. 25-CV-4610 (DLC), 2025 WL 1591830, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. June 5, 2025) (“The public interest

lies in the expedient administration of bankruptcy proceedings.”). Relatedly, the judicial system

has a strong interest in preserving the “enforceability and finality of a [court] order.” 29 Main St.

LLC v. United States Postal Serv., No. 3:19-CV-2003 (SRU), 2022 WL 2374132, at *4 (D. Conn.

Apr. 22, 2022) (citing Found. Capital Res., Inc. v. Prayer Tabernacle Church of Love, Inc., No.

3:17-CV-00135 (JAM), 2021 WL 4901654, at *5 (D. Conn. Oct. 21, 2021)); see also United States

Sec. & Exch. Comm’n v. Mango Labs, LLC, No. 1:24-CV-07334 (JLR), 2026 WL 161024, at *2

(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 21, 2026) (quoting United States v. Cirami, 563 F.2d 26, 33 (2d Cir. 1977)) (“The

‘finality of judgments’ is ‘[v]ery high among the interests’ of the judicial system.”); In re Eletson

Holdings Inc., No. 23-10322 (JPM), 2025 WL 726248, at *12 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 6, 2025)

(noting that “there is a strong public interest in preserving finality of confirmed, chapter 11 plans”).

The policy favoring expedient judicial administration and finality of judgments, however,

must also be balanced against the public interest in “preserving a party’s access to appellate

review.” 29 Main St. LLC, 2022 WL 2374132, at *4. That interest is particularly salient where

“it can be done without undue prejudice to the side that won below.” Motors Liquidation, 539 at

686.

Here, the Debtor argues that “public interest favors orderly appellate review, meaningful

access to the courts for pro se debtors, and preservation of Chapter 13 cure rights where a debtor

seeks to pay allowed arrears rather than avoid them.” (Dkt. No. 37). The Court agrees that the

public interest supports preserving meaningful appellate review, particular where the scheduled

foreclosure sale may occur before the District Court has an opportunity to consider the appeal.

That interest is reinforced by the absence of evidence in the record that the Debtor filed this

Chapter 13 case to “abuse the bankruptcy process” or “to frustrate and delay the creditor from

exercising its legitimate rights.” In re Melton, No. 8-11-70984-REG, 2011 WL 1600506, at *5

(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Apr. 27, 2011) (finding that the public interest counseled against a stay pending

appeal where the debtor had “ten prior bankruptcy filings” and “employed a scheme intended to

frustrate and delay the creditor from exercising its legitimate rights”); see also Green Point Bank

v. Treston, 188 B.R. 9, 12 (S.D.N.Y. 1995) (finding that the public interest weighed against

granting a stay pending appeal where the debtor-appellant “had repeatedly failed to meet his

obligations under the bankruptcy law[s] and could not be permitted to use the protection of the

automatic stay to put off indefinitely the foreclosure of his property”).

At the same time, the Court recognizes the competing public interest in preserving the

finality and enforceability of the Stay Relief Order and the Memorandum Opinion. See 29 Main

St. LLC, 2022 WL 2374132, at *4; see also Motors Liquidation, 539 B.R. at 686. Balancing those

competing considerations, the Court finds that public interest factor is neutral.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the first Nken factor weighs against a stay,

the second and third factors weigh in favor of a stay, and the fourth factor is neutral. Although the

Nken factors do not all point in the same direction, the balance of harms favors preserving the

status quo pending appellate review subject to the conditions set forth below. Considering the

totality of the circumstances, including the imminent foreclosure sale, the risk of irreparable injury

to the Debtor, the limited prejudice to the Creditor from a temporary stay, and the importance of

preserving meaningful appellate review, the Court concludes that limited relief under Rule 8007

is warranted.

Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED that:

1. The Motion is GRANTED on a limited, interim basis, subject to the Debtor’s

compliance with the following conditions (as set forth during the Hearing):

a. The Debtor shall file and serve, no later than Monday, July 20, 2026, at 11:59

p.m. (Eastern Time), a motion for stay pending appeal in the District Court

Action;

b. The Debtor shall file, no later than Monday, July 20, 2026, at 11:59 p.m.

(Eastern Time), an amended Schedule I with updated proof of current monthly

income from all sources; and

c. As security for continuation of the stay pursuant to Rule 8007(c), the Debtor

shall make the following payments (as provided for in the Amended Plan and

as set forth by the Court during the Hearing):

i. A lump sum payment of $4,489.44 to SN Servicing Corporation or the

Chapter 13 Trustee, equal to three months of post-petition arrears, due

on or before July 15, 2026;

ii. Monthly plan payments of $800.00 to the Chapter 13 Trustee,

commencing August 1, 2026, and continuing on the first day of each

month thereafter;

iii. Monthly payments of $1,496.78 to SN Servicing Corporation or the

Chapter 13 Trustee, to be applied toward post-petition mortgage

payments, commencing August 1, 2026, and continuing on the first day

of each month thereafter;

iv. Monthly payments of $289.40 to NHS of NYC or the Chapter 13

Trustee, commencing August 1, 2026, and continuing on the first day of

each month thereafter; and

v. Payments of $7,400.00 to the Chapter 13 Trustee, commencing August

1, 2026 and proceeding under the irregular payment schedule set forth

in the Amended Plan.

2. If the Debtor timely satisfies the conditions set forth in paragraphs 1(a) through (c)

above, the stay granted herein shall remain in effect until the District Court has the

opportunity to rule on the Debtor’s request for stay pending appeal.

3. If the Debtor fails to timely satisfy any of the conditions set forth in paragraphs 1(a)

through (c) above, the stay granted herein shall terminate and the Creditor may submit

an order to terminate the stay, subject to any ruling on a stay pending appeal from the

District Court.

4. Except to the limited extent expressly provided herein, nothing in this Order vacates,

modifies, or otherwise alters the Stay Relief Order or the Memorandum Opinion.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 6, 2026

New York, New York /s/ John P. Mastando III .

HONORABLE JOHN P. MASTANDO III

UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE