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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 JOHN DOE, Case No. 1:25-cv-01372-CDB (HC)

12 Petitioner, ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S MOTION

FOR AWARD OF ATTORNEYS’ FEES

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v. PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 2412

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CHRISTOPHER CHESTNUT, et al., (Doc. 28)

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Respondents.

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17 Petitioner John Doe (“Petitioner”), formerly a federal detainee proceeding by counsel,

18 initiated this action with the filing of a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

19 2241.1

20 Pending before the Court is the motion of Petitioner’s counsel for the award of attorneys’

21 fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (“EAJA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2412. (Doc. 28).

22 Respondents Christopher Chestnut (Warden of the California City Detention Center), Sergio

23 Albarran (Field Officer Director of the Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”)), Todd M.

24 Lyons (formerly Acting Director of ICE), Kristi Noem (formerly Secretary of the Department of

25 Homeland Security), and Pamela Bondi (formerly Attorney General of the United States)

26 (collectively, “Respondents”), filed an opposition (Doc. 29) and Petitioner replied (Doc. 30).

27 1 Both parties have consented to the jurisdiction of a U.S. magistrate judge for all

proceedings in this action, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1). (Doc. 11).

1 I. Relevant Background

2 Following the parties’ briefing, on November 26, 2025, the Court granted in part

3 Petitioner’s motion for preliminary injunction after finding that Petitioner was likely to prevail on

4 his claim that his immigration detention by Respondents violated his procedural due process rights

5 under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See (Doc. 20 at 2-5). In compliance with the

6 preliminary injunction, on December 10, 2025, Petitioner was provided a bond hearing before an

7 immigration judge and was released on bond. (Doc. 22 at 2).

8 On the merits of the petition, the parties largely rested on their arguments considered in

9 connection with Petitioner’s motion for preliminary injunction. The Court granted Petitioner’s

10 second amended petition for writ of habeas corpus on January 26, 2026. (Doc. 26).

11 II. Governing Authority

12 The EAJA provides for an award of attorney fees and costs to private litigants who prevail

13 “in any civil action (other than cases sounding in tort)” against the United States and timely file a

14 petition for fees. 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A). Under the EAJA, a court shall award attorney fees to

15 the prevailing party unless it finds the government’s position was “substantially justified or that

16 special circumstances make such an award unjust.” 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(A).

17 III. Discussion

18 Respondents oppose Petitioner’s motion for award of attorney’s fees and costs on three

19 grounds: (1) that the EAJA does not permit the award of attorneys’ fees here because the underlying

20 habeas corpus proceeding is not a “civil action”; (2) that the EAJA does not permit the award of

21 attorneys’ fees here because Respondents’ position was “substantially justified”; (3) that the

22 attorneys’ fees Petitioner seeks to recoup are excessive.

23 A. Whether This Proceeding is a “Civil Action” Under the EAJA

24 Respondents note that the EAJA expressly limits its provision for an award of attorneys’

25 fees and expenses to a party that prevails against the United States in a “civil action.” Respondents

26 argue that the EAJA’s use of this language constitutes only a “partial” waiver of sovereign

27 immunity that must be strictly interpreted in favor of the United Stages. (Doc. 29 at 12-13, citing

1 action challenging one’s immigration detention is not “unambiguously” a “civil action,” the EAJA

2 does not operate to waive sovereign immunity.

3 In support of this argument, Respondents note that the Supreme Court has found that a

4 habeas proceeding does not constitute a “civil action” as that term is used in 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e).

5 Id. (citing Schlanger v. Seamans, 401 U.S. 487, 490 n.4 (1971)). This argument is unconvincing

6 for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court in Schlanger relied on the legislative history of the

7 passage of § 1391(e), the statute governing nationwide service of process in a “civil action,” and

8 concluded it did not support a finding that Congress intended to expand habeas jurisdiction through

9 inclusion of such cases in its “civil action” ambit. Naturally, that legislative history does not bear

10 on whether the usage of “civil action” in the EAJA includes habeas proceedings. Second, the fact

11 that the Supreme Court has found a habeas proceeding does not constitute a “civil action” as that

12 term is used in one statute does not compel a finding that a habeas proceeding cannot constitute a

13 civil action for purposes of a different statute – particular where, as Respondents acknowledge, the

14 Supreme Court has found that habeas corpus proceedings are “technically ‘civil’” in general.

15 Schlanger, 401 U.S. at 490 n.4.

16 Respondents acknowledge that the Ninth Circuit has held that EAJA fees are available in

17 the context of some immigration habeas actions. (Doc. 29 at 18) (citing In re Hill, 775 F.2d 1037,

18 1040-41 (9th Cir. 1985)). However, Respondents argue the Ninth Circuit did not address or

19 expressly resolve in Hill whether an immigration habeas action is a “civil action;” rather, instead

20 of interpreting the statutory text, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that the award of fees in that case was

21 consistent with EAJA’s “structure and purpose.”

22 Respondents argue that more recent decisions by the Fourth and Fifth Circuit2 finding that

23 habeas proceedings do not unambiguously fit EAJA’s “civil action” definition are more faithful to

24 the Supreme Court’s command to interpret a statute’s ambiguous terms in favor of immunity. (Doc.

25 29 at 12, 17) (citing F.A.A. v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 284, 290 (2012)).

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1 Both the Third Circuit and Tenth Circuit recently have held that the EAJA “unambiguously”

2 encompasses habeas challenges to immigration detention, expressly finding that such proceedings

3 qualify as “civil actions” and that, accordingly, prevailing petitioners are eligible for an award of

4 fees. See Michelin v. Warden, 169 F.4th 418, 424-25 (3d Cir. 2026), pet. for rehrn’g by panel en

5 banc den’d, 169 F.4th 160 (3d Cir. 2026); Daley v. Ceja, 158 F.4th 1152, 1166 (10th Cir. 2025).

6 In reaching this conclusion, both courts relied, in part, on the EAJA’s use of the phrase “any civil

7 action (other than cases sounding tort)” [emphasis added] as the qualifying language entitling a

8 prevailing party to seek an award of fees.

9 In light of the Supreme Court’s characterization in Schlanger that habeas corpus

10 proceedings are “technically ‘civil’” actions, coupled with EAJA’s applicability to “any” civil

11 action except an expressly identified category of cases (e.g., “other than cases sounding in tort”),

12 which category unquestionably does not apply here, the Court agrees that the better interpretation

13 of the term “any civil action” in the EAJA is that it unambiguously includes habeas proceedings

14 challenging immigration detention.

15 B. Whether Respondents’ Position was “Substantially Justified” Under the EAJA

16 Respondents argue Petitioner should not be awarded fees under the EAJA because the

17 government’s positions in this litigation were substantially justified.

18 To defeat a prevailing party’s claim to attorney’s fees under the EAJA, the government

19 bears the burden of showing that its position was substantially justified. Thangaraja v. Gonzales,

20 428 F.3d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Gonzales v. Free Speech Coal., 408 F.3d 613, 618 (9th

21 Cir. 2005)). To be substantially justified, the government’s position must have a “reasonable basis”

22 in law and fact. Id. (citations omitted). “When evaluating the government’s ‘position’ under the

23 EAJA, [courts] consider both the government’s litigation position and the ‘action or failure to act

24 by the agency upon which the civil action is based.’” Ibrahim v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Security,

25 912 F.3d 1147, 1168 (9th Cir. 2019) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2412(d)(1)(B)).

26 Respondents maintain in opposition to Petitioner’s fee motion that their prelitigation and

27 litigation positions were substantially justified given that Petitioner’s detention was pursuant to a

1 that premise is true, Respondents continue to unreasonably discount the applicability of the Due

2 Process Clause under the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution when, as here, immigration

3 authorities seek to maintain custody of a noncitizen without any determinate endpoint. In

4 Respondents’ characterization of governing precedent, § 1225(b)’s provision for mandatory

5 detention pending completion of removal proceedings entirely displaces applicability of the Due

6 Process Clause such that indeterminate detention is not only warranted, but required. Thus,

7 Respondents argued here that Petitioner has no liberty interest that could implicate a due process

8 right to release because he never was lawfully admitted to the United States. See (Doc. 15 at 8)

9 (arguing “aliens who have not legally entered the country are only entitled to the due process that

10 Congress has statutorily created.” ); see also (Doc 21 at 4-5) (same).

11 But in making this argument, Respondents have never attempted to reconcile that after an

12 immigration judge ordered Petitioner be removed, Respondents released him, implicitly finding

13 that his release presented neither flight nor danger risks. See 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8) (“Any officer

14 authorized to issue a warrant of arrest may, in the officer’s discretion, release an alien not described

15 in section 236(c)(1) of the Act, under the conditions at section 236(a)(2) and (3) of the Act; provided

16 that the alien must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer that such release would not pose a

17 danger to property or persons, and that the alien is likely to appear for any future proceeding.”).

18 Nor do Respondents refute or grapple with the fact that for the approximately three- and one-half

19 years following his release, Petitioner successfully complied with all conditions of his supervised

20 release, including the wearing of a geolocation monitoring device until immigration authorities

21 removed it (further confirming their continuing position that Petitioner was not a flight risk). E.g.,

22 Tzafir v. Blanche, No. 25-cv-02126-JHC, 2026 WL 1413606, at *2 (W.D. Wash. May 20, 2026)

23 (finding government’s position not substantially justified where petitioner was ordered removed

24 but then released on an order of supervision, complied with all conditions of release for years, and

25 eventually was rearrested; reasoning, “when revoking a noncitizen’s OSUP, the government must

26 articulate changed circumstances in the noncitizen’s case”).

27 In addressing a related provision of the INA governing mandatory detention of certain

1 as-applied challenges—that is, constitutional challenges to applications of the statute as we have

2 now read it.” Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392, 420 (2019) (interpreting § 1226(c)). The most

3 reasonable interpretation of Preap is that immigration detainees retain procedural due process rights

4 notwithstanding the operation of a statute providing for a detainee’s mandatory detention. Indeed,

5 this interpretation – that statutory detention regimes are not to the exclusion of and do not displace

6 a detainee’s rights under the U.S. Constitution – is consistent with the Supreme Court’s earlier

7 holdings acknowledging this principle. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693, 695 (2001)

8 (holding that the government’s statutory authority to detain noncitizens pending removal “is subject

9 to important constitutional limitations” because due process applies to anyone in the United States,

10 “whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent”); Shaughnessy v. United

11 States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 212 (1953) (reiterating that a noncitizen who successfully enters

12 the United States and afterwards is subject to removal proceedings retains due process rights)

13 (citing cases), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Dep’t of Homeland Security v.

14 Thuaissigiam, 591 U.S. 103, 135 (2020). In light of this authority and the circumstances set forth

15 above, Respondents’ contention that the Due Process Clause does not operate when an immigration

16 detention statute applies is not substantially justified because such a position does not have a

17 “reasonable basis” in law and fact. Thangaraja, 428 F.3d at 874.

18 C. Whether Petitioner’s Fee Request is Reasonable

19 In determining what constitutes “reasonable” attorney’s fees under the EAJA, “the district

20 court must apply the hybrid approach adopted in Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983).”

21 United States v. $12,248 U.S. Currency, 957 F.2d 1513, 1520 (9th Cir. 1991). “First, the district

22 court must calculate the lodestar amount by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended

23 on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate. [citation omitted]. Next, in rare instances, the court

24 may increase or reduce the presumptively reasonable lodestar fee on the basis of factors” that are

25 not captured by the lodestar calculation. Id.

26 The Ninth Circuit maintains a list of the statutory maximum hourly rates authorized by the

27 EAJA, adjusted for increases in the cost of living, on its website. See Thangaraja v. Gonzales, 428

1 available at https://www.ca9.uscourts.gov/attorneys/statutory-maximum-rates/ (last visited May

2 22, 2026). This maximum rate controls unless the district court finds that a “special factor”

3 warrants a higher rate (Sorenson v. Mink, 239 F.3d 1140, 1145 (9th Cir. 2001)), such as “where the

4 quality of representation resulted in a degree of success beyond what would be reasonably expected

5 at that rate.” Int’l Woodworkers of Am., AFL-CIO, Local 3-98 v. Donovan, 792 F.2d 762, 766 (9th

6 Cir. 1985).

7 Here, while Respondents do not challenge the hourly rates counsel for Petitioner uses in his

8 lodestar calculation (a rate that is set at the statutory maximum, $258.46) and do not refute counsel’s

9 declaration that this amount is below market rate (Doc. 28-2 ¶ 8; Doc. 28-3 ¶ 6), Respondents argue

10 the Court should reduce significantly the total fee and cost award Petitioner seeks based on (1) the

11 excessiveness of hours worked, (2) the overstaffing of multiple attorneys, (3) the duplicative nature

12 of certain hours identified, (4) the purported recovery for clerical tasks, and (5) vagueness of billing

13 records.

14 Respondents’ arguments largely are conclusory. Thus, for instance, although Respondents

15 assert that “[e]ven a cursory review reveals that Petitioner’s billing is replete with duplicative and

16 excessive entries” (Doc. 29 at 25), they cite no such examples. Similarly, Respondents contend

17 that “Petitioner’s time entries that are vague should be eliminated” (Doc. 29 at 27), but they fail to

18 cite any such entries. And they likewise argue that the Court should decline to award fees for

19 clerical tasks, but again, purport to require the Court to accomplish this without any hint by

20 Respondents of any specific clerical task.

21 According to their declarations, counsel for Petitioner spent approximately 142 hours on

22 tasks associated with litigating the merits of the case and approximately 19 hours on their fee

23 motion papers. Additionally, counsel for Petitioner seeks to recover for approximately 4 hours of

24 time spent by their paralegal on the litigation.

25 Petitioner’s counsel team includes three attorneys. Two attorneys billed approximately 33.4

26 hours on the drafting, revising, and editing of the original habeas petition. Two attorneys billed

27 approximately 33.4 hours on the drafting and revising of papers filed in support of Petitioner’s

1 preliminary injunction reply papers. In addition, a third attorney billed approximately 16 hours in

2 connection with editing the petitions and preliminary injunction papers.

3 The billing records of Petitioner’s counsel lack any detail that would permit the Court to

4 evaluate whether and the extent to which the multiple attorneys’ work on the same project was

5 duplicative. For the sake of comparison, in an out-of-district immigration habeas case involving a

6 similar amount of litigation as this action – the preparation and filing of a petition and motion by

7 the petitioner to proceed by pseudonym, the litigation and hearing on the petitioner’s application

8 for temporary restraining order, and the petitioner’s EAJA fee motion – the petitioner’s three

9 attorneys billed 50.55 hours. See S.F. v. Bostock, No. 3:25-cv-01084-MTK2026 WL 1230044, at

10 *4-6 (D. Or. May 5, 2026). The undersigned’s experience presiding over a significant number of

11 immigration related habeas corpus cases, coupled with the hours found reasonable by the S.F. court

12 in a similarly postured action, suggest that counsel’s expenditure in this action of more than 161

13 hours is excessive and, based on a review of the vague billing entries noted above, undoubtedly the

14 product in part of duplicative efforts.

15 In light of this, the Court will reduce by 30% the hours billed by multiple attorneys on any

16 one of the three tasks noted above for which the vague billing entries do not corroborate the

17 reasonableness of the hours expended (e.g., 85.8 hours for (1) drafting, revising, and editing of the

18 original habeas petition; (2) drafting and revising of papers filed in support of Petitioner’s motion

19 for preliminary injunction; and (3) drafting the preliminary injunction reply papers), resulting in a

20 reduction of 25.74 hours. Additionally, the Court will exclude from the lodestar two billing record

21 entries, totaling 4.5 hours, for which the associated work description is fatally vague. See (Doc.

22 28-3 at 6) (10/6/25 entry for 1 hour described as “motion”; 10/18/25 entry for 3.5 hours described

23 as “same” where the entries immediate above reflect work by a different attorney).

24 Further, although counsel attests that his firm charges $250 per hour for paralegal rates

25 (Doc. 28-3 ¶ 6), counsel has not sufficiently established that such a rate is prevailing in the local

26 community and in line for similar services by paralegals of “reasonably comparable skill,

27 experience and reputation.” See Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895 & n.11 (1984). Thus, the

1 | found to be the prevailing paralegal rate - $150 hour. See Saesee v. Bisignano, No. 1:21-cv-01562-

2 | SKO, 2026 WL 1398969, at *3 (E.D. Cal. May 19, 2026); see also Denepita v. Colvin, No. 1:13-

3 | cv-00846-JLT, 2014 WL 5242496, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2014) (reducing paralegal rate where

4 | Plaintiff failed to support requested rate because he “provided no information regarding the

5 || experience, skills, or reputations of the paralegals who worked on this matter’’).

6 In sum, largely because Respondents advance no particularized attacks against any specific

7 | or grouping of allegedly excessive, duplicative, or vague billing entries, the Court finds as follows:

8 (1) Total attorney hours claimed: 161.3 (Doc. 28-1 at 11; Doc. 30 at 8) = $42,800.98

9 (2) Less hours deemed duplicative/inadequately documented: -30.24

10 (3) Total adjusted attorney hours deemed reasonable: 131.06 * $258.46/hr. = $33,873.77

11 (4) Total paralegal hours deemed reasonable: 4.3 * $150.00/hr. = $645.00

12 | IV. Conclusion and Order

13 Accordingly, it is HEREBY ORDERED that:

14 1. Petitioner’s motion for the award of attorneys’ fees (Doc. 28) is GRANTED IN PART;

15 2. Respondents shall remit to counsel for Petitioner attorneys’ fees and expenses in the

16 amount of $34,518.77; and

17 3. This award shall be made payable to Petitioner, but if the Department of the Treasury

18 determines that Petitioner does not owe a federal debt, then Respondents shall cause

19 the payment of attorneys’ fees and expenses to be made directly to Petitioner’s counsel.

20 | IT IS SO ORDERED.

71 Dated: _ May 22, 2026 | Wr bY

2 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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