The opinion
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7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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10 LILIA SULEMA GONZALEZ No. 2:26-cv-00375-JAM-CSK
AISPURO, an individual,
11
Plaintiff,
12 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S
v. MOTION TO REMAND
13
GENERAL MOTORS LLC, a
14 Delaware Limited Liability
Company; and DOES 1 through
15 10, inclusive,
16 Defendants.
17
18 Plaintiff, who brings state-law claims related to her
19 purchase of a defective vehicle, moves to remand this matter to
20 state court arguing the Court lacks diversity jurisdiction
21 because the amount in controversy is not met. Defendant, who
22 manufactured and distributed Plaintiff’s car, opposes remand,
23 arguing it has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the
24 $75,000 amount in controversy is satisfied here.
25 As discussed further below, the Court finds that the amount
26 in controversy is satisfied and that the Court has diversity
27 jurisdiction over this matter. Thus, Plaintiff’s Motion to
28 Remand is denied.
1 I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
2 In 2022, Plaintiff Lilia Sulema Gonzalez Aispuro purchased a
3 2023 Chevrolet TrailBlazer (the “Vehicle”). Compl. ¶¶ 6, 9, ECF
4 No. 1-1. The Vehicle’s transmission was defective, and Defendant
5 General Motors LLC, who manufactured and distributed the Vehicle,
6 failed to fulfill its warranty obligations to adequately repair
7 the Vehicle after several opportunities to do so. Id. ¶¶ 9, 12—
8 14. Thus, Plaintiff initiated this lawsuit on November 6, 2025,
9 in the Sacramento County Superior Court, bringing four causes of
10 action under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (the “Song-
11 Beverly Act”) for breach of the implied warranty of
12 merchantability and violations of California Civil Code sections
13 1793.2(a)(3), 1793.2(b), and 1793.2(d). Id. ¶¶ 8–33. Plaintiff
14 seeks actual damages, a civil penalty in the amount of two times
15 Plaintiff’s actual damages, and attorney’s fees. Id. ¶¶ 17, 24,
16 28, and Prayer.
17 Defendant removed the matter to this Court on February 11,
18 2026, based on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441, and 1446, alleging the
19 parties are diverse and the amount in controversy exceeds
20 $75,000. Notice Removal, ECF No. 1. Plaintiff filed the pending
21 Motion to Remand on March 20, 2026. See Mem. P. & A. Supp. Pl.’s
22 Mot. Remand (“Mot.”), ECF No. 9. This matter is fully briefed
23 and was submitted without oral argument under Local Rule 230(g).
24 See Def.’s Opp’n (“Opp’n”), ECF No. 17; Pl.’s Reply (“Reply”),
25 ECF No. 19; ECF No. 20.
26 II. LEGAL STANDARD
27 Federal district courts have subject matter jurisdiction
28 over civil actions between parties with diverse citizenship
1 where “the amount in controversy exceeds the sum of or value of
2 $75,000, exclusive of interests and costs.” 28 U.S.C.
3 § 1332(a). Such an action may be removed to federal court under
4 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). It is well-established that “[r]emoval
5 statutes are strictly construed, and any doubt about the right
6 of removal requires resolution in favor of remand. This rule of
7 narrow construction both recognizes the limited jurisdiction of
8 federal courts and protect[s] the jurisdiction of state courts.”
9 Casola v. Dexcom, Inc., 98 F.4th 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2024)
10 (citing and quoting Moore-Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553
11 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009) and Harris v. Bankers Life &
12 Cas. Co., 425 F.3d 689, 698 (9th Cir. 2005)) (internal citations
13 and quotations removed).
14 “The presumption against removal means that the defendant
15 always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.”
16 Casola, 98 F.3d at 954 (quoting Moore-Thomas, 553 F.3d at 1244)
17 (quotations removed). Indeed, when removal is challenged based
18 on whether the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, “‘the
19 removing defendant bears the burden of establishing, by a
20 preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in controversy
21 exceeds’ the jurisdictional threshold,” unless it is clear from
22 the face of the state court complaint. Urbino v. Orkin Servs.
23 of Cal., Inc., 726 F.3d 1118, 1121-22 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting
24 Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 404 (9th Cir.
25 1996)). The Ninth Circuit defines the “amount in controversy as
26 the amount at stake in the underlying litigation, [that is,] any
27 result of the litigation, excluding interests and costs, that
28 entails a payment by the defendant. This amount includes, inter
1 alia, damages (compensatory, punitive, or otherwise) and
2 the cost of complying with an injunction, as well as attorneys’
3 fees awarded under fee shifting statutes.” Gonzales v. CarMax
4 Auto Superstores, LLC, 840 F.3d 644, 648-49 (9th Cir. 2016)
5 (citing and quoting Theis Rsch., Inc. v. Brown & Bain, 400 F.3d
6 659, 662 (9th Cir. 2005) and Guglielmino v. McKee Foods Corp.,
7 506 F.3d 696, 701 (9th Cir. 2007) (internal quotations,
8 citations, and brackets removed)).
9 In assessing whether the defendant has met its burden, a
10 court “may consider allegations in the complaint and in the
11 notice of removal, as well as summary-judgment-type evidence
12 relevant to the amount in controversy.” Chavez v. JPMorgan
13 Chase & Co., 888 F.3d 413, 416 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Kroske v.
14 U.S. Bank Corp., 432 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2005)).
15 III. OPINION
16 A. Sanctions
17 As a preliminary matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s
18 Reply is 10 pages in violation of this Court’s Order re Filing
19 Requirements that “reply memoranda are limited to five (5)
20 pages.” ECF No. 14-2. Thus, the Court imposes monetary
21 sanctions of $50.00 per page, or $250.00, against Plaintiff.
22 B. Amount in Controversy
23 Here, Plaintiff does not dispute that the Parties are
24 diverse. See generally Mot. Rather, Plaintiff contests
25 jurisdiction by claiming Defendant has not established the
26 amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. Id. The Parties agree
27 that it is not apparent from the face of the Complaint that the
28 amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. See Mot. at 5; Opp’n at
1 1–2. Accordingly, Defendant bears the burden of establishing by
2 a preponderance that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.
3 See Urbino, 726 F.3d 1118. Defendant contends that the amount
4 in controversy is satisfied by a combination of actual damages,
5 civil penalties, and attorney’s fees. Notice Removal at 4–6;
6 Opp’n at 2–8. The Court addresses all three in turn below.
7 1. Actual Damages
8 Plaintiff here seeks actual damages under the Song-Beverly
9 Act, which are “equal to the actual price paid or payable by the
10 buyer,” minus the reduction in value “directly attributable to
11 use by the buyer prior to the time the buyer first delivered the
12 vehicle to the manufacturer or distributor, or its authorized
13 service and repair facility for correction of the problem that
14 gave rise to the nonconformity.” Cal. Civ. Code
15 § 1793.2(d)(2)(B)-(C). This reduction, often called the
16 “mileage offset,” is derived by determining the first relevant
17 repair, then taking the number of miles driven before that,
18 dividing by 120,000, and multiplying that figure by the purchase
19 price of the vehicle. Canesco v. Ford Motor Co., 570 F. Supp.
20 3d 872, 898 (S.D. Cal. 2021); see also Wickstrum v. FCA USA LLC,
21 No. 3:20-CV-00336-L-JLB, 2021 WL 532257, at *1-2 n.2 (S.D. Cal.
22 Feb. 12, 2021) (“The formula to calculate the mileage offset is:
23 (number of miles driven prior to first repair attempt) /
24 (120,000 miles) x (vehicle purchase price).” (citing Cal. Civ.
25 Code § 1793.2(d)(2)(C))). When calculating actual damages for
26 the purpose of determining the amount in controversy, the Court
27 must include the mileage offset. See D’Amico v. Ford Motor Co.,
28 No. CV 20-2985-CJC (JCx), 2020 WL 2614610, at *2-3 (C.D. Cal.
1 May 21, 2020) (collecting cases); Schneider v. Ford Motor Co.,
2 756 F. App’x 699, 701 n.3 (9th Cir. 2018).
3 A vehicle’s purchase price encompasses the entire sale price
4 of the vehicle, including not just the vehicle’s “cash price,”
5 but also any finance charges, sales or use tax, license fees,
6 registration fees, and other incidental fees. Canesco, 570 F.
7 Supp. 3d at 892 (surveying cases); see also Cal. Civ. Code
8 § 1793.2(d)(2)(B). However, negative equity, a manufacturer’s
9 rebate, any third party sold optional equipment, and unpaid
10 financing are excluded from the price by statute. See Perez v.
11 Gen. Motors LLC, No. 2:25-cv-09684-MCS-PVC, 2025 WL 3171905, at
12 *2 (C.D. Cal.); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 871.27(b)-(d), (f); see
13 also Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 871.20 (indicating that section
14 871.27 applies to Song-Beverly claims).
15 Defendant has provided the Vehicle’s Retail Installment
16 Sales Contract (“RISC”), as well as the Repair Order Summary
17 (“ROS”), to calculate damages. See Stafford Decl., Ex. A, ECF
18 No. 17-2 (RISC); Stafford Decl., Ex. B, ECF No. 17-3 (ROS).
19 Defendant calculates actual damages at approximately $36,536.82.
20 Opp’n at 3. Having reviewed Defendant’s calculations and
21 evidence, the Court largely agrees with this calculation. The
22 RISC reflects that Plaintiff agreed to pay $39,824.92 in total
23 for the Vehicle, including a $5,500.00 downpayment, $30,318.48
24 financed, and a $4,006.44 finance charge. Monthly payments of
25 $408.63 were to begin on September 8, 2022, and carry through to
26 August 8, 2029. However, Plaintiff’s initial disclosures
27 apparently indicate that Plaintiff paid off the loan before
28 filing suit, “as the ending balance was $0 on May 31, 2025.” Id.
1 Thus, Plaintiff is entitled to recover the full purchase price
2 paid, $39,824.92, minus any statutory deductions.
3 As for statutory deductions, the RISC shows the following
4 amounts are included in the $39,824.92 total: $199.00 for an
5 optional “Portfolio Etch” theft deterrent device; $1,601.00 for
6 an optional “Portfolio Maint” service contract; and $500 for a
7 manufacturer’s rebate. The Court agrees with Defendant that
8 those items, which total $2,300, must be deducted from the
9 purchase price. See Opp’n at 3; Cal. Civ. Code § 1793.2(d)(2)(B)
10 (excluding nonmanufacturer items installed by a dealer); see also
11 Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 871.27(b) (“The defendant is entitled to
12 an offset in the calculation of the actual price paid or payable
13 for optional equipment, service contracts, or GAP financing
14 purchased by the plaintiff during the motor vehicle purchase or
15 lease transaction from third parties.”); id. § 871.27(d)
16 (“Noncash credits provided by the manufacturer as a form of down-
17 payment assistance, typically referred to as a manufacturer’s
18 rebate, shall not be included in the calculation of the actual
19 price paid or payable . . . .”). Thus, the adjusted purchase
20 price is $37,524.92.
21 Turning to the mileage offset, when Plaintiff purchased the
22 Vehicle, there were 5 miles on the odometer. Opp’n at 3. On or
23 about November 29, 2022, with 3,861 miles on the odometer,
24 Plaintiff presented the Vehicle to a dealership for repair of the
25 defect claim she appears to be pursuing here. See id.; see also
26 Stafford Decl. ¶ 3, ECF No. 17-1. Thus, Plaintiff’s use of the
27 Vehicle prior to the discovery of the alleged defect was 3,856
28 miles. Dividing that number by 120,000, and multiplying that
1 number by the purchase price, $37,524.92, yields an estimated
2 mileage offset of $1,205.80.
3 Defendant reaches a slightly different mileage offset
4 number, $988.10, by using the cash price of the Vehicle,
5 $30,750.00, rather than the adjusted purchase price, $37,524.92,
6 in its mileage offset calculation. See Opp’n at 3. This is
7 incorrect. California Civil Code section 1793.2(d)(2)(C) clearly
8 provides that the mileage offset shall be determined by using the
9 “actual price of the new motor vehicle paid or payable by the
10 buyer,” not the cash price. Thus, the Court will use $1,205.80
11 as the mileage offset here.
12 Even with that correction, however, the Court finds that
13 Defendant has met its burden to show actual damages by a
14 preponderance of the evidence and finds that the “actual” damages
15 at issue here are approximately $36,319.12 (i.e., $37,524.92
16 minus $1,205.80).
17 Plaintiff claims these numbers are speculative and lack a
18 sufficient evidentiary basis. Mot. at 6–8; Reply at 1–3. The
19 Court disagrees. Defendant has presented evidence and analysis
20 of the actual damages at issue here with numbers supported by
21 both the RISC and the ROS. See Opp’n at 3. This satisfies
22 Defendant’s burden under the applicable law. Cf., e.g., Edwards
23 v. Jaguar Land Rover N. Am. LLC, No. 21-cv-05061, 2022 WL 854515
24 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2022) (motion to remand granted because
25 defendant relied on allegations in complaint, civil penalties
26 doubling the claimed amount of damages and general arguments
27 about attorneys’ fees, and did not present evidence to meet its
28 burden); Echemendia v. Subaru of Am., Inc., No. 20-cv-09243,
1 2020 WL 7311348 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2020) (defendant provided
2 sales contract, but no other evidence or analysis to “allow the
3 Court to reliably estimate actual damages”); Chajon v. Ford
4 Motor Co., No. 2:18-cv-10533, 2019 WL 994019 (C.D. Cal., Jan. 8,
5 2019) (defendant failed to meet its burden establishing
6 requisite amount in controversy because it relied on MSRP, did
7 not provide other evidence or an offset calculation, and
8 speculated about penalties and attorneys’ fees). Further,
9 Plaintiff has not provided any alternative calculations or
10 evidence concerning her actual damages for the Court to
11 consider.
12 Accordingly, the Court finds Plaintiff’s estimated actual
13 damages are $36,319.12. The Court now turns to the Parties’
14 arguments regarding penalties.
15 2. Civil Penalties
16 Plaintiff also seeks a statutory civil penalty of twice
17 Plaintiff’s actual damages under the Song-Beverly Act. A buyer
18 who establishes a willful violation of the Song-Beverly Act may
19 recover a civil penalty of up to “two times the amount of actual
20 damages.” Cal. Civil Code § 1794(c). Song-Beverly civil
21 penalties should be included in the amount in controversy
22 calculation when a plaintiff alleges the action was willful and
23 seeks civil penalties under the act. See, e.g., Fang v. Ford
24 Motor Co., No. 1:22-cv-0561-JLT-SAB, 2022 WL 3444715, at *8
25 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2022) (determining that the plaintiff put
26 the civil penalties in controversy by pleading that the
27 defendant acted willfully in failing to comply with the Song-
28 Beverly Act and seeking up to double the actual damages in the
1 prayer for relief); Cortez Martinez v. Ford Motor Co., No. 1:18-
2 cv-01607-LJO-JLT, 2019 WL 1988398, at *7 (E.D. Cal. May 6, 2019)
3 (determining that civil penalties were “expressly placed into
4 controversy by the complaint” where plaintiffs alleged the
5 defendant’s failure to comply with the Song-Beverly Act was
6 willful and the prayer for civil penalty was “in the amount of
7 two times Plaintiffs’ actual damages”); Elenes v. FCA US LLC,
8 No. 2:16-cv-05415-CAS, 2016 WL 6745424, at *5 (C.D. Cal. Nov.
9 14, 2016) (“By specifically seeking the maximum civil penalty
10 [under the Song Beverly Act], plaintiffs placed that amount in
11 controversy.”). Moreover, “courts as a matter of law, calculate
12 the amount in controversy based upon the maximum amount of civil
13 penalties available to a plaintiff.” Fang, 2022 WL 3444715, at
14 *6 (quotations, citations, and modifications omitted).
15 Here, Plaintiff alleges that she is entitled to a “civil
16 penalty in the amount of two times Plaintiff’s actual damages
17 pursuant to Civil Code section 1794(c)” because Defendant
18 willfully violated California Civil Code sections 1793.2(a)(3),
19 (b), and (d). Compl. ¶¶ 17, 24, 28, and Prayer. Thus, Defendant
20 argues that civil penalties are properly included in the amount-
21 in-controversy calculation. Opp’n at 6–7. Using the actual
22 damages figure of $36,319.12 calculated above, the two-times
23 civil penalty pursuant to Song-Beverly would equal $72,638.24,
24 for a total of $108,957.36 in civil penalties and actual damages,
25 surpassing the $75,000 threshold.
26 Plaintiff disagrees that the Court may consider civil
27 penalties, arguing that Defendant “has proffered no evidence
28 whatsoever that Plaintiff will receive the maximum amount of
1 civil penalties—or, indeed, any penalties at all. Rather,
2 Defendant merely assumes a civil penalty award.” Mot. at 8.
3 Plaintiff contends that “Defendant is required to offer evidence
4 of willfulness that might support such an award.” Id. at 9.
5 There is a split among district courts in the Ninth Circuit
6 about when to include Song-Beverly Act civil penalties when
7 calculating the amount in controversy. See Ferguson v. Kia
8 Motors Am. Inc., No. 2:20-cv-01192-KJM-DB, 2021 WL 1997550, at
9 *3 (E.D. Cal. May 19, 2021) (collecting and comparing cases in
10 Southern and Central Districts and finding inclusion of
11 penalties was warranted based on allegations). “On the one
12 hand, many district courts do not require the defendant to
13 provide evidence beyond pointing to claims arising under the Act
14 in the complaint.” Id. On the other, “some district courts
15 have rejected the inclusion of civil penalties or punitive
16 damages when the defendant has not pointed to specific
17 allegations in the complaint that support an award of punitive
18 damages, or provided further evidence.” Id.
19 The Court finds that inclusion of civil penalties is
20 appropriate in this case. Plaintiff makes numerous allegations
21 of willful misconduct against Defendant in the body of her
22 Complaint. See Compl. ¶¶ 17, 24, 28 (alleging Defendant’s
23 failure to comply with their obligations under the Song-Beverly
24 Act was willful because “Defendant knew of its legal obligations
25 and intentionally declined to follow them”). She also expressly
26 requests “a civil penalty in the amount of two times Plaintiff’s
27 actual damages pursuant to Civil Code section 1794(c)” in the
28 Prayer for Relief. On these facts, numerous courts have found
1 inclusion of the civil penalties to be appropriate. See
2 Hernandez v. FCA US LLC, No. 1:21-cv-0745-JLT-HBK, 2022 WL
3 819857, at *4–5 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2022) (surveying similar
4 cases and applying prayed-for Song Beverly civil penalty).
5 Further, while other district courts have found that civil
6 penalties should not be included unless the removing defendant
7 makes some showing regarding the likelihood of penalties, this
8 Court respectfully disagrees. As the Ninth Circuit has
9 explained, the amount in controversy is not “a prospective
10 assessment of defendant’s liability.” Lewis v. Verizon Communs.,
11 Inc., 627 F.3d 395, 400 (9th Cir. 2010). Rather, courts must
12 “accept[ ] the allegations contained in the complaint as true and
13 assume[ ] the jury will return a verdict in the plaintiff’s favor
14 on every claim.” Henry v. Cent. Freight Lines, Inc., 692 F.
15 App’x 806, 807 (9th Cir. 2017). Thus, this Court joins other
16 courts in finding Defendant need not prove that it willfully
17 violated the Song-Beverly Act for civil penalties to be included
18 in the damages calculation. See, e.g., Brooks v. Ford Motor Co.,
19 No. 5:20-cv-302-DSFKK, 2020 WL 2731830, at *2 (C.D. Cal. May 26,
20 2020) (“It would be absurd to suggest a defendant must offer
21 evidence showing it willfully failed to comply with the Song-
22 Beverly Act, given that most defendants . . . will deny that
23 [they] willfully failed to comply with the Song-Beverly Act.”);
24 Watson v. BMW of N.A., LLC, No. 2:22-cv-01514-DAD-JDP, 2022
25 12442891, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 21, 2022) (collecting cases);
26 Canesco, 570 F. Supp. 3d at 902 (siding with “majority of courts
27 and more recent cases” in including civil penalties in amount in
28 controversy); Allen v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, No. 2:25-cv-01222-
DEI III IIE I EE EI RIE NEI OSI IED eee
1 DJC-JDP, 2025 WL 1743919, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jun. 24, 2025) (same).
2 Finally, Plaintiff argues that the penalty calculations are
3 impermissibly speculative because they are derived from an
4 unsupported actual damages valuation. Mot. at 10-11. The Court
5 again disagrees. The Court has determined that Defendant
6 sufficiently met its burden to establish actual damages based on
7 evidence and analysis.
8 Using the underlying actual damages calculation,
9 $36,319.12, the inclusion of the civil penalty brings the amount
10 in controversy to $108,957.36. This number well exceeds the
11 requisite jurisdictional threshold. Thus, based on the evidence
12 before the Court, Defendant has met its burden establishing by a
13 preponderance the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000.
14 3. Attorney’s Fees
15 The amount in controversy is easily satisfied based on
16 Plaintiff’s actual damages and civil penalties, which total
17 $108,957.36. As a result, the Court need not consider attorney’s
18 fees. See, e.g., Villa v. Nissan North Am., Inc., No. 2:25-cv-
19 | 03128-DJC-CKD, 2026 WL 353102, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 9, 2026).
20 Iv. ORDER
21 For the reasons set forth above, the Court DENIES
22 Plaintiff’s Motion to Remand (ECF No. 9). In addition, Counsel
23 for Plaintiff is ordered to pay $250 to the Clerk of Court no
24 later than May 29, 2026.
25 IT IS SO ORDERED.
26 | Dated: May 18, 2026
27
HN A. MENDEZ.
28 Fee UNITED pe acl JUDGE
13