Warden

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 ANIL PUN MAGAR, No. 1:26-cv-03063-DJC-CSK

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Petitioner,

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v. ORDER

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WARDEN, CALIFORNIA CITY

15 DETENTION FACILITY,

16 Respondent.

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18 Petitioner Anil Pun Magar, a noncitizen, entered the United States on January 8,

19 2025, and was immediately detained by immigration authorities. He has been in

20 immigration custody ever since for more than fourteen months. He has never

21 received a bond hearing. On April 21, 2026, he filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas

22 Corpus and a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order. The Court informed the

23 parties that it intended to rule on the merits of the Petition. For the reasons stated

24 below, the Petition is GRANTED.

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1 BACKGROUND

2 Petitioner is a citizen of Nepal who entered the United States without

3 authorization on January 8, 2025. (Pet. (ECF No. 1) ¶ 23.) He was immediately

4 detained by immigration authorities (“ICE”) and placed in expedited removal

5 proceedings. (Id.; Appendix (ECF No. 8-1) at Ex. 1 (“Form I-213”).) He was later

6 placed in standard removal proceedings after an asylum officer found he

7 demonstrated a credible fear of persecution or torture. (Appendix at Ex. 2 (“Not. to

8 Appear”).) On September 22, 2025, an Immigration Judge denied Petitioner’s

9 requests for asylum, withholding of removal under the Immigration & Nationality Act

10 (“INA”) § 241(b)(3) and the Convention Against Torture, and deferral of removal. (Id.

11 at Ex. 5 (“Removal Order”).) The Immigration Judge ordered Petitioner to be removed

12 to Nepal. (Removal Order at 21.) Petitioner filed an appeal to the Board of

13 Immigration Appeals on October 22, 2025. (Appendix at Ex. 6.) That appeal remains

14 pending. Petitioner remains in immigration custody at California City Detention

15 Center and has been detained more than fourteen months. (Pet. ¶¶ 1–2.)

16 Petitioner filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and a Motion for

17 Temporary Restraining Order (Mot. TRO (ECF No. 2)) in this Court. The Court notified

18 the parties that it intended to rule on the merits of the Petition. (ECF No. 6.) The

19 Government filed a Response on May 1, 2026. (Resp. (ECF No. 8).) Petitioner did not

20 file a Reply.

21 DISCUSSION

22 Petitioner raises claims similar to ones this Court has already addressed. This

23 Court has previously joined other districts in concluding that the unreasonably

24 prolonged mandatory detention of individuals such as Petitioner under section

25 1225(b) without a bond hearing can violate the Due Process Clause. See Choudhary

26 v. Chestnut, No. 1:26-cv-01770-DJC-CKD, 2026 WL 816711, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 24,

27 2026); see also Abdul-Samed v. Warden of Golden State Annex Det. Facility, No. 1:25-

28 cv-00098-SAB, 2025 WL 2099343, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2025) (explaining that

1 “essentially all district courts that have considered the issue agree that prolonged

2 mandatory detention pending removal proceedings, without a bond hearing, will—at

3 some point—violate the right to due process”) (quoting Martinez v. Clark, No. 2:18-cv-

4 01669-RAJ, 2019 WL 5968089, at *6 (W.D. Wash. May 23, 2019), report and

5 recommendation adopted, No. 2:18-cv-01669-RAJ, 2019 WL 5962685 (W.D. Wash.

6 Nov. 13, 2019)).

7 Petitioner argues that his prolonged detention without a bond hearing violates

8 the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. (See generally Pet. (ECF No. 1); Mot.

9 TRO (ECF No. 2) at 2.) He seeks immediate release from detention or, alternatively, a

10 bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker in which the Government bears the

11 burden to show, through clear and convincing evidence, that he is a danger or poses

12 a flight risk. (Mot. TRO at 7.) For its part, the Government asserts that Petitioner’s

13 rights are limited to the statutory language of § 1225(b) and, relying in part on

14 Department of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020), that the Due

15 Process Clause “does not override the statute.” (Resp. at 5.) The Government

16 alternatively contends that if the Due Process Clause were to apply, Petitioner’s

17 detention without a bond hearing is constitutionally permissible. (Id. at 6, 8.)

18 I. Government’s Claims

19 The Court declines to adopt the Government’s analysis. Notwithstanding the

20 statutory language of § 1225(b) that provides for mandatory detention, an as-applied

21 constitutional challenge is permissible here. See, e.g., Doe v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-

22 00333-JLT-HBK, 2026 WL 797694, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 23, 2026) (concluding that

23 Supreme Court’s analysis in Thuraissigiam did not foreclose a due process challenge

24 to mandatory detention without a bond hearing under § 1225(b)); Padilla v. U.S.

25 Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1170–73 (W.D. Wash. 2023) (same),

26 appeal docketed, No. 24-2801 (9th Cir. 2025). The Court agrees with the analysis in

27 Padilla that “a broad rule that any inadmissible noncitizen possesses only those due

28 process rights afforded to them by statute, regardless of the nature of their status or

1 the relief they seek. . . . is untethered to the claim in Thuraissigiam[,]” which is

2 ”necessarily constrained” to admissibility challenges and silent as to detention.

3 Accordingly, the Court rejects the Government’s overbroad reading of Thuraissigiam

4 and concludes that Petitioner may assert a due process claim under § 1225(b)(1).

5 II. Due Process

6 To determine if Petitioner’s due process rights have been violated, the Court

7 must answer two questions: “the first asks whether there exists a protected liberty

8 interest under the Due Process Clause, and the second examines the procedures

9 necessary to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the

10 Constitution.” Garcia v. Andrews, No. 2:25-cv-01884-TLN-SCR, 2025 WL 1927596, at

11 *2 (E.D. Cal. Jul. 14, 2025).

12 Petitioner has a clear liberty interest in securing his freedom from detention as

13 he has been detained for more than fourteen months. “Freedom from imprisonment—

14 from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint—lies at the

15 heart of the liberty that Clause protects.” Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001).

16 Having concluded Petitioner has a protected liberty interest, the Court next examines

17 whether his detention has become unreasonable. The Court assesses the following

18 factors: “(1) the total length of detention to date; (2) the likely duration of future

19 detention; (3) the conditions of detention; (4) delays in the removal proceedings

20 caused by the detainee; (5) delays in the removal proceedings caused by the

21 government; and (6) the likelihood that the removal proceedings will result in a final

22 order of removal.” Banda v. McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1118 (W.D. Wash.

23 2019); see, e.g., Sandesh v. LaRose, No. 3:26-cv-00846-JES-DDL, 2026 WL 622690, at

24 *3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2026) (finding “it most appropriate to apply the Banda test to

25 Petitioner's detention here under § 1225(b), as other courts within this district have

26 done in the past” and collecting cases).

27 First, the length of detention, which is “the most important factor,” weighs in

28 Petitioner’s favor as he has been detained more than fourteen months. (Pet. ¶¶ 1-2;

1 Martinez, 2019 WL 5968089, at *9.) This Court has previously found a detention of

2 twelve months to weigh in favor of granting a bond hearing. Choudhary, 2026 WL

3 816711, at *2.

4 The second factor favors Petitioner, which assesses “the likely duration of future

5 detention.” Martinez, 2019 WL 5968089, at *9. Petitioner filed his appeal with the BIA

6 on September 22, 2025, and that decision remains pending. If the BIA affirms,

7 Petitioner will have the opportunity to seek review in the Ninth Circuit. In all, this

8 process takes “approximately 12 to 20 months from the notice of appeal date.” Id.

9 This amount of time is sufficiently lengthy that the Court finds that the second factor

10 favors Petitioner.

11 The third factor as to the conditions of detention also slightly favors Petitioner.

12 While Petitioner does not submit evidence, the Government does not dispute his

13 account. Petitioner writes that he is “getting depressed because of the uncertainty of

14 my future. My medical condition is getting worse every day . . . the living conditions in

15 the detention center are below normal standards. Inmates fall sick very often with no

16 timely medical care inspite of repeated written reminders and sick call notices.” (Pet.

17 ¶ 23) (spelling in original); see also Martinez, 2019 WL 5968089, at *9 (concluding

18 factor was neutral in the absence of evidence).

19 As to the fourth and fifth factors, the Court considers the nature and extent of

20 any delays in the removal proceedings caused by the parties. The Government has

21 provided evidence that Petitioner sought a continuance of one of his immigration

22 hearings to have more time to obtain paperwork from family members. (Appendix at

23 Ex. 3.) The Immigration Judge found good cause and granted the motion to continue.

24 (Id. at Ex. 4.) This delayed immigration proceedings by about three weeks. (Id.)

25 Petitioner also filed an appeal of the Immigration Judge’s adverse decision denying

26 his requests for relief. (Appendix at Ex. 6.) Nevertheless, “Petitioner is entitled to raise

27 legitimate defenses to removal . . . and such challenges to his removal cannot

28 undermine his claim that detention has become unreasonable.” Liban M.J. v. Sec’y of

1 Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 367 F. Supp. 3d 959, 965 (D. Minn. 2019) (citations omitted);

2 see also Henriquez v. Garland, No. 5:22-cv-00869-EJD, 2022 WL 2132919, at *5 (N.D.

3 Cal. Jun. 14, 2022) (“[T]he fact that Petitioner chose to pursue [relief] and requested

4 continuances to further that application does not deprive him of a constitutional right

5 to due process.”) Accordingly, the fourth factor favors Petitioner. Martinez, 2019 WL

6 5968089, at *10. As to the Government’s role in any delay, Petitioner contends that

7 his “court proceedings have been changed on multiple occasions at the accord of

8 DHS, through no fault of my own and continuously prolong my detention.” (Mot. TRO

9 at 2.) The Government does not contest this narrative, thus the Court concludes that

10 the fifth factor favors Petitioner.

11 Finally, the sixth factor is neutral as the Court lacks sufficient information to

12 assess the likelihood that Petitioner’s removal proceedings will result in a final order of

13 removal and, therefore, declines to do so. See Sarr v. Scott, 765 F. Supp. 3d 1091,

14 1109 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (declining to speculate as to the merits of Petitioner's appeal

15 to the Ninth Circuit after the Immigration Judge and the BIA found Petitioner

16 removable).

17 After assessing all the factors, several of which favor Petitioner and none that

18 favor the Government, the Court concludes that Petitioner’s prolonged and indefinite

19 detention entitles him to process and orders a bond hearing.

20 CONCLUSION

21 The Court previously notified the parties that it intended to rule on the merits of

22 the Petition and neither party objected. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

23 1. The Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED.

24 2. Within fourteen (14) days of this Order, Petitioner shall be afforded a

25 constitutionally adequate bond hearing before an Immigration Judge. At

26 this hearing, the Government shall bear the burden of establishing, by clear

27 and convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a danger to the community

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IIIS DIINO IIR IORI III IR IR SSI IIE III IIE IIE

1 or arisk of flight, and Petitioner shall be allowed to have counsel □□□□□□□□ □

2 In the event Petitioner is “determined not to be a danger to the community

3 and not to be so great a flight risk as to require detention without bond,” the

4 Immigration Judge should consider Petitioner's financial circumstances and

5 alternative conditions of release. Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 1000.

6 3. Respondents shall file a status report within five (5) days of Petitioner's bond

7 hearing, confirming a bond hearing was conducted.

8 4. The Clerk of the Court is directed to close this case and enter judgment for

9 Petitioner. This Order resolves all pending motions.

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14 IT IS SO ORDERED.

12 | Dated: _May 15, 2026 “Daneel I rete

Hon. Daniel alabretta

13 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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16 | psce - Magar.26cv03063.merits

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26 ' This burden of proof has been regularly applied by courts reviewing similar cases, and the Court

adopts the views of those courts here. See, e.g., Pablo Sequen v. Albarran, --- F.Supp.3d ----, 2025 WL

27 2935630, at *13-14(N.D. Cal. Oct. 14, 2025); Martinez Hernandez v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-01035-JLT-

HBK, 2025 WL 2495767, at *13-14 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 28, 2025); Castellon v. Kaiser, No. 1:25-cv-00968-JLT-

28 EPG. 2025 WL 2373425, at *11-12 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2025).