Chestnut

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 JOSE CESAR RIVAS CRUZ (A No. 209 No. 1:26-cv-2041 DJC CKD P

898 279),

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Petitioner,

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v.

14 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CHRISTOPHER CHESTNUT, et al.,

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Respondents.

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18 Petitioner, detained by the Immigration and Customs Enforcement Agency (ICE) at the

19 California City ICE Detention Facility, has filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to

20 28 U.S.C. § 2241.1 For the reasons which follow, the court recommends that the petition be

21 granted.

22 I. Facts

23 Petitioner is a citizen of Honduras. ECF No. 9-1 at 1. He entered the United States near

24 Hidalgo, Texas, on or around July 3, 2021, without authorization. ECF No. 9-2 at 8. Petitioner

25 was found inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), released on his own recognizance, and

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1 This matter proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, Fed. R. Civ. P. 72,

28 and Local Rule 302(c)(17).

1 ordered to appear for immigration proceedings on December 2, 2021, in San Francisco. Id. &

2 ECF No. 9-1 at 4.

3 Petitioner was ordered removed on August 14, 2025. ECF No. 9-2 at 1-5. He appealed

4 that decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and the appeal was dismissed on March

5 26, 2026. ECF No. 11. A review of the electronic docket for the Ninth Circuit in case no. 26-

6 1968 reveals petitioner has filed a petition for review with respect to the BIA dismissal. The

7 Ninth Circuit has stayed removal.

8 On December 18, 2025, petitioner was charged in the Superior Court of Alameda County

9 with corporal injury to a relationship partner and damaging the cell phone of a witness. ECF No.

10 10-2. The charges are pending. ECF No. 1 at 3.

11 On February 24, 2026, petitioner reported to an ICE office in San Francisco and was

12 detained due to his Alameda County arrest. ECF No. 9-1 at 4. He was transferred to the

13 California City ICE Detention Facility that same day and remains there. ECF No. 1 at 2, 5.

14 II. Standard for Habeas Relief

15 The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every individual

16 detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const.,

17 Art I, § 9, cl. 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality

18 of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.”

19 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas corpus may be granted to a

20 petitioner in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3).

21 Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive

22 detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S.

23 289, 301 (2001). A district court’s habeas jurisdiction includes challenges to immigration detention.

24 See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001).

25 III. Issues and Analysis

26 A. Mandatory Detention Under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)

27 Respondents claim petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. §

28 1226(c)(1)(E). Under that statute a person such as petitioner who is inadmissible under 8 U.S.C.

1 § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) is subject to mandatory detention through the end of removal proceedings if

2 they are charged with a crime which resulted in “serious bodily injury” to another person.

3 The charging documents applicable to petitioner allege he committed corporal injury

4 “resulting in a traumatic condition.” ECF No. 10-2. Respondent admits petitioner’s charges do

5 not necessarily allege serious bodily injury as that term is defined under California law. ECF No.

6 9 at 7. However, respondents claim that because the acts alleged may have resulted in serious

7 bodily injury, petitioner is subject to mandatory detention unless he shows otherwise. Id.

8 Respondents point to no authority in support of this proposition and under the statute, mandatory

9 detention is only permitted if serious bodily injury was the result of the crime charged, not a

10 possible result. For these reasons, the court rejects the argument that petitioner’s detention is

11 authorized by 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E).

12 B. Mandatory Detention Under 8 U.S.C. § 1231

13 Respondent argues that petitioner became subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. §

14 1231 once the BIA dismissed petitioner’s appeal. ECF No. 11. Under that statute, petitioner is

15 subject to mandatory detention during the “removal period.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2). The removal

16 periods begins on the latest of the following:

17 (i) The date the order of removal becomes administratively final.

18 (ii) If the removal order is judicially reviewed and if a court

orders a stay of the removal of the alien, the date of the court’s

19 final order.

20 (iii) If the alien is detained or confined (except under an

immigration process), the date the alien is released from

21 detention or confinement.

22 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B).

23 With respect to petitioner, the “removal period” has not begun because his removal order

24 is being judicially reviewed and his removal is stayed. Petitioner is not subject to mandatory

25 detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231.

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1 C. Bond Hearing Required Under 8 U.S.C. 1226(a)

2 Petitioner claims he has a statutory right to a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

3 Respondent claims petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). As the

4 court recently held in Puac v. Warden, Cal. City ICE Det. Facility, No 1:26-cv-1388 TLN CKD

5 P, 2026 WL 1133274, *2 (E.D. Cal. April 27, 2026), 8 U.S.C. § 1226, rather than § 1225 applies

6 to individuals such as petitioner who were arrested inside the United States as opposed to at the

7 border around the time of entry. Accord Fernandez Alvarez v. Warden, Fed. Det. Cntr. Miami,

8 No. 25-14065, 2026 WL 1243395, *18 (11th Cir. May 6, 2025) (Ҥ 1226 supplies the default rule

9 of detention for an alien arrested and detained in the interior”); Barbosa da Cunha v. Freden, No.

10 25-3141-pr, 2026 WL 1146044, at *2, 3 (2nd Cir. Apr. 28, 2026) (8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) governed

11 petitioner's detention where petitioner was arrested within the interior of the United States after

12 living here for over twenty years); Castañon-Nava v. DHS, 161 F.4th 1048, 1061 (7th Cir. 2025)

13 (generally speaking, “ICE's authority to detain a noncitizen discovered within the country derives

14 from § 1226(a) and not from § 1225(b)”). But see Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, 166 F.4th 494,

15 502 (5th Cir. 2026) (individuals who have never been formally admitted into the United States

16 and who are arrested in the interior of the country are properly subject to detention under §

17 1225(b)(2)); Avila v. Bondi, 170 F.4th 1128 (8th Cir. 2026) (same).

18 Section 1226(a) expressly authorizes release on bond, and its authorizing regulations

19 provide for immigration judges to convene bond hearings. After arrest, the government “may

20 continue to detain the arreste[e]” until a final removal decision is made or “may release” them on

21 “bond” or “conditional parole.” 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(1)-(2). If the arrestee wishes to contest the

22 initial custody determination—i.e., the denial or amount of bond—the noncitizen has a right to do

23 so before an immigration judge. 8 C.F.R. §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1). By not providing

24 petitioner a bond hearing under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a), respondents are violating petitioner’s federal

25 rights.

26 Alternative to a bond hearing, petitioner seeks outright release from custody. The court

27 has held that aliens who had been released into the country, never charged with a crime and not

28 subject to a final order of removal were entitled to release because of ICE’s failure to provide a

1 bond hearing at or around the time of arrest. E.g. Malla v. Warden, Golden State Annex ICE Det.

2 Fac., No. 1:26-cv-2402 DAD CKD P, 2026 WL 1102941 (E.D. Cal. April 23, 2026). Here,

3 petitioner is charged with a crime and is subject to a final order of removal with removal being

4 stayed by the Ninth Circuit.

5 In Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), the Supreme Court upheld mandatory detention

6 during the remainder of removal proceedings for persons convicted of crimes enumerated in 28

7 U.S.C. § 1226(c). In so doing, the Court recognized the strong public interest in decreasing

8 criminal activity by aliens and completion of removal. Id. at 518. The Court found:

9 First, as Congress explained, “[a]liens who enter or remain in the

United States in violation of our law are effectively taking

10 immigration opportunities that might otherwise be extended to

others.” S.Rep. No. 104–249, p. 7 (1996). Second, deportable

11 criminal aliens who remained in the United States often committed

more crimes before being removed. . .

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Congress also had before it evidence that one of the major causes of

13 the INS' failure to remove deportable criminal aliens was the

agency's failure to detain those aliens during their deportation

14 proceedings. See Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector

General, Immigration and Naturalization Service, Deportation of

15 Aliens After Final Orders Have Been Issued, Rep. No. I–96–03

(Mar.1996), App. 46 (hereinafter Inspection Report) (“Detention is

16 key to effective deportation”); see also H.R.Rep. No. 104–469, p.

123 (1995).

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18 Id. at 518-19.

19 [Mandatory] detention necessarily serves the purpose of preventing

deportable criminal aliens from fleeing prior to or during their

20 removal proceedings, thus increasing the chance that, if ordered

removed, the aliens will be successfully removed. . . Congress had

21 before it evidence suggesting that permitting discretionary release of

aliens pending their removal hearings would lead to large numbers

22 of deportable criminal aliens skipping their hearings and remaining

at large in the United States unlawfully.

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24 Id. at 528. The ability of the executive to detain aliens pending removal, within limits, is

25 undeniable. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 711 (KENNEDY, J., dissenting) (“Congress' power to detain

26 aliens in connection with removal or exclusion . . . is part of the Legislature's considerable

27 authority over immigration matters”).

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] Considering the government interests articulated by the Supreme Court in Demore, the

2 || government’s general ability to detain aliens awaiting removal, the fact that petitioner has been

3 || charged with a crime which at least presents the possibility that petitioner is a danger to the public

4 || and that the charges plus the late stage of removal proceedings at least present the possibility that

5 || petitioner is a flight risk, a bond hearing where flight risk and dangerousness can be assessed is

6 || the appropriate remedy as opposed to outright release. See Singh v. Chestnut, No. 1:26-cv-

7 || 00546-DJC-AC, 2026 WL 266021, at *2, 4 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 2, 2026) (ordering a post-deprivation

8 | bond hearing for a petitioner who was formerly released on his own recognizance but detained by

9 || ICE after he was arrested for aggravated battery, because the government “may well have a

10 || legitimate interest in [p]etitioner’s detention based on the information contained in the arrest

11 || report”).

12 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

13 1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) be GRANTED.

14 2. Within 7 days of the adoption of these findings and recommendations, petitioner be

15 provided with a bond hearing before an immigration judge where petitioner is entitled

16 to release if he can establish he is neither a flight risk nor a risk to the community.

17 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

18 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within seven (7) days

19 || after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written

20 || objections with the court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned

21 || “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the

22 || objections shall be served and filed within seven (7) days after service of the objections. The

23 || parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to

24 || appeal the District Court’s order. Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

25 | Dated: May 15, 2026 □□ I / dle ae

27 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

28 oru72041 imam fis