Opinion

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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MICHAEL J. WINFIELD, Case No. 1:25-cv-01662-JLT-EPG (PC)

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Plaintiff,

12 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS,

RECOMMENDING THAT THIS ACTION

13 v. BE DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE FOR

FAILURE TO STATE A CLAIM, FAILURE

14 TO PROSECUTE, AND FAILURE TO

DR. SAM SLUBTL, et al., COMPLY WITH A COURT ORDER

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Defendants. (ECF Nos. 10, 12)

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Plaintiff Michael J. Winfield is a state prisoner proceeding pro se in this civil rights

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action filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1). Plaintiff filed his signed complaint

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commencing this action on January 28, 2026. (ECF No. 10). Plaintiff alleges that medical

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professional Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs when they allowed

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an unnecessary and defective pacemaker to be placed in his heart. (Id. at 3).

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On March 30, 2026, the Court screened the complaint and concluded that Plaintiff

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failed to state any cognizable claims. (ECF No. 12). The Court gave Plaintiff thirty days to file

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a first amended complaint or to notify the Court that he wanted to stand on his complaint. (Id.

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at 8). And the Court warned Plaintiff that “[f]ailure to comply with this order may result in the

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dismissal of this action.” (Id. at 9).

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1 The deadline to respond to the screening order has expired, and Plaintiff has not filed an

2 amended complaint or otherwise responded to the Court’s order. Accordingly, for the reasons

3 given below, the Court will recommend that Plaintiff’s case be dismissed, with prejudice, for

4 failure to state a claim, failure to prosecute, and failure to comply with a court order.

5 I. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

6 The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against

7 a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a).

8 The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if the prisoner has raised claims that are

9 legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or

10 that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C.

11 § 1915A(b)(1), (2).

12 A complaint is required to contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing

13 that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not

14 required, but “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere

15 conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell

16 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). A plaintiff must set forth “sufficient

17 factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Id.

18 (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570). The mere possibility of misconduct falls short of meeting

19 this plausibility standard. Id. at 679. While a plaintiff’s allegations are taken as true, courts “are

20 not required to indulge unwarranted inferences.” Doe I v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677,

21 681 (9th Cir. 2009) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Additionally, a plaintiff’s

22 legal conclusions are not accepted as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.

23 Pleadings of pro se plaintiffs are to be liberally construed and “must be held to less

24 stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338,

25 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that pro se complaints should continue to be liberally construed

26 after Iqbal).

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1 II. SUMMARY OF PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT1

2 Plaintiff is an inmate currently housed at Corcoran State Prison (“CSP”) in Corcoran,

3 California. Plaintiff names as defendants Dr. Sam Slubtl, a cardiac physician with the

4 California Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections (“CDCR”), Dr. Sarabjit Singh, a

5 CDCR cardiac physician, Dr. Anad Mehta, primary care physician as CSP, Britney Brizendine,

6 CDCR Health Care Director, and Geoff Martha, Chief Executive Officer (“CEO”) for

7 Medtronic, Inc. in Minneapolis, Minnesota (ECF No. 10 at 2, 4).2 Plaintiff asserts claims for

8 cruel and unusual punishment and for deliberate indifference to serious medical needs in

9 violation of the Eighth Amendment. (Id. at 3-4).

10 Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Slubtl placed a pacemaker in his heart that was defective,

11 failed, and had to be removed. (Id. at 3). Dr. Mehta, as Plaintiff’s primary care physician, was

12 aware of the defective heart device and ensuing health problems and “did nothing to ameliorate

13 [his] suffering.” (Id.). Plaintiff was sent to outside physician, Dr. Singh, who subsequently

14 removed the pacemaker but left parts in after it burst inside Plaintiff’s chest. (Id.). “Dr. Singh

15 reported that there was no need for the pacemaker in the first place and should not have been

16 installed.” (Id.) As a result, Plaintiff suffers ongoing health problems. (Id.).

17 Plaintiff has requested a transfer to a high level medical care facility while he is

18 incarcerated, but this request was denied after administrative appeal. (Id.). “Director of

19 Correctional Health Care Services, Director Brizendine, should have been aware of the

20 placement of the pacemaker as defective.” (Id. at 3-4). “Medtronic, Inc. CEO Geoff Martha, the

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1 For readability, minor alterations, like changing capitalization, have been made to some of Plaintiff’s

23 quotations without indicating each change.

24 2 In his initial unsigned complaint, which was stricken by the Court, Plaintiff named as defendants

CDCR Director, CDCR Medical Department, John Doe “Other/Business” that produced the defective

25 pacemaker. (ECF No. 1 at 1-2). In his signed complaint, Plaintiff did not rename CDCR or John Doe.

(ECF No. 10). However, the Court notes that CDCR is immune from suit under the Eleventh

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Amendment. See Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 66 (1989) (holding that the

27 Eleventh Amendment bars § 1983 suits against a State unless the state has waived

its sovereign immunity); Lucas v. Dep't of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam) (holding

28 that the prisoner's Eighth Amendment claims against CDCR for damages and injunctive relief were

barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity).

1 manufacturer of the device, has an obligation to provide defect information to physicians as

2 to…its devices.” (Id. at 4).

3 Plaintiff seeks $1,000,000 in compensatory and punitive damages against each

4 defendant. (Id.).

5 III. ANALYSIS OF PLAINTIFF’S CLAIMS

6 A. Section 1983

7 The Civil Rights Act under which this action was filed provides:

8 Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,

9 regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the

District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any

10 citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction

11 thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities

secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party

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injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper

13 proceeding for redress....

14 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “[Section] 1983 ‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,’ but merely

15 provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.’” Graham v. Connor,

16 490 U.S. 386, 393-94 (1989) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)); see

17 also Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 618 (1979); Hall v. City of Los

18 Angeles, 697 F.3d 1059, 1068 (9th Cir. 2012); Crowley v. Nevada, 678 F.3d 730, 734 (9th Cir.

19 2012); Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1067 (9th Cir. 2006).

20 To state a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must allege that (1) the defendant acted

21 under color of state law, and (2) the defendant deprived him of rights secured by the

22 Constitution or federal law. Long v. County of Los Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir.

23 2006); see also Marsh v. Cnty. of San Diego, 680 F.3d 1148, 1158 (9th Cir. 2012) (discussing

24 “under color of state law”). A person deprives another of a constitutional right, “within the

25 meaning of § 1983, ‘if he does an affirmative act, participates in another's affirmative act, or

26 omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the deprivation of which

27 complaint is made.’” Preschooler II v. Clark Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Trs., 479 F.3d 1175, 1183 (9th

28 Cir. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978)). “The requisite causal

1 connection may be established when an official sets in motion a ‘series of acts by others which

2 the actor knows or reasonably should know would cause others to inflict’ constitutional harms.”

3 Preschooler II, 479 F.3d at 1183 (quoting Johnson, 588 F.2d at 743). This standard of

4 causation “closely resembles the standard ‘foreseeability’ formulation of proximate cause.”

5 Arnold v. Int'l Bus. Mach. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981); see also Harper v. City

6 of Los Angeles, 533 F.3d 1010, 1026 (9th Cir. 2008).

7 B. Deliberate Indifference to Serious Medical Needs

8 Plaintiff claims Defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs by

9 placing and removing a defective and unnecessary pacemaker and for failing to ease his pain

10 resulting from the pacemaker. (ECF No. 10 at 3).

11 “Deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs violates the Eighth

12 Amendment's proscription against cruel and unusual punishment.” Long v. County of Los

13 Angeles, 442 F.3d 1178, 1185 (9th Cir. 2006). “[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim

14 based on prison medical treatment, an inmate must show ‘deliberate indifference to serious

15 medical needs.’” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v.

16 Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). This requires Plaintiff to show (1) “a ‘serious medical need’

17 by demonstrating that ‘failure to treat a prisoner’s condition could result in further significant

18 injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’” and (2) that “the defendant’s

19 response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Id. (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d

20 1050, 1059–60 (9th Cir. 1992), overruled on other grounds by WMX Technologies v. Miller,

21 104 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 1997) (en banc).

22 Deliberate indifference is established only where the defendant subjectively “knows of

23 and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health and safety.” Toguchi v. Chung, 391 F.3d

24 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation omitted). Deliberate indifference can be established “by

25 showing (a) a purposeful act or failure to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need

26 and (b) harm caused by the indifference.” Jett, 439 F.3d at 1096 (citation omitted).

27 A mere difference in medical opinion is “insufficient, as a matter of law, to

28 establish deliberate indifference.’” Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058. Additionally, “a complaint that a

1 physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid

2 claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment. Medical malpractice does not

3 become a constitutional violation merely because the victim is a prisoner.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at

4 106; see also Lemire v. California Dep't of Corr. & Rehab., 726 F.3d 1062, 1082 (9th Cir.

5 2013) (“mere indifference, negligence, or medical malpractice” is insufficient, and “[e]ven

6 gross negligence is insufficient to establish deliberate indifference to serious medical needs”)

7 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

8 Plaintiff fails to state a cognizable claim for deliberate indifference to serious medical

9 needs under these standards.

10 While Plaintiff titled his claim “deliberate indifference,” he does not allege facts that

11 would show that any defendant was deliberately indifferent to his condition. Instead, his claims

12 center around medical negligence and product liability for the defective pacemaker. Plaintiff

13 does not allege that any physician knew the pacemaker was defective before surgery and still

14 placed it in Plaintiff’s heart. While Plaintiff alleges that Dr. Singh subsequently removed the

15 pacemaker and disagreed with Dr. Slubtl about the need for the device, this difference in

16 medical opinion is “insufficient, as a matter of law, to establish deliberate indifference.”

17 Toguchi, 391 F.3d at 1058. Plaintiff alleges that his primary care physician, Dr. Mehta, knew

18 about the defective heart device after placement and ensuing health problems and did not

19 “ameliorate his suffering.” But Plaintiff does not allege that Dr. Mehta was responsible for his

20 cardiac care or was qualified to engage in cardiac surgery to remove the pacemaker. Plaintiff

21 also alleges that Dr. Mehta sent him to an outside physician to remove the device.

22 Finally, Plaintiff alleges that the “Chief Medical Executive or equivalent institutional

23 medical leadership typically reviews and approves medical procedures. That would be Britney

24 Brizendine – Director of Correctional Health Care Services. Director Brizendine should have

25 been aware of the placement as defective.” (ECF No. 10 at 3-4). Plaintiff does not allege that

26 Brizendine reviewed his medical procedure or knew that the pacemaker was defective and still

27 approved the procedure. Thus, Plaintiff fails to state a claim of deliberate indifference by

28 Director Brizendine.

1 Plaintiff also fails to allege that Martha knew the pacemaker was defective or that the

2 device would be placed in Plaintiff’s heart. Plaintiff does not allege that Martha failed to

3 prevent the procedure, knowing it would cause harm.

4 Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against any defendant for deliberate

5 indifference to serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment.

6 C. Color of State Law

7 Plaintiff’s claim against Geoff Martha, CEO of Medtronic Inc., is also subject to

8 dismissal because Plaintiff does not allege that Martha acted under color of state law.

9 To state a claim under section 1983, Plaintiff must allege a deprivation of a right

10 secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States “by a person acting under color of

11 state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988). The Supreme Court has explained that “[t]he

12 traditional definition of acting under color of state law requires that the defendant in a § 1983

13 action have exercised power ‘possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because

14 the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.’” Id. at 49 (quoting United States v.

15 Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941)). To determine whether actions that allegedly caused the

16 deprivation of a right are fairly attributable to the state even though they were committed by

17 private actors, the Ninth Circuit follows a two-part approach: “First, the deprivation must be

18 caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct

19 imposed by the state or by a person for whom the State is responsible.” Florer v. Congregation

20 Pidyon Shevuyim, N.A., 639 F.3d 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil

21 Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982)). “Second, the party charged with the deprivation must be a

22 person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.” Id. Courts start the analysis with the

23 presumption that conduct by private actors is not state action. Sutton v. Providence St. Joseph

24 Med. Ctr., 192 F.3d 826, 835 (9th Cir.1999). Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that

25 defendants were state actors. Florer, 639 F.3d at 922 (citing Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436

26 U.S. 149, 156 (1978)).

27 A private doctor may act under color of state law when they provide medical services to

28 a prisoner pursuant to a contract with the state or county. Id. at 54–55 (a private physician acted

1 under color of state law when he provided medical services to a state prisoner pursuant to a

2 professional contract with the state).

3 Here, Plaintiff does not allege that Martha is a state actor or that he was acting under

4 color of state law. Martha is not an employee of CDCR or any other state agency. Plaintiff does

5 not allege that Martha, individually, or Medtronic had a contract with CDCR to provide

6 services to inmates.

7 Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to state a claim against Defendant Geoff Martha, CEO of

8 Medtronic Inc.

9 IV. FAILURE TO PROSECUTE AND COMPLY WITH COURT ORDER

10 The Court will likewise recommend dismissal based on Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute

11 this case and to comply with the Court’s screening order. (ECF No. 12).

12 In determining whether to dismiss a[n] [action] for failure to prosecute or failure

to comply with a court order, the Court must weigh the following factors: (1) the

13 public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to

manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to defendants/respondents; (4) the

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availability of less drastic alternatives; and (5) the public policy favoring

15 disposition of cases on their merits.

16 Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d

17 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992)).

18 “‘The public’s interest in expeditious resolution of litigation always favors dismissal.’”

19 Id. (quoting Yourish v. California Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 1999)). Therefore, the

20 first factor weighs in favor of dismissal.

21 As to the Court’s need to manage its docket, “[t]he trial judge is in the best position to

22 determine whether the delay in a particular case interferes with docket management and the

23 public interest. . . . It is incumbent upon the Court to manage its docket without being subject to

24 routine noncompliance of litigants. . . .” Id. (citations omitted). Plaintiff has failed to respond to

25 the Court’s screening order. (ECF No. 12). This failure to respond is delaying the case and

26 interfering with docket management. Therefore, the second factor weighs in favor of dismissal.

27 Turning to the risk of prejudice, “pendency of a lawsuit is not sufficiently prejudicial in

28 and of itself to warrant dismissal.” Id. (citing Yourish, 191 F.3d at 991). However, “delay

1 inherently increases the risk that witnesses’ memories will fade, and evidence will become

2 stale,” id. at 643, and it is Plaintiff’s failure to comply with a court order and to prosecute this

3 case that is causing delay. Therefore, the third factor weighs in favor of dismissal.

4 As for the availability of lesser sanctions, given that Plaintiff has chosen not to

5 prosecute this action and has failed to comply with the Court’s order, despite being warned of

6 possible dismissal, there is little available to the Court which would constitute a satisfactory

7 lesser sanction while protecting the Court from further unnecessary expenditure of its scarce

8 resources. Considering Plaintiff’s in forma pauperis status, it appears that monetary sanctions

9 are of little use to prompt him to comply with future orders. Given the stage of these

10 proceedings, the preclusion of evidence or witnesses is not available. Further, as noted above,

11 Plaintiff has failed to state a claim or respond to the Court’s screening order despite being given

12 the relevant legal standards and the opportunity to file an amended complaint. Thus, the lack of

13 any viable claim supports a dismissal with prejudice rather than a lesser sanction. Therefore,

14 the fourth factor weighs in favor of dismissal.

15 Finally, because public policy favors disposition on the merits, this final factor weighs

16 against dismissal. Id.

17 After weighing the factors, the Court concludes that dismissal with prejudice is

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19 V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

20 Accordingly, IT IS RECOMMENDED as follows:

21 1. This action be dismissed, with prejudice, for failure to state a claim, failure to

22 prosecute, and failure to comply with a court order.

23 2. The Clerk of Court be directed to close this case.

24 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

25 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of Title 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within thirty

26 (30) days after being served with these findings and recommendations, Plaintiff may file

27 written objections with the Court. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

28 Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any objections shall be limited to no

1 || more than fifteen (15) pages, including exhibits.

2 Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in

3 || the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014)

4 || (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

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6 IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: _-May 15, 2026 [Je heey ——

8 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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