Opinion

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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WESTERN DIVISION

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ARNO KUIGOUA, ) Case No. 2:26-cv-06117-PA-JDE

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13 Plaintiff, ) ) ORDER OF DISMISSAL

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LORETTA MELBY, et al., )

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16 Defendants. )

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18 I.

19 INTRODUCTION

20 On June 5, 2026, Arno Kuigoua (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed a

21 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, asserting three claims under

22 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Loretta Melby, Executive Officer of the California

23 Board of Registered Nursing (“BRN”), and Elaine Yamaguchi, Executive

24 Officer, Board of Vocational Nursing and Psychiatrist Technicians (“BVNPT”),

25 each named solely in an official capacity presumably as officers of the State of

26 California (“Defendants”). Dkt. 1 (“Complaint”).

27 The Court recently dismissed three other complaints filed by Plaintiff

28 against state officials, including a prior action against defendant Loretta Melby,

1 and/or private actors involved in 2019 State Personnel Board (“SPB”)

2 proceedings and related proceedings for failure to state a claim and/or for

3 seeking relief against immune defendants. See Kuigoua v. Melby, et al., 2:26-

4 cv-04362-PA-JDE (“Melby I”) ; Kuigoua v. Park, et al., 2:26-cv-04365-PA-

5 JDE; Kuigoua v. Gavin Newsom, et al., 2:26-cv-04370-PA-JDE (collectively,

6 “Prior Federal Actions”).

7 As in the Prior Federal Actions, the Court takes judicial notice of the

8 following California Court of Appeal rulings in cases filed by Plaintiff (“Prior

9 State Appellate Cases”). In Kuigoua v. Park, 2025 WL 3139621 (Cal. Ct. App.

10 Nov. 10, 2025), in an appeal by Plaintiff of a dismissal of malpractice claims he

11 brought against his former attorney and his union relating to the 2019 SPB

12 proceedings, the appellate court dismissed the appeal as frivolous because

13 Plaintiff’s arguments were “not coherent” and because he repeatedly cited “to

14 legal authority that does not mention the proposition stated, stands for an

15 opposite proposition, or does not exist at all,” with the court providing “a small

16 sample of the deceptive, incorrect, or irrelevant legal citations in [Plaintiff’s]

17 briefs,” including several cases that “do not exist.” Id. at * 2-4 (citations

18 omitted). Further, roughly four months ago, in an unrelated case, a different

19 California appellate court found Plaintiff “has cited three apparently

20 nonexistent or miscited cases in his opening brief.” Kuigoua v. Sacks, 2026 WL

21 673409, at *1, n.1 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2026). In addition, in another case,

22 another state appellate court found Plaintiff “told two divergent stories: one to

23 the agency, but a different one in court.” Kuigoua v. Dep’t of Veteran Affairs,

24 101 Cal. App. 5th 499, 501 (2024).

25 In this action, Plaintiff seeks what he characterizes as prospective

26 declaratory and injunctive relief, stating the “case arises from two independent

27 but related constitutional violations,” that is, (1) the use of a 2023 BRN license

28 revocation proceeding to create “categorical barriers” to Plaintiff’s “nursing

1 licensure”; and (2) the 2023 BRN proceeding itself, which relied on findings

2 from the 2019 SPB proceeding that Plaintiff contends was constitutionally

3 infirm. Complaint, ¶¶ 1, 3. He alleges that the 2023 BRN revocation used the

4 doctrine of collateral estoppel to accept findings from the 2019 SBN proceeding,

5 at which Plaintiff was unrepresented and lacked sufficient time to prepare, all of

6 which were “constitutional[ly] inadequa[te].” Id., ¶¶ 5-6. He contends his union

7 initially provided counsel for the 2019 SPB proceeding, but such counsel failed

8 to adequately prepare and “[a]banon[ed]” him before the hearing, he was then

9 unable to obtain new counsel, and he did not have sufficient time to adequately

10 prepare for the SBP hearing. Id. at pp. 10-16. Plaintiff thus contends that the

11 SBP findings against him, which he does not fully specify, were constitutionally

12 infirm. Plaintiff then contends that a 2023 BRN proceeding that gave collateral

13 estoppel effect to those 2019 SPB findings resulted in the revocation of his

14 nursing license. Id., ¶¶ 44-51. Next, Plaintiff contends that on June 5, 2025, he

15 applied to take a Vocational Nurse Licensure by Examination with BVNPT,

16 but was told by telephone that “he could not proceed because of the severity of

17 the findings associated with his RN revocation and the related concern

18 regarding patient safety. Id., ¶ 54-55. Plaintiff avers, without specifying dates or

19 manner of communication, that “BVNPT has communicated a present

20 administrative position that prevents Plaintiff from proceeding with the

21 licensing examination pathway.” Id. Plaintiff also generally alleges that he

22 “faces a present barrier to obtaining licensure” in California and other states

23 due to his disciplinary history maintained by California. Id., ¶¶ 57-58.

24 Plaintiff asserts two claims based on alleged Fourteenth Amendment

25 procedural due process violations, both challenging the 2023 BRN’s reliance on

26 collateral estoppel to rely on findings from the 2019 SPB proceeding at which

27 Plaintiff was unrepresented due to his counsel “abandon[ing] him.” Complaint,

28 ¶¶ 65-76. He seeks declarations that “Defendants may not constitutionally treat

1 the 2023 RN revocation and SPB-derived findings as conclusive categorical

2 barriers” to Plaintiff’s nursing licensure pathways; “the [2023] BRN proceeding

3 violated procedural due process by applying collateral estoppel” to the 2019

4 SPB findings; and, the use of the 2019 “SPB-derived findings as conclusive

5 predicates” creating “professional barriers violates procedural due process.” Id.,

6 ¶¶ 77-79. Plaintiff also seeks injunctions barring Defendants from relying on the

7 2023 BRN findings to categorically bar Plaintiff from nursing application

8 pathways “unless and until constitutionally adequate process exists” as to the

9 findings made at the 2023 BRN proceeding. Id., ¶¶ 81-82.

10 II.

11 STANDARD OF REVIEW

12 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. See Gunn v. Minton,

13 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013). “A federal court is presumed to lack jurisdiction in a

14 particular case unless the contrary affirmatively appears.” Stock W., Inc. v.

15 Confederated Tribes of the Colville Rsrv., 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989).

16 The party asserting federal jurisdiction bears the burden of proving his case is

17 “properly in federal court.” See In re Ford Motor Co. / Citibank (S.D.), N.A.,

18 264 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2001).

19 Rule 12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure directs, “[i]f the

20 court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court

21 must dismiss the action.” Courts “have an independent obligation to determine

22 whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge

23 from any party.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006); Scholastic

24 Ent., Inc. v. Fox Ent. Grp., Inc., 336 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 2003); see also

25 Rule 12(h)(3). A complaint seeking relief against a defendant that is immune

26 from suit under the Eleventh Amendment is properly subject to dismissal sua

27 sponte under Rule 12(h)(3). See, e.g., Alexander v. Brown, 2025 WL 2678426,

28 at *7 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2025) (dismissing sua sponte claim against the State

1 of California under Rule 12(h)(3) due to Eleventh Amendment immunity)

2 adopted by 2025 WL 2675793 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2025).

3 Courts construe the allegations of pro se complaints liberally. Erickson v.

4 Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam); see also Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d

5 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (as amended). However, “a liberal interpretation of a

6 civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were

7 not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257

8 (9th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). In addition, although leave to amend is

9 normally liberally granted, if it is “absolutely clear that no amendment can

10 cure the defect,” even pro se pleadings may be dismissed without leave to

11 amend. Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam);

12 see also Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995).

13 III.

14 DISCUSSION

15 “The Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from hearing suits

16 brought against an unconsenting state.” Brooks v. Sulphur Springs Valley Elec.

17 Coop., 951 F.2d 1050, 1053 (9th Cir. 1991) (citing Pennhurst State Sch. &

18 Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 100 (1984)). California has not consented to

19 suit against it in federal court. See Dittman v. California, 191 F.3d 1020, 1025-

20 26 (9th Cir. 1999) (“California has not waived its Eleventh Amendment

21 immunity with respect to claims brought under § 1983 in federal court”); BV

22 Eng’g v. Univ. of Cal., L.A., 858 F.2d 1394, 1396 (9th Cir. 1988). Further,

23 Congress has not abrogated State sovereign immunity for civil rights actions.

24 See Dittman, 191 F.3d at 1026; L.A. Branch NAACP v. L.A. Unified Sch.

25 Dist., 714 F.2d 946, 950 (9th Cir. 1983).

26 Furthermore, an “official-capacity suit is, in all respects other than name,

27 to be treated as a suit against the entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,

28 166 (1985). Such a suit “is not a suit against the official personally, for the real

1 party in interest is the entity.” Id. The Eleventh Amendment “bars action

2 against state officers sued in their official capacities for past alleged misconduct

3 involving a complainant’s federally protected rights, where the nature of the

4 relief sought is retroactive . . . .” Bair v. Krug, 853 F.2d 672, 675 (9th Cir.

5 1988); see also Romano v. Bible, 169 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 1999) (The

6 Eleventh Amendment “prohibits actions for damages against an ‘official’s

7 office,’ that is, actions that are in reality suits against the state itself.”).

8 Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) provides an exception to Eleventh

9 Amendment immunity for prospective declaratory or injunctive relief against

10 state officers in their official capacity for alleged violations of federal law. See

11 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 465 U.S. at 102-06; Coal. to Defend

12 Affirmative Action v. Brown, 674 F.3d 1128, 1133-34 (9th Cir. 2012). But,

13 attempts to have prior state court proceedings declared void, is retroactive in

14 nature, and therefore, the Eleventh Amendment bars such relief. See

15 Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 465 U.S. at 105-06; see also Green v. Mansour,

16 474 U.S. 64, 73 (1985) (concluding claim for declaratory relief based on past

17 violations of federal law barred by the Eleventh Amendment); see also Becker

18 v. Oregon, 170 F. Supp. 2d 1061, 1067-68 (D. Or. 2001) (denying request for a

19 declaration that state official's past actions violated plaintiff's constitutional

20 rights because “[t]his type of relief is forbidden by the Eleventh Amendment”);

21 McCullom v. Alameda Cty. District Attorney’s Office, 2024 WL 4592356, at

22 *3 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 28, 2024) (dismissing § 1983 action, finding the Ex Parte

23 Young exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity did not apply to request

24 for prospective injunctive relief as the plaintiff did not allege he was facing any

25 current state proceedings); cf. City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111

26 (1983) (holding “equitable remedy is unavailable absent a showing of

27 irreparable injury, a requirement that cannot be met where there is no showing

28 of any real or immediate threat that the plaintiff will be wronged again . . . .

1 The speculative nature of [plaintiff's] claim of future injury requires a finding

2 that this prerequisite has not been fulfilled.”); Hodgers–Durgin v. de la Vina,

3 199 F.3d 1037, 1042 (9th Cir. 1999) (en banc) (“[A]bsent a threat of immediate

4 and irreparable harm, the federal courts should not enjoin a state to conduct its

5 business in a particular way.”).

6 Here, Defendants are state officials sued in their official capacity. Thus,

7 absent application of the exception to immunity provided by Ex Parte Young,

8 the action is subject to dismissal.

9 Despite Plaintiff’s conclusory assertions that he seeks only “prospective”

10 relief, in fact, Plaintiff states the case arises from “two independent but related

11 constitutional violations,” the 2023 BRN proceedings that relied on the 2019

12 SPB proceedings, and what Plaintiff avers is the current use of the 2023 BRN

13 proceedings to bar Plaintiff from nursing licensure. See Complaint, ¶ 3. With

14 respect to the first alleged “violation,” it is facially only retroactive and, as

15 such, does not fall within the exception to immunity provided by Ex Parte

16 Young. As to the other purported “constitutional” violation, that is, current

17 reliance on the 2023 BRN (and 2019 SBN) proceedings to bar Plaintiff from

18 future nursing relicensing, Plaintiff is, in essence, seeking to repackage years-

19 old alleged constitutional violations into “prospective” relief by vaguely

20 alleging ongoing harms. Less than a month ago, the Court rejected a nearly

21 identical attempt by Plaintiff to convert past alleged violations into a request

22 for “prospective” relief, noting the nature of the claims was almost entirely

23 retrospective. See Melby I, Dkt. 11 at 5; Dkt. 12. The allegations in the instant

24 Complaint fare no better. The “Factual Allegations” of the Complaint,

25 excluding legal arguments, are contained at Paragraphs 18-59. Of those 42

26 paragraphs, 35 (¶¶ 18-53) relate to the 2019 SBN and 2023 BRN proceedings;

27 only 6 (¶¶ 54-59), or 14%, recount events after those proceedings, and those are

28 largely limited to a telephone call in June 2025 with an unnamed person and

1 otherwise vague and conclusory assertions about Defendants’ “present . . .

2 position.” Further, like the allegations in Melby I, Plaintiff claims of current

3 “harm” are speculative. As to BVNPT, the only “harm” he alleges is that in

4 2025, an unspecified person told him that “he could not proceed” with his

5 application because of the severity of the 2023 BRN findings. But Plaintiff does

6 not allege he tried to take the licensing exam and was precluded. Nor does

7 Plaintiff allege any other specific attempts he has made to lift the revocation of

8 his RN through the BRN. His request for prospective relief is entirely

9 speculative and does not raise a justiciable case or controversy. See United

10 States v. Yepez, 108 F.4th 1093, 1099 (9th Cir.) (“Article III of the

11 Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts to ‘actual, ongoing cases or

12 controversies.’”) (citation omitted), cert denied, 145 S. Ct. 459 (2024). As

13 Plaintiff challenges only past alleged violations and does not seek viable

14 prospective relief as to any actual case or controversy, Ex Parte Young does

15 not apply. See, e.g., Green, 474 U.S. at 74; Becker, 170 F. Supp. 2d 1061 at

16 1067-68; McCullom, 2024 WL 4592356, at *3; cf. Lyons, 461 U.S. at 111

17 (1983); Hodgers–Durgin, 199 F.3d at 1042; (“[A]bsent a threat of immediate

18 and irreparable harm, the federal courts should not enjoin a state to conduct its

19 business in a particular way.”).

20 As noted, a pro se litigant is typically given leave to amend unless it is

21 absolutely clear that pleading deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment.

22 Lucas, 66 F.3d at 248. But if, after careful consideration, it is absolutely clear

23 that a complaint cannot be cured by amendment, the Court may dismiss

24 without leave to amend. See, e.g., Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox Int’l, LP, 300 F.3d

25 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that “there is no need to prolong the

26 litigation by permitting further amendment” where the “basic flaw” in the

27 pleading cannot be cured by amendment); Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. &

28 Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1130 (9th Cir. 2013) (“A district court may deny leave

1 amend when amendment would be futile.”). The Court notes here as part of

2 consideration of leave to amend that Plaintiff, including this case, has now

3 || filed five actions in this Court within a span of roughly six weeks (the Prior

4 Federal Actions, this action, and Kuigoua v. Ambrose, et al., 2:26-cv-06114-

5 ||PA-JDE)), including Melby I, which was substantively very similar to this

6 ||action, and each of those actions have now been dismissed for various pleading

7 defects. The Court also notes here and considers the findings in the Prior State

8 || Appellate Cases, set forth above, that Plaintiff repeatedly made frivolous

9 ||arguments, cited nonexistent cases, and made deceptive citations.

10 After careful consideration, it is absolutely clear that the basic flaw

11 |/cannot be cured by amendment. Further leave to amend is not warranted.

12 IV.

13 CONCLUSION AND ORDER

14 For the foregoing reasons, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction

15 || over the claims asserted in the Complaint. As such, the Court “must dismiss

16 action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

17 Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT this action is

18 || DISMISSED without prejudice and Judgment shall be entered accordingly.

4 || Dated: June 8, 2026 tll, Se

PERCY ANIDERSON

21 United States District Judge

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