Opinion

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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WESTERN DIVISION

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ARNO KUIGOUA, ) Case No. 2:26-cv-06114-PA-JDE

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13 Plaintiff, ) ) ORDER OF DISMISSAL

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SUZANNE AMBROSE, et al., )

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16 Defendants. )

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18 I.

19 INTRODUCTION

20 On June 5, 2026, Arno Kuidous (“Plaintiff”), proceeding pro se, filed a

21 Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, asserting three claims under

22 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Suzanne Ambrose, Jeff Macumber, and Monica

23 Erickson, each an official of the State of California named solely in an official

24 capacity (“Defendants”). Dkt. 1 (“Complaint”).

25 The Court recently dismissed three other complaints filed by Plaintiff

26 against state officials and/or private actors involved in 2019 State Personnel

27 Board (“SPB”) proceedings and related proceedings for failure to state a claim

28 and/or for seeking relief against immune defendants. See Kuigoua v. Melby, et

1 al., 2:26-cv-04362-PA-JDE; Kuigoua v. Park, et al., 2:26-cv-04365-PA-JDE;

2 Kuigoua v. Gavin Newsom, et al., 2:26-cv-04370-PA-JDE (collectively, “Prior

3 Federal Actions”).

4 As in the Prior Federal Actions, the Court takes judicial notice of the

5 following California Court of Appeal rulings in cases filed by Plaintiff (“Prior

6 State Appellate Cases”). In Kuigoua v. Park, 2025 WL 3139621 (Cal. Ct. App.

7 Nov. 10, 2025), in an appeal by Plaintiff of a dismissal of malpractice claims he

8 brought against his former attorney and his union relating to the 2019 SPB

9 proceedings, the appellate court dismissed the appeal as frivolous because

10 Plaintiff’s arguments were “not coherent” and because he repeatedly cited “to

11 legal authority that does not mention the proposition stated, stands for an

12 opposite proposition, or does not exist at all,” with the court providing “a small

13 sample of the deceptive, incorrect, or irrelevant legal citations in [Plaintiff’s]

14 briefs,” including several cases that “do not exist.” Id. at * 2-4 (citations

15 omitted). Further, roughly four months ago, in an unrelated case, a different

16 California appellate court found Plaintiff “has cited three apparently

17 nonexistent or miscited cases in his opening brief.” Kuigoua v. Sacks, 2026 WL

18 673409, at *1, n.1 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 10, 2026). In addition, in another case,

19 another state appellate court found Plaintiff “told two divergent stories: one to

20 the agency, but a different one in court.” Kuigoua v. Dep’t of Veteran Affairs,

21 101 Cal. App. 5th 499, 501 (2024).

22 In this action, Plaintiff seeks what he characterizes as “prospective”

23 declaratory and injunctive relief relating to a pending California State Workers’

24 Compensation Appeals Board proceeding, Case No. ADJ10026969 (“Current

25 State Proceeding”), set for trial on June 25, 2026, averring he “does not seek

26 through this action to enjoin, supervise, review, reverse, or direct any . . . state-

27 court proceeding.” Complaint, ¶¶ 2, 84-94. In particular, Plaintiff appears to

28 focus on the 2019 SPB proceedings that were the focus of the dismissed Prior

1 Federal Actions, seeking declarations and injunctions barring Defendants from

2 using the outcome of the 2019 SPB proceeding in the Current State Proceeding.

3 Id., ¶ 84, 86-91. Plaintiff describes the Current State Proceeding as a “remedial

4 workers’ compensation proceeding initiated by Plaintiff.” Id., ¶ 7. Plaintiff avers

5 that on April 9, 2026, an attorney for a California State agency “stated in

6 substance” that Plaintiff could not be reinstated even were he to prevail in the

7 Current State Proceeding because of the outcome of the 2019 SPB proceeding.

8 Id., ¶ 4. Plaintiff alleges that the outcome of the 2019 SPB proceeding should

9 not be used in other proceedings because “no state or administrative forum ever

10 adjudicated whether the documented abandonment of Plaintiff’s legal

11 representation in the 2019 SPB proceeding . . . caused Plaintiff’s dismissal and

12 its continuing disqualifying consequences.” Id., ¶ 5. Plaintiff complains that the

13 “consequences of that unresolved no-forum structure are not speculative,”

14 because the 2019 SPB proceeding are being used in “efforts to declare Plaintiff a

15 vexatious litigant and restrict his future court access.” Id., ¶ 6. He also avers

16 that the case presents a live case or controversy under Article III because the

17 Current State Proceeding has a June 25, 2026 trial date, and “the dismissal-

18 based reinstatement issue,” the “dismissal-based state employment

19 consequences,” and the “closed-loop result” of his alleged inability to obtain

20 judicial review of his malpractice/abandonment claims against his former

21 counsel in the 2019 SPB case “remain[ ] live.” Id., ¶ 13.

22 Plaintiff asserts three claims based on alleged Fourteenth Amendment

23 violations. First, he alleges his due process rights are being violated in the

24 Current State Proceeding by Defendants’ “maintaining the position that

25 Plaintiff’s prior dismissal [in the 2019 SPB action] and related consequences

26 may be treated as conclusive against him.” Complaint, ¶ 66. Second, he asserts

27 a due process violation by “the combined operation of established California

28 state procedures—specifically the interlocking operations of the SPB

1 procedures” and the Current State Proceedings “constitutes a systematic

2 procedural deprivation.” Id., 70. Third, Plaintiff asserts a “backward-looking”

3 claim for denial of access to courts stemming from his alleged “abandonment”

4 by his counsel in the 2019 SPB proceeding and the “combined operation of

5 interlocking jurisdictional and remedial rules that together closed every

6 available forum without reaching the merits.” Id., ¶ 76.

7 II.

8 STANDARD OF REVIEW

9 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. See Gunn v. Minton,

10 568 U.S. 251, 256 (2013). “A federal court is presumed to lack jurisdiction in a

11 particular case unless the contrary affirmatively appears.” Stock W., Inc. v.

12 Confederated Tribes of the Colville Rsrv., 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989).

13 The party asserting federal jurisdiction bears the burden of proving his case is

14 “properly in federal court.” See In re Ford Motor Co. / Citibank (S.D.), N.A.,

15 264 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2001).

16 Rule 12(h)(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure directs, “[i]f the

17 court determines at any time that it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court

18 must dismiss the action.” Courts “have an independent obligation to determine

19 whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, even in the absence of a challenge

20 from any party.” Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006); Scholastic

21 Ent., Inc. v. Fox Ent. Grp., Inc., 336 F.3d 982, 985 (9th Cir. 2003); see also

22 Rule 12(h)(3).

23 Courts construe the allegations of pro se complaints liberally. Erickson v.

24 Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam); see also Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d

25 338, 342 (9th Cir. 2010) (as amended). However, “a liberal interpretation of a

26 civil rights complaint may not supply essential elements of the claim that were

27 not initially pled.” Bruns v. Nat’l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257

28 (9th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). In addition, although leave to amend is

1 normally liberally granted, if it is “absolutely clear that no amendment can

2 cure the defect,” even pro se pleadings may be dismissed without leave to

3 amend. Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam);

4 see also Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995).

5 III.

6 DISCUSSION

7 As noted, Article III of the United States Constitution limits the

8 jurisdiction of federal courts to actual cases and controversies. “[T]he core

9 component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-

10 controversy requirement of Article III” and contains three elements: (1) the

11 plaintiff must have suffered an injury in fact that is concrete and particularized

12 and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) there must be a

13 causal connection between the injury and the challenged conduct; and (3) it is

14 likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a

15 favorable decision. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992); see

16 also DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 (2006).

17 For injunctive and declaratory relief, a plaintiff must show that he has

18 suffered or is threatened with a “‘concrete and particularized’ legal harm, . . .

19 coupled with ‘a sufficient likelihood that he will again be wronged in a similar

20 way.”” Canatella v. California, 304 F.3d 843, 852 (9th Cir. 2002) (as amended)

21 (citations omitted). To satisfy the plaintiff’s burden, the “threatened injury

22 must be certainly impending to constitute injury in fact, and . . . [a]llegations of

23 possible future injury are not sufficient.” Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568

24 U.S. 398, 409 (2013) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

25 Relatedly, the question of ripeness, which is drawn from both Article III

26 limitations on judicial power and from prudential reasons for refusing to

27 exercise jurisdiction, is “designed ‘to separate matters that are premature for

28 review because the injury is speculative and may never occur from those cases

1 that are appropriate for federal court action.’” Stockton v. Brown, 152 F.4th

2 1124, 1142 (9th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted).

3 Plaintiff bears the burden of proving his case is properly in federal court.

4 See In re Ford Motor Co. / Citbank (S.D.) , N.A., 264 F.3d at 957. Further,

5 this “court is presumed to lack jurisdiction in a particular case unless the

6 contrary affirmatively appears.” Stock W., Inc., 873 F.2d at 1225. Lastly, per

7 Rule 12(h)(3), the Court must dismiss the action if it determines it lacks subject

8 matter jurisdiction.

9 Plaintiff contends the case presents a live Article III case or controversy

10 because: (1) an opposing lawyer in the Current State Proceedings set forth his

11 position two months ago, “in substance,” that Plaintiff, even were he to prevail

12 in those proceedings, could not be reinstated due to the outcome of the 2019

13 SBP proceedings, proceedings Plaintiff contends violated his due process rights

14 because his lawyer “abandoned” him before trial; and (2) “Defendants and

15 litigants” in the Current State Proceedings are relying on the SBP proceedings

16 and findings in other proceedings “to seek or support vexatious-litigant

17 restrictions against Plaintiff.”

18 Plaintiff has not alleged he has standing, part of the core inquiry in

19 assessing whether a live case or controversy exists, because he does not

20 plausibly allege: (1) he has suffered an injury in fact that is concrete and

21 particularized and actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) it is

22 likely, as opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a

23 favorable decision. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61; DaimlerChrysler Corp, 547

24 U.S. at 342. Nor has he plausibly alleged, as he must to seek injunctive relief,

25 that he has suffered or is threatened with a “‘concrete and particularized’ legal

26 harm, . . .” (Canatella, 304 F.3d at 852), nor has he plausibly alleged that the

27 “threatened injury [is] certainly impending to constitute injury in fact . . . . [as

28 opposed to a]llegations of possible future injury [which] are not sufficient.”

1 Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409. Nor, for the consideration of ripeness, has Plaintiff

2 plausibly alleged anything beyond an alleged “‘injury [that] is speculative and

3 may never occur.’” Stockton, 152 F.4th at 1142.

4 In essence, Plaintiff complains about: (1) an argument one lawyer made,

5 one time, two months ago, about what might happen if Plaintiff wins the

6 Current State Proceeding; and (2) litigants relying on the SBP proceedings,

7 among several other proceedings, in seeking to have Plaintiff deemed a

8 vexatious litigant. Plaintiff’s arguments of harm are speculative, hypothetical,

9 and conditional. As to the lawyer’s argument, it is simply a lawyer advising an

10 adjudicator what position the lawyer would take if Plaintiff succeeded in the

11 Current State Proceedings. As to the vexatious litigant proceedings, the 2019

12 SPB proceeding is one of several proceedings on which “litigants” rely in

13 seeking such a designation for Plaintiff; those other proceedings including

14 some of the Prior State Appellate Cases noted above, in which courts found

15 Plaintiff made “frivolous” and “not coherent” arguments based on “deceptive,

16 incorrect, or irrelevant legal citations,” including several cases that “do not

17 exist,” and “told two divergent stories” to different adjudicators at different

18 times. Further, in each situation, the adjudicators have not decided the issues

19 and Plaintiff offers only conjecture as to how the adjudicators would rule.

20 Thus, Plaintiff offers only hypothetical, speculative future “injury” that

21 may never occur and he has not plausibly alleged that his alleged injury would

22 be redressed by a favorable ruling here. As to that final point, Plaintiff’s claims

23 are based on the initial premise that his attorney’s “abandonment” of him in

24 the 2019 SPB proceedings violated his civil rights; yet this Court has found, as

25 matter of law, that his attorney’s alleged conduct did not violate Plaintiff’s civil

26 rights. Kuigoua v. Park et al., 2:26-cv-04365-PA-JDE, Dkt. 12, 13. As such,

27 Plaintiff has not and cannot plausibly allege that his speculative allegations

28 herein will be redressed in a way favorable to him.

1 As noted, a pro se litigant is typically given leave to amend unless it is

2 absolutely clear that pleading deficiencies cannot be cured by amendment.

3 || Lucas, 66 F.3d at 248. But if, after careful consideration, it is absolutely clear

4 ||that a complaint cannot be cured by amendment, the Court may dismiss

5 || without leave to amend. See, e.g., Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox Int’l, LP, 300 F.3d

6 || 1083, 1088 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that “there is no need to prolong the

7 litigation by permitting further amendment” where the “basic flaw” in the

8 || pleading cannot be cured by amendment); Hartmann v. Cal. Dep’t of Corr. &

9 ||Rehab., 707 F.3d 1114, 1130 (9th Cir. 2013) (“A district court may deny leave

10 amend when amendment would be futile.”).

11 Here, after careful consideration, it is absolutely clear that the basic flaw

12 ||cannot be cured by amendment. As such, further leave to amend is not

13 || warranted.

14 IV.

I5 CONCLUSION AND ORDER

16 For the foregoing reasons, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction

17 || over the claims asserted in the Complaint. As such, the Court “must dismiss

18 ||the action.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

19 Therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT this action is

20 || DISMISSED without prejudice and Judgment shall be entered.accordingly.

97 |}Dated: June 8, 2026

PERCY ANDERSON

23 United States District Judge

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