Opinion

Ray

Court: District Court, E.D. California
Filed: May 12, 2026
Cited by: 0 cases
Authority: More cited than 41.6%

The opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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SHANNON RAY, KHALA TAYLOR, PETER No. 1:23-cv-425 WBS CSK

13 ROBINSON, KATHERINE SEBANNE, and

RUDY BARAJAS, individually and

14 on behalf of all those similarly

situated, MEMORANDUM AND ORDER RE:

15 PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR FINAL

Plaintiffs, APPROVAL OF CLASS ACTION

16 SETTLEMENT; AND MOTION FOR

v. ATTORNEYS’ FEES, COSTS, AND

17 SERVICE AWARDS

NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC

18 ASSOCIATION, an unincorporated

association,

Defendant.

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Plaintiffs Shannon Ray, Khala Taylor, Peter Robinson,

Katherine Sebbane, and Rudy Barajas brought this class action

against defendant National Collegiate Athletic Association

(“NCAA”), alleging violations of Section 1 of the Sherman

Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1. (Docket No. 84 (Second Am.

Compl.).) On March 11, 2025, the court certified the proposed

1 class in this action. (See Docket No. 128 (Order Certifying

Class) at 27.) Subsequently, this court granted plaintiffs’

motion for preliminary approval of a class action settlement.

(Docket No. 163 (Prelim. Approval Order).)

Now Plaintiffs move for final approval of the class

action settlement (Docket No. 171 (Pls.’ Mot. for Final

Approval)), as well as for approval of attorneys’ fees, costs,

and service awards (Docket No. 172 (Pls.’ Mot. for Fees)).

I. Motion for Final Approval of Class Action Settlement

The Ninth Circuit has declared a strong judicial policy

favoring settlement of class actions. Class Plaintiffs v. City

of Seattle, 955 F.2d 1268, 1276 (9th Cir. 1992); see also

Rodriguez v. W. Publ’g Corp., 563 F.3d 948, 965 (9th Cir. 2009)

(“We put a good deal of stock in the product of an arms-length,

non-collusive, negotiated resolution[.]”) (citation omitted).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e) provides that “[t]he

claims, issues, or defenses of a certified class may be settled

. . . only with the court’s approval.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e).

“Approval under 23(e) involves a two-step process in

which the Court first determines whether a proposed class action

settlement deserves preliminary approval and then, after notice

is given to class members, whether final approval is warranted.”

Nat’l Rural Telecomms. Coop. v. DIRECTV, Inc., 221 F.R.D. 523,

525 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (citing Manual for Complex Litig. (Third),

§ 30.41 (1995)). This court satisfied step one by granting

plaintiffs’ unopposed motion for preliminary approval of class

action settlement on January 6, 2026. (See Prelim. Approval

1 Order.) Now, following notice to the class members, the court

will consider whether final approval is merited by evaluating:

(1) the treatment of this litigation as a class action and (2)

the terms of the settlement. See Diaz v. Tr. Territory of Pac.

Islands, 876 F.2d 1401, 1408 (9th Cir. 1989).

A. Class Certification

To be certified, a putative class must satisfy the

requirements of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b).

Leyva v. Medline Indus. Inc., 716 F.3d 510, 512 (9th Cir. 2013).

Rule 23(a) restricts class actions to cases where: “(1)

the class is so numerous that joinder of all members is

impracticable [numerosity]; (2) there are questions of law or

fact common to the class [commonality]; (3) the claims or

defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims

or defenses of the class [typicality]; and (4) the representative

parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the

class [adequacy of representation].” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).

After fulfilling the threshold requirements of Rule

23(a), the proposed class must satisfy the requirements of one of

the three subdivisions of Rule 23(b). Leyva, 716 F.3d at 512.

Under Rule 23(b)(3), a class action may be maintained only if (1)

“the court finds that questions of law or fact common to class

members predominate over questions affecting only individual

members” and (2) “that a class action is superior to other

available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the

controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).

On March 11, 2025, the court certified a class

1 consisting of “[a]ll persons who, from March 17, 2019, to June

30, 2023, worked for an NCAA Division I sports program other than

baseball in the position of ‘volunteer coach,’ as designated by

NCAA Bylaws.” (See Order Certifying Class at 27.) At the time

of certification, the class was estimated to contain

approximately some 7,718 members. (See Docket No. 159-2 (Decl.

of Dr. Orley Ashenfelter (Dr. Ashenfelter Decl.)) ¶ 10.)

In its order certifying the class, the court found that

the putative class satisfied the Rule 23(a) requirements. (See

Order Certifying Class at 11—16.) The court found also that both

the predominance and superiority prerequisites of Rule 23(b)(3)

were satisfied. (Id. at 25—26.) The court is unaware of any

changes that would affect its conclusions as to Rule 23(a) or

Rule 23(b), and the parties have not indicated that they are

aware of any such developments.

B. Notice

Once a class is certified under Rule 23(b)(3), the

court “must direct to class members the best notice that is

practicable under the circumstances, including individual notice

to all members who can be identified through reasonable effort.”

Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B). Rule 23(c)(2) governs both the form

and content of a proposed notice. See Ravens v. Iftikar, 174

F.R.D. 651, 658 (N.D. Cal. 1997) (citing Eisen v. Carlisle &

Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 172–77 (1974)). Although that notice

must be “reasonably certain to inform the absent members of the

plaintiff class,” actual notice is not required. Silber v.

Mabon, 18 F.3d 1449, 1454 (9th Cir. 1994) (citation omitted).

1 Plaintiffs’ counsel provided the court with a proposed

email notice and proposed postcard notice to be sent to class

members, as well as media notices. (See Docket No. 159-3 (Decl.

of Elaine Pang (Pang Decl.)) at 3-14.) The notices explained the

proceedings, defined the scope of the class, and explained what

the settlement provides and the minimum amount each class member

can expect to receive in compensation. (See id.) The notices

further explained the opt-out procedure, the procedure for

objecting to the settlement, and the date and location of the

final approval hearing. (See id.) The content of the notices

therefore satisfies Rule 23(c)(2)(B). See Fed. R. Civ. P.

23(c)(2)(B); Churchill Vill., L.L.C. v. Gen. Elec., 361 F.3d 566,

575 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Notice is satisfactory if it ‘generally

describes the terms of the settlement in sufficient detail to

alert those with adverse viewpoints to investigate and to come

forward and be heard.’”) (quoting Mendoza v. Tucson Sch. Dist.

No. 1, 623 F.2d 1338, 1352 (9th Cir. 1980)).

The parties selected A.B. Data, Ltd.’s Class Action

Administration Company (“A.B. Data”) to serve as the Settlement

Administrator. (See Prelim. Approval Order at 11.) The class

was notified by the Settlement Administrator “via email, a

postcard summary notice via first-class U.S. mail, and the long-

form notice posted on the settlement website.” (Pls.’ Mot. for

Final Approval at 9.) Emails were sent to class members with

last-known or otherwise identifiable email addresses, and first-

class mail was sent to class members with last-known physical

addresses. (Docket No. 171-1 (Decl. of Eric J. Miller (Miller

1 Decl.)) at ¶¶ 7—11.) Any UAA Postcard Notice that the USPS

returned as undeliverable was re-sent after contact information

was verified and updated, and where no forwarding address was

provided, A.B. Data conducted a search for a forwarding address.

(Id.) Email notices were also re-sent after follow-up

communications with class members. (Id.) Class Counsel further

contacted class members to ensure they knew about the settlement

and encouraged them to submit information via the settlement

website. (Docket No. 173 (Joint Decl.) at ¶ 38.)

The court appreciates the thorough efforts taken by the

parties to effectuate notice and is satisfied that the notice

procedure was “reasonably calculated, under all the

circumstances,” to apprise all class members of the proposed

settlement. See Roes, 1-2 v. SFBSC Mgmt., LLC, 944 F.3d 1035,

1045–46 (9th Cir. 2019).

C. Settlement Terms

Having determined in its March 2025 order that class

treatment is warranted, the court at this stage now need only

address whether the terms of the parties’ settlement appear fair,

adequate, and reasonable. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). To

determine the fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness of the

agreement, Rule 23(e) requires the court to consider four

factors: “(1) the class representatives and class counsel have

adequately represented the class; (2) the proposal was negotiated

at arm’s length; (3) the relief provided for the class is

adequate; and (4) the proposal treats class members equitably

relative to each other.” Id. The Ninth Circuit has also

1 identified eight additional factors the court may consider, many

of which overlap substantially with Rule 23(e)’s four factors:

The strength of the plaintiff’s case; the risk,

expense, complexity, and likely duration of further

litigation; the risk of maintaining class action

status throughout the trial; the amount offered in

settlement; the extent of discovery completed and the

stage of the proceedings; the experience and views of

counsel; the presence of a governmental participant;

and the reaction of the class members to the proposed

settlement.

Hanlon v. Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1026 (9th Cir. 1998).

1. Adequate Representation

The court must first consider whether “the class

representatives and class counsel have adequately represented the

class.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(A). This analysis is

“redundant of the requirements of Rule 23(a)(4) . . . .” Hudson

v. Libre Tech., Inc., No. 3:18-cv-1371 GPC KSC, 2020 WL 2467060,

at *5 (S.D. Cal. May 13, 2020) (quoting 4 Newberg on Class

Actions § 13:48 (5th ed.)); see also In re GSE Bonds Antitr.

Litig., 414 F. Supp. 3d 686, 701 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (noting

similarity of inquiries under Rule 23(a)(4) and Rule

23(e)(2)(A)).

Because the Court has found that the class satisfied

Rule 23(a)(4) at the class certification stage (Order Certifying

Class at 14—16), the adequacy factor under Rule 23(e)(2)(A) here

is also met. See Hudson, 2020 WL 2467060, at *5.

2. Negotiation of the Settlement Agreement

This action was filed in March 2023. (See Pls.’ Mot.

for Final Approval at 8.) The court disposed of NCAA’s motions

to dismiss and transfer venue in 2023. (See Docket No. 38 (Order

1 Den. Def.’s Mot. to Transfer & Dismiss).) In the summer of 2024,

the parties engaged in mediation but to no avail, being unable to

reach a resolution “or even make meaningful progress.” (Pls.’

Mot. for Final Approval at 14.) Following their unsuccessful

2024 mediation, the parties engaged in substantial further

litigation in the form of extensive discovery and motion

practice. (Id.) Settlement discussions between the parties did

not resume until September 2025. (Id.)

In the roughly one-year period between the first and

second settlement talks, the parties’ vigorous prosecution of

this case included filings for (a) discovery motions and requests

to seal (Docket Nos. 86, 87, 89, 91, 93, 101, 112—115, 119—124,

129, 152); (b) a motion to file a second amended complaint

(Docket Nos. 82, 84); (c) class certification proceedings (Docket

Nos. 85, 94, 95, 102—105, 111, 128); (d) a petition for appeal

(Docket No. 131); and (e) motions for partial summary judgment

(Docket Nos. 144, 150, 151, 153). At the same time, the parties

also conducted formal and informal discovery and worked closely

with experts and economists. (Pls.’ Mot. for Final Approval at

13.)

As a result of zealously litigating this case, the

parties developed “clarity and certainty about the strength[s]

and risks of Plaintiffs’ claims and the potential damages in the

case” by the time settlement discussions resumed. (Id. at 14.)

“After near-daily discussions and exchanges of proposals over the

course of ten days resulted in considerable progress,” the

parties agreed to engage the services of a professional mediator.

1 (Id.) On October 10, 2025, Mr. Miles Ruthberg of Phillips ADR

facilitated the parties’ negotiations in a full-day mediation

that -- along with subsequent additional negotiations -- resulted

in the settlement agreement now before the court. (Id.)

Plaintiffs argue that “[t]he extensive and informed

negotiations between the parties and the assistance of an

experienced mediator confirm that the settlement resulted from

arm’s-length negotiations.” (Id.) The court agrees.

Given the parties’ representation that the settlement

reached was the product of arms-length negotiation, facilitated

by a mediator, and conducted against the backdrop of two and a

half years of vigorous litigation and discovery, the court finds

that the proposed settlement is the result of informed and non-

collusive negotiations between the parties. See In re Anthem,

Inc. Data Breach Litig., 327 F.R.D. 299, 327 (N.D. Cal. 2018);

see also La Fleur v. Med. Mgmt. Int’l, Inc., No. 13-cv-00398,

2014 WL 2967475, at *4-5 (C.D. Cal. June 25, 2014).

3. Adequate Relief

In determining whether a settlement agreement provides

adequate relief for the class, the court must “take into account

(i) the costs, risks, and delay of trial and appeal; (ii) the

effectiveness of any proposed method of distributing relief to

the class, including the method of processing class-member

claims; (iii) the terms of any proposed award of attorney’s fees,

including timing of payment; and (iv) any [other] agreement[s]”

made in connection with the proposal. See Fed. R. Civ. P.

23(e)(2)(C); Baker v. SeaWorld Entm’t, Inc., No. 14-cv-02129-MMA-

1 AGS, 2020 WL 4260712, at *6-8 (S.D. Cal. Jul. 24, 2020).

The court notes that, in evaluating whether the

settlement provides adequate relief, it must consider several of

the same factors outlined in Hanlon, including the strength of

the plaintiffs’ case; the risk, expense, complexity, and likely

duration of further litigation; the risk of maintaining class

action status throughout the trial; and the amount offered in

settlement. See Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026.

In determining whether a settlement agreement is

substantively fair to class members, the court must balance the

value of expected recovery against the value of the settlement

offer. See In re Tableware Antitrust Litig., 484 F. Supp. 2d

1078, 1080 (N.D. Cal. 2007). When a settlement was reached prior

to class certification, it is subject to heightened scrutiny for

purposes of final approval, wherein the recommendations of

plaintiffs’ counsel are not given a presumption of reasonableness

but rather are subject to close review. See In re Apple Inc.

Device Performance Litig., 50 F.4th 769, 782—83 (9th Cir. 2022).

Here, the class was certified almost seven months to the day

before settlement negotiations began. (See Order Certifying

Class.) Because the settlement proposed here was not reached

prior to class certification, such heightened scrutiny is not

necessary. See In re Apple, 50 F.4th at 782—83.

Plaintiffs’ expert calculated the aggregate damages

suffered by class members from lost wages to be $253,900,000.00,

and the total from lost wages as well as lost health benefits to

be $299,600,000.00. (Dr. Ashenfelter Decl. at ¶ 9.) The common

1 settlement fund is $303,000,000.00, which translates to

approximately 119% of the estimated damages from lost wages and

101% of the calculated damages for lost wages and health

benefits. (See Pls.’ Mot. for Final Approval at 9.) Plaintiffs

propose to allocate that amount as follows: (1) $208,375,652.62

in payments to class members; (2) $90,900,000.00 for plaintiffs’

counsel’s fees and $3,599,347.38 for costs and expenses; and (3)

$125,000.00 in incentive awards to be split equally among the

five named plaintiffs. (See id. at 2-3.)

The portion of the settlement allocated to class member

payments -- $208,375,652.62 -- constitutes approximately 68.77%

of the maximum valuation. This represents a strong result for

the class and is comfortably within the range of percentage

recoveries that California courts have found to be reasonable.

See Cavazos v. Salas Concrete, Inc., No. 1:19-cv-62 DAD EPG, 2022

WL 2918361, at *6 (E.D. Cal. July 25, 2022) (collecting cases).

Based on these figures, the average payment per class member is

$26,998.66. This five-figure payout also represents a strong

result for the class.

Each class member’s individual share of the settlement

will be determined by the school, sport, and year(s) in which he

or she worked” where an individual class member’s “allocation

will be based on the actual compensation paid during the class

period to the lowest-compensated, non-wage-fixed coach who worked

on the same team at the same time.” (Pls.’ Mot. for Final

Approval at 13—14.) Or, in rare cases where this method is not

an option due to limited data, based on an estimate. (Id. at

1 14.)

Plaintiffs faced numerous hurdles in this antitrust

litigation, including proving all elements of the claims,

obtaining and maintaining class certification, establishing

liability, and the costliness of litigation and potential appeals

on these issues.

In light of the risks associated with further

litigation and the relative strength of defendant’s arguments,

the court finds that the value of the settlement counsels in

favor of granting final approval. The court further finds the

method of processing class member claims to be adequate. The

court is also satisfied that counsel’s requested fees are

reasonable and support approval of the settlement, which it will

address in greater detail below.

4. Equitable Treatment of Class Members

Finally, the court must consider whether the Settlement

Agreement “treats class members equitably relative to each

other.” See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(D). In doing so, the court

determines whether the settlement “improperly grant[s]

preferential treatment to class representatives or segments of

the class.” Hudson, 2020 WL 2467060, at *9 (quoting Tableware,

484 F. Supp. at 1079).

Here, the Settlement Agreement does not improperly

discriminate between any segments of the class, as all class

members are entitled to monetary relief based on the amount of

time worked as a volunteer coach and the school for which the

class member worked. (See Pls.’ Mot. for Prelim. Approval at 13—

1 22.) The Settlement Agreement aims to make class members whole

and so calculates the awards due to each member individually,

applying formulas and methodologies that “fairly reflect the

contours of the labor market and the but-for compensation each

Class Member would have received absent the Wage Fix.” (Pls.’

Mot. for Final Approval at 22; see also Docket No. 171-2 (Plan of

Allocation) at ¶ 10.)

Payments may differ as between individual class

members, but that is not a function of preferential treatment or

other improper discrimination between class segments because

payments to class members are individually calculated using the

same formula. (Plan of Allocation at ¶¶ 11—14.) Any differences

in the awards distributed to individual class members will result

not from inequitable treatment in the Settlement Agreement, but

from differences in the underlying damages suffered by individual

claimants. (Pls.’ Mot. for Final Approval at 22.) The court

finds this is a relevant difference and does not undermine a

finding if equitable treatment as required under Rule

23(e)(2)(D).

Also, the court notes that the Settlement Agreement and

the Plan of Allocation include various procedural and structural

protections that further serve to guarantee equitable treatment

of and between class members.

First, the agreement sets a compensation floor whereby

all class members are guaranteed to receive no less than

$5,000.00. (Pls.’ Mot. for Final Approval at 22.) The formulas

and processes to be used in calculating an individual class

1 member’s award include a “scaled recognized loss” whereby an

individual class member’s award will be “scaled up” to $5,000.00

if the initial calculation of their damages falls below that

threshold. (Plan of Allocation at ¶ 13.)

Second, the Plan of Allocation provides that the

Settlement Administrator will prepare a “Distribution Report”

that will contain, among other information, (i) “a list of

purported Class Members who filed Claim Forms that were rejected

and the reasons for the rejections”; (ii) “a list of challenges

(if any) to the Claim Forms that were rejected and the reasons

for rejecting the challenges”; and (iii) “the date any such

Claimant whose challenge was rejected was informed by A.B. Data

of that rejection.” (Id. at ¶ 17.)

Third, the Plan of Allocation also provides class

members with terms outlining resolution of any disputes that

arise between claimants and the Claims Administrator. (Id. at ¶¶

26—29.) These procedures further formalize the procedures

whereby the Claims Administrator will apprise a claimant of his

or her rights to challenge decisions of the Claims Administrator

in court. (Id.)

Finally, the court finds the Settlement Agreement does

not treat class members and class representatives in an

inequitable manner. As the court discusses in greater detail

below, see discussion infra Section II.C., the Settlement

Agreement treats class members and class representatives the same

except only for the proposed service awards, but those award

amounts are less than the average settlement payment per class

1 member whether calculated in gross or after deducting fees, id.

Accordingly, the court finds the Settlement Agreement

satisfies the equitable treatment requirements imposed under Rule

23. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2)(D).

5. Remaining Hanlon Factors

In addition to the factors already considered as part

of the court’s analysis under Rule 23(e)(A)-(D), the court must

also examine “the extent of the discovery completed . . ., the

presence of government participation, and the reaction of class

members to the proposed settlement.” Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026.

As explained above, counsel engaged in thorough

informal and formal discovery. This factor thus weighs in favor

of final approval of the settlement.

The seventh Hanlon factor pertains to government

participation. See Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026. As there is no

government participation in this case, this factor is neutral.

The eighth Hanlon factor, the reaction of the class

members to the proposed settlement, also weighs in favor of final

approval. See Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1026. The class has expressed

“enthusiastic support . . . sharing the many ways in which the

substantial relief provided by the Settlement . . . will have

life-changing impacts.” (See Pls.’ Mot. for Final Approval at

1.) At the time of filing, only 12 class members had opted out

and none had objected. (Miller Decl. at ¶ 21.)

In sum, the four factors that the court must evaluate

under Rule 23(e) and the eight Hanlon factors, taken as a whole,

weigh heavily in favor of approving the settlement. The court

1 will therefore grant final approval of the Settlement Agreement.

II. Motion for Attorneys’ Fees, Costs, and Service Awards

A. Attorneys’ Fees

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(h) provides, “[i]n a

certified class action, the court may award reasonable attorney’s

fees and nontaxable costs that are authorized by law or by the

parties’ agreement.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h). If a negotiated

class action settlement includes an award of attorneys’ fees,

that fee award must be evaluated in the overall context of the

settlement. Knisley v. Network Assocs., 312 F.3d 1123, 1126 (9th

Cir. 2002); Monterrubio v. Best Buy Stores, L.P., 291 F.R.D. 443,

455 (E.D. Cal. 2013) (England, J.). The court “ha[s] an

independent obligation to ensure that the award, like the

settlement itself, is reasonable, even if the parties have

already agreed to an amount.” In re Bluetooth Headset Prod.

Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 941 (9th Cir. 2011).

“Under the ‘common fund’ doctrine, ‘a litigant or a

lawyer who recovers a common fund for the benefit of persons

other than himself or his client is entitled to a reasonable

attorney’s fee from the fund as a whole.’” Staton v. Boeing Co.,

327 F.3d 938, 967 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Boeing Co. v. Van

Gemert, 444 U.S. 472, 478 (1980)). In common fund cases, the

district court has discretion to determine the amount of

attorneys’ fees to be drawn from the fund by employing either the

percentage method or the lodestar method. Id. The court may

also use one method as a “cross-check[ ]” upon the other method.

See Bluetooth Headset, 654 F.3d at 944.

1 Like other complex antitrust class actions, this case

presented both counsel and the class with a risk of no recovery

at all, as already discussed above. Plaintiffs’ counsel took on

this matter on a contingency basis. (Pls.’ Mot. for Fees at 2.)

The nature of contingency work inherently carries risks that

counsel will sometimes recover very little to nothing at all,

even for cases that may be meritorious. See Kimbo v. MXD Group,

Inc., No. 2:19-cv-166 WBS KNJ, 2021 WL 492493, at *7 (E.D. Cal.

Feb. 10, 2021).

Where counsel succeed in vindicating rights on behalf

of a class, they depend on recovering a reasonable percentage-of-

the-fund fee award to enable them to take on similar risks in

future cases. See id. Plaintiffs’ counsel argues that, in light

of the result obtained and substantial risk taken in this case, a

$90,900,000.00 fee constituting 30% of the fund is reasonable.

(See Pls.’ Mot. for Fees at 2.) To support their position,

plaintiffs cite numerous antitrust class action cases in this

circuit -- awarding below and above $100 million -- wherein

attorneys’ fees exceeded 30% of the common fund. (See id. at 14—

15.)

The Ninth Circuit has established 25% of the fund as

the “benchmark” award that should be given in common fund cases.

Six (6) Mexican Workers v. Ariz. Citrus Growers, 904 F.2d 1301,

1311 (9th Cir. 1990). But as plaintiffs point out, “courts in

this circuit have approved fees that exceeded that benchmark in

many cases.” Osegueda v. Northern California Inalliance, No. 18-

cv-835 WBS EFB, 2020 WL 4194055, at *6 (E.D. Cal. July 21, 2020)

1 (citation modified). “A fees award amounting to ‘33 1/3% of the

total settlement value’ is considered ‘acceptable.’” Id. at *6;

see also Watson v. Tennant Co., No. 2:18-cv-2462 WBS DB, 2020 WL

5502318, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Sep. 11, 2020) (awarding 33.33% of

settlement fund). Given that the requested fee is in line with

the typical practice in the Ninth Circuit and in this district,

the court agrees that plaintiffs’ counsel’s requested percentage

of the common fund is reasonable.

“Calculation of the lodestar, which measures the

lawyers’ investment of time in the litigation, provides a check

on the reasonableness of the percentage award.” Vizcaino v.

Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1050 (9th Cir. 2002). See In re

Bluetooth Headset, 654 F.3d at 941-42. As part of this lodestar

calculation, the court may consider factors such as the “level of

success” or “results obtained” by plaintiffs’ counsel. See id.

To determine whether counsel has employed a “reasonable

hourly rate” for purposes of calculating the lodestar amount, the

court must look to the “prevailing market rates in the relevant

community.” Gonzalez v. City of Maywood, 729 F.3d 1196, 1206

(9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Blum v. Stenson, 465 886, 895 (9th Cir.

2001)). “Generally, when determining a reasonable hourly rate,

the relevant community is the forum in which the district court

sits.” Id. (quoting Prison Legal News v. Schwarzenegger, 608

F.3d 446, 454 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks

omitted)). Within this geographic community, the district court

should “tak[e] into consideration the experience, skill, and

reputation of the attorney [or paralegal].” Dang v. Cross, 422

1 F.3d 800, 813 (9th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Plaintiffs direct the court’s attention to an exception

to the local forum rule, whereby a non-local rate “may be used if

local counsel was unavailable, either because they are unwilling

or unable to perform because they lack the degree of experience,

expertise, or specialization to properly handle the case.” Smart

v. Nat'l Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, No. 2:22-cv-2125 WBS CSK,

2025 WL 1248794, at *7 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2025) (quoting Barjon

v. Dalton, 132 F.3d 496, 500 (9th Cir. 1997)). Counsel argue

that the reasoning this court applied in Smart also applies in

here because “this case was likewise a large, complex antitrust

matter (indeed, larger and arguably more complex than Smart).”

(Pls.’ Mot. for Fees at 18—19.) Thus, counsel argue that

“[u]sing a non-local rate is especially appropriate in large,

complex antitrust cases, which require a high degree of

specialization and a level of risk that few law firms are willing

to take on.” (Id. at 18.)

Counsel represent that they have dedicated a combined

total of over 35,622.50 hours of work to this case. (Joint Decl.

at ¶ 45.) They have also submitted billing summary charts to

confirm this number. (Docket Nos. 172-1 at 6, 172-2 at 9, 172-3

at 6, 172-4 at 1.)

Across their firms, the typical hourly rates for the

partners working on this case were $925.00 to $1,400.00, while

the typical rates for the non-partner associates ranged from

$400.00 to $850.00. (Docket Nos. 172-1 at 6, 172-2 at 9, 172-3

at 6, 172-4 at 1.) Counsel represent that these rates are

1 “reasonable and in line with rates charged for similarly large

and complex work by professionals with similar levels of

experience and comparable reputations.” (Joint Decl. at ¶ 49

(citing Smart v. NCAA, No. 2:22-cv-02125-WBS-CSK (E.D. Cal. July

2, 2025), Dkt. No. 82-1 at 34).)

According to counsel, “[t]here are relatively few

plaintiff-side complex litigation firms that specialize in large

antitrust cases and are willing to front the substantial attorney

time and expenses to litigate a nationwide case of this scale.”

(Joint Decl. at ¶ 49.) Yet, here, the firms representing the

class all “specialize in litigating nationwide antitrust cases.”

(Id.) More pertinently, counsel argue that “[f]ew practicing

attorneys could offer that first-hand experience with litigating

these types of claims, on behalf of a similar class of coaches,

against the same defendant.” (Id. at ¶ 50.) Finally, counsel

represents that the result achieved in this action –- more than

100% of alleged damages -- supports the requested fees. (See

Pls.’ Mot. for Fees at 7.)

In light of the evidence presented of counsels’

reputation in litigating matters of this kind, alongside the

skill and specialization put to use in achieving the exceptional

result in this case and the lack of available local counsel, the

court is satisfied that a non-local rate is appropriate and thus

that counsel’s requested rate is reasonable.

Counsel have provided a list of attorneys who worked on

the matter along with their rates and hours worked. (Docket Nos.

172-1 at 6, 172-2 at 9, 172-3 at 6, 172-4 at 1.) Based on

1 35,622.50 hours billed at the stipulated rates, the lodestar

figure is $26,662,017.50. The requested amount of $90,900,000.00

exceeds the lodestar figure by a factor of 3.41. However, this

multiplier is within the acceptable range for a case this complex

and is, therefore, reasonable. Ziegler v. GW Pharmaceuticals,

PLC, No. 21-cv-1019 BAS MSB, 2024 WL 1470532 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 3,

2024) (affirming fee award with lodestar multiplier of 2.87); see

also Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1051 (9th Cir.

2002) (same, with 3.65).

Accordingly, the court finds the requested fees to be

reasonable and will grant counsel’s motion for attorneys’ fees.

B. Costs

“There is no doubt that an attorney who has created a

common fund for the benefit of the class is entitled to

reimbursement of reasonable litigation expenses from that fund.”

In re Heritage Bond Litig., No. 02-cv-1475, 2005 WL 1594403, at

*23 (C.D. Cal. June 10, 2005). Costs may be recovered where they

“have been adequately documented and reasonably incurred for the

benefit of the class.” Odrick v. UnionBancal Corp., No. C 10-

5565 SBA, 2012 WL 6019495 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 3, 2012).

Counsel’s litigation expenses and costs total

$3,599,347.38. (Joint Decl. at ¶¶ 53—54.) These expenses

include research fees, expert consultation fees, travel expenses,

transcript fees, service fees, mediation fees, and other court

costs. (Id.) Counsel has documented these costs and shown their

benefit to the class. (See id. at ¶ 55.) The court finds these

are reasonable litigation expenses. Therefore, the court will

1 grant class counsel’s request for costs in the amount of

$3,599,347.38.

C. Service Award

“Incentive awards are fairly typical in class action

cases.” Rodriguez, 563 F.3d at 958. These awards are

“particularly appropriate in wage-and-hour actions where a

plaintiff undertakes a significant reputational risk by bringing

suit against his or her former employers.” Wagner v. Cnty. of

Inyo, No. 1:17-cv-969 DAD JLT, 2018 WL 5099761, at *7 (E.D. Cal.

Oct. 18, 2018) (citing Rodriguez, 563 F.3d at 958–59).

Nevertheless, the Ninth Circuit has cautioned that

“district courts must be vigilant in scrutinizing all incentive

awards to determine whether they destroy the adequacy of the

class representatives . . . .” Radcliffe v. Experian Info.

Solutions, Inc., 715 F.3d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 2013). In the

Ninth Circuit, an incentive award of $5,000.00 is presumptively

reasonable. Davis v. Brown Shoe Co., Inc., No. 1:13-cv-1211 LJO

BAM, 2015 WL 6697929, at *11 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 3, 2015).

In assessing the reasonableness of incentive payments,

the court should consider “the actions the plaintiff has taken to

protect the interests of the class, the degree to which the class

has benefitted from those actions” and “the amount of time and

effort the plaintiff expended in pursuing the litigation.”

Staton v. Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 977 (9th Cir. 2003) (citation

omitted).

Although a $5,000.00 award is considered presumptively

reasonable, in this circuit service awards are by no means capped

1 at $5,000.00. Courts can, and many do, approve incentive awards

that are far larger. Van Franken v. Atl. Richfield Co., 901 F.

Supp. 294, 300 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (authorizing an incentive award

in the amount of $50,000.00); In re College Athlete NIL Litig.,

2025 WL 3171376, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 11, 2025) (approving

service awards of $125,000.00 for each of three class

representatives); Le v. Zuffa, LLC, No. 15-cv-1045, ECF 1065 at 5

(D. Nev. Mar. 3, 2025) (granting service awards of $250,000.00

for each of the five class representatives).

To evaluate whether an uncommonly large award is

appropriate, some of the factors that courts consider include

“the actions the plaintiff has taken to protect the interest of

the class, the degree to which the class has benefited from those

actions, [and] the amount of time and effort the plaintiff

expended in pursuing the litigation.” Staton, 327 F.3d at 977

(quoting Cook v. Niedert, 142 F.3d 1004, 1016 (7th Cir. 1998)).

A court may also take into consideration the level of

risk the class representatives faced by filing suit and by

representing the class. See Dyer v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 303

F.R.D. 326, 335 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (granting approval of a service

award partly because the class representatives “risked their

professional reputation as well as the possibility of

retaliation.”). Ultimately, the court must balance “the number

of named plaintiffs receiving incentive payments, the proportion

of the payments relative to the settlement amount, and the size

of each payment.” Id.

Here, plaintiffs seek $25,000.00 incentive awards for

1 each of the five named plaintiffs, totaling $125,000.00. (See

Pls.’ Mot. for Fees at 21-26.) Noting the unusually large amount

of the requested service awards and the number of awards sought,

at the preliminary approval stage, this court advised that to

receive final approval, plaintiffs’ counsel needed to “provide a

more substantial report . . . of the class representatives’

contributions to this action meriting the requested award amounts

which should also explain the necessity for having five

representatives.” (Prelim. Approval Order at 11.)

According to plaintiffs’ counsel, each of the five

class representatives was essential in prosecuting this case and

securing a favorable outcome for the class. (See Pls.’ Mot. for

Fees at 21—26.) The class representatives “collectively devoted

hundreds of hours assisting in the case.” (Id. at 22.) As well,

each undertook significant risk in bringing this litigation and

did so at the potential cost of their reputations and coaching

careers. (Id. at 23.) For instance, plaintiffs note that “part

of NCAA’s strategy int his case was to question the coaching

competency of the class representatives” and “openly asserted

that none of the class representatives were skilled enough to

qualify for paid coaching positions.” (Id.)

Counsel explains that it was a deliberate choice and

part of the litigation strategy to have exactly five class

representatives. (See id. at 25.) Any other number of

representatives may have been unable to “demonstrate sufficient

commonality” to for purposes of class certification. (Id.)

“Ultimately, having a bench of five representatives, each with

1 their individual perspectives, proved critical to navigating

class certification, working with Dr. Ashenfelter to design a

damages model grounded in the real-world realities of the

coaching market, and ultimately securing an excellent result for

the Class.” (Id. at 26.)

Thus, although the requested service award of

$25,000.00 far exceeds the threshold of presumptive

reasonableness, the essential contributions of each of the five

class representatives weighs heavily in favor of finding the

award reasonable.

The weight shifts further in that direction when the

proposed award is considered “in light of the size of the

settlement and the average payout to other class members.” (Id.

at 24.) Here, “the total service awards represent a minuscule

portion of the overall settlement fund—less than 0.04%.” (Id.)

Further, the individual award amounts are less than the gross

recovery of the average class member. (Id.)

Accordingly, the court finds that each of the five

class representatives expended considerable time and effort. In

light of plaintiffs’ efforts, the risks incurred in bringing this

action, and the degree of success enjoyed by the class, the court

finds the requested incentive awards to be reasonable and will

approve the awards.

III. Conclusion

Based on the foregoing, the court will approve the

settlement set forth in the Settlement Agreement as fair,

reasonable, and adequate. The Settlement Agreement shall be

1 binding upon all participating class members who did not exclude

themselves. The court will also approve the proposed allocation

of attorneys’ fees, litigation expenses, and service awards.

IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiffs’ unopposed

motions for final approval of the class action settlement (Docket

No. 171), and for attorneys’ fees, litigation costs, and service

awards (Docket No. 172) be, and the same hereby are, GRANTED.

ACCORDINGLY, IT IS ORDERED THAT:

(1) This Judgment incorporates by reference the

definitions in the Agreement, and all capitalized terms used

herein shall have the same meanings as set forth in the

Agreement, unless otherwise set forth herein.

(2) This Court has jurisdiction over the subject

matter of the Litigation and over all parties to the Litigation,

including all Class Members.

(3) The Court hereby reaffirms its determination that

the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) and 23(b)(3) are

satisfied, including for settlement and judgment purposes. The

Class is defined as: “All persons who, from March 17, 2019, to

June 30, 2023, worked for an NCAA Division I sports program other

than baseball in the position of ‘volunteer coach,’ as designated

by NCAA Bylaws.”

(4) Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23,

the Court hereby approves the Settlement set forth in the

Agreement and finds that:

a. said Agreement and the Settlement contained

therein are, in all respects, fair, reasonable,

1 and adequate and in the best interest of the

Class;

b. there was no collusion in connection with the

Agreement;

c. the Agreement was the product of informed,

arm’s length negotiations among competent, able

counsel; and

d. the record is sufficiently developed and

complete to have enabled Plaintiffs and

Defendant to have adequately evaluated and

considered their respective positions.

(5) Accordingly, the Court authorizes and directs

implementation and performance of all the terms and provisions of

the Agreement, as well as the terms and provisions hereof.

Except as to any individual claim of those Persons (identified in

Exhibit 1 attached hereto) who have validly and timely requested

exclusion from the Class, the Court hereby dismisses the

Litigation and all claims asserted therein with prejudice. The

Parties are to bear their own costs, except as and to the extent

provided in the Agreement, herein, and in any other order of the

Court.

(6) The terms of the Agreement and of this Judgment

shall be forever binding on the Released Parties (regardless of

whether or not any individual Class Member submits a Proof of

Claim or seeks or obtains a distribution from the Net Settlement

Fund), as well as their respective successors, heirs, and

assigns.

1 (7) Upon the Effective Date, and as provided in the

Agreement, Plaintiffs shall have, and each and every Releasing

Plaintiff Party shall be deemed to have, and by operation of this

Judgment shall have, fully, finally, and forever waived,

released, resolved, compromised, settled, relinquished,

discharged, and dismissed each and every one of the Released

Claims (including unknown claims) against each and every one of

the Released Defendant Parties, whether or not such Class Member

executes and delivers the Proof of Claim and Release or shares in

the Net Settlement Fund. Claims to enforce the terms of the

Agreement are not released.

(8) Upon the Effective Date, and as provided in the

Agreement, the Releasing Plaintiff Parties will be forever barred

and enjoined from commencing, instituting, maintaining,

prosecuting, or continuing to prosecute any action or other

proceeding in any forum (including, but not limited to, any state

or federal court of law or equity, arbitration tribunal, or

administrative forum), asserting any of the Released Claims

against any of the Released Defendant Parties.

(9) Upon the Effective Date, the Releasing Plaintiff

Parties shall be deemed to have covenanted not to sue any

Released Defendant Parties on the basis of any Released Claims.

The foregoing release is given regardless of whether Plaintiffs

or any Class Member: (i) executed and delivered a Proof of Claim

and Release; (ii) received the Notice; (iii) participated in the

Settlement Fund; (iv) filed an objection to the Settlement, the

proposed Plan of Allocation, or any application by Plaintiffs’

1 Counsel for attorneys’ fees and expenses; or (v) had their claims

approved or allowed. Nothing contained herein shall bar any

action or claim to enforce the terms of the Agreement or this

Judgment.

(10) Upon the Effective Date, and as provided in the

Agreement, each of the Released Defendant Parties shall be deemed

to have, and by operation of this Judgment shall have, fully,

finally, and forever released, resolved, compromised, settled,

relinquished, and discharged all Released Claims (including

unknown claims) against the Releasing Plaintiff Parties. Claims

to enforce the terms of the Agreement are not released.

(11) The Court finds and concludes that the Parties and

their respective counsel have complied in all respects with the

requirements of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

in connection with the institution, prosecution, defense, and

settlement of the Litigation.

(12) Neither this Judgment nor the Agreement (whether

or not consummated), including the exhibits thereto and the Plan

of Allocation contained therein (or any other plan of allocation

that may be approved by the Court), the negotiations leading to

the execution of the Agreement, nor any proceedings taken

pursuant to or in connection with the Agreement, and/or approval

of the Settlement (including any arguments proffered in

connection therewith) shall be offered against the Released

Defendant Parties or the Releasing Plaintiff Parties as evidence

of, or construed as, or deemed to be evidence of any presumption,

concession, or admission by any of the parties as to the truth of

1 any facts alleged, validity, merit, or deficiency of any claim or

defense that was or could have been asserted in this Litigation,

that damages recoverable under the Complaint would not have

exceeded the Settlement Amount, or with respect to any liability,

negligence, fault, or wrongdoing of any kind, or in any way

referred to for any other reason as against any of the parties,

in any civil, criminal or administrative action or proceeding,

other than such proceedings as may be necessary to effectuate the

provisions of the Agreement.

(13) The notice of the pendency and proposed Settlement

of the Litigation given to the Class was the best notice

practicable under the circumstances, including the individual

notice to all Members of the Class who could be identified

through reasonable effort. Said notice provided the best notice

practicable under the circumstances of those proceedings and of

the matters set forth therein, including the proposed Settlement

set forth in the Agreement, to all Persons entitled to such

notice, and said notice fully satisfied the requirements of

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and the requirements of due

process. No Class Member is relieved from the terms of the

Settlement, including the Releases provided for therein, based

upon the contention or proof that such Class Member failed to

receive actual or adequate notice. A full opportunity has been

offered to Class Members to object to the proposed Settlement and

to participate in the hearing thereon. The Court further finds

that the notice provisions of the Class Action Fairness Act, 28

U.S.C. § 1715, were fully discharged and that the statutory

1 waiting period has elapsed. Thus, the Court hereby determines

that all Class Members who have not validly requested exclusion

are bound by this Judgment.

(14) Huntington Bank is appointed as the Escrow Agent.

The Court approves the establishment of the escrow account as a

Qualified Settlement Fund (“QSF”) pursuant to Internal Revenue

Code § 468B and the Treasury Regulations promulgated thereunder,

and retains continuing jurisdiction as to any issue that may rise

in connection with the formulation or administration of the QSF.

The Escrow Agent shall maintain the Settlement Fund in accordance

with the requirements set forth in the Agreement. All funds held

by the Escrow Agent shall remain subject to the jurisdiction of

the Court, until such time as such funds shall be distributed

pursuant to the Agreement and further order(s) of the Court.

(15) No Released Defendant Party shall have any

liability, obligation, or responsibility whatsoever for the

administration of the Settlement or disbursement of the Net

Settlement Fund.

(16) Neither the Agreement nor the Settlement contained

therein, nor any act performed or document executed pursuant to

or in furtherance of the Agreement or the Settlement: (a) is, or

may be deemed to be, or may be used as an admission of, or

evidence of, the validity of any Released Plaintiff Parties’

Claims, or of any wrongdoing or liability of Defendant or the

Released Defendant Parties; (b) is, or shall be deemed to be, or

shall be used as an admission of any fault or omission of any

Released Defendant Party in any statement, release, or written

1 documents issued, filed, or made; or (c) is, or may be deemed to

be, or may be used as an admission of, or evidence of, any fault

or omission of any of the Defendant or Defendants’ Released

Persons in any civil, criminal, or administrative proceeding in

any court, administrative agency, or other tribunal. Released

Defendant Parties may file the Agreement and/or this Judgment

from this Litigation in any other action that may be brought

against them in order to support a defense or counterclaim based

on principles of res judicata, collateral estoppel, release, good

faith settlement, judgment bar or reduction, or any theory of

claim preclusion or issue preclusion or similar defense or

counterclaim.

(17) Without affecting the finality of this Judgment in

any way, this Court hereby retains continuing jurisdiction over:

(a) implementation of this Settlement and any award or

distribution of the Settlement Fund, including interest earned

thereon; (b) disposition of the Settlement Fund; (c) hearing and

determining applications for attorneys’ fees, expenses, and

interest in the Litigation; (d) hearing and determining

applications for approval of the Plan of Allocation; and (e) all

parties herein for the purpose of construing, enforcing, and

administering the Agreement.

(18) A separate order shall be entered approving the

Plan of Allocation. That order shall in no way affect or delay

the finality of this Judgment and shall not affect or delay the

Effective Date of the Settlement.

1 (19) The Court’s orders entered during the course of

the Litigation relating to the confidentiality of information

shall survive this Settlement subject to the terms of any such

orders.

(20) In the event that the Settlement does not become

effective in accordance with the terms of the Agreement, or the

Effective Date does not occur, or in the event that the

Settlement Fund, or any portion thereof, is returned to

Defendant, the provisions in Paragraph 6.5 of the Agreement will

control.

(21) Without further order of the Court, the Parties

may agree to reasonable extensions of time to carry out any of

the provisions of the Agreement.

(22) The Court directs immediate entry of this Judgment

by the Clerk of the Court.

AND IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT:

(1) Class Counsel’s requested award of attorneys’ fees

in the amount of 30% of the $303,000,000.00 Settlement Fund (plus

accrued interest), i.e., a fee award of $90,900,000.00 plus

accrued interest, is within the applicable range of reasonable

attorneys’ fees percentage-of-recovery awards established by

relevant precedent.

(2) The percentage-of-recovery method of calculating

attorneys’ fees is appropriate in this Action, as the percentage-

of recovery method is the prevailing practice in the Ninth

Circuit in determining the award of attorneys’ fees in common

fund cases.

1 (3) In evaluating requests for an award of attorneys’

fees, courts in the Ninth Circuit consider the factors set forth

in Rule 23(h) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and in

Vizcaino v. Microsoft Corp., 290 F.3d 1043, 1048-50 (9th Cir.

2002). In making this award of fees to Class Counsel, this Court

has considered these factors and finds that:

a. The Settlement will create a fund of

$303,000,000.00 in cash for the benefit of the

members of the Class, which is an excellent

result for the Class;

b. The Action involves complex factual and legal

issues and, in the absence of the Settlement,

would involve lengthy proceedings whose

resolution would be uncertain;

c. Class Counsel pursued the litigation and

achieved the Settlement with skill,

perseverance, and diligent advocacy on behalf

of the Class;

d. Class Counsel are experienced litigators who

understand the claims and defenses and class

action issues of the Action;

e. Class Counsel undertook numerous and

significant risks on behalf of the Class with

no guarantee that they would be compensated;

f. Class Counsel expended substantial time and

effort pursuing the litigation on behalf of the

Class; had Class Counsel not achieved the

1 Settlement, there would remain a significant

risk that the Class may have recovered less or

nothing from Defendant; and

g. The amount of attorneys’ fees is appropriate to

the specific circumstances of this Action, and

consistent with awards in similar cases.

(4) While a lodestar crosscheck is not required in the

Ninth Circuit, such a check further supports the reasonableness

of the fee award, as a lodestar multiplier of 3.41 is well within

the range of multipliers approved in this Circuit.

(5) Notice to the Class indicated that Class Counsel

would seek an award of attorneys’ fees up to 30% the Settlement

Fund.

(6) Accordingly, Class Counsel’s request for an award

of 30% of the gross $303,000,000.00 Settlement Fund (plus accrued

interest), i.e., an award of $90,900,000.00 plus accrued

interest, to be paid in three equal installments corresponding to

Defendant’s three equal payments into the Settlement Fund, is

granted.

(7) The Court finds that Class Counsel’s request for

reimbursement of their reasonably incurred expenses should be

granted. From the inception of litigation, Class Counsel have

incurred $3,599,347.38 in litigation expense. While the majority

of the expenses were incurred for the work of economic experts,

other essential expenses for the prosecution of the Action

included regular e-discovery and data hosting costs, computer

research, court reporting and deposition transcripts, subpoena

1 services, mediation costs, travel and accommodations, printing,

filing fees, and costs associated with trial preparation. These

collective expenses were reasonably incurred and expended for the

direct benefit of the Class and should therefore be reimbursed.

(8) Notice to the Class indicated that Class Counsel

would seek reimbursement of reasonable litigation costs and

expenses not to exceed $5,000,000.00.

(9) Accordingly, Class Counsel’s request for

reimbursement of litigation costs and expenses in the amount of

$3,599,347.38 is granted.

(10) The Court finds that Class Counsel’s request for

service awards in the amount of $25,000.00 for each of the five

Class Representatives -- Shannon Ray, Khala Taylor, Peter

Robinson, Katie Sebbane, and Rudy Barajas -- is appropriate.

(11) In making these service awards to the five Class

Representatives, this Court finds that each of the Class

Representatives expended considerable time and effort to aid in

the prosecution of this Action, including:

a. filing suit to protect the interests of absent

class members;

b. advising Class Counsel on the relevant facts

and assisting in formulating case strategy;

c. working with Class Counsel to identify and

produce documents responsive to Defendant’s

discovery requests;

1 d. working with Class Counsel to develop, write,

and review their responses to Defendant’s

interrogatories to ensure their accuracy;

e. preparing for their depositions, which included

studying Plaintiffs’ theories of liability,

class certification issues, and preparation for

questions (including review of their document

productions);

f. sitting for a full day deposition;

g. participating in regular meetings with Class

Counsel for updates on the litigation;

h. attending court hearings (including the motion

to dismiss hearing and the class certification

hearing), which required some to engage in

significant travel;

i. consulting with Class Counsel before, during,

and after settlement negotiations; and

j. continuing to assist counsel during the

settlement approval process.

(12) Notice to the Class indicated that Class Counsel

would seek service awards of up to $25,000.00 for each of the

five Class Representatives.

(13) Accordingly, Class Counsel’s request for service

awards of $25,000.00 for each of the five Class Representatives

is granted.

Tt eee nn nen en nn EE I ONES EE

(14) Without affecting the finality of this Order in

any respect, this Court reserves jurisdiction over any matters

related to or ancillary to this Order.

IT IS SO ORDERED

> | patea: May 11, 2026 Abbe an~ Ve 2d. bE

7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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