Livingston

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

STEPHEN J. WILLIAMS,

Plaintiff,

-against-

DEBRA ANN LIVINGSTON; CATHERINE

O’HAGAN WOLFE; RICHARD J. SULLIVAN;

JOSEPH F. BIANCO; MICHAEL H. PARKER;

WILLIAM J. NARDINI; RICHARD J. LOHIER, 26-CV-538 (LTS)

JR.; STEVEN J. MENASHI; EUNICE C. LEE;

BETH ROBINSON; MYRNA PEREZ; ALISON ORDER OF DISMISSAL

J. NATHAN; SARAH A. L. MERRIAM;

MARIA ARAUJO KAHN; RALPH OBAS;

DENNISSE PIZARRO-LEBRON; YANA

SEGAL; LAMA; DOES 1-5, ADDITIONAL

CLERK’S OFFICE STAFF AND

ATTORNEYS,

Defendants.

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN, Chief United States District Judge:

Plaintiff, an attorney who is appearing pro se,1 brings this action by order to show cause

under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), alleging that Defendants

violated his constitutional rights and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and damages. By

order dated January 23, 2026, the Court granted Plaintiff’s request to proceed in forma pauperis

(“IFP”), that is, without prepayment of fees. The Court dismisses the complaint for the reasons

set forth below.

1 Under the signature line of his complaint, Plaintiff lists his “Federal Bar No. CT-

04037.” (ECF 1 at 64.)

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court must dismiss an IFP complaint, or portion thereof, that is frivolous or

malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a

defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see Livingston v.

Adirondack Beverage Co., 141 F.3d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1998). The Court must also dismiss a

complaint when the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3).

While the law mandates dismissal on any of these grounds, the Court is obliged to

construe pro se pleadings liberally, Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009), and interpret

them to raise the “strongest [claims] that they suggest,” Triestman v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 470

F.3d 471, 474-75 (2d Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted) (emphasis in

original). Because Plaintiff is an attorney, however, he is not entitled to the solicitude given to

pro se litigants. See Tracy v. Freshwater, 623 F.3d 90, 102 (2d Cir. 2010) (“[A] lawyer

representing himself ordinarily receives no such solicitude at all.”).

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff is a resident of Connecticut. Named as Defendants in this matter are: (1) the

following Second Circuit Judges, in their individual and official capacities: Chief Judge Debra

Ann Livingston, Judge Richard J. Sullivan, Judge Joseph F. Bianco, Judge Michael H. Parker,

Judge William J. Nardini, Judge Richard J. Lohier, Jr., Judge Steven J. Menashi, Judge Eunice C.

Lee, Judge Beth Robinson, Judge Myrna Perez, Judge Alison J. Nathan, Judge Sarah A. L.

Merriam, and Judge Maria Araujo Kahn (collectively, the “Federal Judge Defendants”);

(2) Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, in her official and individual capacity as Clerk of Court of the

Second Circuit, and the following case managers in the Second Circuit Clerk’s Office, in their

individual capacities: Ralph Obas, Dennisse Pizarro-Lebron, Yana Segal, and “Lama”; and

(3) “Does 1-5, additional clerk’s office staff and attorneys in their individual capacities.” (ECF 1

at 1.)

Following is a brief summary of the factual allegations in Plaintiff’s 64-page complaint.2

Plaintiff has or had four pro se appeals pending in the Second Circuit. That court granted

Plaintiff’s request to file documents electronically, but he “has never been able to access the

ACMS electronic filing system due to technical problems.” (Id. at 10.) Plaintiff has “provided

detailed technical documentation to the Clerk’s Office . . . identifying the specific system

configuration error,” but the case managers in the Clerk’s Office “never responded or “corrected

the problem, despite the passage of five months and multiple requests.” (Id. at 24.) Although the

court authorized Plaintiff to submit documents by email in “Case 25-2607 and other

proceedings,” he provides myriad examples of the Clerk’s Office mishandling,

mischaracterizing, delaying, and rejecting his documents submitted for electronic filing. (Id. at 2,

9-64.) He alleges that the Clerk’s Office “has exceeded its ministerial authority by making

discretionary legal determinations that prevent judicial review, violate clearly established

procedural rights, and deny constitutional access to courts.” (Id. at 3.)

By way of example, Plaintiff sets forth a slew of errors that allegedly occurred in one

appeal, No. 24-760, a mandamus petition that “effectively” caused him to be denied “the urgent

relief sought.” (Id. at 17.) In that matter, he alleges the following: “(1) misdocketing to create

“defects”; (2) striking filings that challenge clerk errors; (3) systematic interception of challenges

to clerk authority; (4) use of clerk’s own errors to bar relief; (5) unauthorized dispositive

determinations by clerk.” (Id. at 19.) This is a non-exhaustive list of instances that are part of

2 The Court quotes from the complaint verbatim. All spelling, grammar, and punctuation

are as in the original unless noted otherwise.

what Plaintiff asserts is a pattern of acts and omissions on the part of the Clerk’s Office in all of

his appeals. (Id. at 3-4.)

Plaintiff alleges that Chief Judge Livingston bears “ultimate administrative responsibility

for the Circuit,” and that the other federal judge defendants, whom he alleges supervise the

Clerk’s Office, are “collectively responsible for administration of” the Circuit. (Id. at 6, 30.)

According to Plaintiff, he sues the judges “for administrative acts,” for which they are entitled to

only qualified immunity, not absolute judicial immunity. (Id. at 8.) He further asserts that

admitted attorneys receive “automatic ACMS filing access with minimal clerk review of their

filings,” that pro se litigants “face substantially greater scrutiny, arbitrary application of technical

requirements, and administrative barriers that represented parties do not encounter,” and that this

“differential treatment lacks rational basis and violates equal protection principles.” (Id. at 5.)

Plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, mandamus relief, and money damages. (Id. at 2.) Along

with the complaint, Plaintiff filed an “unsigned [proposed] order to show cause” and a

memorandum of law seeking a “mandatory temporary restraining order and preliminary

injunction” (i) directing the Second Circuit to “immediately docket” his emergency motions and

other filings in his appeals, (ii) directing “the immediate transmission of” his filings to “a panel

of Article III judges of the Second Circuit for consideration prior to the January 30, 2026,

appropriations deadline,” and (iii) “Restraining the Defendants from further obstructing the

Plaintiff’s right of access to the Court through the use of ‘pre-docketing filters’ or the

recharacterization of petitions into motions without judicial oversight.” (ECF 9-10.) He has also

moved for permission to participate in electronic case filing, and for “expedited consideration of

in forma pauperis application and immediate issuance of summonses.” (ECF 5, 6.)

On February 2, 2026, Plaintiff filed an order to show cause and a memorandum of law

seeking directions to Ruby J. Krajick, the former Clerk of this Court, to issue summonses

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(b) and to ensure the assignment of his case to a district judge

withing a specified time limit. (ECF 12.)

DISCUSSION

A. The Federal Judge Defendants

Judges are absolutely immune from suit for damages for any actions taken within the

scope of their judicial responsibilities. Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). Generally, “acts

arising out of, or related to, individual cases before the judge are considered judicial in nature.”

Bliven v. Hunt, 579 F.3d 204, 210 (2d Cir. 2009); see Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 362

(1978) (the inquiry focuses on whether the judge was performing a “function normally

performed by a judge”).

“Even allegations of bad faith or malice cannot overcome judicial immunity.” Bliven, 579

F.3d at 210 (citations omitted). The doctrine applies “even when such acts are in excess of their

jurisdiction, and are alleged to have been done maliciously or corruptly.” Stump, 435 U.S. 349,

356 (citation omitted)). This is because, “[w]ithout insulation from liability, judges would be

subject to harassment and intimidation . . . .” Young v. Selsky, 41 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1994).

Judicial immunity therefore applies “however erroneous the act may have been, and however

injurious in its consequences it may have proved to the plaintiff.” Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S.

193, 199-200 (1985) (citation omitted). Judicial immunity does not apply when the judge takes

action “outside” his or her judicial capacity, or when the judge takes action that, although

judicial in nature, is taken “in absence of jurisdiction.” Mireles, 502 U.S. at 9-10. But “the scope

of [a] judge’s jurisdiction must be construed broadly where the issue is the immunity of the

judge.” Stump, 435 U.S. at 356. To the extent Plaintiff’s claims against the Federal Judge

Defendants arise out of individual cases before them, Plaintiff does not allege any facts showing

that they acted beyond the scope of their judicial responsibilities or outside their jurisdiction. See

Mireles, 509 U.S. at 11-12. The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s claims for damages against

the Federal Judge Defendants because Plaintiff seeks monetary relief against defendants who are

immune from such relief, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii), and, consequently, the claims are

frivolous, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). See Mills v. Fischer, 645 F.3d 176, 177 (2d Cir. 2011)

(“Any claim dismissed on the ground of absolute judicial immunity is ‘frivolous’ for purposes of

[the in forma pauperis statute].”).3

Although judicial immunity does not absolutely bar a claim for prospective injunctive

relief against a judicial officer acting in his or her judicial capacity, Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S.

522, 541-42 (1984), in the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996 (“FCIA”), Congress

amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to provide that in “any action brought against a judicial officer for an

act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted

unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.” 42 U.S.C.

3 Even if Defendants were not immune from suit, the Supreme Court has severely

curtailed Bivens in recent years, indicating that the three implied causes of action thereunder are

unlikely to be expanded. The Supreme Court has recognized implied causes of action under

Bivens in only three contexts: (1) unreasonable search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment,

Bivens, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); (2) employment discrimination under the Due Process Clause of

the Fifth Amendment, Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979); and (3) inadequate medical

treatment of a convicted prisoner under the Eighth Amendment, Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14

(1980). The Supreme Court has “made [it] clear that expanding the Bivens remedy is now a

‘disfavored’ judicial activity.” Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1857 (2017); see also Egbert v.

Boule, 596 U.S. 482, 495 (2022) (holding in the context of a Fourth Amendment claim under

Bivens that “superficial similarities are not enough to support the judicial creation of a cause of

action”). Here, Plaintiff asserts a First Amendment access-to-court claim, but the Supreme Court

has “never held that Bivens extends to First Amendment claims,” Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S.

658, 663 n.4 (2012), and the Second Circuit has “not recognized a Bivens action sounding in the

First Amendment,” Zherka v. Ryan, 52 F. Supp. 3d 571, 579 (S.D.N.Y. 2014).

§ 1983, as amended by FCIA, § 309(c), Pub. L. No. 104–317, 110 Stat. 3847, 3853 (1996); see

Kampfer v. Scullin, 989 F. Supp. 194, 201 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (applying Section 309(c) of the

FCIA to cases involving federal judicial officers) (citing Tavarez v. Reno, 54 F.3d 109, 110 (2d

Cir. 1995)).

Here, Plaintiff does not allege that the Federal Judge Defendants violated a declaratory

decree. Nor does he allege any facts suggesting that declaratory relief is unavailable. See Davis v.

Campbell, No. 3:13-CV-0693, 2014 WL 234722, at *9 (N.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2014) (“[D]eclaratory

relief against a judge for actions taken within his or her judicial capacity is ordinarily available

by appealing the judge’s order.”). The Court therefore dismisses Plaintiff’s claims for declaratory

and injunctive relief against the Federal Judge Defendants based on the doctrine of judicial

immunity.

B. Clerk of Court Wolfe and Clerk’s Office staff

Similarly, Plaintiff’s claims again Second Circuit Clerk of Court Wolfe, the Second

Circuit case managers, and the other Second Circuit Clerk’s Office staff must be dismissed on

immunity grounds. Judicial immunity has been extended to court clerks and “others who perform

functions closely associated with the judicial process” when they are performing discretionary

acts of a judicial nature which are essential to the judicial process, such as filing court documents

or managing a court’s calendar. Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193, 200 (1985); Rodriguez v.

Weprin, 116 F.3d 62, 66 (2d Cir. 1997) (extending judicial immunity to state court clerks who

were ordered by Appellate Division judges not to provide a litigant with documents and not to

expand the record on appeal); Kane v. Malone, No. 25-CV-0951, 2025 WL 1453891, at *2-3

(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 2025) (applying judicial immunity and dismissing allegations of court clerks

“repeatedly rejecting” filings and deleting or refusing to file documents, including emergency

motions, orders, and appeal-related filings), appeal pending, No. 25-1297 (2d Cir.); McKnight v.

Middleton, 699 F. Supp. 2d 507, 526 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding “Clerk’s Office activities of

filing and docketing legal documents” are an “integral part of the judicial process” and are

generally entitled to absolute immunity); Pikulin v. Gonzales, No. 07-CV-0412 (CBA), 2007 WL

1063353, at *2 (E.D.N.Y Apr. 5, 2007) (extending judicial immunity to the federal court clerk

with respect to claims arising out of the filing and docketing of legal documents); Argentieri v.

Clerk of Ct. for Judge Kmiotek, 420 F. Supp. 2d 162, 165 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) (explaining that

“[i]nasmuch as [the] plaintiff claims that [the] defendants violated his rights by refusing to

acknowledge his motions or to schedule his court proceedings, [the] defendants were assisting

judges in performing essential judicial functions. As a result, [the] plaintiff’s claims are barred

by absolute immunity.”).

Plaintiff’s claims against Clerk Wolfe and the other Second Circuit case managers and

staff arise from the handling of his electronic filings, which is an integral part of the judicial

process. These claims must therefore be dismissed because Plaintiff seeks relief against

defendants who are immune from such relief, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii), and, consequently,

the claims are frivolous, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). See Mills v. Fischer, 645 F.3d 176, 177

(2d Cir. 2011) (“Any claim dismissed on the ground of absolute judicial immunity is ‘frivolous’

for purposes of [the in forma pauperis statute].”).

LEAVE TO AMEND DENIED

District courts generally grant a pro se plaintiff an opportunity to amend a complaint to

cure its defects, but leave to amend is not required where it would be futile. See Hill v. Curcione,

657 F.3d 116, 123–24 (2d Cir. 2011); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861 F.2d 40, 42 (2d Cir. 1988).

Because the defects in Plaintiff’s complaint cannot be cured with an amendment, the Court

declines to grant Plaintiff leave to amend his complaint. Rolle v. See Willis, No. 25-CV-10745

(JMF), 2026 WL 145547, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 20, 2026) (denying leave to replead pro se

complaint naming federal judge as defendant that was dismissed on judicial immunity grounds).

The Court denies all pending motions as moot.4

CONCLUSION

The Court dismisses Plaintiff’s claims for failure to state a claim on which relief may be

granted, and for seeking relief against Defendants who are immune from suit, and therefore as

frivolous. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii). The Court denies all motions as moot, and the Clerk

of Court is directed to terminate them.

The Court certifies under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3) that any appeal from this order would

not be taken in good faith, and therefore IFP status is denied for the purpose of an appeal. Cf.

Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962) (holding that an appellant demonstrates

good faith when he seeks review of a nonfrivolous issue).

The Court directs the Clerk of Court to enter a civil judgment in this action.

Dated: February 9, 2026

New York, New York

/s/ Laura Taylor Swain

LAURA TAYLOR SWAIN

Chief United States District Judge

4 As previously noted, courts are required to screen IFP complaints. See 28 U.S.C.

§ 1915(e)(2)(B). Plaintiff was, therefore, not entitled to issuance of summonses while the Court

was screening his IFP complaint.