Chestnut

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

GAGIK T., Civil No. 1:26-cv-02839-MWJS

Petitioner, ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER,

vs. GRANTING RESPONDENTS’ MOTION

TO DISMISS, AND DISMISSING THE

CHRISTOPHER CHESTNUT, WARDEN, PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CALIFORNIA CITY CORRECTIONAL CORPUS WITHOUT PREJUDICE

CENTER, et al.,

A# 216-809-968

Respondents.

INTRODUCTION

Petitioner Gagik T.1 is detained at the California City Detention Facility

(“CCDF”) pending the resolution of his removal proceedings. He seeks a writ of habeas

corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (“habeas petition”) and a temporary restraining order

(“TRO”) directing his immediate release from immigration custody. Dkt. No. 1.

Respondent moves to dismiss on the ground that Petitioner has not exhausted his

available administrative remedies: having received a bond hearing before an

immigration judge, resulting in an adverse ruling, Petitioner filed this action in federal

court six days before his deadline to appeal that ruling to the Board of Immigration

1 For reasons previously explained in Sergio D.L.S. v. Warden, Cal. City Corr. Ctr.,

No. 1:26-cv-02821-MWJS, 2026 WL 1049713, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2026), only

Petitioner’s first name and the initials of his last name are used in this order.

Appeals (“BIA”). Dkt. No. 7. For the reasons that follow, the court denies Petitioner’s

motion for a TRO and grants Respondent’s motion to dismiss the habeas petition.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner entered the United States at Miami, Florida, on January 17, 2020, on a

B-2 visitor visa and was admitted through July 16, 2020. Dkt. No. 1, Exh. 1. He did not

depart upon the expiration of that period. Dkt. No. 7, at pg. 2. Before his authorized

stay expired, on April 17, 2020, Petitioner filed an affirmative application for asylum

and withholding of removal (Form I-589) with the USCIS San Francisco Asylum Office.

Dkt. No. 1 at pg. 6; Dkt. No. 1, Exh. 2. That application remains pending. Id.

On March 2, 2026, officers from the Sacramento ICE Enforcement and Removal

Operations office arrested Petitioner in Sacramento. Dkt. No. 1, at pg. 2. ICE issued a

Notice to Appear the same day, charging Petitioner with removability under INA

§ 237(a)(1)(B) for remaining in the United States beyond his authorized period of

admission. Dkt. No. 7, Exh. B. Petitioner was taken to CCDF, where he remains in

custody. Dkt. No. 1, at pg. 2.

On March 17, 2026, Petitioner appeared before an immigration judge (“IJ”) at the

Adelanto Immigration Court and requested a custody redetermination pursuant to 8

C.F.R. § 1236. Dkt. No. 1, Exh. 3. After full consideration of the evidence, the IJ denied

bond, finding Petitioner to be a “significant flight risk such that no amount of bond or

conditions would secure his future court appearances.” Id. In reaching that

determination, the IJ considered, among other things, the absence of a stable

employment history, the lack of legal status among Petitioner’s immediate family

members in the United States, and deficiencies in the evidentiary record concerning

Petitioner’s proposed sponsor. Id. Both parties reserved their right to appeal. Id.

Petitioner’s deadline to appeal the IJ’s bond ruling to the Board of Immigration Appeals

(“BIA”) was April 20, 2026. Dkt. No. 1, at pg. 36, Dkt. No. 7 at pg. 2.

Petitioner filed the instant habeas petition and motion for a TRO on April 14 and

19, respectively—just days before his BIA appeal deadline and without having filed an

appeal. Dkt. No. 1; Dkt. No. 7 at pg. 1. His removal proceedings remain ongoing; a

merits hearing previously scheduled for May 15, 2026, was continued on April 22, 2026,

at his request. Dkt. No. 7, Exh. C. Respondent filed the pending motion to dismiss on

April 25, 2026. Dkt. No. 7. The matter is now fully briefed and neither party has

requested oral argument.

DISCUSSION

A. Motion for Temporary Restraining Order

The standard governing a motion for a TRO is, substantively, the same as the

standard governing a preliminary injunction. See Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D.

Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). A party seeking such extraordinary

relief must demonstrate a likelihood of “success on the merits,” a likelihood of

“irreparable harm” in the absence of relief, that the balance of equities favors

intervention, and “that an injunction would serve the public interest.” Winter v. Nat.

Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). Likelihood of success on the merits is the

most important of these factors. Simon v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 135 F.4th 784, 797

(9th Cir. 2025). If a party cannot show a likelihood of success on the merits of a claim,

the party must at least show “serious questions” going to the merits of the claim, along

with showing that the other three Winter factors are satisfied. Alliance for the Wild

Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2011).

As discussed below, Petitioner has failed to exhaust his available administrative

remedies before seeking federal habeas relief. That failure forecloses a finding of

likelihood of success on the merits—and serious questions going to those merits—and

is, standing alone, sufficient to defeat the request for a temporary restraining order.

Petitioner’s motion for a TRO is therefore DENIED.

B. Motion to Dismiss

Before a district court may reach the merits of a habeas petition challenging

immigration detention, it must consider whether the petitioner has exhausted available

administrative remedies. See Castro-Cortez v. INS, 239 F.3d 1037, 1047 (9th Cir. 2001),

abrogated on other grounds, Fernandez-Vargas v. Gonzalez, 548 U.S. 20 (2006). Where a

petitioner has failed to do so, a court “ordinarily should either dismiss the petition

without prejudice or stay the proceedings until the petitioner has exhausted remedies.”

Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 988 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing Leonardo v. Crawford, 646

F.3d 1157, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011)).

To be sure, both parties acknowledge that the exhaustion requirement in this

context is prudential rather than jurisdictional. Id; Dkt. No. 1, at pg. 4, Dkt. No. 7, at pg.

4. Accordingly, the court must determine whether exhaustion here should be excused.

That determination turns on the three considerations identified in Puga v. Chertoff, 488

F.3d 812, 815 (9th Cir. 2007): (1) whether agency expertise is “necessary to generate a

proper record and reach a proper decision”; (2) whether relaxing the requirement

would invite “deliberate bypass of the administrative scheme”; and (3) whether

“administrative review is likely to allow the agency to correct its own mistakes and

forestall the need for judicial review.” Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 988.

It is undisputed that Petitioner received a § 1226(a) bond hearing before the IJ,

who issued a written decision denying bond. Dkt. No. 1, Exh. 3. Where, as here, a

petitioner has already received a bond hearing and the administrative remedy

remaining is a BIA appeal, agency expertise is not strictly necessary to generate a

further record for decision. See Okoth v. Kaiser, No. 1:25-cv-01936-KES-SAB, 2026 WL

45199, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2026); Kithima v. Albarran, No. 1:26-cv-1659-DJC-JDP, 2026

WL 1078236, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2026). The first Puga factor therefore weighs

against requiring exhaustion.

The second and third factors, however, weigh strongly in favor of requiring it.

Section 1226(a) and its implementing regulations establish a comprehensive process for

custody determinations, including the right to a bond hearing before an IJ and appellate

review by the BIA. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19, 1236.1(d). The Ninth Circuit has held that

these procedures are facially constitutional. Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189,

1213 (9th Cir. 2022). Petitioner participated in the bond hearing process, received an

adverse ruling, and rather than appeal that ruling to the BIA—with six days remaining

before the deadline—filed the instant action. Dkt. No. 1; Dkt. No. 7 at pg. 2. On the

second factor, therefore, granting federal habeas relief under these circumstances would

permit Petitioner to bypass the appellate tier of the administrative scheme Congress

established. And allowing Petitioner to do so here would invite other detainees to do

the same. See Kithima, 2026 WL 1078236, at *2–3; see also Martinez v. Scott, No. 2:25-cv-

1538-TSZ-GJL, 2025 WL 2689844, at *5 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 27, 2025). On the third factor,

the BIA has authority to review the IJ’s bond determination, including its factual

findings and application of the applicable legal standards. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(i)–

(ii). Had Petitioner prevailed on appeal, this litigation would have been entirely

unnecessary. Had the BIA affirmed, a more fully developed record would be available

to support any judicial review that followed. Kithima, 2026 WL 1078236, at *3. The

second and third Puga factors therefore favor requiring exhaustion.

C. Waiver of the Exhaustion Requirement

Even where the Puga factors point toward exhaustion, a court retains discretion

to excuse that requirement where administrative remedies are inadequate or

inefficacious, pursuit of those remedies would be a futile gesture, irreparable injury

would result, or the administrative proceedings would be void. Hernandez, 872 F.3d at

988 (quoting Laing v. Ashcroft, 370 F.3d 994, 1000 (9th Cir. 2004)). Petitioner advances

two principal grounds for waiver: first, he argues that exhaustion would be futile, and

second, he alleges irreparable harm arising from the conditions of his confinement. Dkt.

No. 1 at pg. 4, Dkt. No. 3, at pg. 3. But neither is persuasive here.

On futility, Petitioner argues that a BIA appeal would be meaningless because,

he contends, immigration court bond hearings are systemically compromised. In

support of this proposition, he cites declarations from former IJs describing institutional

pressure, and district court decisions from other jurisdictions casting doubt on the

fairness of bond proceedings. Dkt. No. 1 at pgs. 15–18; Dkt. No. 8, at pg. 9. These

submissions raise serious concerns, but only of a generalized nature. And generalized

contentions of this sort do not establish futility: the futility exception requires a

showing that the available administrative remedy is inadequate or unavailing as

applied to a petitioner’s own case. See Kithima, 2026 WL 1078236, at *3. Petitioner has

not offered any evidence or argument of a more particularized nature; he has not shown

that the bond hearing in his case was compromised in any way. And, indeed, the

record here suggests the opposite—as noted, the IJ in this case fully considered the

evidence, and made specific findings of fact to support the conclusion that Petitioner

was a significant flight risk. Dkt. No. 1, Exh. 3. Nor has Petitioner shown that the BIA

would lack the authority or the practical ability to review and, if warranted, correct the

IJ’s bond ruling. The BIA in fact has precisely that authority, see 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3),

and Petitioner points to no case-specific barrier to obtaining meaningful review. See

Kithima, 2026 WL 1078236, at *3; Martinez, 2025 WL 2689844, at *6. Nor are Petitioner’s

generalized arguments about BIA review strong enough to show that no petitioner

would get a fair hearing there. Put differently, Petitioner has made serious generalized

allegations about the agency review process, but he has not done enough to show that

any of those concerns would have made an appeal in his own case futile.

On irreparable harm, Petitioner describes serious concerns about his conditions

of confinement at CCDF, including what he characterizes as inadequate management of

his diabetes and heart conditions, an inappropriate dietary regimen, and noise levels

producing debilitating migraines. Dkt. No. 1 at pgs. 7–9 (citing Gomez Ruiz, No. 3:25-cv-

09757-MMC, 2026 WL 851980 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2026)); see also Dkt. No. 1 at pgs. 19–22.

These are serious allegations. Conditions-of-confinement claims, however, are not

cognizable in a habeas proceeding and must instead be raised in a civil rights action.

Crawford v. Bell, 599 F.2d 890, 892 (9th Cir. 1979); Brown v. Blanckensee, 857 F. App’x 289,

290 (9th Cir. 2021). Because the appropriate remedy for such claims, if proven, is not

release from custody, they cannot serve as the basis for excusing the prudential

exhaustion requirement applicable to a habeas petition challenging detention under

§ 1226(a)—at least when, as here, Petitioner has not shown that those review procedures

are or would be deficient in his own case.

Because the Puga factors weigh in favor of requiring exhaustion here, and

because Petitioner has not offered any persuasive argument against doing so,

Respondents’ motion to dismiss must be granted. The court’s dismissal of this petition

is, of course, without prejudice to Petitioner pursuing his conditions-of-confinement

claims in an appropriate civil rights proceeding.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner’s motion for temporary restraining order,

Dkt. No. 5, is DENIED.

Respondents’ motion to dismiss, Dkt. No. 7, is GRANTED, and the petition for

writ of habeas corpus, Dkt. No. 1, is DISMISSED without prejudice.

The Clerk of Court is directed to close this case.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: May 4, 2026, at Honolulu, Hawai‘i.

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‘A /s/ Micah W.J. Smith

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Micah W.J. Smith

United States District Judge

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Civil No. 1:26-02839-MWJS; Tonian v. Chestnut et al; ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR

TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, GRANTING RESPONDENTS’ MOTION TO

DISMISS, AND DISMISSING THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

WITHOUT PREJUDICE

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