The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 KAVTARADZE GIORGI, No. 1:26-cv-02170-DJC-SCR
(A#249-099-073),
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Petitioner,
13 FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATIONS
v.
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CHRISTOPHER CHESTNUT, et al.,
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Respondents.
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18 Petitioner has been in federal immigration detention for more than seventeen months and
19 filed this habeas corpus action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Petitioner’s motion for a temporary
20 restraining order (ECF No. 2) and habeas corpus petition (ECF No. 1), both of which he filed pro
21 se, are pending before the Court. After appointing petitioner counsel, District Judge Calabretta
22 referred the matter to the undersigned for the filing of findings and recommendations. For the
23 reasons described below, the undersigned recommends granting the § 2241 petition and ordering
24 petitioner’s immediate release from immigration detention. Based on this recommendation, the
25 undersigned further recommends that the motion for a temporary restraining order be denied as
26 moot.
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1 I. Factual and Procedural History
2 Petitioner is a native and citizen of Georgia who crossed the border into the United States
3 on November 18, 2024. ECF No. 1 at 10; see also ECF No. 11-1 at 2 (identifying petitioner’s
4 country of origin). He was detained by immigration officials and requested asylum. ECF No. 1
5 at 10. Since that time, he has been in the continuous custody of immigration officials. ECF No. 1
6 at 6. He is currently detained at the California City Detention Center located in this judicial
7 district. ECF No. 1 at 9.
8 An immigration judge (“IJ”) denied his application for asylum, but granted petitioner
9 withholding of removal to Georgia on June 11, 2025. ECF No. 11-1. Petitioner appealed the IJ’s
10 decision denying him asylum. The Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed the IJ’s
11 ruling on December 19, 2025. ECF No. 11-2.
12 In claim one of his § 2241 petition, he challenges his prolonged detention and alleges that
13 his removal is not reasonably foreseeable because he cannot be returned to Georgia and no third
14 country will accept him. ECF No. 1 at 6. Next, petitioner challenges his detention as a violation
15 of his Fifth Amendment right to due process since he has not been provided a bond hearing. Id.
16 His last two claims for relief allege that he has been denied adequate medical care for a painful
17 cyst and that his detention has caused psychological trauma. ECF No. 1 at 6-7. By way of relief,
18 petitioner seeks immediate release, or, in the alternative, a bond hearing to determine whether his
19 detention is justified. Id. at 7.
20 Respondents’ answer to the § 2241 petition contends that petitioner’s “detention is
21 mandatory, and he is on notice that the government intends to remove him to a third country.”
22 ECF No. 11 at 1. Additionally, respondents submit that this court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate
23 claims arising from the execution of immigration removal orders pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g).
24 ECF No. 11 at 2. Finally, respondents assert that his detention is not indefinite based on the
25 reasoning in Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 701 (2001), because “the Supreme Court
26 determined that it is ‘presumptively reasonable’ for the Government to detain a noncitizen for six
27 months following entry of a final removal order, while it worked to remove the noncitizen from
28 the United States.” ECF No. 11 at 3. In this case, petitioner has not been detained for the
1 presumptively reasonable six months yet because his removal order did not become final until
2 December 19, 2025. Id. Respondents do not credit any of the time in which petitioner was in
3 detention prior to this date.
4 Respondents also contend that petitioner has not met his burden of establishing that his
5 removal is not reasonably foreseeable because it “relies entirely on a speculation that no third
6 country will accept him.” Id. “The only requirement on Respondents under Zadvydas is to rebut
7 a sufficient showing by Petitioner that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the
8 reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. Respondents do not submit any documents related to
9 petitioner’s third country removal. Instead, respondents submitted a copy of the IJ decision
10 denying petitioner asylum as well as the BIA decision affirming that order. ECF Nos. 11-1, 11-2.
11 In a counseled reply brief, petitioner emphasizes that “[t]he only order that remains in
12 effect is the June 11, 2025 order withholding Petitioner’s removal to Georgia, without designation
13 of any third country to which Petitioner could be removed.” ECF No. 12 at 2. Based on his
14 seventeen months in detention with no foreseeable end in sight, petitioner submits that his
15 prolonged detention violates due process. ECF No. 12 at 2. With respect to the challenge to the
16 court’s jurisdiction, petitioner submits that he is not challenging the IJ’s removal order in this
17 case. Id. at 3. “Rather, petitioner seeks relief under the Due Process Clause from his clearly
18 prolonged and indefinite detention.” Id. Thus, habeas jurisdiction is proper since petitioner is
19 challenging the constitutionality of his detention. As a statutory matter, petitioner contends that
20 “federal regulations require ICE to release him from detention on an order of supervision if there
21 is no significant likelihood that [he] will be removed in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. at
22 5 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(g)-(h)). On the merits of his prolonged detention claim, petitioner
23 asserts that the six-month presumption of reasonableness under Zadvydas does not foreclose a
24 challenge to detention that has lasted for less than six months after the order of removal became
25 administratively final. Id.
26 II. Immigration Detention Framework After a Final Order of Removal
27 The detention of noncitizens who have been ordered removed from the United States is
28 governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a). “In particular, § 1231(a)(6) provides that after a 90-day
1 ‘removal period,’ a noncitizen ‘may be detained’ or may be released under terms of supervision.”
2 Johnson v. Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S. 573, 575 (2022). After this 90 day removal period has
3 elapsed, ongoing detention is only authorized for “four categories of people: (1) those who are
4 ‘inadmissible’ on certain specified grounds; (2) those who are ‘removable’ on certain specified
5 grounds; (3) those it determines ‘to be a risk to the community’; and (4) those it determines to be
6 ‘unlikely to comply with the order of removal.’” Arteaga-Martinez, 596 U.S. at 578–79 (quoting
7 8 U.SC. § 1231(a)(6)). Respondents have not taken the position that petitioner falls within one of
8 those four categories, and petitioner contends he “does not fall into any such categorical
9 exception.” As a threshold matter, it is accordingly unclear whether respondents have properly
10 exercised their statutory discretion under § 1231(a)(6) to maintain petitioner in custody.
11 The Supreme Court examined the constitutional limits of detention under § 1231(a)(6) in
12 Zadvydas, describing as “obvious” the “serious constitutional problem arising out of a statute
13 that, in these circumstances, permits an indefinite, perhaps permanent, deprivation of human
14 liberty without any” procedural “protection[s.]” 533 U.S. at 692 (2001). Zadvydas read an
15 implicit due process limitation into the immigration statute governing the removal of noncitizens
16 subject to a final order of removal in order to avoid serious constitutional problems. The
17 Supreme Court reasoned that “the Due Process Clause applies to all ‘persons’ within the United
18 States, including [noncitizens], whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or
19 permanent.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693. As a result, “once [a noncitizen’s] removal is no longer
20 reasonably foreseeable, continued detention is no longer authorized by statute.” Zadvydas, 533
21 U.S. at 699. In order to establish a uniform standard for determining when ongoing detention
22 crosses constitutionally acceptable limits, the Court recognized a presumptively reasonable six
23 month period of detention. Id. at 701. If a noncitizen “provides a good reason to believe that
24 there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, the Government
25 must respond with evidence sufficient to rebut that showing.” Id.
26 III. Jurisdiction Over 2241 Petition Challenging Detention
27 Turning first to respondents’ jurisdictional challenge, the Supreme Court has narrowly
28 interpreted § 1252(g) as applying “only to [those] three discrete actions that the Attorney General
1 may take: her ‘decision or action’ to ‘commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute
2 removal orders.’” Reno v. Am.-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm. et al., 525 U.S. 471, 482
3 (1999) (emphasis omitted) (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(g)). The statute, however, does not “sweep
4 in any claim that can technically be said to ‘arise from’ the three listed actions of the Attorney
5 General.” Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 294 (2018). “Thus, decisions or actions that are
6 a part of the deportation process, but not specifically the action of commencing proceedings,
7 adjudicating cases, or executing removal orders, are not jurisdictionally barred from judicial
8 review.” Trieu Minh Ly, v. Bondi, No. 5:26-cv-01320-SPG-DFM, 2026 WL 917605, * 4 (C.D.
9 Cal. March 31, 2026) (citations omitted). In this case, petitioner is not challenging the decision to
10 “commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute [his] removal order[]” because the IJ
11 granted him withholding of removal to Georgia. He is challenging his prolonged detention in
12 immigration custody. Section 1252(g) is no obstacle to review of that challenge.
13 Respondents argue that the Court’s “no transfer order,” ECF No. 10, “must be dissolved”
14 because of § 1252(g). ECF No. 11 at 2. However, respondents have not shown that they are
15 presently unable to remove petitioner as a result of the no transfer order. Accordingly, there is no
16 current § 1252(g) problem with that order. Moreover, the no transfer order will automatically
17 dissolve upon the final adjudication of the petition contemplated by these findings and
18 recommendations.
19 IV. Under Zadvydas, Petitioner’s Ongoing Detention Violates Due Process
20 A. Petitioner’s Detention is Not Presumptively Reasonable
21 Respondents note that petitioner has been detained for less than six months from the time
22 his removal order became final (in December 2025), and it accordingly remains presumptively
23 reasonable. The undersigned joins other courts that have found that the six-month presumptively
24 reasonable period of detention described in Zadvydas does not mean that detention always
25 reasonable for the full six months. See Uzzhina v. Chestnut, No. 1:25-cv-01594-DAD-SCR,
26 2025 WL 3458787, *3 n. 3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2025) (“The fact that a noncitizen has been held in-
27 custody less than six months does not foreclose a claim that his or her detention is unlawful under
28 Zadvydas.”) (quoting Clark v. Martinez, 543 U.S. 371, 384 (2005) (“Zadvydas did not hold that
1 the statute authorizes detention until it approaches constitutional limits; it held that, since
2 interpreting the statute to authorize indefinite detention (one plausible reading) would approach
3 constitutional limits, the statute should be read (in line with the other plausible reading) to
4 authorize detention only for a period consistent with the purpose of effectuating removal.”); Trinh
5 v. Homan, 466 F.Supp.3d 1077, 1092 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (explaining that “[a]t no point did the
6 Zadvydas Court preclude a noncitizen from challenging their detention before the end of the
7 presumptively reasonable six-month period”); Medina v. Noem, 794 F. Supp. 3d 365, 375 (D.
8 Md. 2025) (noting that “what Zadvydas did make clear was that it was adopting a presumption—
9 not a conclusive bar to adjudication of whether continued detention is authorized that lifts only
10 after six months have elapsed”); Vijdani v. Mattos, No. 2:25-cv-02496-GMN-EJY, 2026 WL
11 560209, at *3-4 (D. Nev. Feb. 27, 2026) (collecting cases concluding the same). Petitioner has
12 sufficiently overcome the presumption of reasonableness under Zadvydas because he cannot be
13 removed to his country of origin, an IJ ordered him removed more than ten months ago, the 90-
14 day mandatory detention period has passed without his removal to any other country, and he has
15 been in detention for a total period of seventeen months. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 701.
16 B. Significant Likelihood of Removal in the Reasonably Foreseeable Future
17 Petitioner has met his burden of establishing a “good reason to believe” that there is no
18 significant likelihood of his removal in the reasonably foreseeable future because he was granted
19 withholding of removal to Georgia over ten months ago, respondents have not designated a third
20 country of potential removal, there “is a considerable backlog in the processing of deportations to
21 third countries,” and, petitioner intends to raise a fear based claim for protection if he is likely to
22 be persecuted or tortured in any designated third country, which could take years to fully resolve.
23 ECF No. 12 at 7-9.
24 Respondents do not identify which third country they are attempting to remove petitioner
25 or describe any steps they have actually taken to do so. As a result, there is nothing in the record
26 to suggest any likelihood that petitioner will be deported in the reasonably foreseeable future. In
27 defending this case, respondents emphasize only the generalized prospect of removal to a third
28 country. ECF No. 11. Based on the present record, the burden shifts to respondents to produce
1 evidence to rebut petitioner’s showing that there is “good reason to believe that there is no
2 significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at
3 701. Respondents did not submit any declaration from an agency official describing any steps
4 ICE has taken to secure petitioner’s removal over the past four-and-a-half months. This silent
5 record reinforces the court’s conclusion that there is no significant likelihood of petitioner’s
6 removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. See Tumasov v. Doe 1, No. 26CV590-LL-DEB,
7 2026 WL 458146, at *3-4 (S.D. Cal. Feb. 18, 2026) (granting habeas to a petitioner who was
8 detained for less than four months after the removal order became final because ICE had not yet
9 identified any country that would accept petitioner). Accordingly, petitioner has sufficiently
10 established that his removal is not reasonably foreseeable and that his ongoing detention is not
11 reasonably necessary to secure his removal. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 699–700. Therefore, the
12 court recommends granting the § 2241petition on claim one based on his unlawful prolonged
13 detention.1
14 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:
15 1. Petitioner’s § 2241 application (ECF No. 1) be granted on claim one.2
16 2. Respondents be ordered to immediately release Petitioner KAVTARADZE GIORGI,
17 (A#249-099-073), under conditions of supervision dictated by applicable statutes and regulations.
18 3. The Clerk of Court be directed to serve the California City Detention Facility with a
19 copy of any final order granting release.
20 4. Respondents shall not redetain petitioner unless and until they comply with all
21 procedures set forth in 8 C.F.R. § 241.13(i) and any other applicable statutes and regulations.
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23 1 While the petition does not expressly raise the issue of fair notice in advance of removal to any
third country, the court notes that petitioner is entitled to adequate notice as well as the
24 opportunity to claim a fear of persecution or torture as to such country. See Andriasian v. I.N.S.,
180 F.3d 1033, 1041 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that “[f]ailing to notify individuals who are subject
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to deportation that they have the right to apply for asylum in the United States and for
26 withholding of deportation to the country to which they will be deported violates both agency
regulations and the constitutional right to due process”).
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2 In the interests of judicial economy, the remaining claims are not addressed herein in light of
28 the recommended relief.
1 5. Petitioner’s motion for a temporary restraining order (ECF No. 2) be denied as moot in
2 || light of the recommendation to grant the § 2241 petition.
3 6. The Clerk of Court be directed to enter judgment for petitioner and to close this case.
4 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge
5 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within seven days after
6 || being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with
7 || the court and serve a copy on all parties. The undersigned finds that a shortened objection period
8 || is warranted in this case given the nature of the relief at issue as well as the fact that the parties
9 || have had sufficient time to submit all of their arguments in written briefs. See United States v.
10 | Barney, 568 F.2d 134, 136 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam) (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) sets
11 | the maximum objection period and not the minimum); see also Local Rule 304(b). The parties
12 || are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal
13 | the District Court’s order. Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
14 | DATED: April 28, 2026
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17 SEAN C. RIORDAN
18 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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