Opinion

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 MICHELA BROWN, Case No. 2:26-cv-00186-DC-CSK PS

12 Plaintiff,

13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

14 COUNTY OF EL DORADO, et al., (ECF Nos. 1, 2)

15 Defendants.

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17 Plaintiff Michela Brown is representing herself in this action and seeks leave to

18 proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.1 (ECF No. 2.) For the

19 reasons that follow, the Court recommends that Plaintiff’s IFP application be denied, and

20 the Complaint be dismissed without leave to amend.

21 I. MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

22 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a) provides that the court may authorize the commencement,

23 prosecution or defense of any suit without prepayment of fees or security “by a person

24 who submits an affidavit stating the person is “unable to pay such fees or give security

25 therefor.” This affidavit is to include, among other things, a statement of all assets the

26 person possesses. Id. The IFP statute does not itself define what constitutes insufficient

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1 This matter proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, Fed. R.

28 Civ. P. 72, and Local Rule 302(c).

1 assets. See Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d 1226, 1234 (9th Cir. 2015). In Escobedo,

2 the Ninth Circuit stated that an affidavit in support of an IFP application is sufficient

3 where it alleges that the affiant cannot pay court costs and still afford the necessities of

4 life. Id. “One need not be absolutely destitute to obtain benefits of the in forma pauperis

5 statute.” Id. Nonetheless, a party seeking IFP status must allege poverty “with some

6 particularity, definiteness and certainty.” Id. According to the United States Department

7 of Health and Human Services, the current poverty guideline for a household of one (not

8 residing in Alaska or Hawaii) is $15,060.00. See U.S. Dpt. Health & Human Service

9 (available at https://aspe.hhs.gov/poverty-guidelines).

10 Here, Plaintiff’s IFP request states that disability benefits are her only source of

11 income and she pays $3,995 a month in rent. See ECF No. 2. Plaintiff has made the

12 required showing under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See id. However, the Court will

13 recommend Plaintiff’s IFP application be denied because the action is facially frivolous or

14 without merit because it fails to state a claim and lacks subject matter jurisdiction. “‘A

15 district court may deny leave to proceed in forma pauperis at the outset if it appears from

16 the face of the proposed complaint that the action is frivolous or without merit.’” Minetti v.

17 Port of Seattle, 152 F.3d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Tripati v. First Nat. Bank &

18 Tr., 821 F.2d 1368, 1370 (9th Cir. 1987)); see also McGee v. Dep’t of Child Support

19 Servs., 584 Fed. App’x 638 (9th Cir. 2014) (“the district court did not abuse its discretion

20 by denying McGee's request to proceed IFP because it appears from the face of the

21 amended complaint that McGee's action is frivolous or without merit”); Smart v. Heinze,

22 347 F.2d 114, 116 (9th Cir. 1965) (“It is the duty of the District Court to examine any

23 application for leave to proceed in forma pauperis to determine whether the proposed

24 proceeding has merit and if it appears that the proceeding is without merit, the court is

25 bound to deny a motion seeking leave to proceed in forma pauperis.”). Because it

26 appears from the face of the Complaint that this action is frivolous or is without merit as

27 discussed in more detail below, the Court recommends denying Plaintiff’s IFP motion.

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1 II. SCREENING REQUIREMENT

2 Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), the court must screen every in forma pauperis

3 proceeding, and must order dismissal of the case if it is “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to

4 state a claim on which relief may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a

5 defendant who is immune from such relief.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Lopez v. Smith,

6 203 F.3d 1122, 1126-27 (2000) (en banc). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an

7 arguable basis either in law or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). In

8 reviewing a complaint under this standard, the court accepts as true the factual

9 allegations contained in the complaint, unless they are clearly baseless or fanciful, and

10 construes those allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. See Neitzke, 490

11 U.S. at 327; Von Saher v. Norton Simon Museum of Art at Pasadena, 592 F.3d 954, 960

12 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 564 U.S. 1037 (2011).

13 Pleadings by self-represented litigants are liberally construed. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627

14 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (liberal construction appropriate even post–Iqbal).

15 However, the court need not accept as true conclusory allegations, unreasonable

16 inferences, or unwarranted deductions of fact. Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d

17 618, 624 (9th Cir. 1981). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action does

18 not suffice to state a claim. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555-57 (2007);

19 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

20 To state a claim on which relief may be granted, the plaintiff must allege enough

21 facts “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A

22 claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court

23 to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”

24 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the

25 complaint and an opportunity to amend unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be

26 cured by amendment. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31; Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80

27 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 1996).

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1 III. THE COMPLAINT

2 Plaintiff brings this action against four named defendants: County of El Dorado,

3 Pippa Temple, Kassie Cardullo, and Jake Hermingaus. See Compl. (ECF No. 1). She

4 also lists South Lake Tahoe Police Department Detectives (“SLT Detectives”) as

5 defendants. Id.

6 Plaintiff alleges this action arises under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges that

7 Defendant County of El Dorado “is responsible for policies and supervision of the District

8 Attorney’s Office.” Compl. at 1. Defendants Temple, Cardullo, and Hermingaus “were

9 employees of the DA’s Office.” Id.

10 Plaintiff alleges that, in a July 2025 investigation, Defendant SLT Detectives

11 “coerced, manipulated [and] pressured” her into making statements while she was

12 experiencing distress from mental health and substance abuse issues. Compl. at 1.

13 Plaintiff alleges that, on November 3, 2025, “Defendants engaged in retaliation,

14 surveillance, intimidation, witness threats, misrepresentation of authority, and unlawful

15 subpoena.” Id. In October 2025, Defendants allegedly “disclosed Plaintiff’s protected

16 victim status to her employer,” causing her to lose her job. Id. at 2.

17 Plaintiff claims that, based on these alleged events, Defendants violated her rights

18 under the First, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, “engaged in conspiracy, and caused

19 constitutional injuries.” Id. at 2. She claims that Defendant County of Eldorado

20 “maintained customs and failure to train that caused these violations.” Id. Plaintiff asserts

21 that Defendants’ actions “were investigative and retaliatory, not protected by

22 prosecutorial immunity.” Id.

23 IV. DISCUSSION

24 A. Failure to Comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8

25 Plaintiff’s Complaint does not contain a short and plain statement of a claim as

26 required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8. In order to give fair notice of the claims

27 and the grounds on which they rest, a plaintiff must allege with at least some degree of

28 particularity overt acts by specific defendants which support the claims. See Kimes v.

1 Stone, 84 F.3d 1121, 1129 (9th Cir. 1996). A review of the Complaint reveals it consists

2 of “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements” of her causes of action and fails to state a claim

3 for relief. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. While this problem infects the entire Complaint, the

4 Court discusses its deficiencies in pleading particular claims below.

5 B. Failure to State a Claim

6 Plaintiff’s Complaint fails to state a claim against any defendant under Section

7 1983. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 “provides a cause of action for the deprivation of any rights,

8 privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States.”

9 Wilder v. Virginia Hosp. Ass'n, 496 U.S. 498, 508 (1990) (internal quotation marks

10 omitted). To state a cognizable Section 1983 claim, a plaintiff must allege the violation of

11 a right protected by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and that the alleged

12 deprivation was committed by a person who acted under color of state law. 42 U.S.C.

13 § 1983; see also Florer v. Congregation Pidyon Shevuyim, N.A., 639 F.3d 916, 921 (9th

14 Cir. 2011). An individual defendant is not liable on a civil rights claim unless the facts

15 establish the defendant’s personal involvement in the constitutional deprivation or a

16 causal connection between the defendant's wrongful conduct and the alleged

17 constitutional deprivation. See Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 645 (9th Cir. 1989);

18 Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1978). Plaintif’s brief and conclusory

19 allegations against Defendants Temple, Cardullo, Hermingaus, and SLT Detectives do

20 not suffice to show unconstitutional conduct under Section 1983.

21 As to Defendant County of El Dorado, plaintiff’s general and conclusory

22 allegations do not “show that a ‘policy or custom’ led to plaintiff’s injury.” See Castro v.

23 County of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1073 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (quoting Monell v.

24 Dep't of Soc. Servs. of City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978)). To impose liability

25 under Monell, a plaintiff must show that (1) she was deprived of a constitutional right;

26 (2) the municipality has a policy; (3) the policy amounts to deliberate indifference to

27 plaintiff's constitutional rights; and (4) the policy is the moving force behind the

28 constitutional violation. Anderson v. Warner, 451 F.3d 1063, 1070 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing

1 Oviatt v. Pearce, 954 F.2d 1470, 1474 (9th Cir. 1994)). The Complaint does not allege

2 specific facts to meet these elements, and plaintiff’s Monell claim is subject to dismissal.

3 Finally, insofar as Plaintiff’s claims concern ongoing state court proceedings, they

4 are barred by the Younger abstention doctrine. See Compl. at 1 (“Plaintiff was the

5 alleged victim in [a] criminal case . . . and invoked her Fifth Amendment rights on

6 November 3, 2025.”). Federal courts are generally required to abstain from interfering

7 with ongoing state court proceedings. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–45 (1971).

8 Abstention of the federal court is required under Younger when “(1) there is ‘an ongoing

9 state judicial proceeding’; (2) the proceeding ‘implicate[s] important state interests’;

10 (3) there is ‘an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional

11 challenges’; and (4) the requested relief ‘seek[s] to enjoin’ or has ‘the practical effect of

12 enjoining’ the ongoing state judicial proceeding.” Arevalo v. Hennessy, 882 F.3d 763,

13 765 (9th Cir. 2018) (citations omitted). The Complaint suggests the parties may be

14 involved in an ongoing state criminal case. The federal court must abstain from

15 interfering with these proceedings, which provide an adequate opportunity to raise

16 constitutional challenges. In sum, all claims in the Complaint should be dismissed.

17 C. Leave to Amend

18 In considering whether leave to amend should be granted, the Court considers

19 that the Complaint does not present a non-frivolous claim. In light of the Court’s lack of

20 subject matter jurisdiction and the Complaint’s many deficiencies, it appears granting

21 leave to amend would be futile. The Complaint should therefore be dismissed without

22 leave to amend. See Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1130-31; Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103,

23 1105-06 (9th Cir. 1995).

24 V. CONCLUSION

25 Based upon the findings above, it is RECOMMENDED that:

26 1. Plaintiff’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) be DENIED;

27 2. Plaintiff’s Complaint (ECF No. 1) be DISMISSED without leave to amend;

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1 3. The Clerk of the Court be directed to CLOSE this case.

2 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District

3 || Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within

4 | 14 days after being served with these findings and recommendations, any party may file

5 || written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. This document should

6 || be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any

7 || reply to the objections shall be served on all parties and filed with the Court within 14

8 | days after service of the objections. Failure to file objections within the specified time

9 | may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order. Turner v. Duncan, 158 F.3d 449,

10 | 455 (9th Cir. 1998); Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153, 1156-57 (9th Cir. 1991).

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12 | Dated: April 16, 2026 C iy S \U

13 CHI S00 KIM

44 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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