Noem

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 AJAY KUMAR, No. 1:26-cv-01148-DJC-AC

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Petitioner,

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v. ORDER

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KRISTI NOEM, et al.,

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Respondents.

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17 Presently before the Court is Petitioner’s Motion to Enforce. (ECF No. 15.) For

18 the reasons stated below, Petitioner’s Motion is granted. The Court orders that

19 Respondents provide Petitioner with a new, constitutionally adequate bond hearing.

20 BACKGROUND

21 Petitioner Ajay Kumar is an immigration detainee presently in the custody of

22 Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). The Court previously granted

23 Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, finding that Respondents’ re-detention

24 of Petitioner violated his due process rights. (See ECF No. 13.) The Court ordered

25 Respondents to provide Petitioner a constitutionally adequate bond hearing before

26 an Immigration Judge (“IJ”), where the Government would bear the burden of

27 establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner posed a danger to the

28 community or risk of flight. (Id. at 2.)

1 On February 19, 2026, Petitioner appeared before an IJ for the scheduled

2 hearing. During the hearing, the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)

3 presented two arguments for detention.1 First, the DHS argued that Petitioner was a

4 flight risk based on the fact that a sponsor, who provided a letter for Petitioner’s bond

5 packet, stated they had a relationship with Petitioner and that Petitioner’s last known

6 address was in Fresno, California. The DHS noted that Petitioner’s I-589 Application

7 showed a New York residential address, but that his mailing address was in Fresno,

8 California. The Government argued that the failure to mention the New York address

9 indicated the sponsor did not know the Petitioner as well as the Sponsor represented

10 in their letter, and that the relationship was unsubstantiated. The Government also

11 suggested that Petitioner may have limited immigration relief available to him. Based

12 exclusively on the purported address inconsistency in the sponsor letter and the claim

13 that only limited relief was likely available to Petitioner, the Government argued that

14 Petitioner was a flight risk. The Government secondarily argued that Petitioner

15 presented a danger to the community based on a January 12, 2026, encounter with

16 federal law enforcement.2

17 At the conclusion of that hearing, the IJ found that DHS had met its burden to

18 establish by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner was such a risk of flight that

19 no amount of bond was appropriate. No other explanation or basis for that finding

20 was stated on the record. The written order subsequently issued by the IJ simply

21 restated that bond was “[d]enied, because the Department has met its burden to

22 prove by clear and convincing evidence that Respondent is such a flight risk that no

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25 1 The Court initially requested a transcript of the proceedings. (ECF No. 16.) After Respondents

informed the Court that no transcript was available, the Court requested that a recording be lodged.

26 (ECF No. 18.) That recording has been reviewed by the Court, and the contents of it are referenced

here.

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2 As the Immigration Judge did not find that Petitioner presented a danger to the community or that

28 detention was warranted based on this incident, the Court does not discuss this argument further.

1 conditions of bond or release are appropriate.” (ECF No. 17-1 at 1.) No further

2 explanation was provided.

3 Petitioner now argues that the hearing he was provided was insufficient to

4 satisfy his due process rights. (Mot. (ECF No. 15).) Petitioner requests that the Court

5 find that the hearing provided was not in compliance with the Court’s order and that

6 the Court order Petitioner released from Respondents’ custody. Respondents oppose

7 Petitioner’s Motion. (Opp’n (ECF No. 17).)

8 LEGAL STANDARD

9 The Court has jurisdiction to enforce its own orders. See Sub-Zero, Inv. v.

10 Wasserman, No. 2:18-cv-00428-JFW-MAR, 2025 WL 1111551, at *3 (C.D. Cal. March

11 27, 2025); see also Agtuca v. Reed, No. 86-cv-00331-RHW, 2006 WL 2009050, at *2

12 (E.D. Wash. July 17, 2006). Petitioner is seeking to enforce the Court’s Order as to the

13 standard imposed at the bond hearing. Petitioner argues that the Court ordered a

14 constitutionally adequate bond hearing with the burden on the Government to prove

15 dangerousness or risk of flight by clear and convincing evidence, but that the hearing

16 failed to comply with that Order. Given the nature of this argument, Petitioner’s

17 motion is simultaneously based on the adequacy of the hearing that was provided.

18 Thus, the Court’s analysis here is grounded in the legal standard for reviewing IJ

19 detention determinations.

20 When reviewing an IJ’s detention determination, the Court reviews mixed

21 questions of fact and law under an abuse of discretion standard. Martinez v. Clark,

22 124 F.4th 775, 785 (9th Cir. 2024). Under this standard, the Court “cannot reweigh

23 evidence” but instead determines whether the Immigration Court “applied the correct

24 legal standard.” Id. (quoting Konou v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1120, 1127 (9th Cir. 2014)).

25 Thus, the Court’s review is effectively limited to whether the IJ’s decision “reflects

26 ‘clear legal error’ or is unsupported by sufficient evidence.” Hilario Pankim v. Barr, No.

27 20-cv-02941-JSC, 2020 WL 2542022, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 19, 2020).

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1 DISCUSSION

2 The Court finds that Petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated that the IJ’s finding

3 that Petitioner was such a flight risk that no amount of bond was appropriate was an

4 abuse of discretion. In its prior Order, the Court ordered that Respondents provide

5 Petitioner with a bond hearing where the Government bore the burden of establishing

6 that detention as necessary by clear and convincing evidence. This clear and

7 convincing standard requires DHS to present evidence that establishes “an abiding

8 conviction that the truth of its factual contentions at issue are highly probable.”

9 Colorado v. New Mexico, 467 U.S. 310, 316 (1984) (internal citation and quotation

10 marks omitted); see Mondaca-Vega v. Lynch, 808 F.3d 413, 422 (9th Cir. 2015). This is

11 only the case where “the material it offered instantly tilted the evidentiary scales in the

12 affirmative when weighed against the evidence . . . offered in opposition.” Colorado,

13 467 U.S. at 316.

14 As an initial issue, the IJ’s decision fails to identify the basis for the flight risk

15 determination. Both orally at the conclusion of the bond hearing and in the

16 subsequent written order, the Immigration Judge only stated that the Government

17 had met its burden to establish that Petitioner is a flight risk. In Franco-Rosendo v.

18 Gonzalez, 454 F.3d 965 (9th Cir. 2006), the Ninth Circuit stated that “[t]he BIA abuses

19 its discretion when it fails to consider and address in its entirety the evidence

20 submitted by a petitioner and to issue a decision that fully explains the reasons for

21 denying a motion to reopen.” Id. at 966 (internal citations and quotation marks

22 omitted). This applies with equal force where the Court reviews an Immigration

23 Judge’s decision to deny release on bond for abuse of discretion. See Miri v. Bondi,

24 No. 5:26-cv-00698-MEMF-MAR, 2026 WL 622302, at *8–9 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2026)

25 (finding an abuse of discretion where an immigration judge did not explain the

26 reasons for denying bond). The IJ’s failure to provide any basis for the decision that

27 Petitioner was a risk of flight, beyond a conclusory statement that DHS had met its

28 burden, was thus an abuse of discretion.

1 Even if the Court were to accept that the IJ adopted in full the DHS’s reasoning,

2 the decision to find that Petitioner was a risk of flight based on the Respondents’

3 arguments was an abuse of discretion. DHS’s argument that Petitioner was a flight risk

4 was almost entirely predicated on the fact that a sponsor letter, provided in

5 Petitioner’s bond packet, stated Petitioner’s last known address was in Fresno, while

6 Petitioner’s I-589 Application showed his “residential address” as located in New York.

7 DHS argued that this difference showed that the relationship between the Petitioner

8 and sponsor was unsubstantiated. Notably, Counsel for DHS expressly stated during

9 the hearing that the I-589 Application listed the Fresno address as Petitioner’s mailing

10 address. Thus, it does not appear that there was any inconsistency between the

11 sponsor’s statement that Petitioner’s last known address is in Fresno and the mailing

12 address listed in the I-589 Application. Moreover, even if the failure to also mention

13 the New York address did represent an inconsistency, DHS cannot meet its burden to

14 prove, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner is a flight risk simply by

15 identifying that a sponsor was not aware of both addresses Petitioner maintained.

16 Again, this was a hearing in which the Government bore the burden of proof. At best,

17 the address argument presented by DHS undercuts the persuasiveness of one piece

18 of evidence provided by Petitioner in support of his release. It does not provide clear

19 and convincing evidence that Petitioner presents a risk of flight.

20 During the bond hearing, DHS also argued briefly that Petitioner presented a

21 risk of flight because the immigration relief available to him was potentially limited

22 due to the delayed filing of the I-589 Application. It is unclear why the potential

23 barriers to obtaining immigration relief indicate that Petitioner is a flight risk. But, at a

24 minimum, it cannot be said that the limited availability of relief is evidence of flight

25 that remotely approaches the clear and convincing standard the IJ purported to

26 apply.

27 The absolute deficiency of the Government’s attempt to meet its burden is

28 further underscored by the factors generally considered in determining whether an

1 individual presents a flight risk. “According to the Board of Immigration Appeals, a

2 noncitizen’s flight risk may be evaluated based on a number of factors including (1)

3 whether the individual has a fixed address in the United States; (2) length of residence

4 in the United States; (3) the individual’s family ties in the United States, and whether

5 they may entitle the noncitizen to reside permanently in the United States in the

6 future; (4) the noncitizen’s employment history; (5) the noncitizen’s record of

7 appearance in court; (6) the noncitizen’s criminal record; (7) the noncitizen’s history of

8 immigration violations; (8) any attempts by the noncitizen to flee prosecution or

9 otherwise escape from the authorities; and (9) the noncitizen’s manner of entry to the

10 Unites States.” S.E. v. Noem, No. 1:26-cv-00356-DAD-SCR, 2026 WL 627456, at *3

11 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2026), findings and recommendations adopted in part by, No. 1:26-

12 cv-00356-DAD-SCR, 2026 WL 836327 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2026) (cleaned up) (citing

13 Matter of Guerra, 24 I&N Dec. 37, *3 (BIA 2006)). DHS’s asserted grounds that

14 Petitioner was a flight risk find no footing in any of these factors, or any other

15 reasonable factor that might be adopted to measure an individual’s risk of flight.

16 Based on the above, it is apparent that while the IJ stated the appropriate

17 burden in making the determination that Petitioner was a risk of flight, that was mere

18 “lip service” to the appropriate standard. See S.E. v. Noem, 2026 WL 627456, at *4

19 (citing Nat'l Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Pritzker, 828 F.3d 1125, 1135 (9th Cir. 2016)). In

20 actuality, the Government was not held to its burden, and the appropriate standard

21 was plainly not applied. Even if the IJ adopted, in full, DHS’s flight risk argument,

22 these arguments did not approach satisfying the clear and convincing burden placed

23 on the Government.

24 The Court rejects Respondents’ argument that Petitioner’s Motion should be

25 denied based on exhaustion grounds. The hearing at issue was conducted pursuant

26 to an order from this Court. That Order also included the appropriate standard to be

27 applied at that hearing. Respondents’ failure to comply with the terms of that Order

28 by applying the standard expressly included in the terms of the Order is an issue

1 appropriately addressed by a motion to enforce the Court’s order. Leonardo v.

2 Crawford, which is cited by Respondents in their Opposition, is unrelated, as it does

3 not concern a situation in which a court ordered a bond hearing with a specific burden

4 of proof that was not imposed during the hearing. See 646 F.3d 1157, 1159 (9th Cir.

5 2011). Instead, the court in Leonardo ordered a bond hearing, which was provided,

6 and the court found that the Government “complied exactly” with the court’s order by

7 providing that hearing. Id. at 1161. Here, the opposite is true: the Court expressly

8 finds the Government failed to comply with its prior order in failing to provide a bond

9 hearing with the appropriate standard stated in the Court’s prior order.

10 Accordingly, the IJ’s determination that Petitioner was such a flight risk that no

11 amount of bond was appropriate was an abuse of discretion due to the failure to state

12 the basis for that decision and the failure to apply the appropriate standard during the

13 hearing. Petitioner’s Motion is thus granted. The Court orders Respondents to

14 provide Petitioner with a new bond hearing where the appropriate standard is

15 applied, the Government is held to its burden, and any decision to detain Petitioner is

16 supported by an adequate explanation for the basis of that finding.3

17 CONCLUSION

18 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

19 1. Petitioner’s Motion to Enforce (ECF No. 15) is GRANTED.

20 2. Within ten (10) days of this Order, Respondents shall afford Petitioner

21 Ajay Kumar a new, constitutionally adequate bond hearing before an

22 Immigration Judge. The Government shall bear the burden of

23 ////

24 ////

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3 In filing this Motion, Petitioner sought an order releasing him from ICE custody. (See Mot. at 13.) The

27 Court does not yet find this to be appropriate. Such relief is beyond what was previously ordered.

While the Court does not find that it is necessarily inappropriate for the Court to determine that further

28 relief can be ordered where necessary, it does not find that this is appropriate at this time.

1 establishing, by clear and convincing evidence, that Petitioner poses a

2 danger to the community or risk of flight, and Petitioner shall be allowed

3 to have counsel present.

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5 IT 1S SO ORDERED.

6 | Dated: □ April 13, 2026 “Daniel CoD tto—

Hon. Daniel t |. od

/ UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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