The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 STANLEY EFREN JOVEL MORAN, No. 2:26-cv-00448-DC-DMC-HC
A-226-062-721,
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Petitioner,
13 FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
v.
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CHRISTOPHER CHESTNUT,
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Respondent.
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Petitioner, an immigration detainee proceeding with appointed counsel, filed a
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petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Respondents filed an answer.
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See ECF No. 5. Petitioner filed a traverse. See ECF No. 13.
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I. BACKGROUND
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According to the Petitioner, he arrived in the United States when he was 16 years-
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old with his mother who has diligently attended all ICE and ISAP appointments since arriving.
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See ECF No. 1, pg. 6. Petitioner contends that after he turned 18 years-old, ICE contacted his
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mother and requested Petitioner appear for an appointment, when Petitioner did, he was
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immediately detained. See id. Petitioner contends he suffers chronic illnesses and would like to be
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released to finish high school. See id. at 7. Petitioner contends he was denied any process prior to
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1 his arrest. See id. at 6-7. Petitioner argues that because his detention was without due process the
2 Court should grant his writ of habeas corpus and order Petitioner be immediately released. See
3 ECF No. 13.
4 Respondents contend that Petitioner “is an applicant for admission under the INA
5 and is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) due to his ongoing removal
6 proceedings under 8 U.S.C. § 1229.” ECF No. 5, pg. 1. According to Respondents, Petitioner was
7 arrested and released from custody the day he entered the United States, May 25, 2024. See id.
8 Respondents contend Petitioner was re-detained on October 27, 2025. See id. Respondents argue
9 that because Petitioner is subject to § 1225(b), his release is not authorized and his arrest did not
10 require a warrant. See id. at 4-5. Attached to the answer is the May 25, 2024, “Record of
11 Deportable/Inadmissible Alien,” which documents that Petitioner raised a credible fear claim with
12 regard to his home country of El Salvado and that Petitioner was released on an order of release
13 on his own recognizance. See ECF No. 5-1.
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15 II. DISCUSSION
16 The undersigned finds that Petitioner has a protectable liberty interest in remaining
17 out of custody, and he was deprived of this liberty without due process when re-detained without
18 notice or a hearing. Accordingly, the undersigned will recommend granting Petitioner’s petition
19 for writ of habeas corpus because his detention violates due process and recommend that
20 Petitioner be immediately released from Respondents’ custody under the same conditions he was
21 released previously.
22 The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause prohibits government deprivation of an
23 individual’s life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Hernandez v. Session, 872 F.3d
24 976, 990 (9th Cir. 2017). The Due Process Clause applies to all “persons” within the borders of
25 the United States, regardless of immigration status. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 693 (2001)
26 (“[T]he Due Process Clause applies to all “persons” within the United States, including
27 noncitizens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.”). These
28 due process rights extend to immigration proceedings. Id. at 693–94. Courts examine procedural
1 due process claims in two steps: the first asks whether there exists a protected liberty interest
2 under the Due Process Clause, and the second examines the procedures necessary to ensure any
3 deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the Constitution. See Kentucky Dep’t of
4 Corrections v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481
5 (1972) (“Once it is determined that due process applies, the question remains what process is
6 due.”). The Court considers each step in turn.
7 As for the first step, the Court finds Petitioner has shown he has a protectable
8 liberty interest. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government
9 custody, detention, or other forms of physical restrain—lies at the heart of the liberty that [the
10 Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. “Even individuals who face
11 significant constraints on their liberty or over whose liberty the government wields significant
12 discretion retain a protected interest in their liberty.” Pinchi v. Noem, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1025, 1032
13 (N.D. Cal. July 24, 2025). “Although in some circumstances the initial decision to detain or
14 release an individual may be within the government’s discretion, the government’s decision to
15 release an individual from custody creates ‘an implicit promise,’ upon which that individual may
16 rely, that their liberty ‘will be revoked only if [they] fail[ ] to live up to the . . . conditions [of
17 release].” Id. (quoting Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482) (modifications in original). “Accordingly, a
18 noncitizen release from custody pending immigration proceedings has a protected liberty interest
19 in remaining out of custody.” Salcedo Aceros v. Kaiser, No. 25-CV-06924-EMC (EMC), 2025
20 WL 2637503, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025). To determine whether an individual’s conditional
21 release rises to the level of a protected liberty interest, courts have “compar[ed] the specific
22 conditional release in the case before them with the liberty interest in parole as characterized by
23 Morrissey.” R.D.T.M. v. Wofford, No. 1:25-cv-01141-KES-SKO, 2025 WL 2617255, at *3 (E.D.
24 Cal. Sept 9, 2025).
25 As a preliminary matter, the Court finds unpersuasive the argument by
26 Respondents’ that Petitioner cannot assert a liberty interest because he is an “applicant for
27 admission” under § 1225 and therefore subject to mandatory detention, ineligible for release,
28 parole, or a custody redetermination hearing. First, Respondents claim Petitioner is inedible for
1 release without explaining how, if he is ineligible for release, Petitioner was previously released
2 on his own recognizance.
3 Next, Respondents contend that Petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C. §
4 1225(b)(2)(A) but there is no evidence in the record that an immigration officer made the
5 requisite determinations for § 1225(b)(2)(A) to apply – that Petitioner is seeking admission and
6 not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted. Following and adopting the reasoning of
7 other courts, this Court finds Petitioner is not actively seeking lawful entry because he already
8 entered the United States over a year ago. See Salcedo Aceros, 2025 WL 2637503, at *8
9 (collecting cases concluding that § 1225 applies only to noncitizens “seeking admission,” a
10 category that does not include noncitizens like Petitioner, living in the interior of the country.).
11 Respondents’ proposed interpretation of the statute disregards the relationship
12 between §§ 1225 and 1226 and would render the recent amendment to § 1226(c) superfluous.
13 Lepe v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-01163-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 2716910, at *4 (E.D. Cal.
14 Sept. 23, 2025). Specifically, and as many courts have discussed in length, if every “applicant for
15 admission” is subject to mandatory detention under § 1225, there would have been no need for §
16 1226(c)(1)(E), which mandates detention for every noncitizen who is “present in the United
17 States without being admitted or paroled” and who has been “charged with, arrested for, or admits
18 to” committing certain crimes. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E); Maldonado v. Olson, No. 25-CV-3142
19 (SRN/SGE), 2025 WL 2374411, at *12 (D. Minn. Aug 19, 2025) (“The Court will not find that
20 Congress passed the Laken Riley Act to ‘perform the same work’ that was already covered by §
21 1225(b)(2).”).
22 Indeed, prior to a July 2025 memorandum changing its’ policy, the government
23 consistently applied Section 1226(a), not Section 1225(b)(2), to noncitizens residing in the United
24 States who were detained by immigration authorities and subject to removal. See Rodriguez Diaz,
25 53 F.4th at 1196. This Court agrees with and joins the majority of courts nationwide, including
26 the Eastern District of California, in rejecting Respondents’ interpretation of Sections 1225 and
27 1226. See Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock, 2025 WL 2782499, at *1, 21-22 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 30,
28 2025) (concluding, after a thorough analysis, that “the government's [interpretation of § 1225]
1 belies the statutory text of the INA, canons of statutory interpretation, legislative history, and
2 longstanding agency practice”); J.Y.L.C. v. Bostock, 2025 WL 3169865, at *2 (D. Or. Nov. 12,
3 2025) (collecting more than thirty cases rejecting the government's assertion that § 1225
4 empowers the DHS to arrest and hold a noncitizen present without legal status who has spent
5 years in the U.S.); Cardona-Lozano v. Noem, 2025 WL 3218244, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 14,
6 2025) (“Repeatedly, [district courts across the country] have found that DHS and the [Board of
7 Immigration Appeals’] construction of the INA is incorrect and that petitioners who have long
8 resided in the United States but are being held under § 1225 are entitled to relief.”) (collecting
9 cases); Faizyan v. Casey, 2025 WL 3208844, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 17, 2025) (holding that § 1226
10 applies to a petitioner who “DHS has consistently treated” as subject to discretionary detention
11 and “who has been residing in the United States for two years” (internal quotation marks and
12 citation omitted)); Josue I.C.A. v. Lyons, 2025 WL 3496432, at *3 n.6 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2025)
13 (collecting cases); Morales-Flores v. Lyons, 2025 WL 3552841, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2025)
14 (collecting cases) (“Courts nationwide, including this one, have overwhelmingly rejected
15 respondents’ arguments and found DHS’s new policy unlawful.”).
16 For these reasons, this Court rejects the government’s contention that Petitioner is
17 an “applicant for admission” subject to § 1225(b)(2) and finds that Petitioner is detained under 8
18 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and its implementing regulations because Petitioner has resided in this country
19 for almost a year and a half since Petitioner was released into the United States on parole, until
20 Petitioner was arrested and detained on October 27, 2025. Petitioner’s re-detention on October
21 27, 2025, was not upon Petitioner’s arrival to the United States.
22 As to whether there exists a protected liberty interest, the Court finds Petitioner
23 was released from immigration detention, which created a reasonable expectation that he would
24 be entitled to retain his liberty absent a material change in circumstances. Petitioner was initially
25 released, on his own recognizance. This language sets a clear and reasonable expectation that
26 Petitioner would be entitled to retain his liberty absent a material change in circumstances.
27 Respondents do not allege that Petitioner violated those conditions nor any change in Petitioner’s
28 asylum application status. Instead, Respondents merely rely on the claim that Petitioner is subject
1 to § 1225(b)(2).
2 Petitioner’s detention goes against United States Supreme Court precedent which
3 recognizes that individuals who have been released from custody, even where such release is
4 conditional, have a liberty interest in their continued release. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. 471 at 482.
5 Given this, the Court finds Petitioner has established his liberty interest in his continued release.
6 B. Procedural Due Process
7 Having found a protected liberty interest, the Court examines what process is
8 necessary to ensure any deprivation of that protected liberty interest accords with the
9 Constitution. To determine such, the Court considers three factors: (1) “the private interest that
10 will be affected by the official action;” (2) “the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest
11 through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
12 safeguards;” and (3) “the Government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal
13 and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.”
14 Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). As set forth below, the Court finds Petitioner has
15 established his due process rights were violated.
16 First, Petitioner has a substantial private interest in remaining free from detention.
17 As discussed above, Petitioner has lived in the United States for almost a year and a half.
18 Petitioner has been living with his mother and other family members in South Dakota where
19 Petitioner attended high school. See ECF No. 13, pg. 2. Petitioner is engaged to a U.S. citizen and
20 “has no history of arrests, convictions, release violations, or any other kind of failure.” Id.
21 Despite that, Petitioner has now been detained for over five months without any evidence of
22 being afforded a bond hearing. Accordingly, this factor weighs in favor of finding Petitioner’s
23 private interest has been impacted by his detention. See Manzanarez v. Bondi, No. 1:25-CV-
24 01536-DC-CKD (HC), 2025 WL 3247258, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2025) (finding similarly);
25 see also Colina-Meira v. Lyons, No. 1:25-cv-1716 CSK P, 2025 LX 673205 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 31,
26 2025).
27 Second, the risk of erroneous deprivation is considerable given Petitioner has not
28 received any bond or custody redetermination hearing. “[T]he risk of erroneous deprivation is
1 high when, as here, parole is revoked without written notice or reason.” Chavarria, 2025 WL
2 3533606, at *3; see also A.E. v. Andrews, 2025 WL 1424382, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 16, 2025)
3 (“The risk of an erroneous deprivation [of liberty] is high” when “[the petitioner] has not received
4 any bond or custody redetermination hearing.”). Civil immigration detention, which is
5 “nonpunitive in purpose and effect[,]” is typically justified under the Due Process Clause only
6 when a noncitizen presents a risk of flight or danger to the community. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at
7 690; Padilla v. ICE, 704 F. Supp. 3d 1163, 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2023). Respondents do not contend
8 that Petitioner is or was a flight risk or a danger to the community. Thus, Court finds there is a
9 serious likelihood Petitioner will be erroneously deprived of his liberty interest. Moreover,
10 without any procedural safeguards to determine whether his re-detention was justifiable, the
11 probative value of additional procedural safeguards is high. R.D.T.M., 2025 WL 2617255, at *4.
12 Finally, the Government’s interest is low, and the effort and cost required to
13 provide Petitioner with procedural safeguards are minimal. See Garcia v. Andrews, No. 2:25-CV-
14 01884-TLN-SCR, 2025 WL 1927596, at *5 (E.D. Cal. July 14, 2025). This Court finds the
15 government has an interest in enforcing immigration laws but Respondents’ interest in detaining
16 Petitioner without notice or a hearing here is low. See Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 970;
17 Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1094 (E.D. Cal. March 3, 2025). Detention hearings in
18 immigration courts are routine and impose a “minimal cost.” Doe, 787 F. Supp. 3d at 1094. Even
19 if Respondents believed they had a proper reason to detain Petitioner, such decision on their part
20 would warrant written notice and a pre-detention hearing rather than automatic detention. See
21 E.A. T.-B. v. Wamsley, 795 F. Supp. 3d 1316, 1322 (W.D. Wash. 2025) (“That the Government
22 may believe it has a valid reason to detain petitioner does not eliminate its obligation to effectuate
23 the detention in a manner that comports with due process”). In addition, the government’s interest
24 is even lower because Petitioner was previously released after immigration officials determined
25 he was not a flight risk or danger to the community, and there is no evidence that he has a
26 criminal record.
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1 On balance, the Court finds the Matthews factors weigh in favor of finding
2 Petitioner is entitled to notice and a bond hearing, and Petitioner should have been provided such
3 notice and a hearing before he was re-detained. The Due Process Clause requires that, at a
4 minimum, “that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property be preceded by notice and opportunity
5 for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S.
6 532, 542 (1985) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In criminal cases, parolees
7 released on parole, which does not provide “absolute liberty,” but rather “conditional liberty
8 properly dependent on observance of special parole restrictions,” are also entitled to due process,
9 including a pre-deprivation hearing before their parole can be revoked. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at
10 480-86. “Numerous district courts have held that these principles extend to the context of
11 immigration detention.” F.M.V., 2025 WL 3083934 at *6 (collecting cases). Respondents identify
12 no reason why written notice was not provided or why a pre-deprivation hearing could not be
13 held, and provided no evidence of “urgent concerns,” thus, “a pre-deprivation hearing is required
14 to satisfy due process.” Guillermo M. R. v. Kaiser, 791 F. Supp. 3d 1021, 1036 (N.D. Cal. 2025).
15 Thus, the undersigned finds Petitioner is entitled to relief as to his due process
16 claims and will recommend granting Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus.
17 III. CONCLUSION
18 Based on the foregoing, the undersigned recommends:
19 1. It is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner’s petition for writ of habeas corpus,
20 ECF No. 1, be GRANTED as Petitioner’s detention violates due process;
21 2. It is RECOMMENDED that Petitioner Stanley Efran Jovel Moran, A-226-
22 062-721, be RELEASED IMMEDIATELY from Respondents’ custody upon the
23 same conditions as his prior release, with his belongings. Respondents shall not
24 impose any additional restriction on him, such as electronic monitoring, unless that
25 is determined to be necessary at a future pre-deprivation/custody hearing;
26 / / /
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1 3. It is RECOMMENDED that Respondents be ENJOINED and
2 RESTRAINED from re-arresting or re-detaining Petitioner absent compliance with
3 constitutional protections, including seven (7) day notice and a hearing before a
4 neutral fact-finder where Respondents show: (a) there are material changed
5 circumstances which demonstrate that there is a significant likelihood of
6 Petitioner’s removal in the reasonably foreseeable future, or (b) Respondents
7 demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner poses a danger to the
8 community or a flight risk. At any such hearing, Petitioner shall be allowed to have
9 counsel present.
10 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District
11 || Judge assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The undersigned
12 | finds that a shortened objection period is warranted in this case given the nature of the relief at
13 || issue as well as the fact that the parties have had sufficient time to submit all of their arguments in
14 | written briefs. See United States v. Barney, 568 F.2d 134, 136 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam)
15 || (stating that 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) sets the maximum objection period and not the minimum); see
16 || also Local Rule 304(b). Thus, within 7 days after being served with these findings and
17 || recommendations, any party may file written objections with the Court. Failure to file objections
18 || within the specified time may waive the right to appeal. See Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th
19 | Cir. 1991).
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21 Dated: April 9, 2026 □ = Co
22 DENNIS M. COTA
3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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