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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 YVETTE FORTIER BLINE, No. 2:25-cv-02318-JAM-JDP

12 Plaintiff,

13 v. ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND

DENYING IN PART DEFENDANTS’

14 MATTHEW D. ROGERS, et al., MOTION TO DISMISS

15 Defendants.

16

17 This matter is before the Court on Defendants County of

18 Tehama, Matt Rogers, Dave Kain, Jeff Garrett, and Eric Clay’s

19 Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff Yvette Bline’s Complaint. ECF No. 9-

20 1, Defendants’ Memorandum of Points and Authorities (“Mot.”).

21 Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendants’ motion (ECF No. 13

22 “Opp’n”)), and Defendant filed a reply (ECF No. 15 (“Reply”)).

23 For the reasons detailed below, Defendants’ Motion to

24 Dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.1 Defendants’

25 unopposed Request for Judicial Notice is also granted. See ECF

26 Nos. 9-2, 14.

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1 This motion was determined to be suitable for decision without

28 oral argument. See ECF No. 18; E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(g).

1 I. FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

2 Plaintiff’s claims stem from her employment with the Tehama

3 County Sheriff’s Office, and a workers’ compensation claim she

4 made while serving as a Correctional Officer at the Tehama County

5 Jail. See Mot.; Opp’n; ECF No. 1, Compl. ¶¶ 3, 16, 44.

6 Plaintiff alleges that because the costs associated with her

7 workers’ compensation claim “were escalating,” and had exceeded

8 “a half a million dollars,” the named “Defendants[] decided to

9 form a scheme to falsely accuse Plaintiff of Insurance Fraud to

10 retaliate against her for exercising her statutory right to . . .

11 Workers’ Compensation benefits [].” Compl. ¶ 44. This included

12 the elected district attorney, Matt Rogers, a district attorney

13 investigator, Eric Clay, the elected sheriff, Dave Kain, and his

14 undersheriff, Jeff Garrett, conspiring to fabricate evidence and

15 conduct an unlawful investigation that culminated in Plaintiff’s

16 arrest, criminal charges being filed, and false statements being

17 made to the press about Plaintiff’s criminal case, despite

18 knowing “that [Plaintiff] was innocent.” E.g., id. ¶¶ 4-8, 51.

19 The felony charged against Plaintiff, however, was dismissed by a

20 judge following a preliminary hearing. See Compl. ¶¶ 104-107,

21 115. At that same hearing, the judge made a factual innocence

22 finding. Id.

23 Plaintiff’s complaint includes eight causes of action. The

24 caption of Plaintiff’s complaint lists six claims, but in the

25 body of the complaint, Plaintiff brings eight causes of action,

26 with two, separate third causes of action; those are:

27 (1) “Conspiracy to Violate Civil Rights” (42 U.S.C. § 1983),

28 against all defendants; (2) Deprivation of due process, liberty

1 and property interests “by Subjecting Plaintiff to Criminal

2 Charges Based on Deliberately False Fabricated Evidence” (42

3 U.S.C. § 1983), against all defendants; (3) Unreasonable seizure

4 (42 U.S.C. § 1983), against all defendants; (3) Malicious

5 prosecution (42 U.S.C. § 1983, captioned as another, separate

6 “Third Claim for Relief” in the Complaint), against all defendant

7 except defendant Rogers; (4) “False Statements to the Media” (42

8 U.S.C. § 1983), against defendants Kain, Rogers, and Tehama

9 County; (5) “Section 1983 Claim Against Local Governing Body

10 Defendants Based on Acts of Final Policymakers,” against

11 defendant Tehama County; (6) “Section 1983 Claim Against Local

12 Governing Body Defendants Based on Ratification,” against

13 defendants Rogers and Kain; and (7) a section 1983 claim for

14 Plaintiff’s “right to be Free from Governmental Action Taken to

15 Retaliate Against Plaintiff for Her Exercise of Her First

16 Amendment Right to Workers Compensation Benefits . . . ,” against

17 all defendants. Defendants’ motion targets the first, second,

18 fourth, seventh, and both of the third causes of action.

19 II. OPINION

20 A. Legal Standard

21 A Rule 12(b)(6) motion challenges the sufficiency of a

22 complaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be

23 granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The motion may be granted

24 only if “the complaint lacks a cognizable legal theory or

25 sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal theory.”

26 Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med. Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th

27 Cir. 2008). The court assumes all factual allegations are true

28 and “construe[s] them in the light most favorable to the

1 nonmoving party.” Parks Sch. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51

2 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Everest & Jennings, Inc.

3 v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 23 F.3d 226, 228 (9th Cir. 1994)).

4 That said, if the complaint’s allegations do not “plausibly give

5 rise to an entitlement to relief,” the motion must be granted.

6 Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 679 (2009).

7 A complaint need contain only a “short and plain statement

8 of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,”

9 Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), not “detailed factual allegations.”

10 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations

11 omitted). However, this rule demands more than unadorned

12 accusations; “sufficient factual matter” must make the claim at

13 least plausible. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In the same vein,

14 conclusory or “formulaic recitation[s] of the elements” do not

15 alone suffice. Id. (internal quotations and citations removed).

16 “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads

17 factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable

18 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct

19 alleged.” Id.

20 In granting a motion to dismiss, a court must also decide

21 whether to grant leave to amend. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15. Leave

22 to amend should be given freely where there is no “undue delay,

23 bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the movant, . . .

24 undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of allowance of

25 the amendment, [or] futility of amendment . . . .” Foman v.

26 Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962); Eminence Cap., LLC v. Aspeon,

27 Inc., 316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). Dismissal without

28 leave to amend is proper only if “‘the complaint could not be

1 saved by any amendment.’” Intri-Plex Techs., Inc. v. Crest

2 Grp., Inc., 499 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting In re

3 Daou Sys., Inc., 411 F.3d 1006, 1013 (9th Cir. 2005)).

4 B. Analysis

5 Starting with Defendants’ Request for Judicial Notice,

6 Plaintiff filed a statement of non-opposition to Defendants’

7 request for the Court to consider the criminal complaint filed

8 in Tehama County against Plaintiff. ECF No. 9-2, 14. Since

9 “court filings and other matters of public record” may be

10 judicially noticed, the Defendants’ request is granted. See

11 Fed. R. Evid. 201; Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc.,

12 442 F.3d 741, 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Burbank–Glendale–

13 Pasadena Airport Auth. v. City of Burbank, 136 F.3d 1360 (9th

14 Cir.1998)).

15 Turning to Defendants’ motion, the Court addresses each of

16 the Defendants’ arguments in the order presented in their

17 briefs, below, before addressing Plaintiff’s failure to comply

18 with the Court’s Order regarding page limits.

19 1. First Cause of Action: Conspiracy

20 Relying almost exclusively on Eleventh Circuit precedent,

21 Defendants allege Plaintiff’s conspiracy claim is barred by the

22 intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, since “[d]efendants were all

23 agents of [Tehama] County” and are therefore “legally incapable

24 of colluding among themselves.” Mot. at 5-6. Plaintiff opposes

25 Defendants’ motion, arguing Defendants’ authority is inapposite

26 since it generally analyzes 42 U.S.C. § 1985 claims and is not

27 from the Ninth Circuit. Opp’n at 6-9.

28 Defendants’ arguments are based on an oversimplification of

1 the intra- or intercorporate conspiracy doctrine, and the

2 precedent cited by Defendants does not support its application

3 at the motion to dismiss stage, especially within the Ninth

4 Circuit. Grider v. City of Auburn, Ala., 618 F.3d 1240 (11th

5 Cir. 2010) is the primary case on which Defendants rely. In

6 Grider, the court applies the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine

7 as part of its analysis regarding the application of qualified

8 immunity at the summary judgment stage. 618 F.3d at 1259-63

9 (reviewing the district court’s denial of qualified immunity

10 based on the plaintiff’s malicious prosecution claim). The

11 Grider court cites and analyzes other precedent, none of which

12 apply the doctrine at a motion to dismiss stage outside of the

13 qualified immunity context. Id. at 1261 (citing, e.g.,

14 Dickerson v. Alachua Cnty. Comm’n, 200 F.3d 761 (11th Cir. 2000)

15 (appeal following a jury verdict, where the intracorporate

16 doctrine was raised at summary judgment and post-verdict stages

17 of the case); Chambliss v. Foote, 562 F.2d 1015 (5th Cir. 1977)

18 (slip opinion affirming the grant of summary judgment)).

19 Although Defendants cite Armstrong v. Reynolds, 22 F.4th

20 1058 (9th Cir. 2022), which appears to briefly discuss and apply

21 the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine, it relies on Nevada

22 state law, appears to be an outlier case, is infrequently cited,

23 and other, more recent Ninth Circuit cases do not follow or

24 apply the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine at the 12(b)(6)

25 stage as a bright-line rule broadly prohibiting any conspiracy

26 claims involving county employees, as Defendants suggest. See

27 Lobato v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, No. 22-

28 16440, 2023 WL 6620306 (9th Cir. Oct. 11, 2023) (acknowledging

1 the application of the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine at the

2 summary judgment stage within a qualified immunity analysis);

3 Long v. Weeks, 2024 WL 1672258 (“Appellants are entitled to

4 qualified immunity on the conspiracy claim because it is not

5 clearly established that the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine

6 is inapplicable to Section 1983 claims.”). The United States

7 Supreme Court also acknowledged the split of authority across

8 the county regarding the application on the intracorporate

9 conspiracy doctrine as to § 1985 claims. See Ziglar v. Abbasi,

10 582 U.S. 120, 154-54 (2017) (including in its string cite “Bowie

11 v. Maddox, 642 F.3d 1122, 1130–1131 (C.A.D.C.2011) (detailing a

12 longstanding split about whether the intracorporate-conspiracy

13 doctrine applies to civil rights conspiracies)”). Since

14 Defendants have failed to demonstrate “the complaint lacks a

15 cognizable legal theory or sufficient facts to support a

16 cognizable legal theory,” Mendiondo v. Centinela Hosp. Med.

17 Ctr., 521 F.3d 1097, 1104 (9th Cir. 2008), their motion to

18 dismiss Plaintiff’s first cause of action is denied.

19 2. Second and Both Third Causes of Action

20 Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s second and third

21 causes of action, arguing they are barred by absolute

22 prosecutorial immunity and because “independent prosecutorial

23 judgment breaks the chain of causation . . . .” Mot. at 6-11.

24 Though Plaintiff concedes a small portion of Defendants’ acts

25 fall within the absolute immunity doctrine, Plaintiff argues the

26 vast majority of her claims do not and Defendants’ arguments are

27 unavailing as to causation. Opp’n at 9-15. The Court first

28 addresses Defendants’ absolute immunity arguments before turning

1 to causation.

2 The seminal Buckley case guides the Court’s analysis as to

3 the first portion of Defendants’ motion. Buckley v.

4 Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993). In Buckley, the Supreme Court

5 reiterated the parameters of absolute and qualified immunity for

6 prosecutors. “[A] state prosecutor ha[s] absolute immunity for

7 the initiation and pursuit of a criminal prosecution, including

8 the presentation of the state’s case at trial,” appearances at

9 probable cause hearings, and acts “‘intimately associated with

10 the judicial phase of the criminal process,’” which also

11 encompass “‘actions preliminary to the initiation of a

12 prosecution and actions apart from the courtroom.’” 509 U.S. at

13 269-274 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976)). As

14 to Plaintiff’s claims related to: (1)the preparation and filing

15 of the criminal complaint; (2)the resulting prosecution and

16 detention of Plaintiff; (3)eliciting or presenting false

17 testimony or evidence at the preliminary hearing; and (4)a

18 failure to disclose exculpatory evidence post-charging,

19 Defendants are shielded by absolute immunity. Id.; see also

20 Friedman v. Younger, 282 F.Supp. 710, 714-16 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 27,

21 1968) (discussing the extension to conspiracies). Since the

22 application of absolute immunity in this context is clear,

23 Defendants’ motion is granted with prejudice as to these four

24 specific acts. Intri-Plex Techs., Inc. v. Crest Grp., Inc., 499

25 F.3d 1048, 1056 (9th Cir. 2007); Opp’n at pg. 10-11

26 (“Unfortunately, Rogers enjoys absolute immunity for [] charging

27 Plaintiff . . . .”).

28 Prosecutors and other public officials, however, are only

1 entitled to qualified immunity for a number of other acts.

2 These include “[a] prosecutor's administrative duties and those

3 investigatory functions that do not relate to an advocate’s

4 preparation for the initiation of a prosecution or for judicial

5 proceedings,” giving legal advice to police, and statements to

6 the media. Buckley, 509 U.S. at 269-279 (“A prosecutor may not

7 shield his investigative work with the aegis of absolute

8 immunity merely because, after a suspect is eventually arrested,

9 indicted, and tried, that work may be retrospectively described

10 as “preparation” for a possible trial; every prosecutor might

11 then shield himself from liability for any constitutional wrong

12 against innocent citizens by ensuring that they go to trial.

13 When the functions of prosecutors and detectives are the same,

14 as they were here, the immunity that protects them is also the

15 same.”) (citing, e.g., Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478 (1991) and

16 Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31, n.33). Although Defendants attempt

17 to couch Rogers’ legal advice during the investigation and

18 statements to the media as either within his advocacy function,

19 or as generally insufficient to state a claim, it is clear these

20 types of acts are not protected by absolute immunity and can

21 substantiate the causes of action presented by Plaintiff. Id.;

22 see also Caldwell v. City and County of San Francisco, 889 F.3d

23 1105, 1112-18 (9th Cir. 2018). Accordingly, as to any claims or

24 acts outside of those covered by absolute immunity, Defendants’

25 motion is denied.

26 Turning to Defendants’ arguments regarding causation, in

27 the Ninth Circuit, “[t]o establish causation, [a plaintiff] must

28 [show] the fabricated evidence was the cause in fact and

1 proximate cause of his injury. [] Like in any proximate cause

2 analysis, an intervening event may break the chain of causation

3 between the allegedly wrongful act and the plaintiff's injury.”

4 Caldwell v. City and County of San Francisco, 889 F.3d 1105,

5 1115 (9th Cir. 2018) (citing Beck v. City of Upland, 527 F.3d

6 853, 862 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal and other citations omitted).

7 Although Defendants rely on Caldwell, their arguments are

8 unavailing since Caldwell supports the denial of their motion.

9 As the Ninth Circuit clarified: “As to what constitutes an

10 injury, a § 1983 plaintiff need not be convicted on the basis of

11 the fabricated evidence to have suffered a deprivation of

12 liberty—being criminally charged is enough.” Caldwell, 889 F.3d

13 1105, 1115 (9th Cir. 2018). And, “[d]eliberately fabricated

14 evidence in a prosecutor's file can rebut any presumption of

15 prosecutorial independence.” Id. at 1116. Since Plaintiff has

16 made allegations in this case that include deliberately

17 fabricated evidence led to her arrest, prosecution, and

18 overnight stay in jail, among other things, Defendants have

19 failed to demonstrate her claims are foreclosed based on a

20 theory of lack of causation; simply because Plaintiff was

21 charged, it does not prohibit the possibility of the

22 deprivations Plaintiff suffered from being linked to the alleged

23 acts occurring before criminal charges were filed. Cf. id. at

24 1112-18. Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss is denied

25 on this basis.

26 3. Fourth Cause of Action: False Statements to Media

27 Starting with Plaintiff’s claims under the Fourteenth

28 Amendment, Defendants argue since Plaintiff has failed to

1 demonstrate “not only ‘the utterance of a statement

2 “sufficiently derogatory to injure his or her reputation, that

3 is capable of being proved false’” but also that the statement

4 caused ‘a deprivation of a legal right or status,’ beyond

5 reputational harm,” this cause of action must be dismissed.

6 Mot. at 12 (quoting Sadallah v. City of Utica, 383 F.3d 34, 38

7 (2d Cir. 2001) (other citations omitted)). Plaintiff counters

8 that Defendants’ statements were “slander per se,” and

9 therefore, her allegations withstand Defendants’ motion. See

10 Opp’n at 16-17.

11 “The procedural due process rights of the Fourteenth

12 Amendment apply only when there is a deprivation of a

13 constitutionally protected liberty or property interest.” WMX

14 Technologies, Inc. v. Miller, 197 F.3d 367, 373 (citing Board of

15 Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972)). Defamation alone is

16 typically not actionable under section 1983 vis-a-vis the

17 Fourteenth Amendment. See id. (“The Supreme Court made clear in

18 Paul v. Davis, 414 U.S. 693 [] (1976) that reputation alone is

19 not an interest protected by the constitution.”); accord

20 Sadallah v. City of Utica, 383 F.3d 34, 38 (2d Cir. 2004)

21 (“Defamation, however, is an issue of state law, not federal

22 constitutional law, and therefore provides an insufficient basis

23 to maintain a § 1983 action.” (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S.

24 693, 699-701 (1976)). As Defendants correctly note, when making

25 allegations, like Plaintiff’s here, one must demonstrate a

26 “state right or status was removed or significantly altered.”

27 WMX, 197 F.3d at 373-74; accord Sadallah, 383 F.3d 34, 38 (2d

28 Cir. 2004) (“The state-imposed burden or alteration of status

1 must be ‘in addition to the stigmatizing statement.’ [] Thus,

2 even where a plaintiff's allegations would be sufficient to

3 demonstrate a government-imposed stigma, such defamation is not,

4 absent more, a deprivation of a liberty or property interest

5 protected by due process.”) (quoting Doe v. Dep’t of Public

6 Safety ex rel. Lee, 271 F.3d 38, 47 (2d Cir. 2001) (overruled on

7 other grounds) and citing Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 233

8 (1991)); Mot. at 11-13; Reply at 4-5.

9 Plaintiff has failed to make a connection between the

10 alleged “slander per se,” and a constitutionally recognized

11 deprivation actionable under section 1983. Plaintiff’s reliance

12 on Buckley is misplaced, since, as argued by Defendants, the

13 Court focused on the issue of absolute versus qualified

14 immunity, and did not make the findings Plaintiff suggests;

15 Buckley does not support a denial of Defendants’ motion. See

16 Mot. at 11-13; Opp’n at 16-17; Reply at 5 (citing Buckley, 509

17 U.S. 259 (1993) (“Buckley was a prosecutorial immunity case, and

18 did not address whether media statements alone can state a valid

19 basis for Constitutional liability.”)). Plaintiff’s claims are

20 insufficiently pled to support her cause of action under section

21 1983 and the Fourteenth Amendment for alleged “False Statements

22 to the Media,” since Plaintiff has not pled facts substantiating

23 “a deprivation of any ‘liberty’ or property’ recognized by state

24 or federal law . . . without due process.” Paul v. Davis, 424

25 U.S. 693, 710-711 (1976); see also WMX, 197 F.3d at 373

26 Plaintiff’s claims under the Fourth Amendment fail for the

27 same reason. Plaintiff has not “demonstrate[d] that the

28 [D]efendant[s’] conduct was the actionable cause of the claimed

1 injury.” Bearchild v. Cobban, 947 F.3d 1130, 1150 (9th Cir.

2 2020) (noting actual and proximate causation are required

3 showings in a § 1983 action); Mot. at 11. Plaintiff’s argument,

4 that Defendants are liable based on other theories, does not

5 create a stand-alone cause of action. See Opp’n at 15-16.

6 Accordingly, Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action is dismissed in

7 its entirety, without prejudice. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178,

8 182 (1962) (leave to amend should be given freely where there is

9 no “undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motive on the part of the

10 movant, . . . undue prejudice to the opposing party by virtue of

11 allowance of the amendment, [or] futility of amendment

12 . . . .”).

13 4. Seventh Cause of Action: First Amendment

14 Retaliation

15 Defendants argue Plaintiff’s seventh cause of action must

16 be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to allege facts

17 substantiating an essential element of a First Amendment

18 retaliation claim; specifically, Plaintiff has not demonstrated

19 she was petitioning on a matter of public concern. Mot. at 14-

20 15; Reply at 5-6. Plaintiff avers the standard cited by

21 Defendants is incorrect, arguing instead that she “alleged

22 sufficient facts showing Defendants retaliated against her for

23 exercising her right to seek redress through the California

24 Workers’ Compensation system.” Opp’n at 19-20.

25 In order to state “a claim of retaliation for the exercise

26 of constitutionally-protected rights, [a court] must consider:

27 (1) whether the plaintiff was engaged in an activity that is

28 entitled to constitutional protection; (2) whether her exercise

1 of the constitutionally-protected right was a ‘substantial’ or

2 ‘motivating’ factor in the defendant's action; and (3) whether

3 the defendant has established that it would have taken the same

4 action in the absence of the protected conduct.” Rendish v.

5 City of Tacoma, 123 F.3d 1216, 1219 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting

6 Gillette v. Delmore, 886 F.2d 1194, 1197 (1994)) (other

7 citations omitted). In the Rendish case, cited by Defendants,

8 the Ninth Circuit clarified that “a public employee’s speech

9 must involve a matter of public concern,” in order “to be

10 protected by the First Amendment.” 123 F.3d at 1219 (citing

11 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983)). Though “a public

12 employee does not relinquish First Amendment rights . . . by

13 virtue of government employment, [a]t the same time, the State’s

14 interest in regulating the speech of its employees differs

15 significantly from its interest in regulating the speech of its

16 citizenry.” Id. (quoting Connick, 461 U.S. at 140) (internal

17 quotations and citations omitted).

18 Plaintiff’s reliance on precedent regarding a prisoner’s

19 right to file grievances is misplaced, especially since it

20 involves a discreet and separate application of certain section

21 1983 principles that only apply to inmates. See Opp’n at 19-20;

22 Rhodes v. Robinson, 408 F.3d 559, 567-68 (9th Cir. 2005)

23 (discussing certain rights that are “[o]f fundamental import to

24 prisoners,” and couching its analysis “within the prison context

25 . . . .”). The allegations in Plaintiff’s complaint are that

26 she was “engaged in her constitutionally protect[ed] right to

27 obtain Workers[’] Compensation benefits,” and Defendants’

28 actions were aimed to prevent or chill Plaintiff from exercising

1 this claimed right, as well as other county employees. See

2 Compl. ¶ 138. The Court agrees that, as presently alleged,

3 “Plaintiff’s workers compensation claims and benefits pertained

4 solely to her own medical needs and advanced only her private

5 interests, rather than matters of general public concern.” Mot.

6 at 15. Although Plaintiff’s complaint includes language

7 regarding Defendants’ actions having a chilling effect on other

8 County of Tehama employees, it is conclusory and there are no

9 other facts or allegations presented by Plaintiff supporting

10 this assertion; nor has Plaintiff presented any precedent

11 demonstrating her claim involves a matter of public concern.

12 Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s seventh

13 claim is granted. However, given the allegation regarding the

14 chilling of other employees, the Court grants Defendants’ motion

15 without prejudice. See Eminence Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316

16 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003).

17 5. Page Limit Order

18 The Court’s Order regarding filing requirements delineates

19 a 15-page limit for all memoranda in support of and in

20 opposition to motions, other than motions for summary judgment.

21 ECF No. 7-2. Plaintiff’s Opposition is 20 pages. Accordingly,

22 Plaintiff’s attorneys are ordered to pay monetary sanctions of

23 $250 ($50 per page over the 15 page limit) to the clerk of court

24 no later than April 27, 2026.

25 III. ORDER

26 For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS IN PART

27 and DENIES in part Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss:

28 1. Defendants’ motion is denied as to Plaintiff’s first

IEEE NE OS EIR IE EO mR IIE RO IRE III OI ED

1 cause of action;

2 2. Defendants’ motion is granted, with prejudice, as to

3 claims in the second and third causes of action barred by

4 absolute prosecutorial immunity, as detailed above;

5 3. Defendants’ motion as to the second and both third

6 | causes of action is otherwise denied;

7 4. Defendants’ motion is granted as to Plaintiff’s fourth

8 cause of action, without prejudice; and

9 5. Defendants’ motion is granted as to Plaintiff’s seventh

10 cause of action, without prejudice.

11 Counsel for Plaintiffs are ordered to pay $250 to clerk of

12 court no later than April 27, 2026.

13 Lastly, if Plaintiff elects to attempt to amend Counts Two,

14 Four, Seven, and both Counts currently captioned as Count Three,

15 she shall file her amended complaint within twenty days of the

16 date of this Order. Defendants shall file their response to the

17 amended complaint within twenty days thereafter.

18 IT IS SO ORDERED.

19 Dated: April 7, 2026

20

HN A. MENDEZ.

21 Fee UNITED pe acl JUDGE

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