Opinion

Opinion

Court
District Court, N.D. California
Filed
Jun 1, 2026
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 41.5%

The opinion

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4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

6 SAN JOSE DIVISION

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8 Case No. 5:21-md-02985-EJD

IN RE: APPLE INC. APP STORE

9 SIMULATED CASINO-STYLE GAMES ORDER STAYING CASE PENDING

LITIGATION INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL

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11 Re: Dkt. No. 194

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IN RE: GOOGLE PLAY STORE

14 SIMULATED CASINO-STYLE GAMES Case No. 5:21-md-03001-EJD

LITIGATION

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IN RE: FACEBOOK SIMULATED

19 CASINO-STYLE GAMES LITIGATION Case No. 5:21-cv-02777-EJD

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23 On September 30, 2025, the Court issued an order granting Defendants Apple Inc.’s,

24 Google LLC’s, and Meta Platforms, Inc.’s motions to dismiss and certifying the order for

25 interlocutory appeal. Order, ECF No. 176. On December 16, 2025, the Ninth Circuit granted

26 Defendants’ petition for permission to appeal. ECF No. 185. On January 7, 2026, the parties

27 submitted a Joint Status Report, ECF No. 189, after which the Court ordered additional briefing as

1 to whether this Court retains jurisdiction to continue proceedings while the Ninth Circuit considers

2 the Section 230 appeal. Order for Additional Briefing, ECF No. 190. The parties submitted the

3 requested briefing. Pls.’ Response (“Response”), ECF No. 191; Defs.’ Reply (“Reply”), ECF No.

4 192. On February 3, 2026, the parties appeared before the Court for a Status Conference. ECF

5 No. 194.

6 Based on the parties’ briefing and the discussion at the Status Conference, the Court

7 STAYS the case pending a ruling from the Ninth Circuit on the interlocutory appeal.

8 I. BACKGROUND

9 The Court’s most recent Order summarized the factual background of this case. Order at

10 2–3.

11 The relevant procedural background is as follows. Defendants first moved to dismiss all

12 claims in 2022, arguing that Defendants were immune under Section 230 of the Communications

13 Decency Act, 47 U.S.C. § 230 (“Section 230”). ECF No. 92. The briefing focused on three

14 theories of liability: (1) the promotion of social casino apps in the app stores (the promotion

15 theory); (2) the processing of in-app transactions for virtual chips (the payment processing theory);

16 and (3) the provision of support to casino app developers to drive increased user engagement and

17 revenue (the business support theory). The Court ruled that Section 230 barred the promotion and

18 business support theories but not the payment processing theory. ECF No. 106. The Court

19 certified its order for interlocutory appeal, which the Ninth Circuit granted but later dismissed and

20 remanded. ECF No. 119.

21 Defendants then moved to dismiss a second time, invoking Section 230 immunity as to the

22 surviving payment processing theory. ECF No. 145. On September 30, 2025, the Court issued an

23 order granting in part and denying in part the motions to dismiss. Order, ECF No. 176. The Court

24 allowed some claims to proceed (including most of the consumer protection claims as well as the

25 Kentucky loss-recovery claim), dismissed other claims (including most of the loss-recovery

26 claims, the unjust enrichment claims, and the RICO claims), and dismissed still other claims with

27 prejudice (including the California unjust enrichment and UCL claims). The Court again certified

1 its order for interlocutory appeal.

2 On October 21, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a notice of their intent to amend their complaint.

3 ECF No. 178. At a status conference on November 25, 2025, the Court expressed concern that

4 filing an amended complaint would moot a potential decision from the Ninth Circuit. Transcript,

5 ECF No. 184 at 5. Responding to that concern, Plaintiffs proposed filing an amended complaint,

6 against which Defendants could “adopt their same arguments on Section 230,” the Court could

7 “issue likely the same order on 230,” and that decision could be appealed with the amended

8 complaint as the new operative complaint. Id. Plaintiffs shared a draft of their amended

9 complaint with Defendants on December 12, 2025. Status Report at 1. On December 16,

10 however, the Ninth Circuit granted Defendants’ petition for permission to appeal. ECF No. 185.

11 Defendants believed that in granting the petition, the Ninth Circuit divested this Court of

12 jurisdiction over the case while the appeal is pending. Status Report at 5–10.

13 II. DISCUSSION

14 On January 8, 2026, the Court ordered Plaintiffs to submit additional briefing addressing

15 three questions raised in Defendants’ portion of the Status Report: (1) Does the Ninth Circuit’s

16 grant of the interlocutory review divest the Court of jurisdiction over the case while that appeal is

17 pending?; (2) If not, can and should the Court exercise discretion to stay the case?; and (3) May

18 the Court nonetheless proceed to issue orders on discovery? Order for Additional Briefing at 2.

19 The Court first addresses whether the Ninth Circuit’s grant of interlocutory review divests

20 the Court of jurisdiction, and, finding it does, does not reach the question of whether it may

21 exercise discretion to stay the case. The Court then addresses whether it may continue to issue

22 orders on discovery.

23 A. The Ninth Circuit’s Grant of Interlocutory Review Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)

24 Divests the Court of Jurisdiction

25 In general, “an appeal from an interlocutory order does not divest the trial court of

26 jurisdiction to continue with other phases of the case.” Plotkin v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 688 F.2d

27 1291, 1293 (9th Cir. 1982); accord Song v. MTC Fin., Inc., 812 F. App’x 609, 610 (9th Cir. 2020).

1 That is because an interlocutory appeal only “divests the district court of its control over those

2 aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” California by & through Harrison v. Express Scripts,

3 Inc., 139 F.4th 763, 767 (9th Cir. 2025) (citing Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski, 599 U.S. 736, 740

4 (2023)).

5 Defendants make two arguments. First, they posit that since the Section 230 issue could

6 terminate these actions in their entirety, the appeal affects—and thus stays—the whole case.1

7 Status Report at 7 (citing Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski, 599 U.S. 736, 741 (2023)). Defendants also

8 suggest that Section 230 is intended to provide immunity from suit rather than just from liability.

9 Id. at 6 (citing Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d

10 1157, 1174 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc)). Plaintiffs disagree, contending that Defendants have

11 incorrectly extended Coinbase beyond the arbitration context, and that Section 230 does not

12 protect defendants from having to litigate. Response at 1–2. In Reply, Defendants contend that

13 Coinbase is not limited to arbitration and that the text of Section 230 explicitly protects defendants

14 from suit. Reply at 2.2

15 The Court finds Defendants’ argument that Section 230 provides immunity from suit

16 unavailing. Defendants point to the clause in Section 230 that states that “no cause of action may

17 be brought” that is contrary to the statute. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3). But the Tenth Circuit has held

18 that Section 230 “provides immunity only from liability, not suit.” Gen. Steel Domestic Sales,

19 L.L.C. v. Chumley, 840 F.3d 1178, 1181 (10th Cir. 2016). And the Ninth Circuit case Defendants

20 themselves cite clearly states that Section 230 is designed “to protect websites against the evil of

21 liability for failure to remove offensive content”; that case does not mention protection from suit.

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23 1 This argument derives from the Griggs principle. In that case, the respondent filed a Rule 59

motion to alter the judgment, then, while that motion was still pending, filed a notice of appeal.

24 The Supreme Court noted than an appeal “divests the district court of its control over those aspects

of the case involved in the appeal” and held that the appeal was null while the Rule 59 motion was

25 pending. Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982).

2 Defendants also assert that Plaintiffs have wrongly relied on Plotkin v. Pac. Tel. & Tel. Co., 688

26 F.2d 1291 (9th Cir. 1982), which predates Coinbase. Reply at 1. The Court finds this argument

unconvincing because Plaintiffs merely use Plotkin to state the general principle that an

27 interlocutory appeal does not divest the trial court of jurisdiction to continue with other parts of

the case. See Response at 1.

1 Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1174. Thus, the Court concludes that Section 230 does not protect

2 Defendants from suit.

3 The Court is, however, persuaded by Defendants’ argument that the interlocutory appeal

4 on the Section 230 issue deprives the Court of jurisdiction while the appeal is pending.

5 Defendants rely on Coinbase, which held that a district court must stay proceedings while an

6 interlocutory appeal on the question of “arbitrability” was ongoing. Coinbase, 599 U.S. at 738.

7 Plaintiffs argue that Express Scripts limited this finding to the arbitration context. California by &

8 through Harrison v. Express Scripts, Inc., 139 F.4th 763, 767 (9th Cir. 2025). In that case, the

9 Ninth Circuit declined to extend Coinbase to the federal officer removal context. Express Scripts,

10 139 F.4th at 767. The defendants had argued that since the issue on appeal was whether the case

11 belonged in state or federal court, the entire case was essentially involved in the appeal and should

12 be stayed. Id. The Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding that a stay was unnecessary because the venue

13 issue did not overlap with the questions that remained before the state court (including whether the

14 claims had merit and whether the parties were entitled to discovery). Id. at 771. Thus, there was

15 no risk that the district court and court of appeals “would be simultaneously analyzing the same

16 judgment.” Griggs, 459 U.S. at 59.

17 Consequently, though Plaintiffs are correct that Express Scripts read Coinbase as limited to

18 arbitration, it did so in the spirit of distinguishing why the specific concerns in Coinbase were not

19 present in Express Scripts. Fundamentally, Express Scripts relied on the Griggs principle: that to

20 prevent a district and an appeals court from coming to inconsistent judgments, an appeal “divests

21 the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal.” Griggs, 459

22 U.S. at 58. Furthermore, other courts have found that a district court may not grant leave to

23 amend an aspect of the case that is pending before the court of appeals. Dayton Indep. Sch. Dist.

24 v. U. S. Mineral Prods. Co., 906 F.2d 1059, 1063 (5th Cir. 1990); Green Leaf Nursery v. E.I.

25 DuPont De Nemours & Co., 341 F.3d 1292, 1309 (11th Cir. 2003). Here, since the Section 230

26 issue has the potential to terminate the actions in their entirety, the Ninth Circuit’s consideration of

27 the appeal stays any filing of an amended complaint.

B. The Court May Not Issue Orders on Discovery During the Stay

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Plaintiffs ask the Court to lift the discovery stay, at least with respect to written discovery.

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They hope lifting the stay would allow the case to progress while the Ninth Circuit considers the

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appeal and allow depositions to begin promptly after the appeal is concluded. Status Report at 3.

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Defendants argue that an interlocutory appeal also divests the district court of authority to order

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discovery. Id. at 8. (citing May v. Shehan, 226 F.3d 876, 880 (7th Cir. 2000)).

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An appeal “divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in

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the appeal.” Griggs, 459 U.S. at 58. Here, the Section 230 issue on appeal implicates and could

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theoretically dispose of the whole case. See supra Part II.A. Thus, the Court does not have

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authority to order discovery during the pendency of the appeal. Cf. May v. Shehan, 226 F.3d 876,

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880 (7th Cir. 2000) (finding that an interlocutory appeal of a denial of qualified immunity divested

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the district court of the authority to order discovery during the pendency of the appeal because

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“the ultimate question is . . . whether a public official should have to undergo the burdens of

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litigation.”).

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III. CONCLUSION

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For the foregoing reasons, the Court ORDERS:

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1. All dates, deadlines, and further activity in this case are stayed pending a decision by

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the Ninth Circuit in the interlocutory appeal.

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2. The Parties shall submit a joint status report within fourteen (14) days after the Ninth

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Circuit issues its opinion. That status report shall inform the Court how the parties intend to

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proceed with this case in light of the ruling in the appeal.

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IT IS SO ORDERED.

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Dated: June 1, 2026

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26 EDWARD J. DAVILA

United States District Judge

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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