The opinion
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7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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10 BRIAN ELLEDGE, No. 2:23-cv-02288-JAM-SCR
11 Plaintiff,
12 v. ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN PART AND
13 COUNTY OF SAN JOAQUIN, JOHN DISMISSING REMAINING CLAIMS
CANEPA, BRIAN MERRITT, and
14 DOES 1-20,
15 Defendants.
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17 Plaintiff Brian Elledge filed the present action on March
18 27, 2023, in the San Joaquin County Superior Court against
19 Defendants the County of San Joaquin, John Canepa, Brian Merritt,
20 and Does 1–20. ECF No. 1. On October 11, 2023, the County of
21 San Joaquin removed the case to federal court under federal
22 question jurisdiction. Id. Plaintiff asserts three causes of
23 action in his operative First Amended Complaint for
24 (1) unreasonable detention, custody, and control under 42 U.S.C.
25 § 1983, (2) violation of the California Civil Rights Act,
26 California Civil Code § 52.1, and (3) negligence arising out of
27 his allegedly prolonged detention by Defendants Canepa and
28 Merritt, San Joaquin County Sheriff’s Office Deputies, when he
1 was operating his boat on the San Joaquin River in 2022. ECF No.
2 24. The Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against Does 1–20 on
3 January 24, 2025. ECF No. 30.
4 Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on February
5 6, 2026, seeking judgment on all causes of action against them.
6 ECF No. 44. Under the Local Rules, Plaintiff’s Opposition was
7 due on February 20, 2026. E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(c). Plaintiff has
8 failed to file any Opposition.
9 The Court grants summary judgment on Plaintiff’s first cause
10 of action for unreasonable detention, custody, and control under
11 42 U.S.C. § 1983. First, under the Local Rules, a failure to
12 file a timely opposition may “be construed by the Court as a non-
13 opposition to the motion.” E.D. Cal. L.R. 230(c). The Court
14 finds it appropriate to deem Plaintiff’s failure to oppose as a
15 non-opposition here.
16 Second, summary judgment is appropriate when the record,
17 read in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,
18 indicates “that there is no genuine dispute as to any material
19 fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”
20 Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine dispute of fact exists only if
21 “there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a
22 jury to return a verdict for that party.” Anderson v. Liberty
23 Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986). If the nonmoving party
24 fails to make this showing, “[t]he moving party is entitled to a
25 judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.
26 317, 323 (1986) (quotations omitted).
27 Here, the Court finds that summary judgment is warranted for
28 the reasons stated in Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.
1 Specifically, the Court agrees that Plaintiff has failed to
2 submit any evidence which would support his theory of municipal
3 liability recognized under Monell v. Department of Social
4 Services of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978) against the
5 County of San Joaquin. See Mot. Summ. J. (“MSJ”) at 10–11, ECF
6 No. 44-1. Thus, the Court grants summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
7 first cause of action against the County of San Joaquin.
8 The Court also agrees that Plaintiff has failed to show any
9 unreasonable search or seizure by Defendants Canepa and Merritt,
10 as the evidence shows Plaintiff freely consented to Defendants’
11 request to examine his eyes. See id. at 7–10. The law is clear
12 that searches and seizures are reasonable where consent is
13 voluntarily given. United States v. Russell, 664 F.3d 1279, 1281
14 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[C]onsent is a recognized exception to the
15 Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable searches and
16 seizures” as long as the “consent was given freely and
17 voluntarily.”). Further, Plaintiff has failed to plausibly
18 allege that the Defendants Canepa and Merritt knew or had reason
19 to know that their actions were violating Plaintiff’s clearly
20 established constitutional rights. See MSJ at 12–14. Thus,
21 Defendants Canepa and Merritt are entitled to qualified immunity,
22 which shields public officials from liability under 42 U.S.C.
23 § 1983 unless “(1) they violated a federal statutory or
24 constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct
25 was clearly established at the time” of the violation. District
26 of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48, 62–63 (2018) (internal
27 quotation marks and citation omitted). The Court grants summary
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en nnn en ne oN EE OSI OIE
1 judgment on Plaintiff’s first cause of action against Defendants
2 Canepa and Merritt as well.
3 Because the Court grants summary judgment on Plaintiff’s
4 sole federal claim, the Court declines to exercise supplemental
5 jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s remaining state-law claims for
6 violation of the California Civil Rights Act and negligence. See
7 Ove v. Gwinn, 264 F.3d 817, 826 (9th Cir. 2001) (“A court may
8 decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over related state-
9 law claims once it has ‘dismissed all claims over which it has
10 original jurisdiction.’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c) (3))).
11 Thus, the Court dismisses Plaintiff’s second and third causes of
12 action without prejudice.
13 I. ORDER
14 For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS summary
15 judgment on Plaintiff’s first cause of action in favor of
16 | Defendants. The Court also DISMISSES Plaintiff’s second and
17 third causes of action without prejudice. The Court further
18 VACATES the hearing set in this matter for April 7, 2026, at 1:00
19 PM in Courtroom 6. Finally, the Court VACATES the settlement
20 conference in this matter currently set for April 23, 2026, at
21 10:00 AM before Magistrate Judge Dennis M. Cota. The Clerk of
22 Court is hereby DIRECTED to close this case.
23 IT IS SO ORDERED.
24 Dated: March 31, 2026
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HN A. MENDEZ.
26 Fee UNITED pe acl JUDGE
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