The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 ARIK WILLIAMS, No. 2:25-cv-787 DAD-SCR
12 Plaintiff,
13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
14 CALIFORNIA HIGHWAY PATROL, et
al.,
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Defendants.
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18 Plaintiff is proceeding pro se in this action against the California Highway Patrol (“CHP”)
19 and CHP Officer Brett Wade. He challenges a February 21, 2025 vehicle stop by Officer Wade,
20 which led Officer Wade to impound his vehicle. Before the Court is Defendants’ motion to
21 dismiss this action for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. ECF No. 17.
22 For the reasons explained below, the undersigned recommends dismissal of every claim,
23 with leave to amend only as to the claim for unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.
24 Through amendment, that claim may be cognizable only as against Officer Wade, and only for
25 certain injunctive relief.
26 I. BACKGROUND
27 A. Pre-Stop Evidence
28 Defendants’ request for judicial notice includes evidence concerning one of Plaintiff’s
1 earlier encounters with CHP. On May 27, 2024, CHP Officer M. Joyner cited Plaintiff for
2 driving his “dark colored Ford pickup” with an expired registration and without California-issued
3 license plates. ECF No. 17-2 at 13, 17. Joyner’s declaration in People v. Arik Averill Ryder
4 Williams, Case No. 24TR126709 (“Williams I”), asserts that Plaintiff was not carrying a driver’s
5 license and was instead identified by his U.S. passport. Id. at 14. Plaintiff signed the citation but
6 added that the signature was “under duress[,]” citing UCC 1-308. Id. at 13. On September 18,
7 2024, the court found Plaintiff guilty of a violation of California Vehicle Code § 4000(a)(1),
8 operation of an unregistered vehicle. Id. at 18.
9 B. Complaint Allegations and Aftermath
10 On March 10, 2025, Plaintiff initiated this case by concurrently filing the Complaint and a
11 motion for a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”). ECF Nos. 1-2. The Complaint alleges that
12 on February 21, 2025, Officer Wade stopped Plaintiff while he was “lawfully traveling on a
13 public road for personal, non-commercial purposes.” ECF No. 1 at 2. Officer Wade stopped
14 Plaintiff, and eventually impounded the vehicle, based solely on the alleged failure to display a
15 valid California license plate. Id. The Complaint argues that this violation did not demonstrate
16 “a true public safety concern” or reflect “any observation of unsafe driving or criminal conduct.”
17 Id. This impoundment caused irreparable injury by leaving Plaintiff without means to work,
18 attend appointments, or perform daily tasks. Id.
19 Based on the stop at issue, Officer Wade cited Plaintiff for driving with an expired
20 registration under California Vehicle Code § 4000(a)(1), driving a vehicle exceeding the class for
21 which he was licensed under California Vehicle Code § 12500(d), towing an excess of 14,000
22 pounds, and unsafe towing. ECF No. 17-2 at 7. A state court hearing on the citation was set for
23 April 29, 2025, which would become People v. Arik Averill Ryder Williams, Case No.
24 25TR129017 (“Williams II”). Id.
25 On February 24, 2025, in Williams v. California Highway Patrol, et al., Case No.
26 25CV14281 (“Williams III”), Plaintiff petitioned the Amador County Superior Court for an
27 emergency injunction to release his car from impoundment based on violations of the Fourth,
28 Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution. ECF No. 17-2 at 24. Later that day,
1 the presiding judge denied an emergency hearing for failure to show irreparable harm or proof of
2 notice to Defendants CHP and Officer Wade. ECF No. 17-2 at 32-33. The judge instead set a
3 noticed hearing for April 9, 2025. Id. at 33. Plaintiff moved for reconsideration of the denial, but
4 the case was dismissed without prejudice on March 3, 2025 by his request before the court ruled
5 on his motion. Id. at 21, 34.
6 On April 30, 2025, the Amador County Superior Court entered a guilty verdict in
7 Williams II with a fine of $495 after “trial by declaration” because Plaintiff did not attend the
8 hearing. ECF No. 17-2 at 9 (citing Cal. Veh. Code §§ 4000(a)(1), 12500(d)).
9 C. Causes of Action
10 Based on Officer Wade’s stop and the vehicle’s impoundment, the Complaint alleges
11 violation of a “Fundamental Right to Travel” and a “constitutional right” to use public highways
12 for personal travel. ECF No. 1 at 3. It argues that imposing licensing and registration
13 requirements on such a fundamental right, and impounding a vehicle for failure to comply, is
14 therefore unconstitutional. Id. at 3-4. The Complaint further alleges that Officer Wade’s
15 unsanctioned stop, warrantless search, and immediate handcuffing1 of Plaintiff were
16 unconstitutional and therefore provide basis for a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. at 4.
17 Plaintiff sought immediate return of the vehicle;2 an order enjoining Defendants from stopping,
18 detaining, citing, or impounding vehicles for lack of a driver’s license or vehicle registration
19 during private travel; prohibition from “further retaliatory or pretextual enforcement actions” for
20 asserting Plaintiff’s right to travel; and reimbursement of costs and other expenses stemming from
21 impoundment of the car and release thereof, which the undersigned interprets as a request for
22 damages. Id. at 5-6.
23 ////
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1 Although the Complaint describes the handcuffing as “use of excessive force[,]” the
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undersigned does not interpret this to allege a separate excessive force claim. ECF No. 1 at 4. To
26 the extent that there is one, Plaintiff does not respond to Defendants’ argument that such a claim
should be dismissed. See ECF No. 17-1 at 15; ECF No. 18.
27 2 Following an evidentiary hearing on the TRO motion, Defendants asserted that Plaintiff’s
vehicle has been released from impoundment “to the lender and legal owner of the vehicle, Wells
28 Fargo Auto.” ECF No. 15 at 2.
1 II. LEGAL STANDARDS
2 A. Dismissal Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)
3 Rule 12(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allows a party to challenge a federal
4 court’s jurisdiction over the subject matter of a claim. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). “A Rule 12(b)(1)
5 jurisdictional attack may be facial or factual.” Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035,
6 1039 (9th Cir. 2004) (citing White v. Lee, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000)). In a factual
7 attack, the challenger provides evidence that an alleged fact is false resulting in a lack of subject
8 matter jurisdiction. Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039. In these circumstances, the
9 allegations are not presumed to be true and “the district court is not restricted to the face of the
10 pleadings, but may review any evidence, such as affidavits and testimony, to resolve factual
11 disputes concerning the existence of jurisdiction.” McCarthy v. United States, 850 F.2d 558, 560
12 (9th Cir. 1988).
13 “Subject matter jurisdiction defines the Court’s authority to hear a given type of case.”
14 U.S. v. Morton, 467 U.S. 822, 828 (1984). “Federal district courts are courts of limited
15 jurisdiction that ‘may not grant relief absent a constitutional or valid statutory grant of
16 jurisdiction’ and are ‘presumed to lack jurisdiction in a particular case unless the contrary
17 affirmatively appears.’” Cooper v. Tokyo Elec. Power Co., 990 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1038 (S.D.
18 Cal. 2013) (quoting A-Z Int’l v. Phillips, 323 F.3d 1141, 1145 (9th Cir. 2003)).
19 The burden of establishing that a cause of action falls within a federal district court’s
20 limited jurisdiction “rests upon the party asserting jurisdiction”—here, on Plaintiff. Kokkonen v.
21 Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); In re Wilshire Courtyard, 729 F.3d 1279, 1284
22 (9th Cir. 2013). Unlike in a facial attack on subject matter jurisdiction, “[t]he court need not
23 presume the truthfulness of the plaintiff’s allegations.” Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039
24 (citing White, 227 F.3d at 1242). “Once the moving party has converted the motion to dismiss
25 into a factual motion by presenting affidavits or other evidence properly brought before the court,
26 the party opposing the motion must furnish affidavits or other evidence necessary to satisfy its
27 burden of establishing subject matter jurisdiction.” Safe Air for Everyone, 373 F.3d at 1039
28 (quoting Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch., 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n. 2 (9th Cir.2003)).
1 B. Dismissal Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)
2 A defendant may move to dismiss a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) if the allegation “fail[s] to
3 state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). To survive, the
4 plaintiff’s complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to
5 relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
6 Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).
7 A claim is facially plausible “when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the
8 court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
9 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. This standard is a “context-specific task that requires the reviewing court
10 to draw on its judicial experience and common sense,” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679, and to “draw all
11 reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party.” Boquist v. Courtney, 32 F.4th 764, 773
12 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Retail Prop. Tr. v. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am., 768 F.3d
13 938, 945 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted). Stating a claim “requires more than
14 labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.
15 The factual allegations must be sufficient to “raise a right to relief above the speculative level”
16 and “raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence” needed to support the
17 claim. Id. at 556.
18 On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court may consider all materials incorporated into the
19 complaint by reference, as well as evidence properly subject to judicial notice. Weston Fam.
20 P’ship LLLP v. Twitter, Inc., 29 F.4th 611, 617-18 (9th Cir. 2022). “Ultimately, dismissal is
21 proper under Rule 12(b)(6) if it appears beyond doubt that the non-movant can prove no set of
22 facts to support its claims.” Boquist, 32 F.4th at 773–74 (internal citation and quotation marks
23 omitted) (cleaned up).
24 A pro se plaintiff's factual allegations are interpreted liberally on a 12(b)(6) motion, and
25 the court must apply a less stringent pleading standard than if the plaintiff was represented by
26 counsel. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of
27 the deficiencies in the complaint and an opportunity to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies
28 could not be cured by amendment. See Akhtar v. Mesa, 698 F.3d 1202, 1213 (9th Cir. 2012).
1 III. JUDICIAL NOTICE
2 A court may judicially notice facts when they are “not subject to reasonable dispute
3 because,” inter alia, they “can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy
4 cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). The court may take such judicial
5 notice either on its own or upon request to do so by a party that supplies the court with sufficient
6 information. Fed. R. Evid. 201(c)(1)-(2). When judicially noticing that a document and its
7 contents exist, the court generally does not take the statements within such a document as true.
8 See Brookfield Property Group, LLC v. Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 679 F.Supp.3d 971,
9 977 (C.D. Cal. 2023) (citing Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, 899 F.3d 988, 999 (9th Cir. 2018)).
10 Separately, however, courts may judicially notice facts that are “capable of accurate and ready
11 determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Jespersen
12 v. Harrah’s Operating Co., Inc., 444 F.3d 1104, 1110 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc).
13 Defendants initially request judicial notice of (1) filings in Williams II, including the
14 underlying citation and the Notice of Decision (ECF No. 17-2 at 5-9); (2) filings in Williams I,
15 including the underlying citation, the Officer’s Declaration, and the Notice of Decision (ECF No.
16 17-2 at 11-19); and (3) filings in Williams III, including the Petition for Emergency Equitable
17 Injunction, the denial thereof, and the Request for Dismissal (ECF No. 17-2 at 24-36). All three
18 requests are granted.
19 After filing their reply, Defendants also requested judicial notice of fifteen purported
20 statements of fact. ECF No. 24 at 2-3. Defendants argue that these facts are supported by two
21 exhibits Plaintiff previously submitted with his motion for a TRO, which the undersigned heard
22 on April 10, 2025. ECF No. 24 at 2, 5-8. Without reiterating all fifteen statements, some state
23 the facts asserted in such documents, whereas others concern events that occurred based on the
24 fact that the documents exist. The Court will only “judicially notice” the latter category.
25 ////
26 ////
27 ////
28 ////
1 IV. ANALYSIS3
2 A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
3 The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution bars a federal action against
4 states “unless they have waived sovereign immunity or other exceptions to the doctrine apply.”
5 In re. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co., 263 B.R. 306, 313 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (citing Seminole Tribe of
6 Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996)). Pena v. Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 472 (9th Cir. 1992)
7 (citing Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974); Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332, 337
8 (1979)). A state official sued in his official capacity, but not his personal capacity, has the same
9 immunity as the state from suit in federal court under the Eleventh Amendment. Pena v.
10 Gardner, 976 F.2d 469, 472-73 (9th Cir. 1992).
11 The parties do not meaningfully dispute that the CHP itself enjoys Eleventh Amendment
12 immunity as an arm of the State of California. See ECF No. 17-1 at 9. Defendants further argue
13 that immunity from suit for monetary damages extends to Officer Wade, who was acting in his
14 capacity as a CHP officer. ECF No. 17-1 at 9-10 (citing Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police,
15 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989)). As Plaintiff notes, however, this suit is brought against Officer Wade in
16 his personal capacity. ECF No. 18 at 4. “State officials can be sued in their personal or
17 individual capacities without running afoul of the Eleventh Amendment.” Peralta v. California
18 Franchise Tax Board, 124 F.Supp.3d 993, 1001 (N.D. Cal. 2015).
19 Augmenting this holding is the Ex Parte Young doctrine, which permits suit against state
20 officers in their individual capacities to obtain prospective injunctive relief. See In re. Pacific
21 Gas and Elec. Co., 263 B.R. at 313 (citing Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)). This doctrine
22 reflects “the fiction that such a suit is not an action against a ‘State’ and is therefore not subject to
23 the sovereign immunity bar.” In re. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co., 263 B.R. at 313 (quoting Agua
24 Caliente Band of Cahuilla Indians v. Hardin, 223 F.3d 1041, 1045 (9th Cir.2000)). By suing
25
26
3 Attached to Plaintiff’s opposition are his objections to the Findings and Recommendations
regarding his TRO motion. ECF No. 18-1. Those objections were filed separately (ECF No. 19)
27 and considered by the district judge in evaluating the TRO Findings and Recommendations.
Plaintiff’s opposition, however, never cites these objections or otherwise connects them to the
28 motion to dismiss. The Court will not consider the objections in ruling on the motion to dismiss.
1 Officer Wade, Plaintiff can in principle seek an injunction compelling the release of an
2 impounded vehicle and enjoining enforcement of any licensing and registration requirements.
3 See ECF No. 1 at 5. Eleventh Amendment immunity merits dismissal of this action only as
4 against the CHP.
5 B. Standing
6 Plaintiff seeks three different forms of injunctive relief, the first being the return of the
7 impounded vehicle. ECF No. 1 at 5. Defendants previously notified the Court that they released
8 the vehicle to the lender and legal owner, Wells Fargo Auto. ECF No. 15 at 2. Defendants now
9 argue that because Wells Fargo is not a party to this action, the Court cannot order it to return the
10 vehicle to Plaintiff. ECF No. 17-1 at 10. Plaintiff responds that this does not necessarily moot
11 the request because of the voluntary cessation doctrine. ECF No. 18 at 4 (citing Friends of the
12 Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services, Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 174 (2000)).
13 As Defendnats properly note, the voluntary cessation doctrine is not relevant to this case.
14 ECF No. 22 at 2. They did not rescind an allegedly unconstitutional policy, but rather released a
15 vehicle to the legal owner in accordance with their duty to do so. ECF No. 22 at 2. Alternatively,
16 Defendants argue that the fact that Wells Fargo owns the truck, and Plaintiff has been silent on
17 whether he can take it back from Wells Fargo, means that Plaintiff cannot establish standing for
18 any action involving recovery of the truck. Id. (citing Friends of the Earth, 528 U.S. at 190).
19 Plaintiff does not dispute that Defendants released the vehicle in accordance with its duty
20 under the California Vehicle Code to release it to the legal owner. Nor does Plaintiff explain
21 under what circumstances Defendants could try to reclaim it, including for purposes of returning
22 the vehicle to Plaintiff. Plaintiff’s request for an injunction that would require Defendants to
23 return the vehicle to him is therefore moot.
24 This does not affect Plaintiff’s request for other forms of injunctive relief, including an
25 order enjoining future impoundment based on invalid registration or retaliation “for asserting his
26 constitutional right to travel.” ECF No. 1 at 5-6. The question becomes whether Plaintiff has
27 stated a claim on which such relief could be granted.
28 ////
1 C. Fundamental Right to Travel
2 The Complaint argues that driver licensing and registration requirements as a whole
3 constitute “arbitrary and impermissible” restrictions in Plaintiff’s “fundamental” right to non-
4 commercial travel, impermissibly transforming this right into a privilege. ECF No. 1 at 3-4.
5 Defendants argue that under Attorney General of New York v. Soto-Lopez, the right to travel is in
6 fact a right to “interstate migration”, which Plaintiff does not allege he was exercising. ECF No.
7 17-1 at 12 (citing 476 U.S. 898, 902–03 (1986)). Without addressing this argument, Plaintiff
8 responds that any restriction on the right to travel is subject to strict scrutiny and must therefore
9 both serve a compelling government interest and be narrowly tailored to serve such interest. ECF
10 No. 18 at 3 (citing Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489 (1999); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634
11 (1969)). Alternatively, Plaintiff reframes this as an equal protection claim, with him as either a
12 class of one or the target of wealth-based discrimination. ECF No. 18 at 3 (citing Village of
13 Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562 (2000); Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660 (1983); Harper v.
14 Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966)).
15 Defendants overstate the holding of Attorney General of New York. The case concerned
16 the State of New York’s “civil service employment preference,” which awarded extra point to
17 civil service examination scores to “New York residents” honorably discharged from the armed
18 forces if they “were residents of New York when they entered military service.” Attorney
19 General of New York, 476 U.S. at 900. The Supreme Court only reframed “the constitutional
20 right to travel” as “the right of free interstate migration” because the residency requirement
21 “classif[ied] residents according to the time they established [state] residence, result[ing] in the
22 unequal distribution of rights and benefits among otherwise qualified bona fide residents.” Id. at
23 902-903. In framing the issues this way, the Supreme Court did not limit the right to travel,
24 particularly as Attorney General of New York opinion also described this right more broadly as
25 “freedom to enter and abide in any State in the Union.” Id. at 902 (quoting Dunn v. Blumstein,
26 405 U.S. 330, 338 (1972)).
27 However, while the impoundment of Plaintiff’s vehicle may be a practical impediment to
28 free movement and travel, “burdens on a single mode of transportation do not implicate the right
1 to interstate travel[,]” and “[Plaintiff] does not have a fundamental ‘right to drive.’” Miller v.
2 Reed, 176 F.3d 1202, 1205-06 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Cholerton v. Brown, 2014 WL 3818049,
3 at *4 (C.D. Cal. May 16, 2014) (“To the extent Plaintiff argues that his fundamental right to travel
4 was violated by impoundment of his vehicle and/or imposition of state vehicle registration
5 requirements on Plaintiff, … there is no merit to these contentions.”); McCain v. Stockton Police
6 Dept., 2011 WL 4710696, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 4, 2011) (“To the extent plaintiff contends that
7 her fundamental right to interstate travel is violated by impoundment of her Vehicle or state
8 requirements that she register the Vehicle and possess a valid driver’s license, that claim fails as a
9 matter of law.”). Plaintiff’s right to free movement was not violated by California’s licensing and
10 registration requirements.
11 Precedent also forecloses an equal protection challenge to the relatively heavier burden
12 registration requirements place on people of limited means. See Monarch Travel Servs., Inc. v.
13 Associated Cultural Clubs, Inc., 466 F.2d 552, 554 (9th Cir. 1972) (“A rich man can choose to
14 drive a limousine; a poor man may have to walk. The poor man’s lack of choice in his mode of
15 travel may be unfortunate, but it is not unconstitutional.”). Moreover, courts in the Ninth Circuit
16 have precluded an equal protection claim based on restrictions on a single mode of transportation.
17 The court in Mendoza v. Garrett, for example, affirmed the constitutionality of a statutory scheme
18 whereby the failure to pay traffic violation fines resulted in suspension of a driver’s license. 358
19 F.Supp.3d 1145, 1151, 1175, 1180 (D. Or. 2018). It cited Miller’s holding that any “burden on a
20 single mode of transportation does not implicate the constitutional right to interstate travel[,]”
21 while noting that wealth-based discrimination is not a basis for strict scrutiny. Id. at 1172-73
22 (citing 176 F.3d at 1205). Such schema are therefore subject to only rational basis review, under
23 which the law will be upheld “if there is any reasonably conceivable state of facts that could
24 provide a rational basis for the classification.” Mendoza, 358 F.Supp.3d at 1175 (quoting
25 Franceschi v. Yee, 887 F.3d 927, 940 (9th Cir. 2018)). The need to enforce traffic laws and deter
26 future violations constitutes such basis, even if such penalties “may be overinclusive by its
27 enforcement as to indigent traffic debtors with no means of paying the fine[.]” Mendoza, 358
28 F.Supp.3d at 1175.
1 Nor are the allegations adequate to support a class-of-one claim. Such a claim requires
2 facts showing that government actors (1) intentionally (2) treated plaintiff differently than other
3 similarly situated persons, (3) without a rational basis. Gerhart v. Lake County, 637 F.3d 1013,
4 1022 (9th Cir. 2010). The Complaint does not discuss similarly situated persons, and Plaintiff’s
5 opposition brief does not suggest that he can amend the pleadings to allege that Defendants have
6 not impounded other driver’s vehicles during similar traffic stops.
7 Any claim based on the right to travel, inclusive of any related Equal Protection Clause
8 claim, should therefore be dismissed.
9 D. Unreasonable Search under the Fourth Amendment
10 The Complaint alleges that Officer Wade violated Plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights
11 by, inter alia, performing an “unsanctioned stop” and a “warrantless search of his vehicle[.]”
12 ECF No. 1 at 4. A traffic stop or other investigative stop is not prohibited by the Fourth
13 Amendment if the officer has “a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular
14 person stopped of criminal activity.” Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. 393, 396–97 (2014)
15 (quoting United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 417-418 (1981)). The “reasonable suspicion”
16 needed depends on “both the content of information possessed by police and its degree of
17 reliability.” Navarette, 572 U.S. at 397 (quoting Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330 (1990)).
18 The level of suspicion required is greater than a hunch but less than either probable cause of proof
19 by preponderance of the evidence. Navarette, 572 U.S. at 397 (internal citations omitted).
20 Defendants argue that by conceding Plaintiff’s vehicle was not displaying valid license
21 plates, a violation of California Vehicle Code § 5200, the Complaint admits Officer Wade had
22 probable cause for the stop. ECF No. 17-1 at 14 (citing ECF No. 1 at 3). Defendants add that
23 under Whren v. United States, whatever subjective intent or personal motivations Officer Wade
24 may have had become irrelevant. ECF No. 17-1 at 14 (citing 517 U.S. 806, 813-814 (1996)); see
25 also id. at 812 (“Not only have we never held…that an officer’s motive invalidates objectively
26 justifiable behavior under the Fourth Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted the
27 contrary.”)
28 Plaintiff responds that Delaware v. Prouse prohibits stopping a driver “for no reason other
1 than to check his license and registration, observing no traffic violation beforehand.” ECF No. 18
2 at 2 (citing 440 U.S. 648 (1979)). The officer in Prouse did not have nearly the same degree of
3 reasonable suspicion as Officer Wade. He admitted that he “observed neither traffic or equipment
4 violations nor any suspicious activity” before stopping to check the driver’s license and
5 registration. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 650. Nor was he following any state or local guidelines or
6 procedures related to such “document spot checks[.]” Id. He effectively admitted that he only
7 chose to pull this driver over because he “wasn’t answering any complaints” at the time. Id. at
8 651. Notably, the Supreme Court then held that such a stop violates the Fourth Amendment
9 “except in those situations in which there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a
10 motorist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered, or that either the vehicle or an
11 occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for violation of law[.]” Id. at 664 (emphasis added). The
12 Complaint here concedes that Plaintiff’s vehicle did not display valid registration, plainly placing
13 these circumstances within this exception. ECF No. 1 at 2-4.
14 Nor does Plaintiff cite any authority supporting his contention that an officer’s personal
15 animus can invalidate such reasonable suspicion. ECF No. 18 at 2. In any case, as Defendants
16 note, this is a conclusory statement without any factual allegations to demonstrate that Officer
17 Wade stopped Plaintiff based on anything but the observed violations of the California Vehicle
18 Code. ECF No. 22 at 9.
19 The claim for unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment should be dismissed
20 without leave to amend.
21 E. Unreasonable Seizure under the Fourth Amendment
22 1. The Community Caretaking Doctrine Justifies the Impoundment as Pled
23 As discussed above, the Complaint alleges that the “seizure and impoundment” of
24 Plaintiff’s vehicle was unconstitutional based on his right to travel. See supra IV.C; ECF No. 1 at
25 3-4. The parties’ briefs discuss this impoundment as a separate claim for unreasonable seizure
26 under the Fourth Amendment. Plaintiff argues that even if the initial stop was justified,
27 Defendants’ decision to tow and retain the vehicle for over 30 days was prohibited under the
28 Fourth Amendment. ECF No. 18 at 2. In the absence of a warrant, at issue is whether the
1 impoundment fell under any exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement. See id.
2 Defendants argue that although the Complaint asserts they only impounded the vehicle for
3 its lack of license plates, judicially noticeable documents also cite the expired registration and
4 lack of appropriate license classification. ECF No. 17-1 at 14 (citing ECF No. 17-2 at 7).
5 Driving with registration that expired more than six months prior is an impoundable offense
6 under California Vehicle Code § 22651(o)(1)(A). ECF No. 17-1 at 14. Plaintiff was convicted in
7 Williams I of operating the vehicle without valid registration on May 27, 2024. Id.; ECF No. 17-2
8 at 13, 17-18. Because Plaintiff did not renew the vehicle registration between Williams I and
9 Officer Wade’s traffic stop on February 21, 2025, Plaintiff’s registration was out of date for well
10 over six months. ECF No. 17-1 at 14-15.
11 That an ordinance or statute authorizes impoundment in a particular circumstance “does
12 not, in and of itself, determine the reasonableness of the seizure under the Fourth Amendment.”
13 Crago v. Knacke, 2020 WL 3073771 at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 10, 2020) (quoting Miranda v. City of
14 Cornelius, 429 F.3d 858, 864 (9th Cir. 2005)). Courts have found impoundment based on traffic
15 infractions unconstitutional unless an exception to the warrant requirement also applied—
16 particularly the community caretaking doctrine. See Miranda, 429 F.3d at 864. This doctrine
17 generally “permits government officials to remove vehicles from the streets when they jeopardize
18 public safety and the efficient movement of vehicular traffic.” Sandoval v. County of Sonoma,
19 912 F.3d 509, 516 (9th Cir. 2018) (internal citations and quotations omitted). Evaluating the
20 constitutionality of an impoundment accordingly requires a fact-intensive inquiry in most cases.
21 Id. (“Whether this exception applies turns on the facts and circumstances of each case.”).
22 The Ninth Circuit has stated that the community caretaking exception allows for
23 impoundment “if the driver is unable to remove the vehicle from a public location without
24 continuing its illegal operation.” Miranda, 429 F.3d at 865. On that basis, courts have
25 consistently found impoundment of an unregistered vehicle to be reasonable under the Fourth
26 Amendment. See Leslie v. City of Sand City, 615 F.Supp.2d 1121, 1125-26 (N.D. Cal. 2009) (in
27 case involving expired registration, stating that “if allowing a driver to remove a vehicle would
28 result in violation of a traffic regulation, impoundment of a vehicle is reasonable” under the
1 Fourth Amendment); Constitution of U.S. v. Southwick, 2008 WL 5111144, at *2-3 (D. Or. Dec.
2 1, 2008) (quoting Miranda to justify impoundment where, among other violations, “the truck had
3 no license plates displayed,” in violation of Oregon law); see also United States v. Cartwright,
4 630 F.3d 610, 616 (7th Cir. 2010) (upholding the impoundment of the defendant’s vehicle, based
5 in part on the fact that “no one could have lawfully driven [the] car from the scene”).
6 Because the judicially noticeable documents establish that the vehicle’s registration had
7 lapsed, Plaintiff could not further drive the vehicle without continuing to violate California
8 Vehicle Code § 22651(o)(1)(A). The community caretaking doctrine therefore justifies
9 impounding the vehicle to remove it from a public road. The Complaint currently fails to state a
10 claim for unreasonable seizure based thereon.
11 2. Leave to Amend Should be Granted
12 A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an
13 opportunity to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See
14 Akhtar, 698 F.3d at 1213. The question becomes whether Plaintiff should be granted leave to
15 amend the Complaint to articulate why the community caretaking doctrine did not justify
16 impounding his vehicle.
17 This Court has previously noted that the community caretaking doctrine may not apply to
18 Plaintiff if “anyone was available to assist him in moving his vehicle by, for example, bringing a
19 trailer to tow his vehicle to Plaintiff’s home or another private property.” ECF No. 16 at 6.
20 Plaintiff now cites Mateos-Sandoval v. County of Sonoma, where a district court refused to
21 authorize impoundment under the community caretaking doctrine where a licensed driver was
22 available to move a vehicle that had at the time of the stop been operated by an unlicensed driver.
23 ECF No. 18 at 3; 942 F. Supp. 2d 890, 910 (N.D. Cal. 2013). During the hearing on Plaintiff’s
24 motion for a TRO, he argued that he could have asked one of several neighbors to help him move
25 the vehicle by putting it on a trailer if Officer Wade had let him walk two blocks to obtain cellular
26 signal and make a phone call. ECF No. 23 at 22-25. Amending the Complaint to include this fact
27 may demonstrate that the vehicle could have been removed from the public road without
28 impounding it.
1 Defendants argue in reply that Miranda articulates two other reasons the community
2 caretaking doctrine may authorize impounding a vehicle, both of which apply here. ECF No. 22
3 at 9 (citing 429 F.3d at 868-69). As to the first, fulfilling an officer’s “duty to prevent [a vehicle]
4 from creating a hazard to other drivers[,]” Defendants note that Officer Wade cited Plaintiff for
5 unsafe towing of a load exceeding 14,000 pounds. ECF No. 22 at 9 (citing ECF No. 17-2 at 7);
6 Miranda, 429 F.3d at 864. As to the second, the duty to prevent the Vehicle from “being a target
7 for vandalism or theft[,]” Officer Wade was purportedly concerned about someone stealing
8 Plaintiff’s tools and trailer if the Vehicle was left abandoned. ECF No. 22 at 9; Miranda, 429
9 F.3d at 864.
10 Neither explanation would render leave to amend the complaint futile. To the extent that
11 towing over 14,000 pounds was “unsafe,” Plaintiff also testified that he had the chains necessary
12 to address that issue on site by further securing the load. ECF No. 23 at 16. Because Plaintiff
13 may amend the Complaint to include this fact, the Court cannot assume that this payload would
14 have remained a road hazard if Officer Wade had granted Plaintiff such an opportunity.
15 Meanwhile, although Officer Wade may have expressed concerns about theft during the
16 traffic stop (see ECF No. 13-4), whether such concerns were genuine remains in dispute. This is
17 particularly true when, as here, Plaintiff has asserted that the timeframe he would have left the
18 vehicle and his tools unattended until a neighbor arrived was relatively limited. See ECF No. 23
19 at 22-25.
20 Plaintiff may be able to amend the Complaint to show that the community caretaking
21 doctrine did not justify impounding the vehicle. Leave to so amend the Complaint should
22 therefore be granted. Because a claim for unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment
23 could then be adequately pled, the Court need not address at this time whether, under Brewster v.
24 Beck, continuing to impound the Vehicle without further justification would in itself constitute an
25 unreasonable seizure. See ECF No. 18 at 3 (citing 859 F.3d 1194 (9th Cir. 2017)).
26 F. Qualified Immunity
27 Under Ex Parte Young, Plaintiff may seek injunctive relief against Officer Wade based on
28 his claim for an unreasonable seizure once amended. See supra IV.A. Whether Plaintiff may
1 also seek civil damages from Officer Wade depends on whether Officer Wade is shielded by
2 qualified immunity.
3 When a state officer is sued in his individual capacity, he enjoys qualified immunity for
4 civil damages if “their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional
5 rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Longoria v. Pinal County, 873 F.3d
6 699, 704 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009)). In other
7 words, qualified immunity applies unless (1) the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right
8 when the allegations are taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting as much, and (2)
9 this right was “clearly established” as of the infringement. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201
10 (2001). However, if a court determines that a right has not been clearly established, it need not
11 determine whether the factual allegations suggest that any such right was actually violated.
12 Pearson, 555 U.S. at 236-37.
13 The Ninth Circuit has held that if the right is not obvious, it can only be clearly
14 established by either controlling prior precedent or a “consensus” of courts outside the relevant
15 jurisdiction. See Sharp v. Cty. of Orange, 871 F.3d 901, 911 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Wilson v.
16 Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 617 (1999)). Specifically, the plaintiff must identify a case or cases “where
17 an officer acting under similar circumstances as [defendants] was held to have violated the Fourth
18 Amendment.” Sharp, 871 F.3d at 911 (quoting White v. Pauly, 580 U.S. 73, 79 (2017)); see also
19 Ashcroft v. al–Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 742 (2011) (holding that “clearly established law” cannot be
20 based on “a high level of generality”)
21 Once amended, Plaintiff’s claim for unreasonable seizure stems from Officer Wade’s
22 decision to impound the vehicle when Plaintiff could have conceivably asked a neighbor to safely
23 and legally get it off the public roads. Mateos-Sandoval does suggest that this possibility
24 removed the impoundment from the community caretaking doctrine. See 942 F. Supp. 2d at 910.
25 However, as a district court case, Mateos-Sandoval, does not qualify as controlling Ninth Circuit
26 authority. Moreover, Mateos-Sandoval does not address lack of registration specifically or
27 whether an officer must let the vehicle’s owner leave the scene to contact obtain the assistance of
28 another individual. Plaintiff cites no authority on this point, nor is the right to recruit an assistant
1 by leaving the scene so obvious as to not require controlling precedent.
2 Qualified immunity precludes any suit for damages against Officer Wade based on his
3 impoundment of the vehicle. Amending the Fourth Amendment claim will only permit Plaintiff
4 to preserve claims for injunctive relief in the absence of another viable claim.
5 G. Procedural Due Process
6 Although the Complaint does not currently include a claim for deprivation of procedural
7 due process, the parties discuss whether Plaintiff could articulate such a claim based on the facts
8 currently alleged. The Court will accordingly determine whether leave to amend to assert a
9 procedural due process claim should be granted.
10 Procedural due process imposes constraints on governmental decisions which deprive
11 individuals of liberty or property interests. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 332 (1976). A
12 procedural due process claim has two distinct elements: (1) a deprivation of a constitutionally
13 protected liberty or property interest, and (2) a denial of adequate procedural protections.
14 Brewster v. Board of Educ. of Lynnwood Unified School Dist., 149 F.3d 971, 982 (9th Cir. 1998).
15 To determine if existing procedures are adequate under the Mathews framework, courts consider
16 “(1) [the person’s or entity’s] private property interest, (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
17 such interest through the procedures used, as well as the value of additional safeguards, and (3)
18 the Government’s interest in maintaining its procedures, including the burdens of additional
19 procedural requirements.” Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Treasury, 686
20 F.3d 965, 979 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Foss v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 161 F.3d 584, 589
21 (9th Cir.1998) (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334–35)).
22 The Ninth Circuit has recently explained how to reconcile Mathews with an older standard
23 under Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., an opinion predating Mathews by twenty-
24 six years. Grimm v. City of Portland, 971 F.3d 1060, 1065 (9th Cir. 2020) (citing 339 U.S. 306,
25 319 (1950)). Mullane held that due process requires:
26 notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to apprise
interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an
27 opportunity to present their objections ... with due regard for the
practicalities and peculiarities of the case.
28
1 Grimm, 971 F.3d at 1065 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314-15). After some confusion as to
2 whether Mathews subsumed this standard, Dusenbery v. United States held that Mullane
3 continues to apply when “the adequacy of the method used to give notice” is at issue. 534 U.S.
4 161, 162 (2002). As Grimm summarized this rule, “Mathews governs the question of whether
5 and when due process requirements, including notice, is required, but Mullane governs [an]
6 adequacy of notice claim.” 971 F.3d at 1067.
7 District courts have therefore found that Mullane applies when the parties agree that a
8 defendant must provide some notice to a plaintiff. See Brewster v. City of Los Angeles, 672
9 F.Supp.3d 872, 949 (C.D. Cal. 2023). The question then becomes “whether the notice was
10 ‘reasonably calculated to apprise [Plaintiffs] of the pendency of the action’ and to ‘afford them an
11 opportunity to present their objections,’ and in turn whether the notice was of ‘such nature as to
12 reasonably convey the required information[.]’” Id. at 949-50 (quoting Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314)
13 (parentheticals original).
14 1. Remedies Upon Impoundment
15 Defendants first argue that Plaintiff may have a protected property interest in his vehicle,
16 but not in driving it without valid registration and licensing. ECF No. 17-1 at 11. The requested
17 injunctive relief concerns Defendants’ ability to impound the vehicle, albeit under particular
18 circumstances. ECF No. 1 at 5-6. Such impoundment impacts Plaintiff’s general property
19 interest in his vehicle, undermining the distinction that Defendant attempts to make.
20 Defendants then argue, however, that Plaintiff cannot plead a lack of procedural
21 protections because he failed to take advantage of available protections. ECF No. 17-1 at 11. For
22 example, Plaintiff argues that California Vehicle Code §22852(a) entitles anyone whose car is
23 impounded to a post-impoundment hearing. ECF No. 18 at 3. Defendants respond that Plaintiff
24 has effectively admitted that Officer Wade informed him of his right to this hearing. ECF No. 22
25 at 6. At the April 10, 2025 evidentiary hearing on his motion for a TRO, Plaintiff submitted a
26 copy of the notice CHP mailed to him about his right to request an administrative hearing within
27 10 days. ECF No. 14-2 at 3; ECF No. 24 at 6.
28 Whether Plaintiff in fact failed to request such a hearing remains in dispute. The
1 undersigned has previously found that “when Plaintiff called CHP to request that hearing, he was
2 told that he could recover his vehicle by registering it, but that otherwise he needed to file a
3 lawsuit.” ECF No. 16 at 4. In ruling on this motion to dismiss, the Court cannot assume that
4 Plaintiff waived his right to this post-deprivation hearing to the extent that it would preclude his
5 claim. See Boquist, 32 F.4th at 773.
6 Defendants are correct, however, that the citation also warned Plaintiff of the April 29,
7 2025 hearing date in Williams II, at which he did not appear. ECF No. 22 at 7; ECF No. 17-2 at
8 7, 9. Plaintiff thereby waived an opportunity to contest the charges under California Vehicle
9 Code §§ 4000(a)(1) and 12500(d) that led to the vehicle’s impoundment. ECF No. 17-1 at 11;
10 ECF No. 17-2 at 9. He also chose to voluntarily dismiss his petition in Williams III, which sought
11 the release of his vehicle. ECF No. 17-1 at 11, n.1; ECF No. 17-2 at 32-34. Defendants further
12 argue that Plaintiff had to know about these remedies from the start because he was issued at least
13 one earlier traffic citation, leading to his conviction in Williams I for operating an unregistered
14 vehicle. ECF No. 17-1 at 11-12; ECF No. 17-2 at 13, 18.
15 Plaintiff’s litigation history, when combined with the written instructions and notices on
16 Officer Wade’s citation, demonstrate that he had more than adequate notice under Mullane as to
17 how he might challenge the impoundment of his Vehicle. The circumstances surrounding the
18 impoundment itself do not give rise to a procedural due process claim.
19 2. Release to Wells Fargo
20 Plaintiff then argues that the lack of a notice or hearing before releasing the vehicle to
21 Wells Fargo constitutes a second deprivation of procedural due process. ECF No. 18 at 3.
22 Defendants argue that because Wells Fargo and Plaintiff were both registered and legal owners of
23 record, it notified Wells Fargo of the impoundment at the same time as Plaintiff. ECF No. 22 at
24 6. CHP was then required to release the vehicle “[t]o the legal owner or the legal owner’s
25 agency” after said owner pays all towing and storage costs, and signs an affidavit confirming they
26 were not in possession of the vehicle at the time of impoundment. Id. at 8; Cal. Veh. Code §
27 22852(o)(3)(C)(i)-(ii). CHP was only required to offer a hearing “to determine the validity of the
28 storage,” which was not in dispute at the time of Wells Fargo’s repossession. ECF No. 22 at 8;
1 Cal. Veh. Code § 22852(a).
2 Plaintiff frames this issue, however, as “Wells Fargo’s failure to provide Plaintiff” with
3 notice that it had reclaimed the vehicle. ECF No. 18 at 3. In doing so, Plaintiff seems to
4 acknowledge that Wells Fargo, a private entity, is responsible for the deprivation of his property
5 interest. He argues that Wells Fargo can still be held accountable because it acted jointly with
6 CHP officials. Id. (citing Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922 (1982)).
7 “A private individual may be liable under § 1983 if she conspired or entered joint action
8 with a state actor.” Franklin v. Fox, 312 F.3d 423, 441 (9th Cir. 2002). However, “[t]o prove a
9 conspiracy between the [state] and [the private party] under § 1983, [the plaintiff] must show ‘an
10 agreement or “meeting of the minds” to violate constitutional rights.’” Id.; accord O’Handley v.
11 Weber, 62 F.4th 1145, 1159 (9th Cir. 2023). “The defendants must have, ‘by some concerted
12 action, intend[ed] to accomplish some unlawful objective for the purpose of harming another
13 which results in damage.’” Mendocino Env’t Ctr. v. Mendocino County, 192 F.3d 1283, 1301
14 (9th Cir. 1999). “Such an agreement need not be overt, and may be inferred on the basis of
15 circumstantial evidence such as the actions of the defendants.” Id. “For example, a showing that
16 the alleged conspirators have committed acts that ‘are unlikely to have been undertaken without
17 an agreement’ may allow a jury to infer the existence of a conspiracy.” Id. “To be liable, each
18 participant in the conspiracy need not know the exact details of the plan, but each participant must
19 at least share the common objective of the conspiracy.” Franklin, 312 F.3d at 441.
20 In Franklin, however, the Ninth Circuit cautioned courts that private actors should only be
21 found liable if there was “a substantial degree of cooperation” between them and the state
22 officials at issue. 312 F.3d at 445. It also held that private actors can only be held liable for
23 conduct committed by the state actor if “the private individual was the proximate cause of the
24 violations.” Id. (citing King v. Massarweh, 782 F.2d 825, 829 (9th Cir.1986)). Nor can courts
25 make this finding without “some showing that a private party had some control over state
26 officials’ decision” to commit the act in question. Franklin, 312 F.3d at 446 (quoting King, 782
27 F.2d at 829).
28 Assuming arguendo that Plaintiff were to add a procedural due process claim against
1 Wells Fargo, he offers no facts to demonstrate that Wells Fargo conspired with Defendants. As
2 Defendants note, they released the vehicle to Wells Fargo because they believed the Vehicle Code
3 required such release. ECF No. 22 at 8. Plaintiff does not allege any facts to suggest that
4 Defendants and Wells Fargo agreed to transfer possession of the vehicle, with the understanding
5 that this would infringe on Plaintiff’s right to repossess it. The release of the vehicle to Wells
6 Fargo does not raise any procedural due process concerns.
7 3. Conclusion
8 To the extent that Plaintiff seeks leave to amend his Complaint to add a claim for
9 deprivation of procedural due process, the undersigned recommends denying such a request.
10 H. Leave to Amend
11 A pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the deficiencies in the complaint and an
12 opportunity to amend, unless the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See
13 Akhtar, 698 F.3d at 1213. As discussed above, the only claim which may be cured via
14 amendment is for unreasonable seizure. See supra IV.E. Specifically, Plaintiff may plead
15 additional facts showing that the community caretaking doctrine did not justify impounding his
16 vehicle because he had options for otherwise removing it from the street. See supra IV.E.2. This
17 does not extend to claims for monetary damages against Officer Wade, however, because Plaintiff
18 cannot demonstrate that qualified immunity does not apply to this impoundment. See supra IV.F.
19 For every other claim and prayer for relief that the undersigned finds deficient, leave to
20 amend would also be futile. Plaintiff does not attempt to argue that either the CHP or Officer
21 Wade in his official capacity have waived Eleventh Amendment immunity. See supra VI.A; ECF
22 No. 18 at 4. No facts suggest that Plaintiff can amend his claim to show that Officer Wade could
23 return his vehicle (see supra VI.B), that licensing and registration requirements infringe on his
24 right to travel (see supra VI.C), or that Officer Wade should not have stopped the vehicle for lack
25 of valid license plates (see supra VI.D). Underscoring the latter point is Plaintiff’s prior
26 admission that he still has not obtained California registration for the car, and will not do so until
27 judgment is entered against him. See ECF No. 23 at 21:21-22:8. This admission also frustrates
28 any procedural due process claim Plaintiff might seek to articulate with regard to transfer of the
1 vehicle to Wells Fargo, as Defendants would have never released the impounded vehicle to
2 Plaintiff without proof of valid registration. See supra VI.F.2.
3 Leave to amend should be limited to whether the impoundment of Plaintiff’s vehicle
4 exceeded the scope of the community caretaking doctrine.
5 V. CONCLUSION
6 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED THAT:
7 1. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 17) is:
8 a. GRANTED as to any claim against Defendant CHP WITHOUT LEAVE TO
9 AMEND;
10 b. GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s request for return of his vehicle WITHOUT
11 LEAVE TO AMEND;
12 c. GRANTED WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND as to Plaintiff’s claims against
13 Officer Wade for:
14 i. Violation of the fundamental right to travel;
15 ii. Performance of an unreasonable search under the Fourth Amendment;
16 iii. Deprivation of procedural due process, to the extent that the Complaint
17 alleges one or could be amended to allege one;
18 d. GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s request for recovery of fees and costs associated
19 with his vehicle’s impoundment WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND; and
20 e. GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s claim against Officer Wade for unreasonable
21 seizure under the Fourth Amendment, but WITH LEAVE TO AMEND as to
22 why the community caretaking doctrine does not justify such seizure, to the
23 extent that Plaintiff seeks some other injunctive relief not precluded by the
24 recommendation above.
25 2. Should Plaintiff wish to continue pursuing injunctive relief in this action, he shall file
26 his First Amended Complaint within 30 days of the district judge’s adoption of these
27 findings.
28 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge
1 || assigned to this case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).. Within fourteen (14)
2 || days after being served with these findings and recommendations, either party may file written
3 || objections with the court. Such document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s
4 | Findings and Recommendations.” Local Rule 304(d). The parties are advised that failure to file
5 || objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District Court’s order.
6 || Martinez v. Yist, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).
7 SO ORDERED.
8 | DATED: March 19, 2026
9 .
10 SEAN C. RIORDAN
1 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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