Opinion

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

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EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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9 DOUGLAS URIEL R.R.,1 Case No. 1:25-cv-01476-EPG-HC

10 Petitioner, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO

GRANT PETITION FOR WRIT OF

11 v. HABEAS CORPUS, DENY

RESPONDENTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

12 WARDEN OF THE GOLDEN STATE AND ALTERNATIVE REQUEST TO

ANNEX ICE DETENTION FACILITY, et al., AMEND BRIEFING SCHEDULE, AND

13 DIRECT RESPONDENTS TO PROVIDE

Respondents. PETITIONER WITH BOND HEARING

14 BEFORE IMMIGRATION JUDGE

15 (ECF Nos. 1, 11)

16 ORDER DIRECTING CLERK OF COURT

TO ASSIGN DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

17

18 Petitioner, represented by counsel, is a federal immigration detainee proceeding with a

19 petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.

20 For the reasons set forth herein, the undersigned recommends granting the petition for

21 writ of habeas corpus, denying Respondents’ motion to dismiss, denying Respondents’

22 alternative request to amend briefing schedule, and ordering that Respondents provide Petitioner

23 with an individualized bond hearing before an immigration judge at which the government must

24 justify Petitioner’s continued detention by clear and convincing evidence.

25

26 1 The Court partially redacts Petitioner’s name to mitigate privacy concerns, as requested by Petitioner

and suggested by the Committee on Court Administration and Case Management of the Judicial

27 Conference of the United States. See Memorandum Re: Privacy Concern Regarding Social Security &

Immigration Opinions (May 1, 2018), https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/18-cv-l-

1 I.

2 BACKGROUND

3 Petitioner is a national of Nicaragua and was initially encountered near the border in

4 Texas on July 7, 2021. (ECF No. 11-1 at 2.2) Petitioner was given a credible fear interview,

5 established a claim of persecution, and was placed in regular removal proceedings before an

6 immigration judge (“IJ”). (ECF No. 11 at 2.) Thereafter, the Department of Homeland Security

7 released Petitioner, who then lived in Sacramento and Stockton for almost four years. (ECF No.

8 20 at 2.)

9 After being released from San Joaquin County jail on misdemeanor convictions for

10 driving under the influence and taking a vehicle without consent, Petitioner was taken into

11 immigration detention by Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) on May 23, 2025.

12 (ECF No. 11-1 at 3.)

13 On December 12, 2025, an IJ denied Petitioner’s application for asylum, withholding of

14 removal, and Convention Against Torture (“CAT”) protection, and Petitioner was ordered

15 removed to Nicaragua. (ECF No. 11-2.) Petitioner filed a notice of appeal with the Board of

16 Immigration Appeals (“BIA”). (ECF No. 11-2.) The appeal is still pending. (ECF No. 20-1.)

17 Meanwhile, on November 3, 2025, Petitioner filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus

18 raising a prolonged detention due process claim. (ECF No. 1 at 6–17.) On January 5, 2026,

19 Respondents filed a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 11.) On February 18, 2026, the Court granted

20 the Federal Defender’s motion for reconsideration and appointed counsel for Petitioner. (ECF

21 No. 16.) On March 12, 2026, Petitioner filed a response to the motion to dismiss, and

22 Respondents filed a reply on March 13, 2026. (ECF Nos. 20, 21.)

23 II.

24 DISCUSSION

25 In the petition, Petitioner asserts that his prolonged detention without a bond hearing

26 violates due process.3

27 2 Page numbers refer to the ECF pagination stamped at the top of the page.

3 Petitioner has not filed an amended petition. Thus, this matter is proceeding on the petition filed by

1 A. Immigration Detention Statutes and Bond Hearings

2 Congress has enacted a complex statutory scheme governing the detention of noncitizens

3 during removal proceedings and following the issuance of a final order of removal. “Where an

4 alien falls within this statutory scheme can affect whether his detention is mandatory or

5 discretionary, as well as the kind of review process available to him if he wishes to contest the

6 necessity of his detention.” Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053, 1057 (9th Cir. 2008).

7 Here, Respondents are subjecting Petitioner to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C.

8 § 1225(b), which the Supreme Court has described as follows:

9 Under § 302, 110 Stat. 3009–579, 8 U.S.C. § 1225, an alien who

“arrives in the United States,” or “is present” in this country but

10 “has not been admitted,” is treated as “an applicant for admission.”

§ 1225(a)(1). Applicants for admission must “be inspected by

11 immigration officers” to ensure that they may be admitted into the

country consistent with U.S. immigration law. § 1225(a)(3).

12

As relevant here, applicants for admission fall into one of two

13 categories, those covered by § 1225(b)(1) and those covered by

§ 1225(b)(2). Section 1225(b)(1) applies to aliens initially

14 determined to be inadmissible due to fraud, misrepresentation, or

lack of valid documentation. See § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i) (citing

15 §§ 1182(a)(6)(C), (a)(7)). Section 1225(b)(1) also applies to certain

other aliens designated by the Attorney General in his discretion.

16 See § 1225(b)(1)(A)(iii). Section 1225(b)(2) is broader. It serves as

a catchall provision that applies to all applicants for admission not

17 covered by § 1225(b)(1) (with specific exceptions not relevant

here). See §§ 1225(b)(2)(A), (B).

18

Both § 1225(b)(1) and § 1225(b)(2) authorize the detention of

19 certain aliens. Aliens covered by § 1225(b)(1) are normally

ordered removed “without further hearing or review” pursuant to

20 an expedited removal process. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(i). But if a

§ 1225(b)(1) alien “indicates either an intention to apply for

21 asylum ... or a fear of persecution,” then that alien is referred for an

asylum interview. § 1225(b)(1)(A)(ii). If an immigration officer

22 determines after that interview that the alien has a credible fear of

persecution, “the alien shall be detained for further consideration

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24 response to the motion to dismiss raises new grounds for relief (e.g., challenging the statutory authority of

Petitioner’s detention and arguing that the failure to provide a pre-deprivation hearing after Petitioner had

25 been paroled into the United States for four years violates due process and entitles him to release), the

Court declines to address such claims as Petitioner has not moved to amend the petition to add these

26 claims. See Cacoperdo v. Demosthenes, 37 F.3d 504, 507 (9th Cir. 1994) (“A traverse is not the proper

pleading to raise additional grounds.”); Dearwester v. Sacramento Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, No. 2:13-cv-

2064 MCE DAD, 2015 WL 3705822, at *3 (E.D. Cal. June 12, 2015) (“As an initial matter, an opposition

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to a motion to dismiss is not an appropriate place to raise and argue new claims or identify new

defendants.”) (citing Schneider v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs., 151 F.3d 1194, 1197 n.1 (9th Cir. 1998)), report

1 of the application for asylum.” § 1225(b)(1)(B)(ii). Aliens who are

instead covered by § 1225(b)(2) are detained pursuant to a

2 different process. Those aliens “shall be detained for a [removal]

proceeding” if an immigration officer “determines that [they are]

3 not clearly and beyond a doubt entitled to be admitted” into the

country. § 1225(b)(2)(A).

4

Regardless of which of those two sections authorizes their

5 detention, applicants for admission may be temporarily released on

parole “for urgent humanitarian reasons or significant public

6 benefit.” § 1182(d)(5)(A); see also 8 C.F.R §§ 212.5(b), 235.3

(2017). Such parole, however, “shall not be regarded as an

7 admission of the alien.” 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A). Instead, when

the purpose of the parole has been served, “the alien shall forthwith

8 return or be returned to the custody from which he was paroled and

thereafter his case shall continue to be dealt with in the same

9 manner as that of any other applicant for admission to the United

States.” Ibid.

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11 Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 287–88 (2018).

12 In Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), the Supreme Court addressed a challenge to

13 prolonged detention under § 1231(a)(6) by noncitizens who “had been ordered removed by the

14 government and all administrative and judicial review was exhausted, but their removal could

15 not be effectuated because their designated countries either refused to accept them or the United

16 States lacked a repatriation treaty with the receiving country.” Prieto–Romero, 534 F.3d at 1062

17 (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 684–86). The Supreme Court held that § 1231(a)(6) does not

18 authorize indefinite detention and “limits an alien’s post-removal-period detention to a period

19 reasonably necessary to bring about that alien’s removal from the United States.” Zadvydas, 533

20 U.S. at 689. Thus, after a presumptively reasonable detention period of six months, a noncitizen

21 was entitled to release if “it has been determined that there is no significant likelihood of removal

22 in the reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. at 701.

23 In Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), the Supreme Court rejected a facial challenge to

24 mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). The Supreme Court upheld its “longstanding

25 view that the Government may constitutionally detain deportable aliens during the limited period

26 necessary for their removal proceedings.” Id. at 526. The Supreme Court distinguished Zadvydas

27 by emphasizing that mandatory detention under § 1226(c) has “a definite termination point” and

“in the majority of cases it lasts for less than the 90 days . . . considered presumptively valid in

1 Zadvydas.” Demore, 538 U.S. at 529. However, Justice Kennedy specifically noted that “a

2 lawful permanent resident alien such as respondent could be entitled to an individualized

3 determination as to his risk of flight and dangerousness if the continued detention became

4 unreasonable or unjustified.” Id. at 532 (Kennedy, J., concurring).

5 “In a series of decisions, the [Ninth Circuit] . . . grappled in piece-meal fashion with

6 whether the various immigration detention statutes may authorize indefinite or prolonged

7 detention of detainees and, if so, may do so without providing a bond hearing.” Rodriguez v.

8 Hayes (Rodriguez I), 591 F.3d 1105, 1114 (9th Cir. 2010). This culminated in Rodriguez v.

9 Robbins (Rodriguez III), 804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015), in which the Ninth Circuit held that for

10 noncitizens detained under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(a), and 1226(c), “the government must

11 provide periodic bond hearings every six months so that noncitizens may challenge their

12 continued detention as ‘the period of . . . confinement grows.’” 804 F.3d at 1089 (quoting Diouf

13 v. Napolitano (Diouf II), 634 F.3d 1081, 1091 (9th Cir. 2011)). Importantly, the Ninth Circuit

14 applied the canon of constitutional avoidance to interpret these immigration detention provisions

15 as providing a statutory right to a bond hearing once detention become prolonged. See Rodriguez

16 Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 2022).

17 In Jennings v. Rodriguez, the Supreme held that the Ninth Circuit misapplied the

18 constitutional avoidance canon to find that “§§ 1225(b)(1) and (b)(2) contain an implicit 6–

19 month limit on the length of detention” and “[o]nce that 6–month period elapses, respondents

20 contend, aliens previously detained under those provisions must instead be detained under the

21 authority of § 1226(a), which allows for bond hearings in certain circumstances.” 583 U.S. at

22 297–98. Jennings also rejected the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation of a statutory right under 8

23 U.S.C. § 1226(a) to “periodic bond hearings every six months in which the Attorney General

24 must prove by clear and convincing evidence that the alien’s continued detention is necessary.”

25 Id. at 306. The case was remanded to the Ninth Circuit “to consider [the] constitutional

26 arguments on their merits.” Id. at 312. The Ninth Circuit likewise remanded the case to the

27 district court to consider the constitutional arguments in the first instance but observed that it had

1 is constitutional or that those who founded our democracy precisely to protect against the

2 arbitrary deprivation of liberty would have thought so.” Rodriguez v. Marin, 909 F.3d 252, 255,

3 256 (9th Cir. 2018).

4 There has been a dearth of guidance regarding the point at which an immigration

5 detainee’s continued mandatory detention becomes unconstitutional. See Rodriguez Diaz, 53

6 F.4th at 1203 (noting that both the Ninth Circuit “and the Supreme Court have repeatedly

7 declined to decide constitutional challenges to bond hearing procedures in the immigration

8 detention context”). The Ninth Circuit has yet to take a position on whether due process requires

9 a bond hearing for noncitizens detained under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b), but it has recognized that

10 “district courts throughout this circuit have ordered immigration courts to conduct bond hearings

11 for noncitizens held for prolonged periods under § 1226(c)” based on due process and noted that

12 “[a]ccording to one such court order, the ‘prolonged mandatory detention pending removal

13 proceedings, without a bond hearing, will—at some point—violate the right to due process.’”

14 Martinez v. Clark, 36 F.4th 1219, 1223 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted), vacated on other

15 grounds, 144 S. Ct. 1339 (2024).

16 Respondents contend Petitioner’s detention during removal proceedings is mandatory and

17 constitutional, relying on Jennings and Demore. (ECF No. 11 at 5.) As noted above, the Supreme

18 Court rejected a facial challenge to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) in Demore.

19 See Demore, 538 U.S. at 514 (“Respondent . . . filed a habeas corpus action pursuant to 28

20 U.S.C. § 2241 . . . challenging the constitutionality of § 1226(c) itself.” (emphasis added)); Black

21 v. Decker, 103 F.4th 133, 149 n.22 (2d Cir. 2024) (“Demore ruled on a due process challenge to

22 the facial constitutionality of section 1226(c)[.]”). In Nielsen v. Preap, 586 U.S. 392 (2019), the

23 Supreme Court expressly preserved the right to bring an as-applied challenge: “Our decision

24 today on the meaning of that statutory provision [§ 1226(c)] does not foreclose as-applied

25 challenges—that is, constitutional challenges to applications of the statute as we have now read

26 it.” Preap, 586 U.S. at 420. See Black, 103 F.4th at 149 (Demore “said nothing about whether

27 due process may eventually require a hearing. If Demore had, in fact, foreclosed the due process

1 Circuit ‘to consider ... in the first instance’ the detainees’ argument that ‘[a]bsent ... a bond-

2 hearing requirement, ... [section 1226(c)] would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fifth

3 Amendment.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Jennings, 583 U.S. at 291, 312)). As noted

4 above, Jennings held the Ninth Circuit erred in finding a statutory right to periodic bond hearings

5 under § 1225(b) and § 1226(a) but did not address the constitutional arguments.

6 Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Jennings and Demore do not foreclose

7 Petitioner’s as-applied constitutional challenge. Therefore, the undersigned recommends finding

8 that dismissal is not warranted on this ground.

9 B. Prolonged Detention

10 Respondents argue that “Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention and is not entitled to

11 any procedure not provided by statute,” relying, inter alia, on Dept. of Homeland Sec. v.

12 Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. 103 (2020). (ECF No. 11 at 9.) The Court finds such an argument

13 unpersuasive. Thuraissigiam challenged “restrictions on the ability of asylum seekers to obtain

14 review under the federal habeas statute” that prevented him from “obtain[ing] additional

15 administrative review of his asylum claim and ultimately . . . obtain[ing] authorization to stay in

16 this country,” Thuraissigiam, 591 U.S. at 106. Thuraissigiam did not concern a challenge to

17 prolonged immigration detention. Respondent “ask[s] the Court to extract from Thuraissigiam a

18 broad rule that any inadmissible noncitizen possesses only those due process rights afforded to

19 them by statute, regardless of the nature of their status or the relief they seek. But such a

20 conclusion is untethered to the claim in Thuraissigiam and the Court’s reasoning.

21 Thuraissigiam’s discussion of due process is necessarily constrained to challenges to

22 admissibility to the United States.” Padilla v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 704 F. Supp. 3d

23 1163, 1171 (W.D. Wash. 2023), appeal filed, No. 24-2801 (9th Cir. argued May 21, 2025). See

24 Castillo v. Wofford, No. 1:25-CV-01586-JLT-HBK, 2025 WL 3466064, at *8 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 2,

25 2025) (finding Thuraissigiam “inapposite and reject[ing] Respondents’ argument that ‘entry

26 fiction’ cases guide the analysis for cases not involving an expedited removal process”).

27 Courts in the Ninth Circuit have taken a variety of approaches to determine whether due

1 2019 WL 7491555, at *6 (applying bright-line rule that “detention becomes prolonged after six

2 months and entitles [the petitioner] to a bond hearing” in § 1226(c) context); Banda v.

3 McAleenan, 385 F. Supp. 3d 1099, 1117 (W.D. Wash. 2019) (considering six factors, which

4 include: “(1) the total length of detention to date; (2) the likely duration of future detention; (3)

5 the conditions of detention; (4) delays in the removal proceedings caused by the detainee; (5)

6 delays in the removal proceedings caused by the government; and (6) the likelihood that the

7 removal proceedings will result in a final order of removal” in § 1225(b) context); Juarez v.

8 Wolf, No. C20-1660-RJB-MLP, 2021 WL 2323436, at *4 (W.D. Wash. May 5, 2021)

9 (considering, in addition to six factors set forth above, “whether the detention will exceed the

10 time the petitioner spent in prison for the crime that made him [or her] removable” and “the

11 nature of the crimes the petitioner committed” in § 1226(c) context), report and recommendation

12 adopted, 2021 WL 2322823 (W.D. Wash. June 7, 2021); Lopez v. Garland, 631 F. Supp. 3d 870,

13 879 (E.D. Cal. 2022) (considering “the total length of detention to date, the likely duration of

14 future detention, and the delays in the removal proceedings caused by the petitioner and the

15 government” in § 1226(c) context).

16 There are also some courts that apply the three-part test set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge,

17 424 U.S. 319 (1976). See Zagal-Alcaraz v. ICE Field Off., No. 3:19-cv-01358-SB, 2020 WL

18 1862254, at *3–4 (D. Or. Mar. 25, 2020) (collecting cases), report and recommendation adopted,

19 2020 WL 1855189 (D. Or. Apr. 13, 2020). In Rodriguez Diaz, which concerned a noncitizen

20 detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) and whether “continued detention was unconstitutional

21 because under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, he is entitled to a second bond

22 hearing at which the government bears the burden of proof by clear and convincing evidence,”

23 the panel majority “assume[d] without deciding” that the Mathews test applied, noting that the

24 Ninth Circuit has “regularly applied Mathews to due process challenges to removal

25 proceedings,” and finding “Mathews remains a flexible test that can and must account for the

26 heightened governmental interest in the immigration detention context.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53

27 F.4th at 1193, 1206. Similarly, the dissent “agree[d] that the test developed in Mathews v.

1 to determine whether there was a due process violation.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1219

2 (Wardlaw, J., dissenting). See also Black, 103 F.4th at 147 (“conclud[ing] that due process

3 challenges to prolonged detention under section 1226(c) should also be reviewed under

4 Mathews”); A.E. v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-00107-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 1424382 (E.D. Cal.

5 May 16, 2025) (applying Mathews test to determine whether due process entitled petitioner to a

6 bond hearing in § 1225(b) context), findings and recommendations adopted, 2025 WL 1808676

7 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2025).

8 Given that Petitioner applies the Mathews test in the petition and the Ninth Circuit has

9 “regularly applied Mathews to due process challenges to removal proceedings,” Rodriguez Diaz,

10 53 F.4th at 1193, the Court will apply Mathews, in which the Supreme Court held that

11 “identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires consideration of three

12 distinct factors”:

13 First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action;

second, the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through

14 the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or

substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the Government’s

15 interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and

administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural

16 requirements would entail.

17 Mathews, 424 U.S. at 334.

18 1. Private Interest

19 With respect to the first factor, the Court finds that the private interest at issue here is

20 fundamental. “Freedom from imprisonment—from government custody, detention, or other

21 forms of physical restraint—lies at the heart of the liberty [the Due Process] Clause

22 protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690. The Ninth Circuit has held that it “is beyond dispute” an

23 immigration detainee’s “private interest at issue here is ‘fundamental’: freedom from

24 imprisonment is at the ‘core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.’” Hernandez v.

25 Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 993 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80

26 (1992)). See Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1207 (“We have also held, more generally, that an

27 individual’s private interest in ‘freedom from prolonged detention’ is ‘unquestionably

1 under Mathews.” (quoting Singh, 638 F.3d at 1208)). Accordingly, the first Mathews factor

2 weighs in favor of Petitioner.

3 2. Risk of Erroneous Deprivation

4 With respect to the second factor, the Court considers the risk of erroneous deprivation of

5 Petitioner’s liberty interest and the probable value of additional procedural safeguards. “In

6 evaluating the risk of erroneous deprivation in the context of noncitizen detention, the Ninth

7 Circuit has looked to whether the detainee has a statutory right to procedural protections, such as

8 individualized custody determinations and the right to seek additional bond hearings throughout

9 detention.” Jensen v. Garland, No. 5:21-cv-01195-CAS (AFM), 2023 WL 3246522, at *6 (C.D.

10 Cal. May 3, 2023) (citing Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1209–10 (finding a small risk of erroneous

11 deprivation where petitioner was detained under § 1226(a) and thus received numerous

12 procedural protections, including individualized custody determinations and right to seek

13 additional bond hearings)).

14 Although the Supreme Court has rejected the Ninth Circuit’s application of the

15 constitutional avoidance canon and its statutory interpretation of § 1225(b), the Court finds

16 Rodriguez v. Robbins (Rodriguez II), 715 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2013), informative regarding the

17 constitutional issue before this Court. The Ninth Circuit “note[d] that the discretionary parole

18 system available to § 1225(b) detainees is not sufficient to overcome the constitutional concerns

19 raised by prolonged mandatory detention” because the “parole process is purely discretionary

20 and its results are unreviewable by IJs” and “release decisions are based on humanitarian

21 considerations and the public interest.” Rodriguez II, 715 F.3d at 1144. See Padilla, 704 F. Supp.

22 3d at 1174 (finding plaintiffs “allege[d] a viable due process claim” because “the parole process

23 available to them under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5)(A) is not a constitutionally adequate substitute for

24 a bond hearing particularly since it does not test the necessity of detention,” “does not afford the

25 noncitizen an in-person adversarial hearing before a neutral decisionmaker where he or she may

26 present witness testimony or evidence,” does not require “the ICE detention officer [to] make

27 any factual findings or provide their reasoning, and there is no apparent right to an administrative

1 Petitioner has been detained for ten months and has not received any bond hearing before

2 a neutral decisionmaker with authority to grant bond. Accordingly, the Court finds that the risk

3 of erroneous deprivation of Petitioner’s liberty interest and the probable value of additional

4 procedural safeguards is high. See Jimenez v. Wolf, No. 19-cv-07996-NC, 2020 WL 510347, at

5 *3 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 30, 2020) (“[T]he risk of an erroneous deprivation of Landeros Jimenez’s

6 liberty interest is high. He has not received any bond or custody redetermination hearing during

7 his one-year detention. Thus, the probable value of additional procedural safeguards—a bond

8 hearing—is high, because Respondents have provided virtually no procedural safeguards at

9 all.”). Therefore, the second Mathews factor weighs in favor of Petitioner.

10 3. Government’s Interest

11 With respect to the third and final factor, the Court recognizes that “the government

12 clearly has a strong interest in preventing aliens from ‘remain[ing] in the United States in

13 violation of our law’” and “has an obvious interest in ‘protecting the public from dangerous

14 criminal aliens.’” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1208 (quoting Demore, 538 U.S. at 518, 515). The

15 Ninth Circuit has stated that “[t]hese are interests of the highest order that only increase with the

16 passage of time,” noting that “[t]he longer detention lasts and the longer the challenges to an IJ’s

17 order of removal take, the more resources the government devotes to securing an alien’s ultimate

18 removal” and “[t]he risk of a detainee absconding also inevitably escalates as the time for

19 removal becomes more imminent.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1208.

20 It is important to stress that the “government interest at stake here is not the continued

21 detention of Petitioner, but the government’s ability to detain him without a bond hearing.”

22 Zagal-Alcaraz, 2020 WL 1862254, at *7. See Zerezghi v. U.S. Citizenship & Immigr. Servs.,

23 955 F.3d 802, 810 (9th Cir. 2020) (noting that “the question [under the third Mathews factor] is

24 not the government’s interest in immigration enforcement” “in general” (emphasis added));

25 Henriquez v. Garland, No. 5:22-cv-00869-EJD, 2022 WL 2132919, at *5 (N.D. Cal. June 14,

26 2022) (“Although the Government has a strong interest in enforcing the immigration laws and in

27 ensuring that lawfully issued removal orders are promptly executed, the Government’s interest in

1 Courts generally have found that the cost of providing a bond hearing is relatively

2 minimal, and there is nothing in the record before this Court demonstrating that providing

3 Petitioner with a bond hearing would be fiscally or administratively burdensome. See Marroquin

4 Ambriz v. Barr, 420 F. Supp. 3d 953, 964 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (noting in context of a § 1226(a)

5 detention, the parties did not contest “that the cost of conducting a bond hearing, to determine

6 whether the continued detention of Petitioner is justified, is minimal”); Singh v. Barr, 400 F.

7 Supp. 3d 1005, 1021 (S.D. Cal. 2019) (noting in the context of § 1226(a) detention that “[t]he

8 government has not offered any indication that a [ ] bond hearing would have outside effects on

9 its coffers”). Accordingly, the third Mathews factor weighs in favor of Petitioner.

10 Based on the foregoing, all three Mathews factor weigh in favor of Petitioner, and the

11 undersigned recommends finding that Petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing.

12 C. Amendment of Briefing Schedule to Allow Appeal to be Resolved

13 “Petitioner’s asylum petition was recently denied and he has appealed that determination

14 to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), so in the alternative, Respondents move to amend

15 the briefing schedule to allow time for that appeal to be resolved” because “it will likely either

16 result in release or in a change to the applicable legal framework.” (ECF No. 11 at 1, 14.)

17 Petitioner notes that “after about ninety (90) days, not only does his appeal remain pending, but

18 the BIA has not yet given him a briefing schedule. Hence, he continues to remain in custody

19 indefinitely.” (ECF No. 20 at 2 (citation omitted).)

20 “Section 1231(a) applies to detention after the entry of a final order of removal” and

21 “governs detention during a ninety-day ‘removal period’ after the conclusion of removal

22 proceedings.” Avilez v. Garland, 69 F.4th 525, 530–31 (9th Cir. 2023). “The removal period

23 begins on the latest of three dates: (1) the date the order of removal becomes ‘administratively

24 final,’ (2) the date of the final order of any court that entered a stay of removal, or (3) the date on

25 which the alien is released from non-immigration detention or confinement.” Johnson v. Guzman

26 Chavez, 594 U.S. 523, 528 (2021) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(B)). “During the removal

27 period, detention is mandatory.” Guzman Chavez, 594 U.S. at 528 (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2)).

1 once a petitioner is subject to detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(2). See, e.g., Inamzhon v.

2 Warden of Golden State Annex, No. 1:25-cv-01059-SKO (HC), 2025 WL 3080525, at *2–3

3 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025). Contra Doe v. Becerra, 697 F. Supp. 3d. 937, 943 (N.D. Cal. 2023)

4 (“Respondents argue in part that Doe’s petition is now moot in light of the change in the basis for

5 his detention. Court need not address this line of argument other than to acknowledge that a live

6 controversy exists because Doe remains detained and to note that the Court’s conclusion in this

7 case is based on the length of Doe’s detention without a hearing, not the statutory basis for his

8 detention.” (citation omitted)).

9 This Court has found that Petitioner’s prolonged detention without a bond hearing

10 violates due process. “It is well established that the deprivation of constitutional rights

11 ‘unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.’” Melendres v. Arpaio, 695 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th

12 Cir. 2012) (quoting Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)). “The government also ‘cannot

13 reasonably assert that it is harmed in any legally cognizable sense by being enjoined from

14 constitutional violations.’” Baird v. Bonta, 81 F.4th 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2023) (quoting Zepeda

15 v. INS, 753 F.2d 719, 727 (9th Cir. 1983)). Further, Petitioner’s BIA appeal was received on

16 December 22, 2025, and no briefing schedule has been set. (ECF No. 20-1.) Accordingly, the

17 undersigned recommends denying Respondents’ alternative request to amend the briefing

18 schedule to allow time for the BIA appeal to be resolved.

19 D. Remedy

20 “The Court finds, consistent with other post-Jennings cases, that the appropriate remedy

21 is a bond hearing before an immigration judge[.]” Lopez, 631 F. Supp. 3d at 882. The Court now

22 turns to the burden of proof at the bond hearing and which party should bear such burden.

23 Having “previously applied the canon of constitutional avoidance to interpret . . .

24 immigration provisions—8 U.S.C. §§ 1225(b), 1226(c), and 1231(a)(6)—as providing a statutory

25 right to a bond hearing once detention becomes prolonged,” the Ninth Circuit in Singh

26 “concluded that for these hearings to comply with due process, the government had to bear the

27 burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the alien poses a flight risk or a danger

1 Although Rodriguez Diaz may have declined to impose the standard articulated in Singh, the

2 panel majority specifically stated that it was not “decid[ing] whether Singh remains good law in

3 any respect following Jennings” and even recognized that Singh was based “on general

4 principles of procedural due process, reasoning that a detained person’s liberty interest is

5 substantial.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1202 n.4, 1199. Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has

6 suggested post-Jennings that Singh remains good law in Martinez v. Clark, which took “no

7 position” on “[w]hether due process requires a bond hearing for aliens detained under

8 § 1226(c),” but did address “the scope of federal court review of those bond determinations” and

9 found with respect to a bond hearing for a noncitizen detained under § 1226(c) that “the BIA

10 properly noted that the government bore the burden to establish by clear and convincing

11 evidence that Martinez is a danger to the community.” Martinez, 36 F.4th at 1223, 1231. On

12 remand, and after Rodriguez Diaz was decided, the Martinez panel reconfirmed “that the

13 government bore the burden to establish by clear and convincing evidence that Martinez is a

14 danger to the community” and “that the BIA applied the correct burden of proof.” Martinez v.

15 Clark, 124 F.4th 775, 785, 786 (9th Cir. 2024).

16 Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the government must justify Petitioner’s

17 continued confinement by clear and convincing evidence that Petitioner is a flight risk or a

18 danger to the community. See A.E. v. Andrews, No. 1:25-CV-00107-KES-SKO (HC), 2025 WL

19 1808676, at *1 (E.D. Cal. July 1, 2025) (directing respondent “to schedule a bond hearing before

20 an immigration judge . . . wherein respondent must justify petitioner’s continued detention by

21 clear and convincing evidence” in § 1225(b) context); Sanchez-Rivera v. Matuszewski, No. 22-

22 cv-1357-MMA (JLB), 2023 WL 139801, at *7 n.5 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2023) (following “an

23 overwhelming majority of courts that have held that the government must justify the continued

24 confinement of a non-citizen detainee under § 1226(c) by clear and convincing evidence that the

25 non-citizen is a flight risk or a danger to the community”).

26 Further, in the event Petitioner is determined not to be a danger to the community and not

27 to be so great a flight risk as to require detention without bond, the IJ should consider

1 Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 1000 (9th Cir. 2017) (“Plaintiffs are likely to succeed on their challenge

2 under the Due Process Clause to the government’s policy of allowing ICE and IJs to set

3 immigration bond amounts without considering the detainees’ financial circumstances or

4 alternative conditions of release.”); Black, 103 F.4th at 138 (The district court “correctly directed

5 the immigration judge (‘IJ’), in setting his bond and establishing appropriate terms for his

6 potential release, to consider his ability to pay and alternative means of assuring appearance.”).

7 III.

8 RECOMMENDATION & ORDER

9 Based on the foregoing, the undersigned HEREBY RECOMMENDS that:

10 1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus be GRANTED;

11 2. Respondents’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 11) and alternative request to amend briefing

12 schedule be DENIED;

13 3. Respondents be directed to provide Petitioner with a bond hearing before an immigration

14 judge to be held within THIRTY (30) days that complies with the requirements set forth

15 in Singh v. Holder, 638 F.3d 1196 (9th Cir. 2011), at which

16 a. “the government must prove by clear and convincing evidence that [Petitioner] is

17 a flight risk or a danger to the community to justify denial of bond,” Singh, 638

18 F.3d at 1203, and

19 b. the IJ should consider Petitioner’s financial circumstances or alternative

20 conditions of release in the event Petitioner is determined not to be a danger to the

21 community and not to be so great a flight risk as to require detention without

22 bond.

23 Further, the Court DIRECTS the Clerk of Court to assign a District Court Judge to the

24 present matter.

25 This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the assigned United States District

26 Court Judge, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the Local

27 Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within

1 | written objections, no longer than fifteen (15) pages, including exhibits, with the Court and

2 | serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate

3 | Judge’s Findings and Recommendation.” Replies to the objections shall be served and filed

4 | within fourteen (14) days after service of the objections. The assigned United States District

5 | Court Judge will then review the Magistrate Judge’s ruling pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C).

6 | The parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the

7 | right to appeal the District Court’s order. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir.

8 | 2014) (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)).

9

10 IT IS SO ORDERED.

11] Dated: _March 19, 2026 [spe ey

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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