Wallace

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

11 RICK HAZELTINE, No. 1:25-cv-00698-KES-SKO (HC)

12 Petitioner, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION

TO DENY PETITION FOR WRIT OF

13 v. HABEAS CORPUS

14 JANINE WALLACE, Warden, [21-DAY OBJECTION DEADLINE]

15 Respondent.

16

17 Petitioner is a state prisoner proceeding pro se with a petition for writ of habeas corpus

18 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter was referred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

19 § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Rule 302. As discussed below, the Court finds the petition to be

20 without merit and recommends it be DENIED.

21 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND1

22 On February 9, 1994, appellant Rick Hazeltine sexually assaulted his live-in girlfriend’s

23 three children, whose ages ranged from eight months to four years. Hazeltine was sentenced to 11

24 years in state prison. This was his third conviction involving the sexual abuse of minors. His first

25 conviction at age 16 was based on his molestation of a six-year-old niece when he was 13 years

26

1 The Fifth DCA’s summary of facts in its unpublished opinion is presumed correct. 28 U.S.C. §§

27 2254(d)(2), (e)(1). Therefore, the Court will rely on the Fifth DCA’s summary of the facts in People v.

Hazeltine, Case No. F053109 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008). (Doc. 17-1 at 1-3.) See Moses v. Payne, 555 F.3d 742,

28 746 (9th Cir. 2009).

1 old. His second conviction was at age 17, when he was convicted of molesting a 13-year-old girl.

2 In addition to these convictions, Hazeltine had suffered a number of other offenses, including

3 forgery, vehicle theft, petty theft, and contributing to the delinquency of a minor.

4 In 1999, prior to Hazeltine's release from prison, the Tuolumne County District Attorney

5 filed a petition seeking to commit Hazeltine to the Department of Mental Health (department) as a

6 sexually violent predator (SVP) under the Sexually Violent Predator Act (SVPA) (Welf. &

7 Inst.Code, § 6600 et. seq.). The petition was granted and Hazeltine was committed for a two-year

8 term. Recommitment petitions were filed and granted in 2001 and 2003.

9 On August 11, 2005, the district attorney again filed a petition seeking an extension of the

10 SVP commitment. The trial was held on June 13, 2007. Hazeltine waived personal appearance at

11 trial and did not appear.

12 At trial, Dr. Kathleen Longwell and Dr. Robert Owen testified as experts. Dr. Longwell, a

13 clinical psychologist, testified that she had conducted the initial SVP evaluation of Hazeltine. She

14 performed recommitment evaluations in 2005 and 2006. In 1999, Hazeltine admitted to molesting

15 his niece, but denied molesting the 13-year-old, stating that the sexual contact was consensual.

16 [How can he admit to molesting her and deny that she was molested?] He denied any sexual

17 contact with the children of his live-in girlfriend. While confined, Hazeltine has refused to

18 participate in any sexual-offender or substance-abuse treatment. He is “hostile toward the whole

19 notion of treatment.” He contends that the treatment program offered is a “bad program, it doesn't

20 help and he is never going to do it.” Dr. Longwell opined that Hazeltine's 1994 conviction met the

21 first criteria for SVP determination. She also opined that his diagnosed mental health disorder of

22 paraphilia not otherwise specified, alcohol dependence, and antisocial personality disorder met

23 the second criteria for SVP determination. Dr. Longwell testified that Hazeltine met the third

24 criteria for SVP determination because, in her opinion, he was likely to engage in sexually violent

25 predatory criminal behavior in the future.

26 Dr. Owen, also a clinical psychologist, evaluated Hazeltine in 2002, 2005, and 2006,

27 although Hazeltine refused to be interviewed by Owen for any of the three evaluations. Dr. Owen

28 diagnosed Hazeltine as a pedophile with alcohol dependence disorder and antisocial personality

1 disorder. According to Dr. Owen, all three diagnoses lead to Hazeltine's inability to control his

2 behavior. Dr. Owen testified that Hazeltine presented every factor suggesting a likelihood of

3 reoffending in the future, including a deviant sexual preference for children; prior sexual

4 offenses; early onset of sexual offending; poor probation and parole performance; unemployment;

5 antisocial personality; separation of parents; failure to participate in treatment; and no protective

6 factors like being in the community for five years without reoffending or serious health problems

7 to preclude reoffending. Dr. Owen concluded Hazeltine was likely to reoffend in a predatory way.

8 After hearing the evidence, the jury found that Hazeltine met the criteria for commitment

9 as an SVP. On June 14, 2007, the court ordered Hazeltine committed as an SVP for an indefinite

10 term pursuant to section 6604.

11 II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

12 Petitioner appealed to the California Court of Appeals, Fifth Appellate District

13 (hereinafter “5th DCA”). On June 2, 2008, the Fifth DCA affirmed the judgment. (Doc. 17-1.)

14 The California Supreme Court denied review on August 13, 2008. (Doc. 17-3.)

15 Thereafter, Petitioner filed five pro se habeas petitions in the state courts as follows:

16 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus - Tuolumne County Superior Court

Filed: November 16, 2023;

17 Resolution: January 12, 2024: Denied without prejudice to re-filing a petition that

complies with Cal. Welfare and Inst. Code § 6604.9.

18

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus - California Court of Appeal

19 Filed: February 2, 2024;

Resolution: August 8, 2024: Denied without prejudice to exhausting remedies in trial

20 court.

21 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus – Cal. Supreme Court

Filed: August 26, 2024;

22 Resolution: January 15, 2025: Summarily denied.

23 Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus – Cal. Supreme Court

Filed: October 25, 2024;

24 Resolution: January 15, 2025: Petition denied with citation to In re Robbins, 18 Cal.4th

770, 780 (1998) and In re Clark, 5 Cal.4th 750, 767-69;

25

Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus – Cal. Supreme Court

26 Filed: January 7, 2025;

Resolution: May 14, 2025: Petition denied with citations to People v. Duvall, 9 Cal.4th

27 464, 474 (1995) and In re Swain, 34 Cal. 2d 300, 304 (1949).

28 (Docs. 17-4 to 17-13.)

1 Petitioner also filed numerous motions with counsel and while pro se in the Tuolumne

2 County Superior Court from 2020 through 2025. (Docs. 17-14 to 17-38; 24-1 to 24-2.)

3 III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

4 A petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) will not be granted unless

5 the petitioner can show that the state court’s adjudication of his claim: (1) resulted in a decision

6 that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law,

7 as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that “was

8 based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State

9 court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 70-71 (2003);

10 Williams, 529 U.S. at 412-413.

11 Under Section 2254(d)(1), a state court decision is “contrary to” clearly established

12 federal law “if it applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in [the Supreme

13 Court’s] cases, or “if it confronts a set of facts that is materially indistinguishable from a

14 [Supreme Court] decision but reaches a different result.” Brown v. Payton, 544 U.S. 133, 141

15 (2005) (citing Williams, 529 U.S. at 405-406). This court looks to “Supreme Court holdings at

16 the time of the state court’s last reasoned decision” as “the source of clearly established Federal

17 law for the purposes of AEDPA.” Barker v. Fleming, 423 F.3d 1085, 1093 (9th Cir. 2005). A

18 Supreme Court precedent is not clearly established law under section 2254(d)(1) unless the Court

19 “squarely addresses the issue” in the case before the state court. Wright v. Van Patten, 552 U.S.

20 120, 125–26 (2008) (per curiam) (concluding that a state court had not unreasonably applied

21 federal law to a claim of prejudice under Strickland where the logic of petitioner’s argument

22 would have required the extension of the Supreme Court’s inherent prejudice doctrine to a new

23 context); Carey v. Musladin, 549 U.S. 70, 76–77 (2006) (same). While “[c]ertain principles are

24 fundamental enough that when new factual permutations arise, the necessity to apply the earlier

25 rule will be beyond doubt,” Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 666 (2004), “when a state

26 court may draw a principled distinction between the case before it and Supreme Court caselaw,

27 the law is not clearly established for the state-court case.” Murdoch v. Castro, 609 F.3d 983, 991

28 (9th Cir. 2010). “‘[I]f a habeas court must extend a rationale before it can apply to the facts at

1 hand,’ then by definition the rationale was not ‘clearly established at the time of the state court

2 decision.’” White v. Woodall, 572 U.S. 415, 426 (2014) (quoting Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 666).

3 In Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011), the U.S. Supreme Court explained that

4 an “unreasonable application” of federal law is an objective test that turns on “whether it is

5 possible that fairminded jurists could disagree” that the state court decision meets the standards

6 set forth in the AEDPA. The Supreme Court has “said time and again that ‘an unreasonable

7 application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.’” Cullen v.

8 Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 203 (2011). The petitioner “must show far more than that the state

9 court’s decision was ‘merely wrong’ or ‘even clear error.’” Shinn v. Kayer, 592 U.S. 111, 118

10 (2020) (quoting Virginia v. LeBlanc, 582 U. S. 91, 93 (2017) (per curiam)). Rather, a state

11 prisoner seeking a writ of habeas corpus from a federal court “must show that the state court’s

12 ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was

13 an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility of fairminded

14 disagreement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 103 (emphasis added); see also Kayer, 592 U.S. at 118. In

15 other words, so long as fairminded jurists could disagree with each other as to whether the state

16 court was correct, the state court decision is not unreasonable under AEDPA. Congress “meant”

17 this standard to be “difficult to meet.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 102.

18 Section 2254(d)(2) pertains to state court decisions based on factual findings. Davis v.

19 Woodford, 384 F.3d 628, 637 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322 (2003)).

20 Under § 2254(d)(2), a federal court may grant habeas relief if a state court’s adjudication of the

21 petitioner’s claims “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the

22 facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” Wiggins v. Smith, 539

23 U.S. 510, 520 (2003); Jeffries v. Wood, 114 F.3d 1484, 1500 (9th Cir. 1997). The federal habeas

24 court must give “substantial deference” to the state court. Brumfield v. Cain, 576 U.S. 305, 314

25 (2015). “Factual determinations by state courts are presumed correct” and the petitioner bears the

26 burden of overcoming the presumption with “clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.”

27 Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 340; 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). A state court’s factual finding is unreasonable

28 when it is “so clearly incorrect that it would not be debatable among reasonable jurists.” Jeffries,

1 114 F.3d at 1500; see Taylor v. Maddox, 366 F.3d 992, 999-1001 (9th Cir. 2004), cert.denied,

2 Maddox v. Taylor, 543 U.S. 1038 (2004). If “‘[r]easonable minds reviewing the record might

3 disagree’ about the finding in question, ‘. . . that does not suffice’” to prove the lower court’s

4 factual determination was unreasonable. Wood v. Allen, 558 U.S. 290, 301 (2010) (alteration in

5 original) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410 (2000)).

6 To determine whether habeas relief is available under § 2254(d), the federal court looks to

7 the last reasoned state court decision as the basis of the state court’s decision. See Ylst v.

8 Nunnemaker, 501 U.S. 979, 803 (1991); Andrews v. Davis, 994 F.3d 1042, 1107 (9th Cir. 2019)

9 (en banc). “[A]lthough we independently review the record, we still defer to the state court’s

10 ultimate decisions.” Pirtle v. Morgan, 313 F.3d 1160, 1167 (9th Cir. 2002).

11 The prejudicial impact of any constitutional error is assessed by asking whether the error

12 had “a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s verdict.” Brecht v.

13 Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 623 (1993); see also Fry v. Pliler, 551 U.S. 112, 119-120 (2007)

14 (holding that the Brecht standard applies whether or not the state court recognized the error and

15 reviewed it for harmlessness).

16 IV. REVIEW OF CLAIMS

17 Petitioner presents the following grounds for relief: 1) his lawyer rendered ineffective

18 assistance by failing to follow-up on her demand for Petitioner’s release following removal of his

19 pedophillic disorder diagnosis; 2) the SVPA process is a “sham” in that Petitioner cannot obtain

20 discovery, he has had no lawyer for most of his commitment, and the state adds new evidence that

21 he cannot challenge; 3) he has completed a 10-module treatment program and has had his

22 pedophillic disorder diagnosis removed, yet the state and courts keep Petitioner committed; 4) the

23 state’s argument that he acted with full intent as to his crime of conviction is contradicted by their

24 new position that he acted without intent and because of a mental disorder; 5) the state has used

25 annual evaluations with new, untested claims against him but failed to allow him a chance to

26 confront or challenge them; 6) his 1981-1982 juvenile plea is invalid because he wasn’t told it

27 could be used later to label him a sexually violent predator; and 7) the cumulative effect of the

28 errors violates Petitioner’s due process rights.

1 A. Removal of Diagnosis and Ten-Module Treatment Plan2

2 In Claim Three, Petitioner contends he is wrongly in civil commitment, because the two

3 mental disorder diagnoses for which he had been civilly committed had been removed.

4 Petitioner’s contention does not merit federal habeas relief.

5 Petitioner points to a 2020 “Diagnosis Change/Update Form” signed by two reviewing

6 psychologists and one psychiatrist. (Doc. 9 at 106-107.) In this form, the reviewing mental health

7 professionals changed Petitioner’s current DSM-5 diagnosis by removing “pedophilic disorder,

8 non-exclusive type, sexually attracted to both,” and “major depressive disorder, single episode,

9 unspecified.” (Id.) At first glance, the removal of the pedophilic disorder may appear to lend

10 weight to Petitioner’s argument. However, the reviewing professionals left unchanged

11 Petitioner’s diagnoses for “alcohol use disorder, severe, in remission, in a controlled

12 environment” and “antisocial personality disorder.” (Id. at 107.) Under California law, there

13 would still be probable cause for his commitment based on the anti-social personality disorder

14 diagnosis.

15 In Hubbart v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. 4th 1138, 81 Cal.Rptr.2d 492, 969 P.2d 584 (Cal.

16 1999), the California Supreme Court rejected the appellant’s request to strike down the SVPA

17 because it does not expressly exclude antisocial personality disorders or other conditions

18 characterized by an inability to control violent behavior, such as paraphilia, from being

19 categorized as a "diagnosable mental disorder." In so ruling, the court necessarily found that these

20 conditions can be mental disorders under the SVPA if coupled with a finding of current

21 dangerousness. Likewise, in an unpublished opinion, the California Court of Appeals rejected the

22 contention that an antisocial personality disorder diagnosis cannot provide the basis of an SVPA

23 commitment. People v. Swain, 2010 WL 717687, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 3, 2010). In Swain,

24 the court held, “We have found no authority to support Swain's position that an antisocial

25 personality disorder alone cannot form the basis of an SVP commitment where, like here, the jury

26 makes the required finding that the disorder makes him a danger to the public because, as a result

27

2 The Court will address Petitioner’s claims out of the order Petitioner presented them because the

28 resolution of subsequent claims relies on the discussion of the facts resolving the instant claim.

1 of the disorder, it is likely that he will engage in sexually violent predatory conduct." Id. In

2 rejecting that anti-social personality disorder cannot, standing alone, be a “qualifying mental

3 disorder” for purposes of the SVPA, the Court held, “An instruction that antisocial personality

4 disorder is never a qualifying mental disorder under the statutory definition is an incorrect

5 statement of the law and would properly have been refused if requested.” Id. at *3. See also

6 Rainwater v. King, 2017 WL 6040425, at *9, n. 2 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2017); Leonard v. King,

7 2014 WL 7239453, at *8, n. 6 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 17, 2014).

8 Thus, under California law, Petitioner still has a qualifying mental health diagnosis for

9 commitment under the SVPA. A federal court is bound by the state’s interpretation of state law.

10 Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76 (2005) (per curiam). It is also well-settled that federal

11 habeas relief does not lie for errors of state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 67 (1991);

12 Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir. 1997) (“alleged errors in the application of state

13 law are not cognizable in federal habeas corpus” proceedings). It is not for this Court to question

14 what qualifies under California law as a mental health disorder for SVPA purposes. Habeas relief

15 is thus unavailable.

16 Petitioner cites to Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992), for his contention that he must

17 be released because the mental disorder that placed him under involuntary commitment has been

18 removed. In Foucha, the issue was not simply that the originally diagnosed condition had

19 resolved; the doctors were unwilling to opine Foucha had any mental illness (Id. at 74-75), and

20 the court held commitment could not continue solely on the basis of dangerousness for which

21 there was no evidence of anyway (Id. at 80-83). Foucha does not hold that resolution of certain

22 symptoms or a change from the diagnosis that originally supported commitment precludes

23 continuing commitment. The Court held that the evidence indicated Mr. Foucha had no remaining

24 mental illness.

25 Here, Petitioner has been continually diagnosed with antisocial personality disorder,

26 which qualifies as a mental disorder under the SVP Act. Therefore, the holdings in Foucha are

27 inapplicable. If, like Foucha, the evidence were to indicate that Petitioner has no remaining

28 mental illness, then release would be required absent civil commitment proceedings. But that is

1 not case here, where no doctor has opined that there are no further mental defects or disorders

2 remaining.

3 Likewise, Petitioner’s claim that he has completed a 10-Module Treatment Program to

4 treat his mental disorder, while laudable, does not merit habeas relief. Whether the treatment

5 program qualifies under California law, and how it impacts his mental health diagnosis, are

6 questions entirely dependent on application and interpretation of California law.

7 B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

8 In a related claim, Petitioner alleges his appointed counsel rendered ineffective assistance

9 in violation of his constitutional rights. He claims counsel failed to follow-up with the state

10 hospital authorities after counsel notified them that his former diagnoses for pedophilic disorder

11 had been removed. Had counsel done so, Petitioner alleges he would have been released since he

12 no longer qualified as a sexually violent predator.

13 1. Legal Standard

14 Effective assistance of counsel is guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth

15 Amendment. Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 391-405 (1985). Claims of ineffective assistance of

16 counsel are reviewed according to Strickland’s two-pronged test. Strickland v. Washington, 466

17 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984); Miller v. Keeney, 882 F.2d 1428, 1433 (9th Cir. 1989); United States v.

18 Birtle, 792 F.2d 846, 847 (9th Cir.1986); see also Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988) (holding

19 that where a defendant has been actually or constructively denied the assistance of counsel

20 altogether, the Strickland standard does not apply and prejudice is presumed; the implication is

21 that Strickland does apply where counsel is present but ineffective).

22 To prevail, Petitioner must show two things. First, he must establish that counsel’s

23 deficient performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing

24 professional norms. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88. Second, Petitioner must establish that he

25 suffered prejudice in that there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional

26 errors, he would have prevailed at trial. Id. at 694. A “reasonable probability” is a probability

27 sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome of the trial. Id. The relevant inquiry is not what

28 counsel could have done; rather, it is whether the choices made by counsel were reasonable.

1 Babbitt v. Calderon, 151 F.3d 1170, 1173 (9th Cir. 1998).

2 With the passage of the AEDPA, habeas relief may only be granted if the state-court

3 decision unreasonably applied this general Strickland standard for ineffective assistance.

4 Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 122 (2009). Accordingly, the question “is not whether a

5 federal court believes the state court’s determination under the Strickland standard “was incorrect

6 but whether that determination was unreasonable–a substantially higher threshold.” Schriro v.

7 Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465, 473 (2007); Knowles, 556 U.S. at 123. In effect, the AEDPA standard

8 is “doubly deferential” because it requires that it be shown not only that the state court

9 determination was erroneous, but also that it was objectively unreasonable. Yarborough v.

10 Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 5 (2003). Moreover, because the Strickland standard is a general standard, a

11 state court has even more latitude to reasonably determine that a defendant has not satisfied that

12 standard. See Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004) (“[E]valuating whether a rule

13 application was unreasonable requires considering the rule’s specificity. The more general the

14 rule, the more leeway courts have in reaching outcomes in case-by-case determinations.”)

15 2. Analysis

16 As an initial matter, the Court notes that Respondent correctly argues there is no

17 constitutional right to counsel in collateral proceedings with respect to civil commitment.

18 “In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right...to have the assistance of

19 counsel for his defense.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. However, while civil commitment proceedings

20 “constitute[ ] a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due process protection,” Addington

21 v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425 (1979), the “fact that a proceeding will result in loss of liberty does

22 not ipso facto mean that the proceeding is a ‘criminal prosecution’ for purposes of the Sixth

23 Amendment,” Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 37 (1976). The Supreme Court has not

24 addressed whether there is a constitutional right to counsel in civil commitment proceedings. Cf.

25 Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. 431, 441 (2011) (“[T]he Sixth Amendment does not govern civil

26 cases.”); Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 608 (1993) (“The protections provided by the

27 Sixth Amendment are explicitly confined to ‘criminal prosecutions.’”); Carty v. Nelson, 426 F.3d

28 1064, 1073 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding “the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation does not attach

1 in civil commitment proceedings”); Young v. King County, 70 F. App'x 939, 940 (9th Cir. 2003)

2 (unpublished) (holding that person civilly committed under Washington's SVP act did not have

3 right to effective assistance of counsel).

4 “[W]hen a Supreme Court case “does not ‘squarely address[ ] the issue in th[e] case’ or

5 establish a legal principle that ‘clearly extend[s]’ to a new context to the extent required by the

6 Supreme Court ... it cannot be said, under AEDPA, there is ‘clearly established’ Supreme Court

7 precedent addressing the issue before us, and so we must defer to the state court's decision.”

8 Moses, 555 F.3d at 754 (second, third, and fourth alterations in original) (quoting Wright, 552

9 U.S. at 125). Therefore, the state court's denial of Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel

10 claim was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law, nor

11 was it based on an unreasonable determination of fact. The state court's decision was not “so

12 lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law

13 beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. Accordingly,

14 Petitioner is not entitled to habeas relief on this ground.

15 Petitioner’s claim must also be rejected because he cannot demonstrate that counsel’s

16 alleged error was prejudicial. As discussed in the first claim, the removal of pedophilic disorder

17 did not remove all bases for Petitioner’s SVPA commitment. Under California law, Petitioner’s

18 diagnosis of antisocial personality disorder provided a valid basis for SVPA commitment. Thus,

19 even if counsel had followed up with state mental health authorities, there is not a reasonable

20 probability the result would have been different. Authorities may have rejected counsel’s

21 suggestion but failed to respond to counsel’s letter. If counsel’s letter was simply overlooked,

22 any follow-up would have likely been rejected. Moreover, the federal standard of review is

23 “doubly deferential” because it requires that it be shown not only that the state court

24 determination was erroneous, but also that it was objectively unreasonable. Yarborough v.

25 Gentry, 540 U.S. at 5. Again, Petitioner fails to show the state court's decision was “so lacking in

26 justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond

27 any possibility for fairminded disagreement.” Richter, 562 U.S. at 103.

28

1 C. SVPA Procedures

2 In his next claim, Petitioner claims California’s SVPA release mechanisms are a “sham.”

3 He argues that: 1) he cannot obtain records such as his annual SVP evaluations; 2) he has been

4 without a lawyer for most of his commitment; and 3) he has no way of challenging his annual

5 evaluations. The claims are without merit.

6 Petitioner’s complaint that he cannot obtain records such as annual SVP evaluations is

7 belied by the record. See May 3, 2024, Annual Evaluation (Doc. 9 at 58-87.) In his traverse,

8 Petitioner complains that the annual evaluation is “so heavily redacted with opaque black bars as

9 to be utterly illegible, precluding any meaningful review or challenge.” (Doc. 21 at 4.) The Court

10 has reviewed the document in question. While there are redactions, they are primarily within

11 Petitioner’s “Sexual Offense History” section (Doc. 9 at 60-64), and the redactions are mostly to

12 victim identities. Moreover, these facts are known to Petitioner. Some redactions are also made to

13 victim-identifying facts within Petitioner’s “Relevant Psychosocial History” section (Doc. 9 at

14 64-68), but again, these facts are known to Petitioner and are not material to the determination.

15 The relevant sections of the annual evaluation for Petitioner’s purposes, such as “Treatment

16 Progress” (Doc. 9 at 68-73), “Diagnosed Mental Disorder” (Doc. 9 at 73-76), “Risk Assessment”

17 (Doc. 9 at 77-82), “Opinion Regarding Unconditional Discharge” (Doc. 9 at 82-83), and

18 “Conclusion” (Doc. 9 at 84), are almost entirely intact with few exceptions for identifying

19 information and depictions of sexual acts. As before, these redacted facts are known to Petitioner

20 and immaterial to the evaluation. Thus, the Court rejects the argument that the annual evaluation

21 is “utterly illegible precluding meaningful review or challenge.”

22 With respect to Petitioner’s claimed lack of counsel, as discussed supra, the Supreme

23 Court has not found a constitutional right to counsel in civil commitment proceedings. See Turner

24 v. Rogers, 564 U.S. at 441. Therefore, Petitioner cannot demonstrate a violation of his

25 constitutional rights to warrant habeas relief. Moses, 555 F.3d at 754. Moreover, as pointed out

26 by Respondent, Petitioner was without counsel for much of the time because of his repeated

27 requests to be pro per. (Doc. 17-16; 17-35; 17-38; 24-2.) He cannot now claim he was denied

28 counsel when it was he who chose to be pro per. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834, n.

1 46 (1975) (“... a defendant who elects to represent himself cannot thereafter complain that the

2 quality of his own defense amounted to a denial of ‘effective assistance of counsel.’”).

3 Lastly, Petitioner argues he has no way of challenging his annual evaluations. This is

4 incorrect. Petitioner must follow the pertinent procedures set forth in Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§

5 6604.9, 6605, 6608 to challenge his commitment, as noted by the state courts. (Doc. 17-5, 17-7.)

6 In any event, habeas relief is unavailable for Petitioner’s contention that the State of

7 California has failed to follow the commitment procedures set forth in the SVPA in violation of

8 his federal due process rights. Alleged errors in the application of state law are not cognizable in

9 federal habeas corpus. See Hubbart v. Knapp, 379 F.3d 773, 779–80 (9th Cir. 2004); see also

10 Langford v. Day, 110 F.3d 1380, 1389 (9th Cir.1996) (holding that a petitioner may not

11 “transform a state-law issue into a federal one merely by asserting a violation of due process”);

12 Johnson v. Hunter, 291 F. App'x 836, 837 (9th Cir. 2008) (alleged failure by state in following

13 commitment procedures does not present a federal question).

14 D. Contradictory Positions by the State

15 Petitioner next argues that his SVPA proceedings violated the doctrine of judicial estoppel

16 because the state took two different and opposite positions on the same issues and deprived

17 Petitioner of his federal and state constitutional rights. Petitioner contends that in 1993, the

18 prosecution argued he acted with full intent and volition when he violated Cal. Penal Code §

19 288(a), and never mentioned a mental disorder. However, after he had served his time, the

20 government then claimed his 1993 conviction proved he had a mental disorder that impairs his

21 control.

22 Again, habeas corpus is unavailable for alleged error in the interpretation or application of

23 state law. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385 (1981); see also

24 Lincoln v. Sunn, 807 F.2d 805, 814 (9th Cir.1987); Givens v. Housewright, 786 F.2d 1378, 1381

25 (9th Cir.1986). The standard of review for a federal habeas court “is limited to deciding whether a

26 conviction violated the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States (citations omitted).”

27 Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. at 68. After review of the record, this court finds there was no

28 conflict requiring application of estoppel principles. Whether or not petitioner was found guilty of

1 a general or specific intent crime bears no relevance to the later determination that he was

2 presently volitionally impaired and posed a danger, if released.

3 Moreover, the claim is untimely. Petitioner was committed as an SVPA on June 14, 2007.

4 Petitioner’s petition for review in the California Supreme Court was denied on August 13, 2008.

5 (Doc. 17-3.) His appeal became final 90 days thereafter on November 11, 2008. Bowen v. Roe,

6 188 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir.1999). Thus, the one-year statute of limitations expired on November 12,

7 2009. Petitioner’s claim is untimely by 16 years.

8 E. Annual Evaluations

9 Petitioner next contends that the state has submitted annual evaluations including clinical

10 notes, observations and conclusions that he has never seen or given a chance to challenge. He

11 claims he has had no lawyer to question the evaluator’s qualifications or the reliability of their

12 findings. He asserts that without a lawyer, he is defenseless against the ever-growing record.

13 Respondent alleges that the claim is unexhausted. While Petitioner has included the

14 argument within his claims before the state court, he has never raised a stand-alone due process

15 claim before the state court, as he does here. Thus, Respondent is correct that the claim is

16 unexhausted. In any event, this claim is without merit.

17 As previously discussed, the Supreme Court has not found a constitutional right to counsel

18 in civil commitment proceedings. See Turner v. Rogers, 564 U.S. at 441. Moreover, Petitioner

19 was given counsel but chose to dismiss his lawyer and proceed pro per. (Doc. 17-16; 17-35; 17-

20 38; 24-2.) In addition, Petitioner attached his annual evaluation to his petition, disproving his

21 claim of no access. As to his claim that he is unable to challenge the annual evaluation, this is not

22 true. First, it appears Petitioner voluntarily refused to participate in the annual evaluation process

23 by declining to be interviewed. (Doc. 9 at 73, 87.) Second, Petitioner may challenge the annual

24 evaluations utilizing the procedures set forth in Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code §§ 6604.9, 6605, and

25 6608. (Doc. 17-5, 17-7.)

26 F. Juvenile Conviction

27 Petitioner next contends his juvenile plea in 1981-82 was invalid because he was not

28 advised that his plea could be used decades later to label him a sexually violent predator.

1 Petitioner’s claim is barred from federal review by Lackawanna County Dist. Attorney v.

2 Coss, 532 U.S. 394 (2001). In Lackawanna, the Supreme Court considered whether a § 2254

3 habeas petitioner could collaterally attack an earlier state conviction used to enhance the sentence

4 for a later state conviction. The Court ruled that such a petitioner satisfies the “in custody”

5 requirement if, although no longer serving the sentences imposed for the first state convictions,

6 the petitioner was serving the sentences enhanced by the first convictions. Id. at 402-403.

7 The Court then turned to the central question of the appeal, and held that if a prior

8 conviction is no longer open to federal review, the defendant cannot collaterally attack the prior

9 conviction through a § 2254 petition:

10 ...[W]e hold that once a state conviction is no longer open to direct or collateral

attach in its own right because the defendant failed to pursue those remedies while

11 they were available (or because the defendant did so unsuccessfully), the

conviction may be regarded as conclusively valid. [Citation.] If that conviction is

12 later used to enhance a criminal sentence, the defendant generally may not

challenge the enhanced sentence through a petition under § 2254 on the ground

13 that the prior conviction was unconstitutionally obtained.

14 Id. at 403-404.

15 The Supreme Court recognized two possible exceptions to the bar. A petitioner in these

16 circumstances may seek habeas relief if: 1) he challenges an enhanced sentence on the grounds

17 that the prior conviction used to enhance the sentence was obtained where there was a failure to

18 appoint counsel in violation of the Sixth Amendment, or 2) he obtains compelling evidence that

19 he is actually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted, and could not have uncovered

20 such evidence in a timely manner. Id. at 405.

21 Petitioner does not allege any facts that would qualify him for an exception to the

22 Lackawanna bar. Petitioner does not assert that the basis for the unconstitutional conviction in

23 1981-82 was the court’s failure to appoint counsel, nor does he demonstrate that he is actually

24 innocent of the 1981-82 crime. Accordingly, Petitioner does not meet an exception to the

25 Lackawanna bar. Id. Thus, federal habeas review of the 1981-82 state court juvenile conviction is

26 barred.

27 G. Cumulative Error

28 Petitioner claims the combined impact of the individual errors alleged above violated his

1 due process rights. Under the cumulative error doctrine, the combined effect of multiple errors at

2 trial can give rise to a due process violation, if the errors rendered the trial fundamentally unfair,

3 even if each error considered individually would not warrant relief. See Parle v. Runnels, 505

4 F.3d 922, 928 (9th Cir. 2007). “[T]he fundamental question in determining whether the combined

5 effect of trial errors violated a defendant’s due process rights is whether the errors rendered the

6 criminal defense far less persuasive” and thus “had a substantial and injurious effect or influence

7 on the jury’s verdict.” Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The Ninth Circuit has

8 “granted habeas relief under the cumulative effects doctrine when there is a ‘unique symmetry’ of

9 otherwise harmless errors, such that they amplify each other in relation to a key contested issue in

10 the case.” Ybarra v. McDaniel, 656 F.3d 984, 1001 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing Parle, 505 F.3d at 927).

11 The Court has addressed each of the alleged errors Petitioner has raised in his petition for

12 writ of habeas corpus and found no violation of the Constitution. Therefore, “[b]ecause we

13 conclude that no error of constitutional magnitude occurred, no cumulative prejudice is possible.”

14 Hayes v. Ayers, 632 F.3d 500, 524 (9th Cir. 2011). The claim should be denied.

15 V. RECOMMENDATION

16 For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby RECOMMENDS the petition for writ of

17 habeas corpus be DENIED.

18 This Findings and Recommendation is submitted to the United States District Court Judge

19 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) and Rule 304 of the

20 Local Rules of Practice for the United States District Court, Eastern District of California. Within

21 twenty-one (21) days after being served with a copy of this Findings and Recommendation, a

22 party may file written objections with the Court and serve a copy on all parties. Id. The document

23 should be captioned, “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendation” and shall

24 not exceed fifteen (15) pages, except by leave of court with good cause shown. The Court will not

25 consider exhibits attached to the Objections. To the extent a party wishes to refer to any

26 exhibit(s), the party should reference the exhibit in the record by its CM/ECF document and page

27 number, when possible, or otherwise reference the exhibit with specificity. Any pages filed in

28 excess of the fifteen (15) page limitation may be disregarded by the District Judge when

1 reviewing these Findings and Recommendations pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). The

2 parties are advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may result in the waiver

3 of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 838-39 (9th Cir. 2014). This

4 recommendation is not an order that is immediately appealable to the Ninth Circuit Court of

5 Appeals. Any notice of appeal pursuant to Rule 4(a)(1), Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure,

6 should not be filed until entry of the District Court's judgment.

7

IT IS SO ORDERED.

8

9 Dated: March 19, 2026 /s/ Sheila K. Oberto .

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28