Opinion

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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

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11 KLIFFORD ANTENOR MONTALVAN No. 1:26-cv-00441-DC-JDP (HC)

REYES,

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Petitioner,

13 ORDER DENYING WITHOUT PREJUDICE

v. PETITIONER’S MOTION FOR A

14 TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER

WARDEN OF THE GOLDEN STATE

15 ANNEX DETENTION FACILITY, et al., (Doc. No. 10)

16 Respondents.

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18 This matter is before the court on Petitioner Klifford Antenor Montalvan Reyes’s motion

19 for a temporary restraining order (Doc. No. 10), filed shortly after his amended petition for writ of

20 habeas corpus brought under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging his re-detention by U.S. immigration

21 authorities. (Doc. No. 6.) For the reasons explained below, the court will deny Petitioner’s motion

22 for a temporary restraining order without prejudice.

23 BACKGROUND

24 A. Factual Background

25 Petitioner Klifford Antenor Montalvan Reyes is a native of Nicaragua. (Doc. No. 6 at 1.)

26 Petitioner entered the United States through the southern border on November 18, 2022. (Id.)

27 Petitioner was briefly detained by U.S. immigration authorities before being released on parole.

28 (Id.) Petitioner has resided in the United States continuously since his initial release with his

1 common law wife and his U.S. citizen two-year-old child. (Id. at 4.) Petitioner has a pending

2 asylum claim relating to political violence in his home country. (Id.)

3 On March 21, 2025, Petitioner was arrested by local law enforcement and charged with

4 criminal threats in violation of California Penal Code § 422 and larceny in violation of California

5 Penal Code § 484(a). (Id.) Eight months later, on November 26, 2025, U.S. Immigration and

6 Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) directed Petitioner to come to the San Jose ICE office the

7 following morning and to bring all documents relating to his arrest. (Id.) On November 27, 2025,

8 Petitioner was arrested by ICE. (Id.) He has been in ICE detention since that date and is currently

9 detained at the Golden State Annex Detention Facility in McFarland, California. (Id. at 1.)

10 On January 20, 2026, Petitioner was provided with a bond hearing before an immigration

11 judge. (Id. at 5.) The immigration judge ruled that he did not have jurisdiction to consider bond

12 pursuant to the ruling by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) in Matter of Yajure-Hurtado,

13 29 I. & N. 216 (BIA 2025). (Id.) On January 21, 2026, the criminal charges against Petitioner

14 were dismissed in the interests of justice. (Doc. Nos. 6 at 4; 6-1.)

15 B. Procedural Background

16 On January 20, 2026, proceeding pro se, Petitioner filed an initial habeas petition asserting

17 a single claim for violation of the Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause relating to his detention

18 without a bond hearing. (Doc. No. 1 at 21.) On that same day, Petitioner filed a motion to appoint

19 counsel. (Doc. No. 3.) On January 27, 2026, the assigned magistrate judge granted Petitioner’s

20 motion to appoint counsel and appointed Petitioner his present counsel. (Doc. No. 5.)

21 On February 3, 2026, Petitioner, through his counsel, filed the operative amended habeas

22 petition in which he argues that he is subject to discretionary detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a),

23 rather than mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(b)(2), and was therefore entitled to a bond

24 hearing before his re-detention. (Doc. No. 6 at 7–9.) Petitioner asserts the following claims

25 against Respondents Wanda Wilson, Sergio Albarran, Kristi Noem, Pam Bondi, U.S. Department

26 of Homeland Security (“DHS”), and U.S. Executive Office for Immigration Review (“EOIR”):

27 (1) violation of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) relating to Respondents’ alleged

28 misclassification of Petitioner’s detention as mandatory under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b); and (2)

1 violation of his Fifth Amendment right to due process relating to his re-detention without a bond

2 hearing. (Doc. No. 6 at 11–12.) In his amended petition, Petitioner seeks an order requiring his

3 immediate release and directing Respondents to provide Petitioner with notice and a bond hearing

4 pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) should they seek to re-detain him. (Id. at 12.) On February 10,

5 2026, Petitioner filed the pending motion for a temporary restraining order asserting the same

6 arguments, and seeking the same relief, as in his habeas petition. (Doc. No. 10.)

7 Before Petitioner filed the pending motion, on February 4, 2026, Respondents filed an

8 opposition to the habeas petition, arguing that as an “applicant for admission,” Petitioner is

9 subject to mandatory detention pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). (Doc. No. 9 at 3–4.) But on

10 February 12, 2026, Respondents filed their opposition to Petitioner’s motion for a temporary

11 restraining order arguing, for the first time, that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under

12 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(ii) due to his March 2025 arrest for larceny, in addition to being subject

13 to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A). (Doc. No. 12 at 2–6.) Respondents noted

14 that in Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510 (2003), the Supreme Court held that mandatory detention

15 without a bond hearing is constitutionally permissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c). (Id. at 4.)

16 On February 13, 2026, the magistrate judge issued findings and recommendations as to

17 Petitioner’s habeas petition. (Doc. No. 13.) The magistrate judge found that Petitioner’s re-

18 detention without a bond hearing violated his right to due process and recommended that

19 Petitioner be immediately released from Respondents’ custody under the same conditions he was

20 subject to prior to his November 27, 2025 detention. (Id. at 3–7.) Because the magistrate judge

21 recommended granting Petitioner’s requested relief on constitutional grounds, he did not address

22 Petitioner’s claim brought under the INA. (Id. at 3 n.2.) Notably, the magistrate judge did not

23 address Respondents’ arguments regarding Petitioner’s mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. §

24 1226(c), likely because that issue was not raised in either party’s briefing relating to the habeas

25 petition.

26 On February 15, 2026, Respondents filed objections to the magistrate judge’s findings and

27 recommendations, reiterating that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. §

28 1226(c). (Doc. No. 14 at 1.)

1 On February 17, 2026, Petitioner filed an omnibus reply in support of his motion for a

2 temporary restraining order and response to Respondents’ objections to the findings and

3 recommendations. (Doc. No. 15.) Petitioner argues that he is not subject to mandatory detention

4 under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) because the charges against him have been dismissed, therefore he is

5 not currently subject to any charge envisioned by that statute. (Id. at 3.)

6 LEGAL STANDARD

7 Injunctive relief is “an extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear

8 showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such relief.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555

9 U.S. 7, 22 (2008) (citation omitted). The standard governing the issuing of a temporary

10 restraining order is “substantially identical” to the standard for issuing a preliminary injunction.

11 Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001). To

12 obtain either form of injunctive relief, the moving party must show: (1) a likelihood of success on

13 the merits; (2) a likelihood of irreparable harm to the moving party in the absence of preliminary

14 relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in favor of the moving party; and (4) that an injunction

15 is in the public interest. Winter, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008). The likelihood of success on the merits is

16 the most important Winter factor. Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc., 869 F.3d 848, 856 (9th

17 Cir. 2017).

18 A party seeking injunctive relief must make a showing on all four prongs of the Winter

19 factors to obtain injunctive relief. All. for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, 632 F.3d 1127, 1135 (9th

20 Cir. 2011); see Lopez v. Brewer, 680 F.3d 1068, 1072 (9th Cir. 2012) (“A preliminary injunction

21 is ‘an extraordinary and drastic remedy, one that should not be granted unless the movant, by a

22 clear showing, carries the burden of persuasion.’”) (quoting Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968,

23 972 (1997)). A district court may consider “the parties’ pleadings, declarations, affidavits, and

24 exhibits submitted in support of and in opposition to the [motion for injunctive relief].” Cal. Rifle

25 & Pistol Ass’n, Inc. v. L.A. Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 745 F. Supp. 3d 1037, 1048 (C.D. Cal. 2024);

26 see also Johnson v. Couturier, 572 F.3d 1067, 1083 (9th Cir. 2009). Any evidentiary issues

27 “properly go to weight rather than admissibility.” Am. Hotel & Lodging Ass’n v. City of Los

28 Angeles, 119 F. Supp. 3d 1177, 1185 (C.D. Cal. 2015).

1 DISCUSSION

2 A. Likelihood of Success on the Merits

3 Petitioner argues that Respondents have improperly subjected Petitioner to mandatory

4 detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A), whereas courts across the country, including this court,

5 have determined that noncitizens who have previously been detained then subsequently released

6 by ICE are entitled to a pre-deprivation bond hearing before they may be re-detained. (Doc. No.

7 10 at 3) (citing Altin v. Chestnut, 1:26-cv-00792-DC-CSK, 2026 WL 309563 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 5,

8 2026)).

9 Respondents contend that Petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under both 8 U.S.C.

10 § 1225(b)(2)(A) and 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(ii). (Doc. No. 12 at 2–6.)

11 This court has repeatedly found the government’s argument regarding mandatory

12 detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) unavailing and makes the same determination here.

13 See, e.g., Altin, 2026 WL 309563; Selis Tinoco v. Noem, 1:25-cv-01762-DC-JDP, 2025 WL

14 3567862 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2025); D.L.C. v. Wofford, 1:25-cv-01996-DC-JDP, 2026 WL 25511

15 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2026).

16 As to Respondents’ second contention, Congress enacted provisions under § 1226(c) of

17 the INA in response to a legislative determination that noncitizens with certain criminal

18 convictions pose elevated risks of danger to their communities. See Demore, 538 U.S. 510 at 513.

19 Section 1226(c) therefore subjects noncitizens convicted of these enumerated crimes to

20 mandatory detention. Id. In January 2025, Congress amended § 1226(c) to subject additional

21 categories of noncitizens who have had interactions with law enforcement to mandatory detention

22 without a bond hearing. Pub. L. No. 119-1, 139 Stat. 3 (2025). Specifically, under 8 U.S.C. §

23 1226(c)(1)(E), detention is mandatory for any noncitizen who is charged as “inadmissible” as

24 having entered the U.S. without inspection under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A) and, as relevant here:

25 is charged with, is arrested for, [or] is convicted of . . . committing

acts which constitute the essential elements of any burglary, theft,

26 [or] larceny . . . when the alien is released, without regard to whether

the alien is released on parole, supervised release, or probation, and

27 without regard to whether the alien may be arrested or imprisoned

again for the same offense.

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1 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1)(E)(i)-(ii). Respondents contend that Petitioner’s arrest for larceny facially

2 subjects him to mandatory detention under § 1226(c)(1)(E)(ii), and as the Supreme Court held in

3 Demore, Petitioner is not constitutionally entitled to a bond hearing under that statute. (Doc. No.

4 12 at 3–4) (citing Demore, 538 U.S. 510 at 521.)

5 Petitioner does not—and seemingly, cannot—argue that his arrest for larceny does not

6 constitute an event subjecting him to the mandatory detention requirement of § 1226(c)(1)(E)(ii).

7 Instead, Petitioner argues that, due to the subsequent dismissal of those charges, Petitioner “does

8 not meet the requirements of section 1226(c)(1)(E)(ii).” (Doc. No. 15 at 3.) Indeed, several courts

9 within the Ninth Circuit have found that the Constitution cannot permit mandatory detention

10 without a bond hearing under § 1226(c) where the predicate charge has been dismissed. See, e.g.,

11 S.E. v. Noem, No. 1:26-cv-00356-DAD-SCR, 2026 WL 206085, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 27, 2026)

12 (ordering bond hearing for noncitizen who was detained under § 1226(c) relating to an arrest for

13 which charges were never filed); Brandon Y.M. v. Andrews, No. 1:25-cv-01962-SKO, 2026 WL

14 125234, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 16, 2026) (same as to noncitizen who had been arrested, but no

15 complaint was ever filed); E.C. v. Noem, No. 2:25-cv-01789-RFB-BNW, 2025 WL 2916264, at

16 *13 (same as to noncitizen who had been acquitted of the charged offenses).

17 However, unlike the above cases, Petitioner’s charges were not dismissed until after he

18 was re-detained by ICE. (Doc. Nos. 6 at 4; 6-1.) Further, in both his amended petition and motion

19 for a temporary restraining order, Petitioner argues that his initial detention was in violation of

20 the INA and the Constitution, not that his detention became unconstitutional upon the dismissal of

21 his criminal charges. (Doc. Nos. 6, 10.) Therefore, Petitioner does not seek relief relating to his

22 dismissed charges in his amended petition or pending motion.

23 In this regard, the court finds the district court’s decision in Calderon v. Noem, No. 2:25-

24 cv-02136-LK-TLF, 2025 WL 3754042 (W.D. Wash Dec. 29, 2025), appeal docketed, No. 26-

25 1267 (9th Cir. Mar. 4, 2026), to be persuasive. In Calderon, the petitioner was arrested for theft

26 and was in ongoing criminal proceedings in state court. Calderon, 2025 WL 3754042, at *1. The

27 petitioner was detained by ICE under § 1226(c) based on that arrest. (Id.) The petitioner filed a

28 habeas petition in April 2025. Id. at *2. Shortly thereafter, the state court dismissed the

1 petitioner’s predicate charge for lack of a speedy trial. Id. at *1.

2 In his initial habeas petition, as here, the petitioner in Calderon’s “sole claim for relief

3 [wa]s that Respondents violated his Fifth Amendment rights by failing to afford him written

4 notice or meaningful opportunity to be heard by a neutral decisionmaker prior to his re-detention

5 in April 2025.” Id. at *4 (internal quotation omitted). And, as here, “[t]he petition does not raise a

6 challenge relating to his right to a hearing after the charges against him were dropped” following

7 his ICE detention. Id. Thus, the court in Calderon, noting that “a habeas petitioner cannot amend

8 his petition—much less introduce wholly new claims—in his reply brief,” denied Petitioner’s

9 habeas petition. Id. (quoting McClellon v. Rickard, No. 24-cv-10053-VSB-BCM, 2025 WL

10 3286917, at *10 (S.D.N.Y. June 24, 2025)). The court noted, however, that “[t]o the extent Mr.

11 Calderon wishes to challenge his current detention, he is free to file a new habeas petition

12 pursuant to Section 2241.” Calderon, 2025 WL 3754042, at *4.

13 As in Calderon, Petitioner’s amended petition and motion for a temporary restraining

14 order challenge only the basis for his initial detention, not the effect of the subsequent dismissal

15 of his criminal charge on that basis. Further, as in Calderon, the court cannot issue relief

16 predicated on a claim that has not been brought before it in Petitioner’s petition or motion for

17 injunctive relief. While Petitioner may have a meritorious claim relating to the constitutionality of

18 his continued detention in light of the dismissal of his larceny charge, that claim is not before the

19 court. Accordingly, the court finds that Petitioner is unlikely to succeed on the merits of his claim

20 that his initial detention violated the INA or his constitutional right to due process, and

21 Petitioner’s motion for a temporary restraining order will be denied without prejudice.

22 CONCLUSION

23 For the reasons explained above,

24 1. Petitioner Klifford Antenor Montalvan Reyes’ motion for a temporary restraining

25 order (Doc. No. 10) is DENIED without prejudice; and

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] 2. If Petitioner wishes to file an amended Petition relating to his continued detention

2 under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), he may do so within fourteen (14) days of issuance of

3 this order.

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5 IT IS SO ORDERED. :

6 | Dated: _ March 17, 2026 oes Osa

Dena Coggins

7 United States District Judge

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