Warden

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

11 JASPINDER SINGH, A-240-270-983, No. 1:26-cv-1284 DJC CSK

12 Petitioner,

13 v. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

14 WARDEN OF THE GOLDEN STATE

ANNEX DETENTION FACILITY, et al.,

15

Respondents.

16

17

18 Petitioner Jaspinder Singh, a national and citizen of India, entered the United States in

19 2022, and has filed pro se a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.1 In

20 May 2022, petitioner was initially detained by Customs and Border Protection, and subsequently

21 released by order of recognizance, subject to supervision. on January 20, 2026, after petitioner

22 reported to the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”) office as instructed,

23 petitioner was re-detained has remained in ICE custody. This habeas action concerns petitioner’s

24 re-detention. For the reasons that follow, the Court recommends granting the petition for a writ

25 of habeas corpus.

26 ///

27

1 This matter proceeds before the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, Fed. R. Civ. P. 72,

28 and Local Rule 302(c)(17).

1 I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

2 Petitioner is a national and citizen of India. (ECF No. 8-1 at 1 (Form I-213).) On May 4,

3 2022, petitioner entered the United States without inspection and was detained by U.S. Customs

4 and Border Protection. (ECF No. 8-1 at 2.) After immigration officials determined that petitioner

5 was not a threat to public safety or national security, Petitioner was subsequently released on an

6 Order of Recognizance/Alternative to Detention (“ATD”). (Id. at 4.)

7 Petitioner reported to the ICE office in Stockton on January 20, 2026 as instructed, and

8 was re-detained by ICE. (ECF No. 8-1 at 4.) Petitioner alleges that he was given no information

9 as to why he was being detained, and claims his request for asylum is still pending. (ECF No. 1

10 at 5.)

11 Respondents assert petitioner was arrested on March 1, 2024, for assault with a deadly

12 weapon (not a firearm), and on August 16, 2024, for driving under the influence. (ECF No. 8 at 5

13 (citing ECF No. 8-1 at 4-5.) In addition, respondents claim petitioner has violated the conditions

14 of his release multiple times. (Id.) Respondents do not, however, assert that petitioner was re-

15 detained based on the alleged 2024 arrests or the release condition violations. (See ECF No. 8.)

16 II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

17 On February 13, 2026, petitioner filed his petition for writ of habeas corpus. (ECF No. 1.)

18 On February 18, 2026, the district judge referred this matter to the undersigned. (ECF No. 4.) On

19 February 27, 2026, respondents timely filed a motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 8.) Petitioner did not

20 file a reply. Briefing is now complete.

21 III. LEGAL STANDARD

22 The Constitution guarantees the availability of the writ of habeas corpus “to every individual

23 detained within the United States.” Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 525 (2004) (citing U.S. Const.,

24 Art I, § 9, cl. 2). “The essence of habeas corpus is an attack by a person in custody upon the legality

25 of that custody, and . . . the traditional function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody.”

26 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973). A writ of habeas corpus may be granted to a

27 petitioner who demonstrates that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or federal law.

28 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(3). Historically, “the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing

1 the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its protections have been strongest.”

2 I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). A district court’s habeas jurisdiction includes challenges

3 to immigration detention. See Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 687 (2001).

4 IV. DISCUSSION

5 In his sole claim for relief, petitioner raises a Fifth Amendment due process claim for

6 prolonged detention that exceeds six months. (See ECF No. 1 at 8-17.) The Court notes at the

7 outset that it is undisputed that petitioner has not been detained for more than six months.

8 Because petitioner is proceeding pro se and pro se pleadings are liberally construed, the Court

9 construes petitioner’s claim as a Fifth Amendment due process claim challenging his re-detention,

10 and not as a claim limited to challenging his detention as prolonged. Respondents contend that

11 because petitioner is an ”applicant for admission,” petitioner is detained pursuant to the

12 mandatory detention provision of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b). (ECF No. 8 at 1.) Respondents further

13 argue that his detention is not prolonged where petitioner has been detained for less than six

14 weeks, and that petitioner does not possess a right to freedom from immigration detention in any

15 form other than the form provided by Congress. (Id. at 2.) In the alternative, respondents request

16 that the Court stay this matter pending resolution of Rodriguez v. Bostock, No. 25-6842 (9th

17 Cir.). (Id.)

18 Generally, noncitizens are subject to civil immigration detention only if the noncitizen

19 presents a risk of flight or danger to the community. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (holding that

20 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(6) does not authorize indefinite detention).

21 A. Applicability of 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) or 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)

22 The Court must first decide whether petitioner, who has lived in the United States since

23 2022, is subject to discretionary release as first ordered by immigration officials under § 1226(a),

24 or whether petitioner is now subject to mandatory detention under § 1225(b), as respondents

25 argue. 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2) mandates detention during removal proceedings for applicants

26 “seeking admission” and does not provide for a bond hearing. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a) “provides the

27 general process for arresting and detaining [noncitizens] who are present in the United States and

28 eligible for removal.” Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1196 (9th Cir. 2022). Under

1 § 1226(a), the government makes an initial custody determination, and the noncitizen will be

2 released upon a showing “to the satisfaction of the officer that such release would not pose a

3 danger to property or persons, and that the [noncitizen] is likely to appear for any future

4 proceeding.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1196 (citing 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8)). Section 1226(a)

5 provides “an initial bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, the opportunity to be

6 represented by counsel and to present evidence, the right to appeal, and the right to seek a new

7 hearing when circumstances materially change.” Id. at 1202. Therefore, “[i]f the noncitizen is

8 detained under section 1226(a), she is entitled to a bond hearing.” Labrador-Prato v. Noem, 2025

9 WL 3458802, at *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2025) (citing Jennings v. Rodriguez, 583 U.S. 281, 306

10 (2018)). Respondents contend § 1225(b) applies because petitioner is an “applicant for

11 admission” and therefore subject to mandatory detention. (ECF No. 8 at 1.)

12 The Court concludes that § 1226(a) applies to petitioner. First, immigration authorities

13 released petitioner in or around May 2022 through an order of recognizance after finding that he

14 was not a threat to public safety or national security. (See ECF No. 8-1 at 4.) Respondents do not

15 dispute this fact, and state that petitioner was “paroled by an immigration official.” ((See ECF

16 No. 8 at 1.) Second, though respondents refer to two 2024 arrests in their motion, respondents do

17 not contend that petitioner is subject to mandatory detention under 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c), which

18 mandates detention for certain criminal convictions and arrests.2 (See ECF No. 8 at 1-2.)

19 Respondents further do not assert that petitioner is detained pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1231, which

20 mandates detention of noncitizens subject to an order of removal that is administratively final and

21 during the removal period.3 (See ECF No. 8 at 1-2.)

22 Second, this Court agrees with and joins the majority of courts nationwide, including the

23 Eastern District of California, in rejecting respondent’s new interpretation4 of Sections 1225 and

24

2 The Court notes that this in contrast to other cases where the government has asserted that a

25

noncitizen is subject to § 1226(c) detention, presenting records of criminal convictions or history.

26

3 In addition, the documentation submitted by respondents demonstrates that the order of

removal is not administratively final where the appeal is pending before the Board of Immigration

27 Appeals. (See ECF No. 8-2 at 1-2.)

4 Until DHS changed its policy in July 2025, the Government consistently applied Section

28

1 1226. See Rodriguez Vazquez v. Bostock, 2025 WL 2782499, at *1, 21-22 (W.D. Wash. Sept.

2 30, 2025) (concluding, after a thorough analysis, that “the government’s [interpretation of § 1225]

3 belies the statutory text of the [Immigration and Nationality Act], canons of statutory

4 interpretation, legislative history, and longstanding agency practice”); J.Y.L.C. v. Bostock, 2025

5 WL 3169865, at *2 (D. Or. Nov. 12, 2025) (collecting cases rejecting the government’s assertion

6 that § 1225 empowers DHS to arrest and hold a noncitizen present without legal status who has

7 spent years in the U.S.); Cardona-Lozano v Noem, 2025 WL 3218244, at *6 (W.D. Tex. Nov. 14,

8 2025) (“Repeatedly, [district courts across the country] have found that DHS and the [Board of

9 Immigration Appeals’] construction of the [Immigration and Nationality Act] is incorrect and

10 that petitioners who have long resided in the United States but are being held under § 1225 are

11 entitled to relief.”) (collecting cases)); Faizyan v. Casey, 2025 WL 3208844, at *5 (S.D. Cal.

12 Nov. 17, 2025) (holding that § 1226 applies to a petitioner who “DHS has consistently treated” as

13 subject to discretionary detention and “who has been residing in the United States for two years”

14 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)); Josue I.C.A. v. Lyons, 2025 WL 3496432, at 3

15 n.6 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 5, 2025) (collecting cases); Morales-Flores v. Lyons, 2025 WL 3552841, at

16 *3 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 2025) (collecting cases) (“Courts nationwide, including this one, have

17 overwhelmingly rejected respondents’ arguments and found DHS’s new policy unlawful.”).

18 “These courts examined the text, structure, agency application, and legislative history of

19 1225(b)(2) and concluded that it applies only to noncitizens ‘seeking admission,’ a category that

20 does not include noncitizens like [petitioner], living in the interior of the country.” Salcedo

21 Aceros v. Kaiser, 2025 WL 2637503, at *8 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 12, 2025) (collecting cases). By

22 contrast, “[t]he government’s proposed reading of the statute (1) disregards the plain meaning of

23 section 1225(b)(2)(A); (2) disregards the relationship between sections 1225 and 1226; (3) would

24 render a recent amendment to section 1226(c) superfluous; and (4) is inconsistent with decades of

25 prior statutory interpretation and practice.” Guerro Lepe v. Andrews, 2025 WL 2716910, at *4

26 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 23, 2025) (collecting cases). This Court incorporates and adopts the thorough

27

1226(a), not Section 1225(b)(2), to noncitizens residing in the United States who were detained

28 by immigration authorities and subject to removal. See Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F.4th at 1196.

1 and persuasive reasoning of the district court in Lepe, 2025 WL 2716910, at *3-9.

2 Further, respondents’ reliance on Buenrostro-Mendez, 166 F.4th 494, is unavailing. In

3 Buenrostro-Mendez, the Fifth Circuit recently agreed with the government’s interpretation of

4 § 1225(b)(2). This Court agrees with the district court in Gurvinder Singh v. Chestnut, 2026 WL

5 413839 (E.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2026):

6 Two courts of appeal have addressed whether 8 U.S.C.

§ 1225(b)(2)(A) applies to noncitizens who have lived in the United

7 States for years without having been admitted. See Castañon-Nava

v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048, 1060-62 (7th Cir.

8 2025) (concluding that government was not likely to prevail on the

merits that petitioner was subject to mandatory detention under

9 § 1225(b)(2)(A)); Buenrostro-Mendez v. Bondi, --- F.4th ---, Nos.

25-20496, 25-40701, 2026 WL 323330 (5th Cir. Feb. 6, 2026)

10 (finding petitioners were subject to mandatory detention under

§ 1225(b)(2)(A)). Respondents cite to the Buenrostro-Mendez

11 decision. Doc. 9 at 1. The Court finds the analysis in Castañon-Nava

and in the dissent in Buenrostro-Mendez to be more persuasive on

12 the statutory interpretation issue. In any event, the Buenrostro-

Mendez decision did not address the due process claim at issue in the

13 present case.”

14 Gurvinder Singh, 2026 WL 413839, at *1 n.1. This Court does not find Buenrostro-Mendez to be

15 persuasive for the reasons provided above. See also Singh v. Baltazar, 2026 WL 352870, at *3-6

16 (D. Colo. Feb. 9, 2026) (rejecting the Buenrostro majority in its interpretation of § 1225 as

17 nonbinding and highlighting the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals’ disagreement with the

18 Buenrostro majority) (citing Castanon-Nava v. U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec., 161 F.4th 1048,

19 1052 (7th Cir. 2025)); Tomas Nicolas v. Warden, 2026 WL 364399, at *3 n.3 (S.D. Ind. Feb. 10,

20 2026) (disagreeing with Buenrostro majority and declining to follow); Chachipanta Cando v.

21 Bondi, 2026 WL 357551, at *5 n.6 (D. Neb. Feb. 9, 2026) (same); Aroca v. Mason, 2026 WL

22 357872, at *15 n.40 (S.D. W.Va. Feb. 9, 2026) (same). In addition, as in Gurvinder Singh,

23 petitioner raises a due process claim, which the court in Buenrostro-Mendez did not address, and

24 which the Court turns to next.

25 Following the majority of courts, this Court also rejects the government’s new

26 interpretation of 8 U.S.C. § 1225(b)(2)(A) and their contention that petitioner is an “applicant for

27 admission” subject to § 1225(b)(2). This Court finds that petitioner is detained under 8 U.S.C.

28 § 1226(a) and its implementing regulations because petitioner was released on his own

1 recognizance after immigration officials determined that he was not a threat to public safety or

2 national security, he has resided in this country for over 3.5 years since his May 2022 release, and

3 petitioner’s January 2026 arrest and re-detention by ICE were not upon his arrival to the United

4 States. In addition, respondents do not assert detention authority pursuant to § 1226(c) or § 1231.

5 “Federal regulations provide that [noncitizens] detained under § 1226(a) receive bond hearings at

6 the outset of detention.” Jennings, 583 U.S. at 306 (citing 8 CFR §§ 236.1(d)(1)). If, at this

7 hearing, the detainee demonstrates that he or she is not “a threat to national security, a danger to

8 the community at large, likely to abscond, or otherwise a poor bail risk,” the immigration judge

9 will order his or her release. Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F. 4th at 1197 (citing Matter of

10 Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40 (B.I.A. 2006)). As such, petitioner should have been provided a

11 bond hearing before his re-detention and is entitled to relief based on 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a).

12 B. Due Process Claim

13 Liberally construed, petitioner argues he has a fundamental liberty interest in freedom

14 from imprisonment pursuant to the Fifth Amendment. (ECF No. 1 at 6-18.) Petitioner has a

15 liberty interest in not being incarcerated after prior release without pre-custodial hearing or

16 notice. Respondents argue petitioner’s due process claims fail because petitioner does not

17 possess a right to freedom from immigration detention in any form other than the form provided

18 by Congress. (ECF No. 8 at 2.) Respondents’ arguments do not demonstrate the government has

19 satisfied the requirements of the Due Process Clause, “which of course constitute[s] the supreme

20 law of the land[.]” Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 472 (1943) (Black, J., concurring).

21 The Due Process Clause protects persons in the United States from being deprived of life,

22 liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const. amend. V. “It is clear that

23 commitment for any purpose constitutes a significant deprivation of liberty that requires due

24 process protection.” Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992). “[T]he Due Process Clause

25 applies to all ‘persons’ within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is

26 lawful, unlawful, temporary, or permanent.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 693. “The Due Process

27 clause applies to noncitizens in this country in connection with removal proceedings, even if their

28 presence is unlawful or temporary.” Tinoco v. Noem, 2025 WL 3567862, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Dec.

1 14, 2025) (citing Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690).

2 The Supreme Court has found that a protected liberty interest may arise from a conditional

3 release from physical restraint. Young v. Harper, 520 U.S. 143, 147-49 (1997). Even when a

4 statute allows the government to arrest and detain an individual, a protected liberty interest under

5 the Due Process Clause may entitle the individual to procedural protections not found in the

6 statute. See id. (finding due process requires pre-deprivation hearing before revocation of

7 preparole); Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (same, in probation context);

8 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1972) (same, in parole context). To determine whether

9 a specific conditional release rises to the level of a protected liberty interest, “[c]ourts have

10 resolved the issue by comparing the specific conditional release in the case before them with the

11 liberty interest in parole as characterized by Morrissey.” Gonzalez-Fuentes v. Molina, 607 F.3d

12 864, 887 (1st Cir. 2010) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

13 In Morrissey, the Supreme Court explained that parole “enables [the parolee] to do a wide

14 range of things open to persons” who have never been in custody or convicted of any crime,

15 including to live at home, work, and “be with family and friends and to form the other enduring

16 attachments of normal life.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. “Though the [government] properly

17 subjects [the parolee] to many restrictions not applicable to other citizens,” such as monitoring,

18 his “condition is very different from that of confinement in a prison.” Id. “The parolee has relied

19 on at least an implicit promise that parole will be revoked only if he fails to live up to the parole

20 conditions.” Id. The revocation of parole undoubtedly “inflicts a grievous loss on the parolee.”

21 Id. (quotations omitted). Therefore, a parolee possesses a protected interest in his “continued

22 liberty.” Id. at 481-84.

23 Here, petitioner’s initial detention and subsequent release on an order of recognizance in

24 May 2022, are similar because it allowed petitioner to live in the United States, subject to

25 immigration supervision, but free of custody for over 3.5 years. Such time allowed petitioner to

26 form “enduring attachments of normal life.” Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 482. This Court finds that

27 petitioner’s original release and time out of custody gave rise to a constitutionally protected

28 liberty interest.

1 Petitioner’s release was premised upon a finding that, at the time of petitioner’s release, he

2 was neither dangerous nor a flight risk (ECF No. 8-1 at 4). See 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8) (“Any

3 officer authorized to issue a warrant of arrest may, in the officer’s discretion, release an alien not

4 described in [8 U.S.C. § 1226](c)(1), under the conditions at section [8 U.S.C. § 1226](a)(2) and

5 (3) of the Act; provided that the alien must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer that such

6 release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the alien is likely to appear for

7 any future proceeding.”); Saravia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 1168, 1176 (N.D. Cal. 2017), aff’d

8 sub nom. Saravia for A.H. v. Sessions, 905 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2018); F.M.V. v. Wofford, 2025

9 WL 3083934, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 4, 2025). In light of all of the foregoing, the Court finds that

10 petitioner’s prior release created a reasonable expectation that he would be entitled to retain his

11 liberty as long as he was not a flight risk and did not pose a danger to the community. See Perry

12 v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 601-03 (1972) (finding reliance on governmental representations

13 may establish a legitimate claim of entitlement to a constitutionally-protected interest); F.M.V.,

14 2025 WL 3083934 at *4. This Court concludes that petitioner has a protected liberty interest in

15 his release. See Guillermo M. R. v. Kaiser, 2025 WL 1983677, at *4 (N.D. Cal. July 17, 2025)

16 (recognizing that “the liberty interest that arises upon release [from immigration detention] is

17 inherent in the Due Process Clause”); Ortega v. Kaiser, 2025 WL 1771438, at *3 (N.D. Cal. June

18 26, 2025) (collecting cases finding that noncitizens who have been released have a strong liberty

19 interest); F.M.V., 2025 WL 3083934 at *4-5.

20 Next, the Court turns to what procedures are necessary to ensure that the deprivation of

21 that protected liberty interest meets the demands of the Constitution. The Ninth Circuit has

22 “regularly applied Mathews [v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976)], to due process challenges to

23 removal proceedings.” Rodriguez Diaz v. Garland, 53 F.4th 1189, 1206 (9th Cir. 2022); see also

24 Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 993 (9th Cir. 2017) (applying Mathews factors in

25 immigration detention context). In applying the Mathews test to a procedural due process claim

26 challenging immigration detention, the Ninth Circuit explained that “Mathews remains a flexible

27 test that can and must account for the heightened governmental interest in the immigration

28 detention context.” Rodriguez Diaz, 53 F. 4th at 1206-07 (citations omitted). Under Mathews,

1 the Court considers three factors: (1) the private interest affected; (2) the risk of an erroneous

2 deprivation; and (3) the government’s interest. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.

3 First, petitioner has a clear interest in remaining free from detention. “Freedom from

4 imprisonment -- from government custody, detention, or other forms of physical restraint -- lies at

5 the heart of the liberty that [the Due Process] Clause protects.” Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (citing

6 Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80 (“Freedom from bodily restraint has always been at the core of the liberty

7 protected by the Due Process Clause.); Hernandez, 872 F.3d at 981 (“[T]he government’s

8 discretion to incarcerate non-citizens is always constrained by the requirements of due process.”).

9 For over three and a half years, petitioner was free from custody before his re-detention. The

10 duration of his conditional release elevates and underscores his interest in liberty. See Pinchi v.

11 Noem, 2025 WL 2084921, at *3 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2025) (in the past five years, petitioner

12 developed “extensive relations of support and interdependence” that “underscore the high stakes

13 of [his] liberty.”); Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d 963, 963 (N.D. Cal. 2019) (holding that

14 petitioner had a substantial liberty interest where he had been released from custody for 18

15 months and was living with his wife, spending time with his mother and other family members,

16 working as a bicycle mechanic, and developing friendships in his community).

17 The second Mathews factor also weighs in petitioner’s favor. “The risk of an erroneous

18 deprivation [of liberty] is high” when “[the petitioner] has not received any bond or custody

19 redetermination hearing.” See A.E. v. Andrews, 2025 WL 1424382, at *5 (E.D. Cal. May 16,

20 2025). Again, civil immigration detention, which is “nonpunitive in purpose and effect[,]” is

21 typically justified under the Due Process Clause only when a noncitizen presents a risk of flight

22 or danger to the community. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; Padilla v. ICE, 704 F. Supp. 3d

23 1163, 1172 (W.D. Wash. 2023). In addition, although respondents refer to petitioner’s 2024

24 arrests, they do not contend that petitioner is subject to § 1226(c) detention. (See ECF No. 8.)

25 Here, petitioner has been detained since January 2026, without being given an

26 individualized bond hearing to evaluate whether petitioner is a flight risk or a danger to the

27 community. No neutral arbiter has determined whether petitioner is a flight risk or a danger to

28 the community. Respondents must demonstrate that petitioner’s re-detention is reasonably

1 related to a valid government purpose. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; see, e.g., Rodriguez Diaz

2 v. Kaiser, 2025 WL 3011852, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 16, 2025) (“If respondents wish to establish

3 that re-detention is warranted by raising the effect of . . . [petitioner’s] six alleged bond violations,

4 a hearing before a neutral adjudicator provides a forum to do so.”); see also Cajina v. Wofford,

5 2025 WL 3251083, at *1, 6 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 21, 2025) (ordering petitioner’s immediate release

6 and enjoining and restraining respondents from re-detaining petitioner absent a pre-detention

7 hearing, despite petitioner being charged with driving under the influence).

8 As to the third Mathews factor, this Court recognizes that the government has an interest

9 in enforcing immigration laws, but respondents’ interest in detaining petitioner without a hearing

10 is “low.” Ortega v. Bonnar, 415 F. Supp. 3d at 970; Doe v. Becerra, 787 F. Supp. 3d 1083, 1094

11 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2025). Detention hearings in immigration courts are routine, and impose a

12 “minimal cost.” Doe, 787 F. Supp. 3d at 1094. In addition, here, the government’s interest is

13 even lower because petitioner was previously released by order of recognizance after immigration

14 officials determined he was not a danger to the community and he lived in the country for over

15 3.5 years on release. See Pinchi, 2025 WL 1853763, at *2.

16 Overall, balancing these factors, the Court finds that the Mathews factors weigh in favor

17 of finding petitioner is entitled to a bond hearing, and petitioner should have been provided such a

18 hearing before he was detained. “An essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of

19 life, liberty, or property be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the

20 nature of the case.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542 (1985) (internal

21 quotation marks and citation omitted) (emphasis added). In criminal cases, parolees released on

22 parole, which does not provide “absolute liberty,” but rather “conditional liberty properly

23 dependent on observance of special parole restrictions,” are also entitled to due process, including

24 a predeprivation hearing before their parole can be revoked. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 480-86.

25 “Numerous district courts have held that these principles extend to the context of immigration

26 detention.” F.M.V., 2025 WL 3083934 at *6 (collecting cases). Respondents point to no reasons

27 a pre-deprivation hearing could not be held, and provided no evidence of “urgent concerns,” thus,

28 “a pre-deprivation hearing is required to satisfy due process.” Guillermo M. R. v. Kaiser, 791 F.

1 Supp. 3d at 1036. Accordingly, the Court finds that petitioner is entitled to relief on his due

2 process claim.

3 V. RESPONDENTS’ REQUEST TO STAY

4 Respondents’ alternative request that this matter be stayed pending a ruling by the Ninth

5 Circuit in Rodriguez v. Bostock, No. 25-6842 (9th Cir.) should be denied because a stay is not in

6 the interests of petitioner, who has been detained since January 20, 2026, and because a stay

7 would not promote the efficient use of scarce judicial resources in a district with some of the

8 highest caseloads in the country. A stay would put a further strain on limited judicial resources.

9 VI. RESPONDENTS’ MOTION TO DISMISS

10 For the reasons set forth above, respondents’ motion to dismiss should be denied.

11 VII. CONCLUSION

12 In summary, the Court recommends that the petition for writ of habeas corpus be granted

13 on petitioner’s due process claim.

14 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that:

15 1. The petition for writ of habeas corpus (ECF No. 1) be GRANTED.

16 2. Respondents’ motion to dismiss (ECF No. 8) and request to stay this matter be denied.

17 3. Respondents be ordered to IMMEDIATELY release petitioner Jaspinder Singh (A-

18 240-270-983), and be ordered to provide petitioner with a copy of the release order at

19 or near the time of release. If respondents have custody of petitioner’s documents

20 (e.g., identification, passport, work permit, Social Security card, etc.), respondents

21 shall return those to petitioner at the time of release

22 4. Absent establishment of detention authority pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) or

23 8 U.S.C. § 1231, respondents be ENJOINED AND RESTRAINED from re-detaining

24 petitioner unless the government demonstrates, by clear and convincing evidence at a

25 pre-deprivation bond hearing before a neutral decisionmaker, that petitioner is a flight

26 risk or danger to the community such that his physical custody is legally justified.

27 5. Given petitioner’s pro se status, respondents be directed to file, within seven days of

28 the adoption of these findings and recommendations, a status report addressing

] petitioner’s status.

2 6. The Clerk of the Court be directed to enter judgment in favor of petitioner and close

3 this case.

4 These findings and recommendations are submitted to the United States District Judge

5 || assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within seven days of

6 || the date of these findings and recommendations, any party may file written objections with the

7 || court and serve a copy on all parties. Such a document should be captioned “Objections to

8 | Magistrate Judge’s Findings and Recommendations.” Any response to the objections shall be

9 || filed and served within seven days after service of the objections. The parties are advised that

10 | failure to file objections within the specified time may waive the right to appeal the District

11 || Court’s order. See Martinez v. YIst, 951 F.2d 1153 (9th Cir. 1991).

12

13 || Dated: March 13, 2026 4 aA

Aan Spe |

CHI SOO KIM

15 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

16 || //sing1284.157.mtd.imm

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28

13