The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 JOHN GD DOE, a minor, by and Case No. 8:25-cv-02052-JWH-KES
through his Guardian ad litem, JANE
12 SM DOE, an individual,
ORDER GRANTING IN PART
13 Plaintiff, AND DENYING IN PART
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO
14 v. DISMISS [ECF No. 22] AND
GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S
15 NEWPORT MESA UNIFIED MOTION TO REMAND [ECF
SCHOOL DISTRICT, a local public No. 11]
16 entity;
RIGO PINON, an individual; and
17 DOES 1-100, inclusive,
18 Defendants.
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1 This action involves allegations that a high school coach and other school
officials turned a blind eye to the bullying, harassment, and physical assault that
one student suffered at the hands of another.'
4 Presently before the Court are the following matters:
5 e the motion’ of Defendants Newport Mesa Unified School District
6 (“NMUSD”) and Rigo Pinon to dismiss the Complaint of Plaintiff John
7 GD Doe, a minor who is proceeding pseudonymously through his
8 guardian ad litem;> and
9 e Doe’s motion to remand.‘
10 The Court concludes that these matters are appropriate for resolution
11|| without a hearing. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78; L.R. 7-15. After considering the
papers of record,° the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part
13 || Defendants’ Motion to dismiss and GRANTS Doe’s Remand Motion, for the
14|| reasons set forth below.
15 I. BACKGROUND
16|| A. Factual Allegations
17 In ruling on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
18 || Procedure, “[a|ll allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in
19|| the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Am. Family Ass°n v. City &
20 □□ ———————————————
1 See generally Compl. (the ““Complaint”) [ECF No. 1-1].
2 Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss (the “Motion”) [ECF No. 22].
3 Complaint 2:3-4.
‘ Pl.’s Mot. to Remand (the “(Remand Motion”) [ECF No. 11].
741 s The Court considered the documents of record in this case, including the
|| following papers: (1) Complaint; (2) Motion; (3) Pl.’s Opp’n to the Motion (the
26 || “Opposition”) [ECF No. 24]; (4) Defs.’ Reply in Supp. of the Motion (the
“Reply”) [ECF No. 25]; (5) Remand Motion; (6) Defs.’ Opp’n to the Remand
271! Motion (the ““Remand Opposition”) [ECF No. 15]; (7) Pl.’s Reply in Supp. of
|| the Remand Motion (the “Remand Reply”) [ECF No. 18].
1 County of San Francisco, 277 F.3d 1114, 1120 (9th Cir. 2002). Doe’s allegations
2 in this case may be summarized as follows:
3 Doe was born in February 2010.6 The alleged tortious conduct took place
4 while Doe was a freshman at Newport Harbor High School (“NHHS”) during
5 the 2024-2025 school year, when Doe was a member of the school’s wrestling
6 team.7 From August through October 2024, Doe was subjected to ongoing
7 harassment, assault, bullying, and abuse by a senior student who was also on the
8 wrestling team.8
9 Specifically, in October 2024, the NHHS wrestling team attended a
10 school-sponsored tournament called “Freakshow” in Las Vegas, Nevada.9 The
11 team stayed in a hotel during the tournament. Doe alleges that the senior chased
12 Doe through the hotel and threw baby oil on him.10 When hotel security
13 intervened, the senior threatened Doe.11 Later that evening, the senior entered
14 Doe’s hotel room and strangled Doe until Doe almost lost consciousness, then
15 the senior dropped Doe and left the room.12
16 The next day, after competing in the wrestling tournament, Doe returned
17 to his hotel room to find that the senior had entered Doe’s room and had
18 urinated on his bed, his clothing, and his personal belongings.13 Doe confronted
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6 Complaint ¶ 25.
22 7 Id.
23 8 Id.
24 9 Id. at ¶ 25(a).
25 10 Id.
26 11 Id.
27 12 Id.
1 the senior, and the senior responded by threatening Doe, kicking Doe, and
2 strangling Doe until he was unconscious.14
3 When Doe regained consciousness, Pinon was present.15 Pinon was the
4 wrestling coach and a teacher at NHHS.16 Doe informed Pinon of the bullying
5 that the senior had inflicted on him.17 In response, Pinon called the senior’s
6 father and instructed the father to “resolve this” with Doe’s mother.18
7 After Doe’s mother spoke with the senior’s father, Doe’s mother was
8 concerned about the senior’s reaction, and she contacted Pinon.19 Pinon
9 informed Doe’s mother that he was aware of prior complaints of bullying by the
10 senior, but that the senior’s father always “took care of it.”20
11 On October 22, 2024, Doe’s mother called NHHS to report both the
12 abuse that Doe had suffered and coach Pinon’s reaction.21 Two days later,
13 Doe’s mother met with the NHHS Assistant Principal and Athletic Director to
14 explain Doe’s situation.22 Thereafter, the Assistant Principal and Athletic
15 Director told NHHS Principal Sean Boulton about the bullying that had
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14 Id.
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15 Id. at ¶ 25(c).
22 16 Id. at ¶ 11.
23 17 Id. at ¶ 25(c).
24 18 Id.
25 19 Id. at ¶ 25(d).
26 20 Id. at ¶ 25(e).
27 21 Id. at ¶ 25(f).
1 occurred at the tournament.23 Boulton then informed Doe’s mother that Doe
2 would be suspended.24
3 In response, Doe’s mother contacted NMUSD to report her son’s abuse,
4 to report coach Pinon for concealing the abuse that Doe had suffered from the
5 senior, and to report the NHHS employees for their inaction and retaliation for
6 Doe’s mother’s report of Doe’s abuse.25 After receiving Doe’s mother’s report,
7 NHHS terminated Pinon’s employment, and Boulton conducted a meeting
8 during which several parents expressed concerns for their children’s welfare
9 stemming from bullying perpetrated by the senior who had assaulted Doe.26
10 B. Procedural History
11 In June 2025, Doe filed the instant action in Orange County Superior
12 Court, asserting claims including negligence, intentional infliction of emotional
13 distress, public entity liability, and violations of Title IX—20 U.S.C. §§ 1681(a),
14 et seq.27
15 In September 2025, Defendants removed the action to this Court based
16 upon federal question and supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
17 §§ 1331 & 1367.28 Later that month, Defendants filed their first motions to
18 dismiss Doe’s Complaint.29 Six days later, Doe filed the instant Remand
19 Motion.30
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23 Id.
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24 Id.
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25 Id. at ¶ 25(g).
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26 Id.
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27 See generally id.
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28 See Not. of Removal (the “Notice of Removal”) [ECF No. 1] ¶¶ 7 & 9.
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29 Defs.’ Mots. to Dismiss (the “First Dismissal Motions”) [ECF Nos. 4 &
27 10].
1 In March 2026, the Court denied Defendants’ First Dismissal Motions
2 without prejudice because in his opposition Doe represented that he could
3 amend his pleading and fix any deficiencies that the Court may find.31 In the
4 Order, the Court directed Doe to file an amended pleading, if at all, no later than
5 April 17, 2026.32 Doe did not amend his Complaint. On April 21, 2026,
6 Defendants filed the instant Motion.33
7 II. LEGAL STANDARD
8 A. Rule 12(b)(6)—Motion to Dismiss
9 A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the
10 claims asserted in a complaint. See Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir.
11 2001). Although a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion “does not need
12 detailed factual allegations,” a plaintiff must provide “more than labels and
13 conclusions.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007).
14 To state a plausible claim for relief, the complaint “must contain
15 sufficient allegations of underlying facts” to support its legal conclusions. Starr
16 v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011). “Factual allegations must be
17 enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level on the assumption
18 that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact) . . . .”
19 Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555–56 (citations and footnote omitted). Accordingly, to
20 survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint “must contain sufficient factual matter,
21 accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” which
22 means that a plaintiff must plead sufficient factual content to “allow[] the Court
23 to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct
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31 Order Denying the First Dismissal Motions and Setting Hr’g on the
26 Remand Motion (the “Order”) [ECF No. 21] 6:18–7:4.
27 32 Id. at 8:10–14.
1 alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal quotation marks
2 omitted). A complaint must contain “well-pleaded facts” from which the Court
3 can “infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Id. at 679.
4 B. 28 U.S.C. § 1441—Removal Jurisdiction
5 Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Accordingly, “[t]hey
6 possess only that power authorized by Constitution and statute.” Kokkonen v.
7 Guardian Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994). In every federal case, the
8 basis for federal jurisdiction must appear affirmatively from the record. See
9 DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 n.3 (2006). “The right of
10 removal is entirely a creature of statute and a suit commenced in a state court
11 must remain there until cause is shown for its transfer under some act of
12 Congress.” Syngenta Crop Prot., Inc. v. Henson, 537 U.S. 28, 32 (2002) (internal
13 quotation marks omitted). When Congress has acted to create a right of
14 removal, those statutes, unless otherwise stated, are strictly construed against
15 removal jurisdiction. See id.
16 To remove an action to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441, the
17 removing defendant “must demonstrate that original subject-matter jurisdiction
18 lies in the federal courts.” Syngenta, 537 U.S. at 33. As such, a defendant may
19 remove a civil action in which either (1) a federal question exists; or
20 (2) complete diversity of citizenship between the parties exists and the amount
21 in controversy exceeds $75,000. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 & 1332.
22 The right to remove is not absolute, even when original jurisdiction exists.
23 In other words, the removing defendant bears the burden of establishing that
24 removal is proper. See Abrego Abrego v. Dow Chem. Co., 443 F.3d 676, 684 (9th
25 Cir. 2006) (noting the “longstanding, near-canonical rule that the burden on
26 removal rests with the removing defendant”); Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564,
27 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (“The strong presumption against removal jurisdiction
1 proper.” (quotation marks omitted)). Any doubts regarding the existence of
2 subject-matter jurisdiction must be resolved in favor of remand. See id.
3 (“Federal jurisdiction must be rejected if there is any doubt as to the right of
4 removal in the first instance.”). “In a case that has been removed to federal
5 court on the basis of federal question jurisdiction, the Court may remand to state
6 court after dismissing all federal claims.” Daniels v. Specialized Loan Servicing,
7 LLC, 2019 WL 6794212, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 1, 2019) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1447;
8 Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639–40 (2009)).
9 C. 28 U.S.C. § 1367—Supplemental Jurisdiction
10 “[I]n any civil action of which the district courts have original
11 jurisdiction, the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other
12 claims that are so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction
13 that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the
14 United States Constitution.” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a). Supplemental jurisdiction
15 “is a doctrine of discretion, not of plaintiff’s right.” United Mine Workers of Am.
16 v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
17 A district court has the discretion to decline to exercise supplemental
18 jurisdiction over a state law claim when “the district court has dismissed all
19 claims over which it has original jurisdiction[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). In
20 deciding whether to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction in such cases,
21 a court should consider “principles of economy, convenience, fairness, and
22 comity[.]” Carnegie–Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 357 (1988). However,
23 “in the usual case in which all federal-law claims are eliminated before trial, the
24 balance of factors to be considered under the pendent jurisdiction doctrine . . .
25 will point toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state-law
26 claims.” Id. at 350 n.7.
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1 III. ANALYSIS
2 A. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss
3 1. Claim 7—Violations Arising Under 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a)
4 (Title IX)
5 a. Doe’s Title IX Claim Against Individual Defendant
6 Pinon
7 Defendants argue that Doe’s Title IX claim against Pinon “fails as a
8 matter of law because a Title IX claim can only be brought against an educational
9 institution.”34 The Court agrees with Defendants.
10 “Overwhelming authority” suggests that only institutions, and not
11 individuals, may be held liable under Title IX. Large v. Regents of Univ. of
12 California, 2012 WL 3647455, at *6 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 22, 2012); see also Roe ex rel.
13 Callahan v. Gustine Unified Sch. Dist., 678 F. Supp. 2d 1008, 1024 (E.D. Cal.
14 2009) (granting summary judgment in favor of individual defendants sued in
15 their personal capacity under Title IX for sexual discrimination and
16 harassment); Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 830 F. Supp. 1560, 1576 (N.D. Cal.
17 1993) (“Petaluma I”) (“individuals may not be held personally liable under
18 Title IX”). While the Ninth Circuit has not directly addressed this issue, the
19 Supreme Court has stated that Title IX has “consistently been interpreted as
20 not authorizing suit against school officials, teachers, and other individuals.”
21 Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 555 U.S. 246, 247 (2009) (emphasis added).
22 In his Opposition, Doe addresses the wrong case and cites inapposite
23 authority.35 First, Doe argues that the case that Defendants cite “is irrelevant”
24 because it deals with qualified immunity.36 But Doe refers to the wrong case.
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26 34 Id. at 12:2–3.
27 35 Opposition 15:7–16:5.
1 Defendants’ argument relies, in part, on the district court case Petaluma I,
2 whereas the qualified immunity case that Doe avers is irrelevant is Doe ex rel.
3 Doe v. Petaluma City Sch. Dist., 54 F.3d 1447 (9th Cir. 1995) (“Petaluma II”)—
4 the appeal from the district court’s decision.37 In those cases, the district court
5 properly dismissed the individual defendant, holding that he could not be sued
6 as an individual under Title IX, and that issue was not appealed. See Petaluma II,
7 54 F.3d at 1449 (“The district court entered an order holding that the School
8 could be held liable under Title IX, [Defendant] could not be sued as an
9 individual under Title IX but could be sued for Title IX violations through
10 section 1983, and that [Defendant] was not entitled to qualified immunity.
11 [Defendant] appeals from the order denying qualified immunity.”). Therefore,
12 the case upon which Doe relies supports Defendants’ position, not his.
13 Next, Doe argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in Davis Next Friend
14 LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629 (1999), renders the
15 analysis in Petaluma II “obsolete.”38 But Doe’s argument does not address the
16 question of individual liability for Pinon. Rather, Doe contends that the cited
17 case “establish[es] the modern framework for analyzing institutional liability
18 . . . .”39 But that proposition is irrelevant to establishing Pinon’s individual
19 liability. Therefore, Doe’s Title IX claim fails against Pinon as a matter of law.
20 Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES without leave to amend Doe’s
21 Title IX claim against Pinon. See Maple v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 649 F. App’x
22 570, 572–73 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding that a claim that fails as a matter of law
23 should be dismissed with prejudice).
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26 37 See id. at 15:9–10.
27 38 Id. at 15:26–16:5.
1 b. Doe’s Title IX Claim Against NMUSD
2 Defendants argue that Doe’s Title IX claim fails to state a claim because
3 Doe “pleads no facts that he was discriminated against based on his sex.”40 Doe
4 responds by arguing that all he must prove are the five elements of a Title IX
5 violation.41 The Court agrees with Defendants.
6 Title IX provides that “[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis
7 of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
8 subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving
9 Federal financial assistance.” 20 U.S.C. § 1681(a). A plaintiff “must establish
10 sexual harassment of students that is so severe, pervasive, and objectively
11 offensive . . . that the victim-students are effectively denied equal access to an
12 institution’s resources and opportunities.” Davis, 526 U.S. at 651 (emphasis
13 added). The Supreme Court further explains that “[w]hether gender-oriented
14 conduct rises to the level of actionable harassment thus depends on a
15 constellation of surrounding circumstances, expectations, and relationships.”
16 Id. Indeed, in every case examined by the Court, plaintiff’s Title IX allegations
17 arose from sexual misconduct, harassment, or assault. See, e.g., id. at 633
18 (Title IX allegations that the plaintiff’s daughter had been the victim of sexual
19 harassment by another student); Karasek v. Regents of Univ. of California, 956
20 F.3d 1093, 1099 (9th Cir. 2020) (Title IX allegations arising from victims who
21 were sexually assaulted while undergraduates); A.B. v. Regents of Univ. of Cal.,
22 2021 WL 5195639, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2021) (Title IX allegations arising
23 from sexual assault and sexual battery); Petaluma I, 830 F. Supp. at 1564
24 (Title IX allegations arising from repeated sexual harassment).
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27 40 Motion 12:13–15.
1 Here, Doe’s Title IX claim against NMUSD is insufficient because his
2 Complaint contains no allegations of harassment on the basis of sex. Doe’s
3 Complaint pleads no sexual misconduct, sexual harassment, sexual battery, or
4 any other sex- or gender-based conduct.42 Rather, the Complaint alleges
5 “egregious bullying, harassment, and physical assault.”43 Doe’s Opposition
6 ignores that criticism from Defendants and instead skips to an analysis of the
7 five Davis elements.44 But those elements are used to determine when a
8 recipient of federal funds may be liable for damages under Title IX, not to
9 determine whether an abuser’s conduct rises to the level of a violation of
10 Title IX. See Davis, 526 U.S. at 640–41. Therefore, Doe’s Title IX claim
11 against NMUSD fails as a matter of law.
12 Accordingly, the Court DISMISSES without leave to amend Doe’s
13 Title IX claim against NMUSD. See Chodos v. W. Publ’g Co., 292 F.3d 992, 1003
14 (9th Cir. 2002) (“[W]hen a district court has already granted a plaintiff leave to
15 amend, its discretion in deciding subsequent motions to amend is particularly
16 broad.” (citation modified)).
17 2. Doe’s Other Claims for Relief
18 In view the Court’s decision (1) to grant Defendants’ Motion and to
19 dismiss Doe’s only federal claim for relief;45 and (2) to grant Doe’s Remand
20 Motion,46 the Court refrains from making a substantive ruling on Defendants’
21 Motion to dismiss Doe’s other six claims for relief; Defendants’ instant Motion
22 is DENIED without prejudice with respect to those claims. If Defendants
23
24 42 See generally Complaint.
25 43 Id. at 2:8–9.
26 44 Opposition 10:9–21.
27 45 See supra Part II.A.1.
1 choose to pursue their efforts to dismiss those claims, they may do so in the state
2 court.
3 B. Doe’s Motion to Remand
4 “When a case is in federal court on federal question jurisdiction, and the
5 federal claims are dismissed before trial, the trial court should decline to exercise
6 supplemental jurisdiction and dismiss or remand as appropriate the remaining
7 state law claims.” Taylor v. Bosco Credit, 2019 WL 2644671, at *4 (N.D. Cal.
8 June 27, 2019) (citing United Mine Workers of Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726
9 (1966)); see also Andrews v. Bd. of Trs. of the California State Univ., 2019 WL
10 4137622, at *1 (C.D. Cal. May 28, 2019) (“When a case is removed based on
11 federal question jurisdiction and all federal claims have been dismissed, the
12 district court may, in its discretion, decline to exercise jurisdiction over any
13 remaining state law claims and remand those claims to state court.”); York v.
14 Int’l Acad. of Film & Television, LLC, 2016 WL 3360953, at *1 (C.D. Cal.
15 June 13, 2016) (“If the federal claims that served as the basis for removal are
16 eliminated, the district court has discretion to decline to exercise its
17 supplemental jurisdiction and to remand the remaining state law claims to state
18 court.” (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a); Harrell v. 20th Century Ins. Co., 934 F.2d
19 203, 205 (9th Cir. 1991))).
20 Here, Defendants removed the instant action based upon federal question
21 jurisdiction.47 As previously discussed, the Court dismissed Doe’s Title IX
22 claim that gives rise to federal question jurisdiction. Therefore, the Court
23 exercises its discretion and declines to assert supplemental jurisdiction over the
24 remaining state-law claims. See Taylor, 2019 WL 2644671, at *4.
25 Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Doe’s Remand Motion.
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1 IV. DISPOSITION
2 For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby ORDERS as follows:
3 1. Defendants’ Motion to dismiss [ECF No. 22] is GRANTED in
4|| part and DENIED in part. Specifically,
5 a. Doe’s seventh claim for relief arising under Title IX is
6 DISMISSED without leave to amend; and
7 b. Defendants’ Motion is otherwise DENIED without
8 prejudice.
9 2. Doe’s Remand Motion [ECF No. 11] is GRANTED.
10 3. This case is REMANDED to Orange County Superior Court.
11 IT IS SO ORDERED. MUHA
12 .
73|| Dated: May 26, 2026
14 GNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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