The opinion
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
10
11 MOHAMED NABIL AMIN, et al., Case No.: 25-cv-02019-AJB-BLM
12 Plaintiffs,
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
13 v. COMPEL PLAINTIFF MOHAMED
NABIL AMIN’S CLAIMS TO
14 G2 SECURE STAFF, L.L.C., et al.,
ARBITRATION
15 Defendants.
(Doc. No. 32)
16
17
Before the Court is a motion filed by Defendant G2 Secure Staff, LLC (“G2”),
18
seeking the Court to compel the claims of Plaintiff Mohamed Nabil Amin (“Amin”) to
19
arbitration. (Doc. No. 32.) Defendants Menzies Aviation (USA) Inc. and Air Menzies
20
International, (USA) Inc. (collectively, “Menzies”) joined in the motion. (Doc. No. 43.)
21
Amin filed an opposition (Doc. No. 41), to which G2 replied (Doc. No. 45).1 For the
22
reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS the motion.
23
24
I. BACKGROUND
A. Procedural Background
25
The instant action is a wage-and-hour putative class action asserting that Defendants
26
27
28
1 G2 and Menzies (collectively, “Defendants”) misclassified Plaintiffs and other employees
2 at San Diego International Airport as “‘exempt’ in order to avoid requirements imposed by
3 the Labor Code.” (Doc. No. 27, First Am. Compl. (“FAC”), at ¶ 2.) Plaintiffs Amin and
4 Dawit Negusse (“Negusse”) filed the instant action in state court on June 16, 2025. (Doc.
5 No. 1-2.) G2 removed the instant action on August 6, 2025, on the basis of diversity
6 jurisdiction pursuant to the Class Action Fairness Act. (Doc. No. 1.) G2’s answer, filed
7 concurrently, asserts arbitration agreements as an affirmative defense. (Doc. No. 2 at 3.)
8 The next day, Magistrate Judge Barbara Lynn Major issued an order setting an Early
9 Neutral Evaluation Conference (“ENE”) and Case Management Conference (“CMC”) for
10 September 10, 2025. (Doc. No. 3 (“ENE Order”).) As required by the ENE Order (see id.
11 ¶¶ 4, 6), the parties filed a joint discovery plan and lodged confidential settlement
12 statements with Judge Major’s chambers in advance of the conferences (see Doc. No. 9).
13 After holding the ENE and CMC (Doc. No. 10), Judge Major issued a scheduling order,
14 setting deadlines regulating discovery and other pre-trial proceedings (Doc. No. 11). As
15 required by the scheduling order (Doc. No. 11 ¶ 1), the parties filed a joint motion for a
16 protective order (Doc. No. 13), which the Court granted (Doc. No. 15).
17 On October 29, 2025, the parties filed a joint motion to submit Negusse’s claims to
18 arbitration based on “the arbitration agreement that he signed in connection with his
19 employment with Defendant.” (Doc. No. 16 at 2.) The Court granted the motion the same
20 day. (Doc. No. 17.)
21 On December 9, 2025, the parties filed a joint motion requesting to extend the
22 deadline to amend the pleadings because Plaintiffs intended to add Elvissa Villarin as a
23 named plaintiff and the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency required
24 sixty-five days to determine whether it intended to investigate the alleged violations. (Doc.
25 No. 18.) The Court granted the motion, extending the deadline to February 26, 2026. (Doc.
26 No. 19.)
27 On February 20, 2026, G2 filed a motion to compel Amin’s claims to arbitration;
28 however, on February 26, 2026, the parties timely filed a joint motion for leave to file the
1 FAC (Doc. No. 25), which the Court granted, mooting the motion to compel arbitration
2 (Doc. No. 26). Plaintiffs filed the FAC the next day. (Doc. No. 27.) In the operative
3 complaint, Plaintiffs assert eleven causes of action against Defendants: (1) failure to timely
4 pay minimum wages and overtime/double time compensation, (2) failure to provide legally
5 compliant meal periods or compensation in lieu thereof, (3) failure to provide legally
6 compliant rest periods or compensation in lieu thereof, (4) failure to pay all wages owed
7 upon separation, (5) failure to provide paid sick leave and written notice of the amount of
8 sick leave available, (6) failure to furnish accurate itemized wage statements, (7) failure to
9 maintain accurate records, (8) failure to provide copies of signed documents, (9) failure to
10 reimburse for necessary work expenses, (10) violation of California’s Unfair Competition
11 Law (“UCL”), and (11) violation of the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (“PAGA”).
12 (See generally id.)
13 Two weeks later, Defendants again moved to compel arbitration, pointing to two
14 arbitration agreements: one from 2022 when he initially applied to work for G2 and one
15 from 2023 when he applied for a promotion. (Doc. No. 32-2 at 6–8 (2022 Arbitration
16 Agreement), 9–13 (2023 Arbitration Agreement).) Amin challenges the validity of both.
17 (See generally Doc. No. 41.)
18 B. Factual Background
19 Amin worked for G2 from approximately August 2022 to September 2024, although
20 he worked for S.A.S. Services Group, Inc. (“S.A.S”) at the San Diego International Airport
21 before G2 acquired S.A.S. (Doc. No. 32-1 at 7.) Upon the acquisition, Amin applied for
22 and accepted a position with G2.2 (Id.) Defendants state that “[a]s part of the application
23 process, Plaintiff Amin was required to (a) register for his own individual-specific account
24 using his email address, and (b) enter a unique password in order to log into the system and
25 submit his application for employment with G2.” (Doc. No. 32-1 at 7.) Next, in the online
26
27
2 Amin reports being employed by Defendants since 2016 but also does not dispute that “his first
28
1 application system, Amin “was first presented with an Electronic Signature Notice and
2 ||Consent disclosure form that informed him that, among other things, when he types his
3 ||name into a textbox in the online portal, it constitutes his electronic signature.” (/d.) Amin
4 “twas required to indicate his agreement to electronic signatures.” (/d.) Next, Amin was
5 || asked to enter his personal contact information, work history, and educational background.
6 || Then, Amin was presented an arbitration agreement (“2022 Arbitration Agreement’)
7 || which he “was required to scroll through,” type his name into a textbox, and “select one of
8 ||two radio buttons marked ‘Accept’ or ‘Decline’” “in order to continue the online
9 ||application process and submit his application.” (/d. at 7-8.) Defendants assert that,
10 || “[a]ecording to G2’s online application system,” Amin “accessed and electronically signed
11 |/the 2022 Arbitration Agreement” on August 26, 2022, “by typing his name into a textbox”
12 || and “select[ing] the radio button marked ‘Accept.’” Ud.; see also Doc. No. 32-2 at 8.)
13
14 Fig. 1:
Signature Page of 2022 Arbitration Agreement
1S ns turoves ne sugscr 0 A HaNORT OR BDRM ARBTATION PROGIAM TO THE EXTENT ALLOWED EY TH LAW. EMPLOYEES UNDERSTAND, AIOWLEDCE, AND ACHEE THAT
16
18 Sr. View Procint, ER Adkinson
19 |] erecrromic sicwarure: Please type your legal name (Mohamed Amin) into the signature field below:
0 Be □□□ er □□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□□ oe
21 (Doc. No. 32-2 at 8)
22 Next, Defendants state that, on May 9, 2023, Amin went through the same process
23 || of logging into the application system, accessing an updated arbitration agreement (“2023
24 || Arbitration Agreement’), scrolling through the entire document, and electronically signing
25 2023 Arbitration Agreement in order to apply for a promotion. (Doc. Nos. 32-1 at 8-9;
26 ||45 at 7.) Amin “typed [his name] into the textbox” and “selected the radio button marked
27 || ‘Accept’,” which caused “the text ‘Mohamed Amin’ [to] appear[] next to the signature
28 || line” and the word “Accepted” to appear below his name. (Doc. No. 32-1 at 9.) Finally,
1 Defendants assert that “by 2023, G2’s online application system was updated such that
2 || when the Arbitration Agreement is printed out, the date that Plaintiff Amin signed appears
3 under the word ‘Accepted’: ‘Date Signed: May 9, 2023.’” (/d.)
4 Fig. 2:
5 Signature Page of 2023 Arbitration Agreement
G? AND ITS EMPLOYEES ARE SUBJECT TO A MANDATORY BINDING ARBITRATION
6 ACKNOWLEDGE, AND AGREE THAT G2 IS AN “AT WILL” EMPLOYER AND THAT
EMPLOYEES ARE EMPLOYED ON AN "AT WILL” BASIS.
Sr. Vice President, HR and Administration
9 Mohamed Amin Mohamed Amin
Accepted
10 Date Signed: May 5, 2023
11 ||(Doc. No. 32-2 at 13)
12 In opposition, Amin avers “he never saw, signed, or was aware of any arbitration
13 ||agreement, either during his 2022 application or his 2023 application.” (Doc. No. 41 at 17.)
14 ||. LEGAL STANDARD
15 The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) applies to contracts “evidencing a transaction
16 || involving commerce.” 9 U.S.C. § 2; Brennan v. Opus Bank, 796 F.3d 1125, 1129 (9th Cir.
17 ||2015). “Generally, a court must determine two issues before deciding whether to compel
18 arbitration: (1) whether there is an agreement to arbitrate between the parties; and (2)
19 || whether the agreement covers the dispute.” Knapke v. PeopleConnect, Inc, 38 F.4th 824,
20 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting Zoller v. GCA Advisors, LLC, 993 F.3d 1198, 1201 (9th Cir.
21 ||2021)). If the two factors are met, the Court must enforce the arbitration agreement in
22 accordance with its precise terms. Kilgore v. KeyBank, Nat. Ass’n, 673 F.3d 947, 955 (9th
23 || Cir. 2012), on reh’g en banc, 718 F.3d 1052 (9th Cir. 2013).
24 The party seeking to compel arbitration “has the burden of proving the existence of
25 ||an agreement to arbitrate by a preponderance of the evidence.” Knutson v. Sirius XM Radio
26 || Inc., 771 F.3d 559, 565 (9th Cir. 2014). “In determining whether a valid arbitration
27 ||agreement exists, federal courts apply ordinary state-law principles that govern the
28 || formation of contracts.” Heckman v. Live Nation Ent., Inc., 120 F.4th 670, 680 (9th Cir.
1 2024), cert. denied sub nom. Live Nation v. Heckman, No. 24-1145, 2025 WL 2823733
2 (U.S. Oct. 6, 2025); see also Olson v. FCA US, LLC, 176 F.4th 612, 617 (9th Cir. 2026)
3 (“Arbitration is a matter of contract.”). “Thus, generally applicable contract defenses, such
4 as fraud, duress, or unconscionability, may be applied to invalidate arbitration agreements
5 without contravening” federal law. Doctor’s Assocs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681, 687
6 (1996). “[T]he party opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving any defense, such as
7 unconscionability.” Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Mkt. Dev. (US), LLC, 55
8 Cal. 4th 223, 236 (2012).
9 III. DISCUSSION
10 G2 moves to compel arbitration of Amin’s individual claims, and to dismiss Amin’s
11 putative class claims, and stay Amin’s representative PAGA claim. (See generally Doc.
12 No. 32-1.) Amin opposes the motion, arguing that G2 waived its right to compel arbitration
13 by litigating inconsistently with that right and that G2 has failed to establish by a
14 preponderance of the evidence there is a valid arbitration agreement because Amin avers
15 he never saw, signed, or was aware of any arbitration agreement.3 (See generally Doc. No.
16 41.) The Court addresses each issue in turn.
17 A. Whether G2 Waived Its Right to Compel Arbitration
18 Amin asserts that G2 waived its right to compel arbitration by (1) waiting to file the
19 motion to compel “more than eight months after the Complaint was filed[,]” (2)
20 “invok[ing] the judicial process” such as when G2 removed the case, filed a notice of
21 related case, participated in drafting and filing a joint discovery plan and joint motion for
22 protective order, and attended the ENE and CMC; and (3) “participat[ing] in discovery and
23 discovery-related motion practice” such as responding to Amin’s discovery requests,
24 engaging in the discovery dispute process, and agreeing to extend deadlines for discovery
25 motions. (Doc. No. 41 at 13–14.)
26
27
3 Amin does not contest that his claims fall within the Arbitration Agreement and does not raise any
28
1 In response, G2 asserts that it “never made an intentional decision not to move to
2 compel arbitration.” (Doc. No. 45 at 12.) Instead, G2 argues the delay was short—only six
3 months after removal, copies of the agreements were provided “as soon as they were
4 located,” and then counsel met and conferred “multiple times in an effort to avoid
5 unnecessary motion practice.” (Id.) Additionally, G2 contends that its participation in
6 litigation was limited to what was mandated by the Court through its scheduling order and
7 chambers rules—such as filing a joint motion for protective order and participating in an
8 informal discovery conference after responding to Amin’s written discovery requests with
9 objections. (Id. at 13.)
10 “[A] party waives its right to compel arbitration when (1) it has knowledge of the
11 right, and (2) it acts inconsistently with that right.” Hill v. Xerox Bus. Servs., LLC, 59 F.4th
12 457, 460 (9th Cir. 2023). “Under [Ninth Circuit] precedent, a party generally acts
13 inconsistently with exercising the right to arbitrate when it (1) makes an intentional
14 decision not to move to compel arbitration and (2) actively litigates the merits of a case for
15 a prolonged period of time in order to take advantage of being in court.” Armstrong v.
16 Michaels Stores, Inc., 59 F.4th 1011, 1015 (9th Cir. 2023) (citation and internal quotations
17 omitted). “There is no concrete test to determine whether a party has engaged in acts
18 inconsistent with its right to arbitrate; rather, we consider the totality of the parties’
19 actions.” Hill, 59 F.4th at 471 (citation omitted); see also Martin v. Yasuda, 829 F.3d 1118,
20 1125 (9th Cir. 2016) (collecting cases to map holdings on this element). “[T]he burden for
21 establishing waiver of an arbitration agreement is the same as the burden for establishing
22 waiver in any other contractual context.” Armstrong, 59 F.4th at 1015.
23 It is undisputed that G2 had knowledge of its right to arbitrate as it cited the
24 Arbitration Agreements as an affirmative defense in its answer and compelled Negusse’s
25 claims to arbitration earlier in this action. At issue, instead, is whether G2 acted
26 inconsistently with that right based on the totality of the parties’ actions.
27 The Court does not find that Defendants “actively litigate[d] the merits” of the case
28 to support a finding a waiver. Compare Martin, 829 F.3d at 1126 (9th Cir. 2016) (holding
1 a party waived the right to arbitration litigating for seventeen months, filing a motion to
2 dismiss “on a key merits issue,” only noting a right to arbitrate nearly a year into litigating,
3 and moving to arbitrate far later) with Armstrong, 59 F.4th at 1016 (rejecting waiver where
4 defendant “never s[ought] or obtain[ed] a ruling on the merits” and sought only “limited
5 discovery requests”). Defendants filed no substantive motions; in fact, Menzies has yet to
6 file a responsive pleading. G2 engaged in litigation only to the extent mandated by the
7 Court, such as filing a joint discovery statement, attending the ENE, filing a joint motion
8 for entry of a protective order, and meeting and conferring for a discovery dispute as
9 required by the scheduling order and the Magistrate Judge’s chambers rules. In each filing,
10 G2 asserted its intent to compel Amin’s claims to arbitration. (See Doc. Nos. 2 at 3
11 (asserting arbitration as an affirmative defense in answer); 9 at 3–4, 6–8 (arguing a schedule
12 should not issue and discovery should be stayed due to intent to compel arbitration); 13 at
13 2 n.1 (“reserv[ing] all rights and defenses with respect to enforcing its arbitration
14 agreements” and asserting participation should not be construed as waiver).) The Court
15 agrees that Amin’s characterization of G2’s engagement with discovery is “misleading.”
16 (See Doc. No. 45 at 13.) G2 responded to Amin’s written discovery exclusively with
17 objections, and the “discovery-related motion practice” was only to stay the deadline to
18 raise a discovery dispute pending the Court’s resolution of its motion to compel. (See Doc.
19 No. 23.)
20 Additionally, the Court does not find that the delay here to qualify as “a prolonged
21 period of time.” See, e.g., Fox v. Experian Info. Sols., Inc., 718 F. Supp. 3d 1231, 1239
22 (E.D. Cal. 2024) (finding a “defendant’s delay is insufficient to establish waiver” where
23 the “defendant moved to compel arbitration within a year of the filing of plaintiff’s
24 complaint, and its motion to compel arbitration is the first substantive motion filed in this
25 action”); Topolewski v. Experian Data Corp., 736 F. Supp. 3d 818, 825 (C.D. Cal. 2024)
26 (finding no “conduct indicating waiver” despite the defendant waiting eleven months to
27 file); Rissi v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 762 F. Supp. 3d 959, 972 (S.D. Cal. 2025) (finding no
28 waiver despite five-month delay).
1 Defendants “never wavered from the view that [they] had a right to arbitration, as
2 evidenced by [G2] moving to compel arbitration within a year after [Amin] filed the
3 complaint, never seeking or obtaining a ruling on the merits, and never waffling about
4 whether to arbitrate or stay in district court.” See Armstrong, 59 F.4th at 1016. Accordingly,
5 based on the totality of the parties’ actions, the Court finds that Defendants have not waived
6 their right to arbitration. See, e.g., Bracamontes v. United Rentals, Inc., No.
7 223CV02697DADCSK, 2024 WL 1884052, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2024) (“In this case,
8 defendant moved to compel arbitration well within a year of the filing of plaintiff’s
9 complaint, and its motion to compel arbitration is the first substantive motion filed in this
10 action. Accordingly, the court finds that defendant’s brief delay in filing the pending
11 motion is insufficient to establish a waiver of the right to arbitrate.”).
12 B. Whether the Agreements Are Valid and Enforceable
13 Defendants argue that both the 2022 and 2023 Arbitration Agreements are valid and
14 enforceable. (See generally Doc. Nos. 32; 45.) In opposition, Amin argues Defendants
15 failed to meet their burden because (1) Amin avers under penalty of perjury to having never
16 seen, signed, or been made aware of the agreements, (2) there is no electronic signature on
17 the 2022 Arbitration Agreement, (3) the metadata shows that both agreements were
18 modified at a much later date, and (4) Defendants fail to provide sufficient evidence
19 demonstrating the user interface. (See generally Doc. No. 41.)
20 First, Amin generally avers “he never saw, signed, or was aware of any arbitration
21 agreement, either during his 2022 application or his 2023 application.” (Doc. No. 41 at 17.)
22 However, relying on the declaration of Christopher Elliott, G2’s Director of Labor
23 Relations, Benefits, and Human Resources Information Systems, Defendants assert that
24 “Plaintiff could not have completed and submitted their online application for employment
25 without scrolling through the Arbitration Agreements.” (Doc. Nos. 45 at 7 (emphasis in
26 original); 32-2 at 1–5, Declaration of Christopher Elliott (“Elliott Decl.”), at ¶ 9 (“Plaintiff
27 Amin was required to scroll through the Arbitration Agreement in order to continue the
28 online application process and submit his application. In other words, an applicant
1 (including Plaintiff Amin) cannot complete and submit an application for employment with
2 G2 without scrolling through the Arbitration Agreement.”).)
3 Pursuant to the Uniform Electronic Transaction Act, a “signature may not be denied
4 legal effect or enforceability solely because it is in electronic form,” but rather, “[i]f a law
5 requires a signature, an electronic signature satisfies the law.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1633.7(a),
6 (d). “An electronic record or electronic signature is attributable to a person if it was the act
7 of the person.” Cal. Civ. Code § 1633.9(a). “The act of the person may be shown in any
8 manner, including a showing of the efficacy of any security procedure applied to determine
9 the person to which the electronic record or electronic signature was attributable.” Cal. Civ.
10 Code § 1633.9(a).
11 Because Amin was required (1) to create an individual-specific account using his
12 own email address and a “unique password,” (2) to consent to use of his typed name as an
13 electronic signature, and (3) to enter his personal information into the application before
14 being presented the Arbitration Agreement, Defendants have met their burden of
15 authenticating Amin’s signature. See, e.g., In re Axos Bank Litig., No. 23-CV-2266-RSH-
16 SBC, 2024 WL 4195299, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 13, 2024) (collecting cases where electronic
17 signature is authenticated by the defendant describing the relevant system’s security
18 measures and required steps for proceeding); Zamudio v. Aerotek, Inc., 733 F. Supp. 3d
19 931, 939–40 (E.D. Cal. 2024) (“Courts have found that evidence of a unique, secure
20 username and password may sufficiently authenticate a signature when that signature is a
21 typed name input by the user.”); Campbell v. CubeSmart, L.P., No. 24-CV-02282-AJB-
22 VET, 2025 WL 251429, at *5 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 21, 2025) (finding an employer met its burden
23 by detailing the required, sequential steps for electronic onboarding of employees which
24 included signing an arbitration agreement before the employee could move on to the next
25 step); Gonzalez v. Peak California Rest. Grp., LLC, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, No. 25-CV-04068-
26 AMO, 2026 WL 765325, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 18, 2026) (finding an employer sufficiently
27 authenticated the employee’s electronic signature on an arbitration agreement by
28 describing the login security and signing process).
1 As noted by G2 (see Doc. No. 45 at 7), Amin’s general denial of having seen or
2 signed an arbitration agreement is insufficient to create a genuine dispute where G2’s
3 application process requires applicants to scroll through the entire agreement in order to
4 press submit. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Lineage Logistics Servs. LLC, 769 F. Supp. 3d 1132,
5 1140 (E.D. Cal. 2025) (“Plaintiff’s mere statement that he ‘does not recall’ seeing or
6 signing the document is insufficient to create a material question of fact in light of
7 Defendant’s evidence to the contrary, even when considering all evidence in the light most
8 favorable to Plaintiff.”); Montes v. Thorntons LLC, --- F. Supp. 3d ----, No. 25-CV-05895-
9 EKL, 2026 WL 881712, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 26, 2026) (“Plaintiff’s bare denials [that he
10 did not sign an arbitration agreement] are insufficient to overcome [the defendant’s]
11 overwhelming evidence.”).
12 Beyond his general denials, Amin only raises two specific arguments to question the
13 validity of his electronic signature: (1) the difference in signature lines between the 2022
14 and 2023 Arbitration Agreements and (2) the “modification date” metadata.
15 With regard to the signature line, Amin asserts that the 2022 agreement “contains a
16 dotted signature line that appears empty, no typed name in the signature field, and no date
17 signed,” which is in conflict with the agreement produced for Negusse. (Doc. No. 41 at 8.)
18 Based on the Court’s review of all the arbitration agreements submitted by all named
19 plaintiffs in this action, pre-2023 arbitration agreements—such as the 2022 Arbitration
20 Agreement and Villarin’s 2017 arbitration agreement—have a dotted line leading to the
21 typed name of the plaintiff, under which the word “Accepted” appears. In contrast, the
22 2023 arbitration agreements—such as the one at issue here and Negusse’s—have no dotted
23 line and instead reflect the typed name of the plaintiff a second time and a “date signed”
24 field. Although Amin views the differences as supporting that he did not accept the 2022
25 Arbitration Agreement, Defendants proffer evidence explaining the difference as the result
26 of a system update. (See Elliott Decl. ¶ 13 (“By 2023, G2’s online application system was
27 updated such that when the Arbitration Agreement is printed out, the date that Plaintiff
28 Amin signed appears under the word ‘Accepted’: ‘Date Signed: May 9, 2023.’”).) The
1 Court finds this explanation sufficient. See, e.g., Catalan v. GE United Tech., LLC, No.
2 2:23-CV-01005-SPG (SHK), 2023 WL 12294391, at *4 (C.D. Cal. June 9, 2023) (finding
3 an electronic signature sufficiently authenticated where the employer “explained why the
4 font on the signature appears different from those in other documents signed by [the
5 employee] on Green Leaf[, the employer’s online portal]”).
6 With regard to metadata, Amin argues that “the documentary evidence Defendant
7 relies upon raises significant questions regarding authenticity and reliability” because G2
8 “initially represented that no signed arbitration agreement existed” but “later produced a
9 document on September 12, 2025, that purportedly applied to Plaintiff, yet that version
10 lacked the signature features present in Plaintiff Negusse’s agreement” and the metadata
11 associated with both the 2022 and 2023 Arbitration Agreements have modification dates,
12 which Negusse’s did not have. (Doc. No. 41 at 19.) In his declaration, Amin avers to having
13 “r[u]n metadata on the document that Defendant contends is [his] arbitration agreement,”
14 and provides a true and correct copy of the “metadata report” as an exhibit. (Doc. No. 41-
15 2 at 1–3, Declaration of Plaintiff Mohamed Nabil Amin (“Amin Decl.”), at ¶ 13.)
16 G2 responds that the metadata issue is a “red herring” because (1) the metadata
17 report lacks the necessary foundation, (2) the modification date of the copies of the
18 agreements could have explanations that do not undermine their authenticity, and
19 (3) Plaintiff Counsel failed to raise the issue of metadata during the meet-and-confer, “so
20 Defendant had no opportunity to meaningfully respond.” (Doc. No. 45 at 10–11.)
21 G2’s third point lacks merit. Defendants were able to “meaningfully respond” in
22 reply. Second, although G2 provides a scenario in past conditional tense where “copies
23 may contain ‘metadata’ that reflect[] different ‘creation’ or ‘modification’ dates” (see id.
24 at 10 (emphasis added)), it is not clear from the sentence construction whether G2 is
25
26
4 Although not considered in reaching its determination, the Court notes that Amin’s argument that
27 the dotted line demonstrates a lack of signature on the 2022 Arbitration Agreement implicitly
acknowledges that the absence of a dotted line on the 2023 Arbitration Agreement is because it is in fact
28
1 arguing that is, in fact, the reason for the “modification date” metadata. Moreover, G2
2 proffers no declaration or other evidence to support this explanation. As such, the Court
3 does not find G2’s second argument persuasive. However, G2’s first argument raises the
4 issue of whether the Court can consider the metadata.
5 “In reviewing motions to compel arbitration[,] a court must consider all relevant,
6 admissible evidence submitted by the parties and contained in pleadings, depositions,
7 answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits.” Herrera v.
8 Cathay Pac. Airways Ltd., 104 F.4th 702, 705 (9th Cir. 2024); see also Fed. R. Civ. P.
9 56(c)(1)(B) (“A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support
10 the assertion by . . . showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence
11 of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to
12 support the fact.”), 56(c)(4) (“An affidavit or declaration used to support or oppose a
13 motion must be made on personal knowledge, set out facts that would be admissible in
14 evidence, and show that the affiant or declarant is competent to testify on the matters
15 stated.”). Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Evidence, “[i]f a witness is not testifying as an
16 expert, testimony in the form of an opinion is limited to one that is (a) rationally based on
17 the witness’s perception; (b) helpful to clearly understanding the witness’s testimony or to
18 determining a fact in issue; and (c) not based on scientific, technical, or other specialized
19 knowledge within the scope of Rule 702.” Fed. R. Evid. 701. However, to testify as an
20 expert, the witness must meet the more stringent criteria of Federal Rule of Evidence 702.
21 Because Amin used some sort of technical program or software to generate the
22 metadata report, his opinion based thereon is not “rationally based on [his] perception,” but
23 rather on technical knowledge. See Fed. R. Evid. 701(a), (c). However, Amin does not
24 provide any facts addressing how he “is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill,
25 experience, training, or education,” how his “testimony is based on sufficient facts or
26 data[, . . .] is the product of reliable principles and methods[, . . . and] reflects a reliable
27 application of the principles and methods to the facts of the case.” See Fed. R. Evid. 702.
28 Without information about Amin’s credentials or the process for running the metadata
1 report, the Court finds the metadata report inadmissible. Even if it were admissible, the
2 Court finds the metadata report and the questions of modification to bear minimal weight
3 for the same reasons. As such, the Court finds that the “modification date” metadata does
4 not call into question the authenticity of the 2022 and 2023 Arbitration Agreements such
5 that there is a genuine dispute of material fact. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1)(B), 56(c)(4).
6 Finally, Amin argues that Defendants fail to provide evidence “demonstrating how
7 the agreement was actually displayed to Plaintiff at the time he applied, how conspicuous
8 it was, or whether the process required meaningful review,” or “any evidence, such as
9 screenshots, system logs, or user interface descriptions, showing that a download option
10 was actually available to Plaintiff at the time of his applications[.]” (Doc. No. 41 at 18
11 (relying on Avery v. Integrated Healthcare Holdings, Inc., 218 Cal. App. 4th 50, 66–67
12 (2013)).) Amin relies on Avery as an example of where a court rejected an arbitration
13 agreement under “similar circumstances” because “the employer failed to demonstrate that
14 the employee received meaningful notice of the agreement’s terms” (id.); however, the
15 facts of Avery are hardly analogous to those presented here.
16 In Avery, an employer attempted to enforce an arbitration agreement implied-in-fact
17 through continued employment based on the employee receiving a handbook referencing
18 the requirement. Avery, 218 Cal. App. 4th at 63. The employer conceded that the employee
19 never signed an arbitration agreement or any document referencing receipt of the
20 handbook. Id. The employer failed to present any evidence showing it sent or otherwise
21 provided the employee with the handbook. Id. at 64. The employee, on the other hand,
22 proffered a declaration that she did not receive an employee handbook, she never spoke
23 with anyone about the arbitration policy, and she kept all her orientation documents, which
24 do not include the handbook. Id. at 64–65. The Avery court found the foregoing to
25 constitute “substantial evidence” that the employer failed to meet its evidentiary burden
26 that the employee had notice of the arbitration agreement, as required to enforce an
27 implied-in-fact agreement. Id. at 65–66.
28 ///
1 In stark contrast, Defendants here have proffered evidence that Amin received both
2 Arbitration Agreements and was required to scroll their contents to proceed with his
3 applications. Moreover, Amin’s denials do not include the same degree of specific details
4 or other evidence that the employee in Avery proffered to explain how he knew he never
5 signed or why he never signed. Cf. Metter v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 16-CV-06652-RS, 2017
6 WL 1374579, at *3–4 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 17, 2017) (finding no notice where the plaintiff
7 declared the terms of service alert was blocked by the application’s keypad); Duarte v.
8 Mission Fed. Credit Union, No. 319CV01441AJBKSC, 2020 WL 4732058, at *3 (S.D.
9 Cal. Aug. 14, 2020) (finding lack of mutual assent where the plaintiff declared “she never
10 signed a document containing the arbitration provision” and “her visual impairment
11 physically kept her from seeing or understanding the terms on the notices”). Accordingly,
12 Defendants have sufficiently demonstrated that Amin had notice of and electronically
13 signed both Arbitration Agreements. See, e.g.¸ Zamudio, 733 F. Supp. 3d at 939–40.
14 C. Whether Amin’s Claims Fall Within the Agreement’s Scope
15 Having found Amin signed both Arbitration Agreements, the Court turns to whether
16 the claims fall within the scope of the agreements. Defendants argue that “the entirety of
17 Plaintiff’s claims stem from his employment with G2,” so all claims “fall squarely within
18 the scope of his Arbitration Agreement.” (Doc. No. 32-1 at 17.) Further, Defendants assert
19 that the putative class claims in the first ten causes of action are barred by the class action
20 waiver and, thus, must be dismissed. (Id. at 21–22.) Finally, Defendants argue that the
21 representative PAGA claim brought on behalf of others must be stayed pending arbitration
22 of Amin’s status as an aggrieved employee. (Id. at 22–23.) Amin does not address any of
23 these issues in his opposition. (See Doc. Nos. 41; 45 at 14.)
24 Both Arbitration Agreements mandate that “all legal disputes and claims between
25 [the parties] shall be determined exclusively by final and binding arbitration[.]” (Doc. No.
26 32-2 at 7 (2022), 11 (2023).) Covered claims “include all claims arising from or relating to
27 Individual’s application for employment, employment (if hired), employment benefits, and
28 termination of employment[.]” (Id. at 7 (2022), 11 (2023).) The 2023 Arbitration
1 Agreement lists as excluded “non-individual claims under PAGA for Labor Code
2 violations that Individual claims an employee other than Individual suffered[.]” (Id. at 11.)
3 Finally, both Arbitration Agreements include a class, collective, and representative action
4 waiver, although the 2022 version has more expansive language with regard to
5 representative actions than the 2023 version. (Id. at 8 (2022), 11 (2023).)
6 Because all eleven of Amin’s causes of action assert wage-and-hour violations, the
7 Court finds the claims arise from Amin’s employment with G2. However, the
8 representative PAGA claim is excluded from arbitration, both by the express terms of the
9 2023 Arbitration Agreement and by California law. See Diaz v. Macys W. Stores, Inc., 101
10 F.4th 697, 705 (9th Cir. 2024) (“The California Supreme Court has held that the ability to
11 bring non-individual PAGA actions cannot be waived by agreement, because such a waiver
12 would frustrate the enforcement objectives of PAGA.”). To the extent the 2022 Arbitration
13 Agreement would attempt to compel arbitration of the representative PAGA claim in
14 violation of California law, the severability clause would sever any unlawful aspects of the
15 contract and permit the Court to enforce the remaining agreement. See Johnson v. Lowe’s
16 Home Centers, LLC, 93 F.4th 459, 464 (9th Cir. 2024) (“The rest of the contract—
17 including Johnson’s agreement to arbitrate her individual PAGA claim—remains binding
18 and enforceable.”). Based on the class action waiver, the putative class claims cannot be
19 compelled to arbitration. See Granite Rock Co. v. Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters, 561 U.S. 287,
20 299 (2010) (“Arbitration is strictly a matter of consent and thus is a way to resolve those
21 disputes—but only those disputes—that the parties have agreed to submit to arbitration.”)
22 (cleaned up). Rather, Amin must arbitrate his California Labor Code and UCL claims
23 against Defendants on an individual basis. The representative PAGA claim must be stayed
24 pending arbitration of the rest of the claims. See 9 U.S.C. § 3. (See also Doc. No. 32-2 at 8
25 (2022), 11 (2023) (“If a party brings an action that includes both claims subject to
26 arbitration under this Agreement and claims that by law are not subject to arbitration, all
27 claims that by law are not subject to arbitration and as to which Individual has standing
28 after a claim that is subject to arbitration has been sent to arbitration shall be stayed until
1 claims subject to arbitration are fully arbitrated.”).)
2 CONCLUSION
3 For the reasons discussed above, the Court hereby ORDERS:
4 1. Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED. Plaintiff Mohamed
5 ||Nabil Amin must arbitrate his individual claims pursuant to the terms of the Arbitration
6 || Agreements.
7 2. Plaintiff Mohamed Nabil Amin’s non-PAGA, putative class claims are
8 || DISMISSED.
9 3. The instant action is STAYED as to Plaintiff Mohamed Nabil Amin pending
10 arbitration of his individual claims.
11 4. Amin and Defendants must file a joint status report addressing the status of
12 || arbitration is due no later than September 2, 2026, with specific details including the date
13 |}when the parties submitted the matter to arbitration. This joint status report may be
14 || combined with that submitted for Negusse’s claims.
15 5. Every sixty days thereafter, the parties must file joint status reports
16 |/informing the Court about the status of arbitration, including specific details regarding
17 subsequent dates, any changes to dates, and actions the parties are taking to facilitate the
18 || process.
19 IT IS SO ORDERED.
20 || Dated: July 2, 2026 ©
21 Hon, Anthony J.Battaglia
22 United States District Judge
23
24
25
26
27
28
17