The opinion
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8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
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11 DEILI PORFIDI MAURICIO CANO, Case No.: 3:25-cv-03334-DMS-KSC
12 Petitioner,
ORDER GRANTING PETITIONER’S
13 v. MOTION FOR FURTHER RELIEF
14 CHRISTOPHER J. LAROSE, Senior
[ECF No. 15]
Warden, Otay Mesa Detention Center, et
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al.,
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Respondents.
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On November 27, 2025, Petitioner Deili Porfidi Mauricio Cano petitioned for writ
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of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, contesting her detention at the Otay Mesa
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Detention Center. (Mot., ECF No. 1.) On December 24, 2025, this Court found, over
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Respondents’ opposition, Petitioner’s prolonged detention violated her due process rights,
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and granted in part the Petition (“Habeas Order”). (See Habeas Order, ECF No. 12, at 6.)
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Specifically, the Court denied Petitioner’s request for immediate release, but ordered
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Respondents to provide her with an individualized bond hearing within fourteen (14) days
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of entry of the Habeas Order. (Id.) Petitioner received a hearing on January 6, 2026,
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wherein the immigration judge (“IJ”) denied bond because Petitioner “failed to
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demonstrate that she does not present an extreme risk of flight such that no amount of bond
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1 was warranted.” (IJ Order, ECF No. 21-1, at 7.) Petitioner appealed to the Board of
2 Immigration Appeals, which remains pending. (See Mot. ¶ 18.) Now, Petitioner moves
3 this Court for further relief, arguing the IJ incorrectly placed the burden on Petitioner. (Id.
4 ¶ 28.) This matter is fully briefed, (see ECF Nos. 18 (Respondents’ opposition), 19
5 (Petitioner’s reply)), and suitable for decision without oral argument pursuant to Civil
6 Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). Considering the briefs, submitted evidence, and legal authority, the
7 Court grants Petitioner’s motion.
8 “District courts have the authority to review compliance with prior orders granting
9 habeas relief, including orders for bond hearings.” Bayani v. LaRose, No. 26-CV-0266,
10 2026 WL 1270059, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May 8, 2026) (citing Leonardo v. Crawford, 646 F.3d
11 1157, 1161 (9th Cir. 2011)). Specifically, “the Court retains jurisdiction to determine
12 whether a party has complied with its earlier habeas order.” Lara v. Bondi, No. 26-cv-
13 1125, 2026 WL 892021, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2026) (citing Leonardo, 646 F.3d at 1161).
14 Federal courts also have jurisdiction to review whether the agency properly applied the
15 burden of proof. Martinez v. Clark, 124 F.4th 775, 784 (9th Cir. 2024). When conducting
16 bond hearings for detainees held under 8 U.S.C. § 1225, IJs must place the burden on the
17 Government to prove by clear and convincing evidence that the detainee is either a flight
18 risk or danger to the community. Bayani, 2026 WL 1270059, at *5 (citations omitted).
19 “The clear and convincing evidence standard is an ‘intermediate burden of proof’ applied
20 when ‘particularly important interests are at stake.’” Id. (citation omitted).
21 Here, the IJ misplaced the burden onto Petitioner. In its Habeas Order, the Court
22 conducted its analysis assuming Petitioner was properly detained under § 1225(b)(2)(A),
23 rather than 8 U.S.C. § 1226(a). (Habeas Order 4.) Under this assumption, the Court found
24 Petitioner’s detention became unconstitutionally prolonged in violation of the Fifth
25 Amendment’s Due Process Clause and, for that reason, ordered Respondents to provide
26 Petitioner with a bond hearing before an IJ. (Id. at 5–6.) Thus, it was the Government’s
27 burden to prove Petitioner was either a flight risk or a danger to the community. However,
28 the IJ’s written order recites the burden of proof for a § 1226(a) bond hearing, rather than
1 |}a §1225(b)(2)(A) prolonged detention hearing. (See IJ Order 6.) Further, the IJ denied
2 Petitioner bond because Petitioner “failed to demonstrate that she does not present an
3 ||}extreme risk of flight.” (Ud. at 7.) Thus, the IJ misplaced the Government’s burden of
4 ||proof onto Petitioner and relied upon this improper burden when denying bond.
5 || Accordingly, the Court finds the bond hearing was constitutionally deficient. Petitioner’s
6 motion for further relief is GRANTED.!
7 The Court ORDERS Respondents to provide Petitioner with a second bond
8 determination hearing within ten (10) days of entry of this Order. See Bayani, 2026 WL
9 || 1270059, at *8 (ordering second bond hearing when immigration judge failed to place
10 |/burden on Government). At this bond hearing, Respondents must justify Petitioner’s
11 |/continued detention by a showing of clear and convincing evidence that she would likely
12 || flee or pose a danger to the community if released. Elikaei v. LaRose, No. 25-CV-03219,
13 WL 3539165, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2025). Respondents are further ORDERED
14 || to provide a status report within five (5) days of providing Petitioner with a bond hearing,
15 notifying this Court of the results.
16 IT IS SO ORDERED.
17 || Dated: July 2, 2026 f
18 a YM «
19 Hon. Dana M. Sabraw
United States District Judge
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25 ' Respondents argue that Petitioner must first exhaust her administrative remedies before seeking relief
from this Court. (See ECF No. 18, at 2-4.) While this Court previously required prudential exhaustion,
26 || Elikaei v. Larose, No. 25-CV-03219, 2026 WL 1625645, at *1 (S.D. Cal. June 5, 2026), the present case
is factually distinct in that the IJ explicitly recited and relied on an improper burden of proof. Thus,
27 considering the circumstances in this case and the narrow scope of the Court’s review, waiver of
28 exhaustion is warranted. See Singh v. LaRose, No. 26-CV-1425, 2026 WL 1387428, at *3 (S.D. Cal. May
18, 2026); Bayani, 2026 WL 1270059, at *5.