Opinion

Opinion

Court
District Court, C.D. California
Filed
May 27, 2026
Cited by
0 cases
Authority
More cited than 41.5%

The opinion

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 2:26-cv-05090-MWF (SK) Date: May 27, 2026

Title Joshua Hurd v. Sheriff of Los Angeles County

Present: The Honorable: Steve Kim, United States Magistrate Judge

Connie Chung n/a

Deputy Clerk Court Reporter / Recorder

Attorneys Present for Attorneys Present for

Plaintiff(s)/Petitioner(s): Defendant(s)/Respondent(s):

None present None present

Proceedings: (IN CHAMBERS) ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Petitioner Joshua Hurd is a pretrial detainee at North County Correctional

Facility on state criminal charges for burglary. (ECF 1 at 1). According to petitioner,

satanic cult members broke into his music production studio, called the police, and

reported petitioner for burglary. (Id.). He alleges that the cult members have since

ransacked the building, stolen equipment and cargo trailers filled with “treasures,” and

stolen the identities of various individuals who worked at or rented space at the studio.

(Id. at 2–4). Petitioner seeks federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 claiming he is

being detained without due process because his arrest was not prompted by an “owner

complaint.” (Id. at 4–5). But as alleged, his petition is subject to summary dismissal for

two separate procedural deficiencies. See L.R. 72-3.2.

First, federal courts may not intervene in pending state court proceedings under

Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971). Indeed, “Younger exemplifies one class of

cases in which federal-court abstention is required: When there is a parallel, pending

state criminal proceeding[.]” Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72 (2013).

And nothing in the petition credibly suggests that one of the narrow exceptions to this

rule might apply: when a prosecution is “undertaken for harassment purposes or in bad

faith without hope of obtaining a valid conviction,” or if there are “other extraordinary

circumstances where irreparable injury can be shown.” Brown v. Ahern, 676 F.3d 899,

902–03 (9th Cir. 2012) (cleaned up). The Court has no authority to derail petitioner’s

pending state criminal prosecution “until after the jury comes in, judgment has been

CIVIL MINUTES – GENERAL

Case No. 2:26-cv-05090-MWF (SK) Date: May 27, 2026

Title Joshua Hurd v. Sheriff of Los Angeles County

appealed from and the case [is] concluded in the state courts.” Drury v. Cox, 457 F.2d

764, 764–65 (9th Cir. 1972); see, e.g., Bautista v. People of California, 2016 WL

5661861, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2016) (dismissing habeas petition sua sponte based

on Younger abstention).

Second, even if Younger abstention was not required, dismissal would still be

proper because petitioner has not exhausted his federal claims in state court. See, e.g.,

Lobato v. San Bernardino Cnty., 2020 WL 1166996, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2020)

(dismissing § 2241 petition for lack of exhaustion because there was “no indication that

[the petitioner had] presented any of his claims to the California Supreme Court”);

Neter v. Villanueva, 2020 WL 442992, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 28, 2020) (same). To be

sure, the exhaustion requirement for § 2241 actions is only a prudential one. See Ward

v.Chavez, 678 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2012). But there is hardly any more fitting

situation for federal judicial prudence than when a state criminal defendant tries to

short-circuit his pending prosecution with premature federal habeas claims. Petitioner

has not explained (nor is the Court aware of any reason) why he cannot raise his claims

first in state court, whether that be through pretrial motion practice, defenses at trial, or

available appellate remedies.

For all these reasons, petitioner is ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE on or before

June 18, 2026, why the Court should not dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction

and lack of exhaustion. Petitioner may discharge this order by voluntarily dismissing

the entire action using the attached Form CV-09y. Failure to respond to this order,

however, may lead to involuntary dismissal for failure to prosecute and obey court

orders. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); L.R. 41-1.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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