Coronado

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

9 SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

10

11 ANDREW VICTOR CORONADO, Case No.: 26-CV-3650 TWR (SBC)

12 Plaintiff,

ORDER (1) GRANTING

13 v. PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO

PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS,

14 COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO, et al.,

(2) DISMISSING FIRST AMENDED

15 Defendants. COMPLAINT PURSUANT TO

28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), AND

16

(3) DENYING AS MOOT

17 REMAINING EX PARTE MOTIONS

18

(ECF Nos. 2–6)

19

20 Presently before the Court are Plaintiff Andrew Victor Coronado’s Master Verified

21 Federal Amended Complaint in Equity and Civil Rights (“FAC,” ECF No. 6), Application

22 to Proceed in District Court Without Prepaying Fees or Costs (Long Form) (“IFP Mot.,”

23 ECF No. 3), Ex Parte Motion for Leave to File Electronically (“E-Filing Mot.,” ECF No.

24 3), Ex Parte Motion for Preliminary Injunction (“PI Mot.,” ECF No. 4), and Emergency

25 Ex Parte Application for a Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO Mot.,” ECF No. 5). For

26 the reasons discussed below, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s IFP Motion, DISMISSES

27 Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), and

28 DENIES AS MOOT Plaintiff’s remaining Ex Parte Motions.

1 MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS

2 All parties instituting any civil action, suit, or proceeding in a district court of the

3 United States, except an application for a writ of habeas corpus, must pay filing and

4 administration fees totaling $405.1 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). A court may, however, in its

5 discretion, allow a plaintiff to proceed without paying these fees if the plaintiff seeks leave

6 to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) by submitting an affidavit demonstrating the fees

7 impose financial hardship. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a); Escobedo v. Applebees, 787 F.3d

8 1226, 1234 (2015). Although the statute does not specify the qualifications for proceeding

9 IFP, the plaintiff’s affidavit must allege poverty with some particularity. Escobedo, 787

10 F.3d at 1234. Granting a plaintiff leave to proceed IFP may be proper, for example, when

11 the affidavit demonstrates that paying court costs will result in a plaintiff’s inability to

12 afford the “necessities of life.” Id. The affidavit, however, need not demonstrate that the

13 plaintiff is destitute. Id.

14 Here, Plaintiff’s affidavit indicates that he receives $1,900 per month in public

15 assistance, (see IFP Mot. at 1–2); spends $2,900 per month on rent, utilities, food, and

16 transportation, (see id. at 4–5); has a checking account that is overdrawn by $3,500, (see

17 id. at 2); and is supporting four children under the age of six. (See id. at 3.) Because

18 Plaintiff adequately demonstrates that he cannot pay the $405 filing fee and still afford the

19 necessities of life, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s IFP Motion (ECF No. 2).

20 SUA SPONTE SCREENING PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

21 I. Legal Standard

22 The Court must screen every civil action brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)

23 and dismiss any case it finds “frivolous or malicious,” “fails to state a claim on which relief

24 may be granted,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from relief.”

25

26

1 In addition to the $350 statutory fee, civil litigants must pay an additional administrative fee of

27 $55. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) (Judicial Conference Schedule of Fees, District Court Misc. Fee Schedule,

§ 14 (eff. Dec. 1, 2023)). The additional $55 administrative fee does not apply to persons granted leave

28

1 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); see also Calhoun v. Stahl, 254 F.3d 845, 845 (9th Cir. 2001)

2 (“[T]he provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) are not limited to prisoners.”); Lopez v.

3 Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126–27 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (noting that 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)

4 “not only permits but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint

5 that fails to state a claim”). As amended by the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”),

6 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) mandates that the court reviewing an action filed pursuant to the

7 IFP provisions of section 1915 make and rule on its own motion to dismiss before directing

8 the Marshal to effect service pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(c)(3). See Fed.

9 R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3); Navarette v. Pioneer Med. Ctr., No. 12-cv-0629-WQH (DHB), 2013

10 WL 139925, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 9, 2013).

11 “The purpose of [screening] is ‘to ensure that the targets of frivolous or malicious

12 suits need not bear the expense of responding.’” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 907

13 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014). While Federal “Rule [of Civil Procedure] 12(b)(6) does not

14 countenance . . . dismissals based on a judge’s disbelief of a complaint’s factual

15 allegations[,] . . . Section 1915([e)(2]) . . . accords judges not only the authority to dismiss

16 a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory, but also the unusual power to pierce

17 the veil of the complaint’s factual allegations and dismiss those claims whose factual

18 contentions are clearly baseless,” including “claims describing fantastic or delusional

19 scenarios.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327–28 (1989). A pleading is “factual[ly]

20 frivolous[]” if “the facts alleged rise to the level of the irrational or the wholly incredible,

21 whether or not there are judicially noticeable facts available to contradict them.” Denton

22 v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 33 (1992).

23 II. Plaintiff’s Allegations

24 Plaintiff generally alleges a vast, fourteen-year conspiracy between various state,

25 county, municipal, and private corporate actors and individuals to conceal a July 26, 2012

26 “kidnapping and torture” of Plaintiff, who was then a minor in dependency proceedings,

27 “to orchestrate a highly lucrative administrative fraud” to the tune of $9.2 million in Title

28 IV-E federal funds. (See FAC at 15, 40.) When Plaintiff was poised to expose this fraud,

1 Defendants preemptively destroyed his credibility by “forc[ing] [a] 2025 plea deal . . . to

2 brand the Plaintiff with a criminal record.” (See id. at 40.) After Plaintiff filed a California

3 Public Records Act request in early October 2025, Defendants “orchestrated a ‘staged

4 accident’ or kinetic event” in which Plaintiff “suffered a catastrophic motor vehicle

5 collision resulting in a severe Subarachnoid Hemorrhage (brain bleed) and stroke[]” on

6 October 29, 2025. (See id. at 42.) In an act of “Medical Mimicry,” Plaintiff was arrested

7 for driving under the influence. (See id. at 42–43.) While Plaintiff was comatose, his

8 driver’s license was suspended, (see id. at 43), and he was arrested for driving on a

9 suspended license on December 21, 2025. (See id. at 44.) This “muti-agency racketeering

10 enterprise” was designed to prevent Plaintiff from “access[ing] the Federal Court to enforce

11 [his] $290.9 million equitable lien.” (See id. at 44–45.)

12 Plaintiff brings claims for deprivation of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and

13 Monell v. Department of Social Services, 426 U.S. 658 (1978); extrinsic fraud on the court;

14 the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3729; conspiracy to interfere with his civil rights under

15 42 U.S.C. § 1985; retaliation in violation of California Labor Code § 1102.5;

16 “[i]nstitutional [d]omestic [a]buse & [f]raudulent [s]iphoning[;]” “[e]xtrinsic [f]raud &

17 [f]orgery of the 90-[d]ay [t]ransition [p]lan[;]” fraud in the inducement and rescission of

18 “[v]oid [l]iability [w]aivers; “[u]nlawful [c]onversion & [a]buse of [r]epresentative [p]aye

19 [s]tatus;” violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206; and “[e]xtrinsic fraud upon the tribunal and

20 subversion of WIC § 241.4 protocols.” (See Compl. at 49–61 (emphasis omitted).) Among

21 other things, Plaintiff seeks declaratory relief; imposition of a constructive trust in the

22 amount of $14.3 million; “the immediate, condition-free disbursement of $500,000.00 to

23 the Enforcer [i.e., Plaintiff] to remedy the ‘State-Created Insolvency,’ provide for the

24 biological Estate, and restore the ‘Equality of Arms’ for the duration of this litigation[;]”

25 an immediate stay of the “malicious prosecutions [of Plaintiff] in both San Bernardino

26 County (Case No. FSB24001315) and San Diego County (Case No. CE437463)[;]” “[a]

27 Writ of Mandate compelling the California Department of Motor Vehicles to immediately

28 lift the November 7, 2025, administrative suspension[ of Plaintiff’s license][;]”

1 “[c]ompensatory [r]estitution” in the amount of $290,719,993.00; treble damages under the

2 False Claims Act; and punitive damages. (See id. at 61–66 (emphasis omitted).)

3 III. Analysis

4 Having reviewed Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint, the Court concludes that

5 dismissal is warranted under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i). Although the Court is

6 sympathetic to Plaintiff, his allegations concerning a fourteen-year-long and vast

7 conspiracy involving various state, county, municipal, and private corporate entities and

8 individuals “[n]o matter how sincerely believed by Plaintiff, . . . are simply too fantastic to

9 warrant the expenditure of further judicial and private resources.” See Athans v. Starbucks

10 Coffee Co., No. CV-06-1841-PHX-DGC, 2007 WL 1673883, at *2 (D. Ariz. June 11,

11 2007) (sua sponte dismissing as frivolous pro se litigant’s complaint alleging a conspiracy

12 of “illegal surveillance, undercover ‘sting’ operations, and [the] unlawful ‘doping’ of

13 [Starbucks] beverages.”); see also, e.g., Franklin v. Newsom, No. 3:21-CV-01645-GPC-

14 BGS, 2021 WL 5827117, at *3, *5 (S.D. Cal. Dec. 7, 2021) (sua sponte dismissing as

15 frivolous under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) and 1915A(b)(1) case seeking

16 $3,010,000,000 in damages from “former Governors of California, together with the

17 former President and Vice-President of the United States” for “unspecified Constitutional

18 violations”); Johnson v. Paul, No. 20-CV-2174-JLS (WVG), 2020 WL 6825673, at *1–2

19 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 20, 2020) (sua sponte dismissing as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

20 § 1915(e)(2) complaint seeking $1 billion in damages against “Defendants Pope Francis

21 Paul, Russell Moore, President Obama, President Trump, Mike Pompeo, Senator Kamala

22 Harris, Angela Byers, and members of the United Nations” for “‘crimes in religion over 12

23 yr period . . . human trafficking crimes, Biblical crimes . . . extortion, conspiracies . . .

24 public kidnappings,’ and other unclear allegations”); Abel v. Trump, No. CV 20-00075

25 LEK-WRP, 2020 WL 2530310, at *2 (D. Haw. May 18, 2020) (sua sponte dismissing

26 prisoner’s “irrational and wholly incredible” claims that “President Trump personally came

27 to Kauai and withdrew bone marrow from both of his legs” as frivolous pursuant to 28

28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2) and 1915A); Martin v. Trump, No. 3:18-CV-02677-BTM-JLB, 2019

1 WL 1317331, at *1–3 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 2019) (sua sponte dismissing as “plainly

2 frivolous” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) complaint against “current and former

3 Presidents of the United States, the former Governor of California, a Superior Court Judge,

4 the San Diego County Sheriff, and dozens of [Richard J. Donovan Correctional Facility]

5 correctional officers, psychiatrists, psychologists, nurses, technicians, social workers, and

6 therapists” regarding “‘a food and water poisoning operation’ involving ‘microscopic

7 mites’ [that] . . . are tracked using Global Positioning Systems . . . transmitting devices,

8 and controlled by . . . mainframe computers at” various prisons).

9 “Because Plaintiff’s claims, like those in the cases cited above, are fanciful,

10 irrational, incredible, and appear delusional, they qualify not only as legally implausible,

11 but as factually frivolous.” See Order Dismissing Civil Action as Frivolous Pursuant to 28

12 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and Denying Motion to Proceed in Forma Pauperis as Moot at 5,

13 Blanton v. CDCR, No. 3:24-cv-00595-DMS-BLM (S.D. Cal. filed June 24, 2024), ECF

14 No. 5 (citing Denton, 504 U.S. at 33 (quoting Neitzke, 490 U.S. at 328)). “When a case

15 [is] . . . frivolous . . . , there is, by definition, no merit to the underlying action and so no

16 reason to grant leave to amend.” Lopez, 203 F.3d at 1128 n.8. The Court therefore

17 DISMISSES Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND

18 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).2

19 CONCLUSION

20 In light of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s IFP Motion (ECF No. 2),

21 DISMISSES Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint (ECF No. 6) pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

22 § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i), and DENIES WITHOUT PREJUDICE AS MOOT Plaintiff’s

23 remaining Ex Parte Motions (ECF Nos. 3–5). The Court also CERTIFIES that an IFP

24 appeal of this Order would not be taken in good faith pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(3)

25

26

2 Although the Court does not grant Plaintiff leave to amend, dismissal under 28 U.S.C.

27 § 1915(e)(2)(B) “does not prejudice the filing of a paid complaint making the same allegations.” See

Denton, 504 U.S. at 34. This does mean, however, that Plaintiff would bear the burden of paying the $405

28

1 |}and DIRECTS the Clerk of the Court to enter a judgment of dismissal and to close the

2 || case.

3 IT IS SO ORDERED.

4 || Dated: June 30, 2026 ——— 12

5 [aD (re

6 Honorable Todd W. Robinson

4 United States District Judge

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

26

27

28